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chapter 1
Introduction: On Transcultural Memory  
and Reception
Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, Tea Sindbæk Andersen and Astrid Erll
In the autumn of 2012, the sculpture The Black Cone by the Spanish artist 
 Santiago di Sierra was placed in front of the Parliament of Iceland, on Reykjavik’s 
symbolic square Austurvöllur. The Black Cone was intended to  commemorate 
the massive public protests, the so-called ‘pots and pans revolution’ in Iceland 
2008–2009 against the politicians held responsible for the country’s financial 
crash. While the majority of Reykjavik’s city council in 2012 agreed to accept 
the artist’s donation of the monument, council members were divided on the 
issue and it did raise controversies.1 Yet, since 2012 the monument has largely 
vanished from public attention.2 Perhaps its shape – a natural rock with a ridge 
created by a small black cone – allows it to remain unnoticed or casually over-
looked as one of several organic parts of the square. How are we to understand 
this lack of explicit reactions to di Sierra’s monument? Is it rejection, purpose-
ful ignoring, or simply indifference? At the very least we can say that as by 2016, 
no one has taken ownership or re-appropriated the monument as a memorial 
representation for her or his own purposes.3
When in 2012 Christopher Clark published the book The Sleepwalkers. How 
Europe Went to War in 1914 as yet another attempt to analyze the causes of the 
outbreak of the First World War, reactions were numerous. Published strate-
gically at the advent of the war’s centenary by a renowned Cambridge histo-
rian, The Sleepwalkers was reviewed in newspapers and history journals across 
 Europe, sometimes with acclaim and sometimes with lukewarm apprecia-
tion.4 Clark’s account was also included in several scholarly review  articles that 
1 ‘Sierra’s “Black Cone” Causes Controversy in Reykjavik,’ Iceland Review Online, 5 October 
2012, accessed 8 October 2016. http://icelandreview.com/news/2012/10/05/sierras-black 
-cone-causes-controversy-reykjavik.
2 Gunnþórunn Guðmundsdóttir, ‘Memory and Memorialisation in Post-Recession Iceland’ 
(paper presented at the conference Collapse of Memory – Memory of Collapse: Remember-
ing the Past, Re-Constructing the Future in Periods of Crisis, Lund, 20–22 September 2016).
3 Ibid.
4 See for example Ian Pindar, ‘The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark – review,’ The Guard-
ian, 19 July 2013, accessed 8 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jul/19/ 
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traced the arguments proposed in the wave of new history books appearing in 
connection with the centenary of the First World War.5 Moreover, Clark made 
an effort to create attention around his book and held lectures in numerous 
German cities during the summer of 2014. Yet, for academic literature more 
unusually, Clark’s book was also explicitly mentioned in a speech by Serbia’s 
president Tomislav Nikolić two years after its publication, in the summer of 
2014. Clark, according to Nikolić, was the primary source of a revisionism that 
aimed to convince the world that it was Serbs who had caused the Great War. 
Thus, argued Nikolić, ‘the Serb struggle for freedom … is now to be dragged 
through the mud’.6 Though Clark himself had, already in 2013, clearly stated 
that he had ‘of course not wished to blame Serbia for the outbreak of the war’, 
this was clearly how he was interpreted by Nikolić and a number of historians 
and commentators in Serbia.7
Thus, unlike The Black Cone, which seems to have become a silent and un-
engaging medium of commemoration in spite of the importance of the events 
it recalls, Clark’s book caused very explicit reactions, both in the historical 
 debates of several European countries and in the political sphere and com-
memorative activities of Serbia in 2014. As these two examples show, the ef-
fects and afterlives of memorializations and reinterpretations of the past can 
vary to a great extent. Trying to understand how and why individuals and 
communities react towards mediations of memory is a complex challenge. In 
an article published in 2002, Wulf Kansteiner points out that memory stud-
ies have ‘not yet paid enough attention to the problem of reception both in 
sleepwalkers-christopher-clark-review; Sean McMeekin, ‘The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went 
to War in 1914,’ History Today, 62, 12 December 2012, accessed 8 August 2016, http://www.histo 
rytoday.com/blog/2012/11/sleepwalkers-how-europe-went-war-1914.
5 See e.g. Hew Strachan, ‘Review article: The origins of the First World War,’ International Af-
fairs 90, 2 (2014): 429–439; Andrew G. Bonnell, ‘New Histories of the Origins of the First World 
War: What happened to the “Primacy of Domestic Politics”?’ Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 61, 1 (2015): 121–127; William Mulligan, ‘The Trail Continues: New directions in 
the Study of the Origins of the First World War,’ English Historical Review 129, no. 538 (2014): 
639–666.
6 ‘Govor Predesednika Reublike, sanu – Veliki rat, 13.6.2014.’ (Supplied at request from 
the press centre at the office of the President of the Republic of Serbia). See also ‘ Srbija 
ušla u Prvi svetski rat da bi opstala,’ President of the Republic of Serbia, Press centre, 
13 June 2014, accessed 8 August 2016, http://www.predsednik.rs/lat/pres-centar/vesti/
srbija-usla-u-prvi-svetski-rat-da-bi-opstala.
7 ‘Srbi su 1914, bili sami – Evropljani,’ Deutsche Welle, 11 November 2013, accessed 8 August 2016, 
http://www.dw.com/sr/srbi-su-1914-bili-samo-evropljani/a-17215852. See also the chapter by 
Dedovic and Sindbæk Andersen in this volume.
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terms of  methods and sources’.8 Since then, the field of memory studies has 
developed in many important directions, but it is the contention of the editors 
and authors of this volume that we still struggle with the questions of how to 
understand and study the reception of memories.9 The aim of this book is to 
move forward the scholarly discussion of these questions while paying special 
attention to the transcultural and transnational dimensions of memory trans-
mission and reception across Europe.
As no mediation of memory can have an impact on memory culture if it 
is not ‘received’ – seen, heard, used, appropriated, made sense of, taken as an 
 inspiration – by a group of people, reception is indeed one of the key issues 
within memory studies. Collective memory is an ongoing process of mediation; 
it is produced by the continuous internalization and externalization of mem-
ory contents and memory forms within social groups. Whatever  narratives or 
images about the past are externalized (via ‘media’ as diverse as facial expres-
sions, orality, performance, sculpture, texts, television or the internet), they 
can only become a meaningful part of collective memory once they are also 
internalized, i.e. received by audiences, readers, listeners, users or consumers.10
Reception is a central concern of the new transcultural memory studies. If 
we assume that all memory ‘travels’ (Erll), is constantly ‘on the move’ (Rigney), 
then it clearly must move somewhere, towards a (however transitory) destina-
tion. Successful memory transmission entails reception. Transcultural memo-
ry research deals with acts of reception which are located beyond commonly 
assumed boundaries (national, ethnic, linguistic, religious ones, for example). 
For transcultural memory to actually come into existence, deterritorialized 
transmission must be followed by localizing reception. It does not come as 
a surprise, therefore, that key concepts of transcultural memory studies rely, 
more or less markedly, on the idea of memory reception: Levy and Sznaider’s 
‘cosmopolitan memory’ is an effect of (productive) appropriations of the 
8 Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective 
memory studies,’ History and Theory 41 (2002): 180.
9 One indication of this is the fact that the otherwise timely collection Research Methods 
for Memory Studies (2013) does not feature a chapter on reception. A sustained discus-
sion of reception from the angle of television studies is, however, provided by Ann Gray 
(‘Televised remembering’, in: Emily Keightley & Michael Pickering, eds. Research Methods 
for Memory Studies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh up 2013, 79–96).
10 On the mediation of memory and mediated memories see Astrid Erll and Ann  Rigney, 
eds., Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory (Berlin/New York: 
de Gruyter, 2009); José van Dijck, Mediated Memories in the Digital Age (Stanford, 
ca:  Stanford University Press, 2007); Joanne Garde-Hansen, Media and Memory (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).
Törnquist-Plewa, Sindbæk Andersen and Erll 4
300845
 globally circulating Holocaust-schema.11 Michael Rothberg’s ‘multidirectional 
memory’ is based on the reception and recombination of different memo-
ries.12 Alison Landsberg’s ‘prosthetic memory’ explicitly deals with memory 
reception and describes it graphically as the ‘taking on’ of a mediated ‘memory 
limb’. Landsberg highlights the role of empathy as an important prerequisite of 
memory reception, and of solidarity as one of its potential effects.13 Studies of 
transgenerational transmission, too, rely on the idea that younger people ‘re-
ceive’ memory messages transmitted by an older generation, however implic-
itly. Seen in this way, Marianne Hirsch’s ‘postmemory’ is first of all an effect of 
memory reception.14 But however fundamental the idea of reception may be 
to memory studies’ current key concepts, the question of how to observe and 
analyse concrete acts of reception remains the major conundrum of the field.
How can memory studies address reception? One important caveat that has 
already been voiced by Kansteiner is that memory scholars should not con-
flate individual reception with receptions that are collectively relevant, i.e. 
that shape or change the collective memories of a group.15 It would be a ‘recep-
tional fallacy’ to study reactions and memory negotiations among individuals 
or aggregations of individuals (for example, a group of viewers’ reactions to a 
film) and to draw from there conclusions about collective memories. It there-
fore seems important to distinguish between different dimensions and scales 
of reception: As Halbwachs has already emphasized, individual memories are 
always shaped by social contexts.16 Jeffrey Olick therefore describes individual 
memories as “collected memories”.17 Collected memories are rooted in biologi-
cal and psychic processes. They need to be differentiated from the dimension 
of “collective memory” in the narrower sense: the media, social practices and 
institutions that enable people to share memories, that often substantiate the 
11 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age 
( Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).
12 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of De-
colonization (Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press, 2009).
13 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in 
the Age of Mass Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
14 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Ho-
locaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
15 Kansteiner, Finding meaning in memory.
16 Maurice Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, edited by Gérard Namer (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1994 [1925]).
17 Jeffrey K. Olick, ‘Collective Memory. The Two Cultures,’ Sociological Theory 17, 3 
(1999): 333–348.
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identity of a given group and that are anchored in the group’s cultural life.18 
Only the ongoing interaction of both, individual and socio-medial dimensions 
of memory can generate what Maurice Halbwachs termed la mémoire collec-
tive. Furthermore, as De Cesari and Rigney (2014) have argued, there are differ-
ent ‘scales’ of memory, such as the intimate, the familial, the local, the urban, 
the regional, the national, the transnational and the global. These are also the 
‘scales of reception’. Of course, each scholar who studies the reception of mem-
ory mediations will – depending on disciplinary background, methodological 
inventory and research questions – lay emphasis on specific dimensions and 
scales. However, as the dynamics of memory consists in the continuous move-
ment of contents and forms between such levels, reception research will profit 
greatly from multi-level analyses.
Such complex research designs are of particular relevance for studies 
that aim to provide (mnemo)historical insights into how changes in cultural 
systems of representation take place. For example, a powerful mediation of 
memory by an individual can influence a large group of people, and in turn, 
when local groups repeatedly commemorate a specific event, they may change 
collective memory on a national or even transnational scale. Illustrations of 
such cases can be found in this book in the chapters written by Heimo and de 
Kerangat, respectively.
The crucial question is what we mean when we speak about reception in 
the context of memory studies. Since cultural memories are part of human 
communication we can try to answer this question by going back to commu-
nication theory. According to the original mathematical models of communi-
cation, ‘reception’ means the decoding of a message. Early models of media 
communication, such as that by Shannon and Weaver,19 featured a sender, a 
message, a channel and a receiver (all aligned in the process from encoding to 
decoding). These ideas inspired linguists and literary scholars such as Roman 
Jakobson, who used it as a starting point to develop a sophisticated and com-
plex model of ‘communicative act’20 which is shaping ideas about reception 
to this day, In this model there is no room for a simplistic conception of an 
unambiguous message encoded in, say, a history film, that is to be effortlessly 
decoded by its audience. Furthermore, in the wake of cultural studies, scholars 
18 See also Barbara Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (London: Open University press, 
2003), 25.
19 Claude Elwood Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communica-
tion (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949).
20 Roman Jakobson, ‘Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics,’ Style In Language edited 
by Thomas A. Sebeok, (Cambridge Massachusetts: mit Press 1960): 350–377.
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such as Stuart Hall have emphasized that reception is an active process, which 
can produce diverse ‘readings’ or ‘appropriations’ of the same message.21 The 
insights of cultural and media studies also reveal that it is impossible to iso-
late reception from other constitutive elements of the communicative act such 
as the message (memory representation, its content and form), the medium 
(the channel of transmission), the sender (agents/producers of memory) and 
the social contexts in which mediation and reception take place. All these ele-
ments of an act of communication are interlocked. Therefore, although on a 
theoretical level one can speak about reception as a specific element of the 
communicative act, in the empirical studies and on the methodological level it 
seems impossible (and arguably not desirable) to isolate it from the other com-
ponents of memory communication. Moreover, in memory culture the cycle of 
production, representation and reception becomes a perpetual spiral. Recep-
tion is not the final destination of the memory process, but can lead to further 
(individual and collective) productions, such as private ones (for example, the 
retelling of family narratives between generations22), semi-public ones (for ex-
ample, the sharing of photos on social media platforms) or official ones (the 
erection of a monument as a reaction to multiply mediated memories of a 
specific past event or figure).
A too strong distinction between representation and reception in memory 
studies is therefore misleading.23 Many representations of memory emerge in 
response to earlier mediations of certain contents, and sometimes they may 
even be understood as explicit re-mediations. Thus, the analysis of a specific 
memory representation will often turn out to be simultaneously a study of 
the reception of an older memory by the producers of this new representa-
tion. An example of this can be found in this book in the chapter written by 
Majsova. She analyzes two films and examines them as acts of reception, be-
cause the filmmakers reinterpret, in these films, an already existing narrative 
dominant in their culture. Thus the filmmakers can be seen as both memory 
receivers (or ‘consumers’) of a specific memory narrative embedded in their 
culture, and as memory producers, since they reinterpret earlier narratives 
and  remediate them.
21 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding/Decoding,’ in Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies, 1972–79, ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (London: 
Hutchinson, 1980), 128–138.
22 Harald Welzer, ‘Re-Narrations: How Pasts Change in Conversational Remembering,’ Mem-
ory Studies 3, 1 (2010): 5–17.
23 Cf. Kansteiner’s 2002 criticism that memory studies privileges representation over recep-
tion (Kansteiner, Finding meaning in memory.).
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Remediations are acts of reception. The individuals involved in the process-
es of remediation are ‘prosumers’ (both producers and consumers).24 This is 
especially evident in literature and the visual media, but also in the remedia-
tion of memories via so called new digital media. The chapter by Neijmann 
and Gudmundsdottir, as well as the chapter by Heimo in this book, deal with 
reception-as-remediation. In the words of Erll and Rigney, ‘remediation is con-
cerned with the ways in which the same story is recalled in new media at a 
later point in time and hence given a new lease of cultural life’.25 Thus, studies 
of the reception of memories include studies of remediation and the circula-
tion of memories. The remediation of a specific memory narrative can be stud-
ied as a form of reception on the individual level, but at the same time, if such 
remediations are recurrent, they are also evidence for the reverberation of this 
specific memory in the cultural sphere.
In light of the issues raised so far, it seems that there are two fundamen-
tal approaches to an understanding of ‘reception’ in memory studies: The first 
concerns the reception of mediated memory in the minds of individuals. The 
second refers to mediated reception: remediation. Of course, both dimen-
sions (reception in mind and media) are interlinked. Mental reception is the 
starting point for remediation. It is thus possible to study (mental) reception 
via (medial) production. Conversely, for remediations to become collectively 
relevant memory receptions, they need to be actualized in individual minds. 
However, with units of analysis so far apart – mental operations in the first 
case, media representations in the second – methodologies will vary greatly: 
The study of representations, and filiations of representations, summed up 
under the umbrella term of ‘remediation’, has a long tradition in research on 
influence, intertextuality, and adaptation, in ‘classical reception studies’, and 
last but not least in Aby Warburg’s work on the afterlives of symbols.26 To ac-
cess the reception of mediated memory in individual minds, memory studies 
can draw on social sciences’ methodologies of qualitative interviewing, oral 
history and ethnographic approaches, on television studies’ audience research 
and cultivation theory, or on literary studies’ reception aesthetics and reader 
24 Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading, eds., Save as … digital memo-
ries (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2009):129.
25 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, ‘Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics,’ in Media-
tion, Remediation and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, edited by Astrid Erll and Ann 
Rigney (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2009), 8.
26 Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation (New York: Routledge, 2012); Charles Martindale 
and Richard F. Thomas, eds., Classics and the Uses of Reception (Malden, ma: Blackwell, 
2006); Aby Warburg, Der Bilderatlas Mnemosyne, edited by Martin Warnke and Claudia 
Brink (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2000).
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response theory.27 The social contexts of individual reception are studied by 
social psychology, which helps us to understand how a ‘socially shared reality’ 
is produced, for example by discursive remembering.28
Memory studies’ insights into the dynamics of reception hinge on the in-
volved disciplines bringing their methodologies to the field. To give just a few 
examples: Where memory research has teamed-up with social network analy-
sis, it has enabled us to look at transnational networks of commemoration and 
to conduct ‘influence mapping’.29 Studies located at the intersection of mu-
seum studies and memory studies have developed complex approaches to the 
‘mediation of memory’, which pay attention to the visitors’ experience of and 
engagement with the museum.30 Visitor studies increasingly work with ‘eye 
tracking’ methods to follow museum goers’ individual attention to texts, im-
ages and objects.31 From literary and media studies perspectives, the reception 
of films such as Hotel Rwanda or The Downfall has been shown to be deeply 
influenced by individual viewers’ backgrounds.32 On a collective level, the sta-
tus and meaning of a ‘memory film’ seems to be negotiated ‘outside’ the film’s 
symbolic structure, within ‘plurimedial constellations’.33 The narratology of 
27 Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, eds., The Oral History Reader (London: Routledge, 
1998); James Shanahan and Michael Morgan, Television and Its Viewers: Cultivation 
Research and Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wolfgang Iser, 
The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett 
( Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978); Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in This 
Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1980).
28 Charles B. Stone and Lucas M. Bietti, eds., Contextualizing Human Memory: An Inter-
disciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past 
( London: Routlegde, 2016).
29 Jenny Wüstenberg. ‘Vernetztes Gedenken? Netzwerkmethoden und Transnationale Erin-
nerungsforschung’ Jahrbuch für Politik und Geschichte 6 (2016): 97–113.
30 Silke Arnold-de Simine, Mediating Memory in the Museum: Trauma, Empathy, Nostalgia 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Irit Dekel, Mediation at the Holo-
caust Memorial in Berlin (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
31 Silivia Filippini Fantoni, Kyle Jaebker, Daniela Bauer and Kathryn Stofer, ‘Capturing Visi-
tors’ Gazes: Three Eye Tracking Studies in Museums.’ In Museums and the Web 2013, edited 
by N. Proctor & R. Cherry (Silver Spring, md: Museums and the Web. Published 31 Janu-
ary 2013), accessed 16 December 2016, http://mw2013.museumsandtheweb.com/paper/
capturing-visitors-gazes-three-eye-tracking-studies-in-museums/.
32 Christian Gudehus, Stewart Anderson and David Keller, ‘Understanding Hotel Rwanda: a 
Reception Study,’ Memory Studies 3, 4 (2010): 344–363.
33 Astrid Erll and Stephanie Wodianka, eds., Film und kulturelle Erinnerung: Plurimediale 
Konstellationen (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2008).
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cultural memory has shown that narratives about the past often display a ‘rhet-
oric of collective memory’ with a specific ‘mnemonic potential’ that may be 
actualized by (and thus have actual effect on) individual readers and viewers.34
Receptions are never stable, once-and-for-all understandings of collective 
memory. They will be shaped and reshaped across time by frameworks of dis-
cursive and otherwise mediated remembering, for example, by discussions 
among family and friends, by social media, and newsmedia. But are repeated, 
particular representations of the past in the public arena and their  assimiliation 
into dominant discourses a sufficient indicator for their impact on collective 
memory in a society? The case analyzed in the chapter written by Kapralski 
in this book speaks against such a claim. Kapralski argues that despite a large 
amount of new memory narratives about Polish-Jewish relations during the 
Holocaust which have been repeatedly remediated in Polish culture during the 
last fifteen years or so, the Polish collective memory of the Holocaust has not 
changed tangibly, at least as evidenced by opinion polls. This case points to 
a difficult question about the relation between knowledge and memory. We 
may make a distinction between knowledge about and memory of something. 
‘To know something’ is not the same as to internalize something to the point 
that it is important to one’s identity, attitudes and behaviour. This distinction 
makes studies of reception particularly difficult and emphasizes the need to 
study also emotional aspects of reception, an attempt of which is made in the 
chapter by Pavlakovic and Perak in this volume.
How can we address this complex process of meaning-making involved in 
reception? How are we to answer the question put at the beginning of this 
introduction describing the cases of The Black Cone and The Sleepwalkers, i.e., 
why do some mediated (and remediated) memories take root in collective 
memory while others fail?
In order to come closer to responding to these issues, Kansteiner suggests 
that we pay particular attention to three factors: ‘… the intellectual and cultur-
al traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory mak-
ers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory 
consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artefacts according to their own 
interest’.35 This analytical model can serve as a good starting point for the anal-
ysis of reception, but it has to be substantially developed in order to catch the 
complexity of the reception processes. First and foremost, representation as 
34 Astrid Erll, ‘Literature, Film and the Mediality of Cultural Memory,’ in A Companion to 
Cultural Memory Studies, edited by Astrid Erll & Ansgar Nünning, 389–398. (Berlin/New 
York: de Gruyter, 2010).
35 Kansteiner, Finding meaning in memory, 180.
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such disappears in this model and should be re-introduced into it. The content 
of the mediated story about the past, as well as its forms (including genre, plot 
structure, and narrative voice) and the medium used, play a role in the pro-
cess of reception. An inquiry into why some stories succeed and others do not 
would have to consider ‘the medial framework of remembering and the spe-
cifically medial process through which memories come into the public arena 
and become collective’.36 Media have their different kinds of logic and both 
media producers and consumers exploit the possibilities and are restricted by 
the limitations of their chosen media. For example, it matters for the reception 
of a certain story about the past if the medium used is seen as reliable (such 
as scholarly historiography), stands for immediacy of experience (such as live 
news) or if the mediated text or image is seen as authentic (such as seemingly 
‘indexical’ press photography and documentary film).
Furthermore, when analysing reception it is important to pay attention to 
the importance of what Erll calls ‘premediation’ – cognitive schemata and pat-
terns of representation that are available in a given media culture. They are 
 ‘patterns and structures of knowledge on the basis of which we make assump-
tions regarding specific objects, people, situations and the relation between 
them’.37 By reducing the complexity of reality, they influence our perception of 
what we remember. We acquire cognitive schemata through socialization in the 
cultural environments we are raised in and where we encounter repertoires of 
medial representations of the past.38 These culturally  inherited and mediated 
schemata and templates influence the memory producers and the representa-
tions of the past they create. They also influence memory  consumers (or  rather 
prosumers), whose reception is shaped by their own cultural  schemata.39 
 Sindbæk Andersen and Dedovic’s chapter in this volume investigates how 
strongly premediation may shape political responses to  representations of the 
36 Erll and Rigney, ‘Introduction’, 2.
37 Astrid Erll ‘From “Distric Six” to District 9 and Back: The Plurimedial Production of Trav-
elling Schemata,’ in Transnational Memory. Circulation, Articulation, Scales, edited by 
 Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney, (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2014), 31. See also James 
V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).
38 On the culture-specifity of narrative schemata, see the seminal study by F.C. Bartlett, Re-
membering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1932).
39 Ignacio Brescó de Luna and Alberto Rosa Rivero, ‘Memory, History and Narrative: Shifts of 
Meaning when (Re)constructing the Past,’ Europe’s Journal of Psychology 8, 2 (May 2012): 
300–310.
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past. And Farbøl shows how the mediation of memories of one significant past 
may premediate the memorial framework of an altogether different past.
The cultural templates and schemata, many of them embodied, some even 
unconscious and often not explicitly articulated,40 create cultural  constraints 
for memory production and reception and shape cultural frames of memory 
dynamics. This cultural ‘programming’ may help us understand why some 
memories evoke strong emotions and others not. As pointed out by Sara 
Ahmed, what is ‘sticky’ in terms of emotions and affect differs to a large  extent 
from one culture to another.41 It may be justified to assume that memory repre-
sentations that reverberate with specific cognitive schemata and affective pat-
terns of reaction embedded in the culture of receivers/consumers, may have 
greater chance to take effect in their cultural memory. Consequently one may 
claim that ‘the intellectual traditions’, mentioned by Kansteiner are important 
but not enough to consider in the studies of reception. Cultural frames for 
memory reception include many more elements that have to be accounted for 
and they matter as much to memory makers as to memory consumers.
In his model Kansteiner rightly mentions the necessity to scrutinize the in-
terests and needs of the main players in the memory field: memory makers 
and consumers. Such a functionalist perspective is necessary to understand 
the importance attached to certain memories. For what purposes are memo-
ries used? What kind of needs, and whose needs, can be met by the mediation 
of certain stories and interpretations of the past? Furthermore, it is vital for 
the study of reception to properly identify who the memory agents actually 
are. It makes a difference whether they possess cultural capital in terms of au-
thority and trust in the eyes of the memory ‘prosumers’. It makes a difference, 
too, whether the memory agents manage to identify the needs and interests of 
their audience and shape their narratives accordingly.
Last but not least the entire social context in which reception of the medi-
ated narratives of the past takes place has to be considered, with special atten-
tion to power relations. Do the agents of memory and ‘prosumers’ have access 
to structural resources (such as institutions), the financial means, and power 
enough to direct public attention to particular memory narratives and estab-
lish them as part of the cultural canon? These kinds of questions have to be 
approached, because the world of memory is a world of political economy. 
Political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and to some extent historians 
40 For more about the embodied memories see for example Paul Connerton, How Societies 
Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
41 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 
2004).
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are usually interested and methodologically well equipped to study these as-
pects. In this volume the reader will find many examples of studies focusing 
on such issues, especially in the chapters by Góra and Mach, Jones, Kapralski, 
Melchior and Farbøl.
It is the contention of the editors and authors of this book that in the stud-
ies of reception we should ideally pay attention to all elements involved in 
the process of memory as a communicative act and the interplay between 
them, avoiding an exclusive focus on memory consumers as a distinct unit. 
Moreover, reception in itself is a dynamic, ongoing process, one difficult to 
capture. A number of researchers within communication studies struggle with 
this problem when they want to investigate the impact of certain products 
(such as films, books etc.) on the audience. It may feel like chasing a moving 
target. A researcher can take a snap-shot of reception at a certain moment. 
By doing questionnaires and interviewing people before and after the act of 
 consumption of the memorial story (viewing or reading) they can draw some 
conclusions about reception.42 However, this method catches the reception at 
a certain moment of time, gives a snap-shot of audience reactions, but these 
can change rather quickly in a changed social constellation and in a new con-
text. Thus, long-term effects of memory mediation remain a difficult question. 
But memory scholars are particularly interested in this aspect: What ‘stays’? 
What becomes absorbed in people’s imagination?
To approach the last questions we need longitudinal studies, a diachronic 
perspective and a historical approach to the material. There are many cases 
of mediated stories about the past that fail to attract public attention at a cer-
tain moment but, remediated at a later point in time in a new social and me-
dial context, they become highly visible in the public arena and sometimes 
even part of official memory.43 The last process requires, however, repetitions 
of the story over a longer time span and reiterations across different cultural 
and social platforms in the public arena, such as commemorative speeches 
42 See for example the study by Jürgen Grimm, ‘How do films contribute to shaping 
teenagers’ identity’ (Paper presented at the conference Mapping Memories, Kijev 2 
 October 2016). See also link http://www.br-online.de/jugend/izi/english/publication/
televizion/29_2016_E/Grimm-How_do_films_contribute_to_shaping_teenagers_identity 
.pdf (accessed 20 October 2016).
43 See, for example Kansteiner on the reception of the tv-miniseries Holocaust (1978) in 
Germany: Wulf Kansteiner, In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics 
After Auschwitz (Athens, oh: Ohio University Press, 2006) or Bilj on the (re)emergence 
of photographs of colonial atrocity in the Netherlands: Paul Bijl, Emerging Memory: Pho-
tographs of Colonial Atrocity in Dutch Cultural Remembrance (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2015).
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and rituals, books (including school books), images and the Internet. In this 
way the memory narrative can be anchored in the imagination of a commu-
nity and tied to its identity. It can become part of the ‘canon’, or at least of the 
‘archive’, to use Aleida Assmann’s distinction. The first ‘stands for the active 
working memory of a society that defines and supports the cultural identity of 
a group’.44 The second is the passive realm of cultural memory, a kind of ‘store 
house’ of the mnemonic representations that can be taken into use when there 
is need for them. The ongoing movements between the two, the ‘mutual influx 
and reshuffling’,45 contribute to the dynamics of memory and can make it dif-
ficult to judge as to what is ‘failure’ and ‘success’ in the process of reception of 
a certain memory narrative. Can we speak about a ‘successful’ reception of a 
memory if it takes root in the culture of a community and becomes a part of 
‘the archive’, or is ‘success’ equal to becoming a part of a ‘canon’? However, 
even if a memory succeeds in establishing itself as part of the ‘canon’ this does 
not necessarily mean that it is supported by a widespread consensus within 
the community. Despite common knowledge of a certain mnemonic narrative 
and despite its dominance in the public arena, individuals, even en masse, can 
refuse to internalize it emotionally, receiving it as a knowledge about but not a 
memory of a particular version of the past. As mentioned earlier, the cognitive 
knowledge of the past does not need to be followed by its emotional or identity-
related perception. This discrepancy is especially common in the processes of 
reception of the so-called ‘difficult’, traumatic past. The chapter by Kapralski in 
this book illustrates this dilemma. He summarizes it in the statement that the 
Holocaust can be commemorated but not remembered.46 Is this evidence of 
failed reception? Farbøl demonstrates in her chapter how a certain past, that 
of the Cold War, can be represented in museums with numerous visitors, but 
apparently without a surrounding memory culture and without much reaction 
from the audience. Another contributor to this volume, de Kerangat, compli-
cates further our view on reception by pointing to the fact that we should be 
careful to interpret silence around a certain memory as a sign of indifference 
and thus ‘a failure’ in the process of memory reception. She demonstrates with 
the case of post-Franco Spain that silence can be a form of reception.
44 Aleida Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive,’ in Cultural Memory Studies. An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook, edited by Astrid Erll and Angar Nunning (Berlin/New York: de 
Gruyter, 2008), 106.
45 Ibid.
46 An example of previous research that paid attention to this problem is the seminal study 
‘Opa war kein Nazi’: Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis by Harald 
Welzer, Sabine Moller and Karoline Tschugnall (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2008).
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In sum, this volume shows that the processes of memory reception are 
 extremely complex and dynamic. Studying them may involve tracing chains 
of reactions, mediations and re-mediations, circulations and re-circulations, 
re-appropriations and rejections. It includes investigating already existing 
memory patterns, understanding the specific dynamics of genres and fields 
of discourse, and trying to grasp political needs and the cultural logic of the 
present. Studies of reception in all these aspects require a variety of methods. 
Through a selection of chapters that analyze cases of transcultural transmis-
sion and reception of European memories of the twentieth century, we hope to 
demonstrate both the variety of questions about reception that exists, under-
stood as entangled in all parts of the mnemonic communicative act, and the 
diversity of ways in which to investigate them.
The authors of the chapters in this volume apply a variety of methods in 
their analyses of reception. These are, among others, interviews, participant 
observation, opinion polls, surveys and questionnaires, close reading of spe-
cific images, films and other media text, netnography, discourse analysis of 
speeches and debates, as well social network analyses. Moreover, they con-
tribute to a deeper understanding of reception from the perspective of their 
respective disciplines: anthropology and ethnology, cultural studies, history, 
sociology, literary studies, cognitive linguistics and political science.
The examples of The Black Cone and The Sleepwalkers, mentioned at the 
beginning of this introduction, point to the fact that Europe’s twentieth cen-
tury memories are inherently transcultural and, with the rise of digital com-
munication and the radically intensified mobility of people across the national 
borders, increasingly so. Memory representations in Europe and in the world 
travel across borders: cultural, national, and linguistic ones, but also between 
media and genres, as well as domains of society, such as politics, popular cul-
ture, history, the arts, mass media and education. The Internet and modern 
mass culture have made the distribution and sharing of memory content faster 
and easier.47 This also allows people to engage emotionally with memories that 
they are not obviously connected with through personal, familial, ethnical or 
national ties.48 People can become part of new memory communities, subcul-
tural, cosmopolitan or activist groups, and to (differently) imagined memory 
47 Andrew Hoskins, ‘Digital Network Memory,’ in Mediation, Remediation and the Dynam-
ic of Cultural Memory, edited by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 
91–106.
48 Stef Craps and Michael Rothberg, ‘Introduction: Transcultural Negotiations of Holocaust 
Memory,’ Criticism 53, 4 (2011): 517.
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communities, such as European communities or global ones.49 Due to the mul-
tifaceted nature of our identities our individual memory is located at the inter-
section of multiple social frameworks and thus it is inherently transcultural. 
The same can be argued about cultural memories since no culture is a closed 
container and the entanglement of cultures and their interaction is taken for 
granted in today’s society. Moreover, cultures are always internally heteroge-
neous, to a larger or lesser extent.50
These basic insights, however, have not been at the centre of attention of 
memory studies as they (re-)emerged in the 1980s, when ‘cultural’ or ‘collec-
tive memory’ was usually imagined as the mnemonic property of bounded 
cultures – the memory of a nation, an ethnic group, a religious community, a 
social class etc. In the age of Pierre Nora’s lieux de mémoire, ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (U. Beck) was only the most visible aspect of the larger tendency 
towards ‘methodological culturalism’. This tendency to see cultures as contain-
ers affected a reification of the bonds between culture and memory. However, 
some researchers, including Erll, Rigney and Rothberg have recently pointed 
to the need to direct attention to the inherent transculturality of memory. This 
volume contributes to this new direction in memory studies by scrutinizing 
one specific arena of transcultural memory practice – Europe – and by focus-
sing on reception as a major force of the transcultural memory process.
By focusing on the transculturality of memory, the editors and authors of 
this book take into account that memory cultures, like cultures in general, 
are no homogenous unified entities but rather ‘more porous than previous-
ly acknowledged’.51 Memory communities increasingly cross traditional (or 
traditionally perceived) cultural borders and are, like most modern cultural 
communities, characterized by internal differentiation and external intercon-
nectedness.52 The concept of transculturality encompasses – and cuts trans-
versally across – the international, the national and the local, the universalistic 
and the particularistic. As suggested by Astrid Erll, the term ‘transcultural’ can 
49 For discussion about possibilities of global communities of memory see Aleida Assmann 
and Sebastian Conrad, eds., Memory in a Global Age. Discourses, Practices and Trajectories 
(New York: Palgrave, 2010).
50 See Wolfgang Welsch: ‘Transculturality – the puzzling form of Cultures Today,’ in Spaces 
of Culture: City, Nation, World, edited by Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 
1999), 194–213.
51 Lucy Bond and Jessica Rapson, ‘Introduction,’ in The Transcultural Turn. Interrogating 
Memory between and beyond borders, edited by Lucy Bond and Jessica Rapson (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2014), 19.
52 Wolfgang Welsch, ‘Transculturality – the puzzling form of cultures today’.
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be used as ‘an umbrella term for what in other academic contexts might be 
described with concepts of the transnational, diasporic, hybrid, syncretistic, 
postcolonial, translocal, creolized, global or cosmopolitan’.53 As the prefix of 
‘trans’ indicates, we are looking at movements from one or more of the porous 
European memory communities to others, and, by focusing on reception, we 
are exploring the dialogues between them. What happens when memories are 
shared across alleged cultural borders? How are they negotiated, transformed, 
appropriated or rejected?
Transcultural memory according to Erll can be conceived ‘as the incessant 
wandering of carriers, media, contents, forms and practices of memory, their 
continual “travels” and ongoing transformations through time and space, across 
social, linguistic and political borders’.54 The chapters of this book show the 
‘travelling’ of memory and what happens in this process. Jones, Melchior, Góra 
and Mach demonstrate in their chapters how individuals such as migrants, 
politicians and activists of different organizations try to disseminate, outside 
their countries, the mnemonic narratives (‘contents’) of their national com-
munities, seeking recognition for them among people of other nationalities in 
Europe. Jones points especially to how forms and practices of remembrance 
are shared among people from the organizations that work with politics of 
memory. She indicates directions of diffusion and mutual influence. The ‘trav-
elling’ practices are also in the focus of the chapter by de Kerangat, who points 
to a transnational reception of the discourses promoting and implementing 
silence about the violent past. She also emphasizes the transcultural and trans-
national character of the practice of exhumation of the victims of mass vio-
lence as a way of remembering. Farbøl shows how memories of a past shared 
by an international community is translated into a decidedly quiet national 
narrative, whereas Sindbæk Andersen and Dedovic demonstrate how national 
memory politics may take the shape of a reaction to or even rejection of ten-
dencies within international history debates. Other authors put greater focus 
on the travel of the specific memory contents and media across space, time 
and cultures (Neijmann and Gudmundsdottir, Heimo, Majsova,  Kapralski, 
 Pavlakovic and Perak). Pavlakovic and Perak also direct our attention to the 
important, but much less researched, intersubjective aspect of memory trans-
mission and reception.
The chapters of the book are divided into two general sections. While all 
chapters study transcultural transmission and reception of memory, the 
chapters in the first section concentrate on the roles of memory actors and 
53 Astrid Erll, ‘Travelling Memory’ Parallax 17, 4 (2011): 9.
54 Ibid.11.
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 entrepreneurs, as well as different social and political practices in transcultural 
transmission and reception of memory.
The role of memory entrepreneurs and institutions in transnational shar-
ing of memory narratives and in the processes of transmission, reception and 
redistribution is explored in the first chapter by Sara Jones. Using social net-
work analysis to investigate networks of memory entrepreneurs, Jones charts 
the involvement of institutions, and the connections through which narra-
tives of memory and ways of remembering are transmitted and shared within 
such networks. Turning our focus towards the role of memory agents, Jones 
introduces the concept of ‘collaborative memory’ in order to emphasize how 
 networks of institutions and entrepreneurs work together across borders when 
constructing narratives of memory, and to explore how such narratives are re-
ceived and put to use in different places.
Political mediation and use of memory in a European political arena, as well 
as political reception of memory politicization is the topic of the chapter by 
Zdzisław Mach and Magdalena Góra, who explore how Polish politicians in the 
European Parliament have demanded recognition for Polish, and more gener-
ally Central European, memories of the twentieth century. Analyzing debates 
from the European Parliament since 2004, Mach and Góra show how the Pol-
ish concerns, though partly based on domestic memory debates and divisions 
within Polish politics, were received largely favourably on a principal level, and 
requests to recognize memories of totalitarian communism were widely sup-
ported by Parliamentarians. Yet, as the chapter shows, attempts to use these 
memories in requests for economic concessions have been less successful.
Political agency in the form of reception and contestation of a particular in-
terpretation of the past is studied in the third chapter by Tea Sindbæk  Andersen 
and Ismar Dedovic. Looking at the Serbian president’s reception of a historical 
study that reinterprets the much-discussed question of the causes of and path 
to the outbreak of the First World War, Sindbæk Andersen and Dedovic argues 
that this kind of reception reflects both a need to defend an essential part of 
Serbian national memory and a significant and somehow politically obliging 
premediation in the form of a tradition to reject Serbian responsibility for the 
outbreak of the Great War.
Zoé de Kerangat’s chapter on exhumations of victims of Francoism by their 
friends and relatives investigates an example of contestation and rejection 
of memory politics from the side of unofficial and very local memory agents. 
De Kerangat shows how small memory communities have reacted to official 
memory politics through informal practices of contestation. Indeed, the ex-
humations constitute both a belated reaction to and commemoration of the 
crimes and a form of reception – and rejection – of official memory politics 
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after the fall of the Franco regime. De Kerangat demonstrates how very local 
and unofficial memory entrepreneurs defy the memory politics of the state 
by quietly creating alternative sites and rituals of memory, thereby affirming 
alternative memory narratives.
The individual as memory agent, both with regard to remediation and 
reception, is the topic of Inge Melchior’s chapter on Estonian migrants in 
the Netherlands. Through interviews and participant observation, Melchior 
 explores how Estonians perceive themselves as carriers of national memory 
narratives that are not quite compatible with the mainstream memory frame-
work in their new country of residence. Melchior shows how individuals feel 
both challenged and obliged to defend their position, but also that attitudes 
from both Estonians and long-time citizens of the Netherlands are  dynamic 
and influenced by, for example, changing attitudes towards Russia in the 
Netherlands
The chapters in the second section focus on the functions of contents and 
media in the processes of transcultural transmission and reception of memory.
The way that politically contested memory is being mediated in a way that 
somehow minimizes contestation is studied in the section’s first chapter, in 
which Rosanna Farbøl explores how the disputed memory of the Cold War 
in Denmark is being presented at several new or newly refurbished Cold 
War museums. Farbøl emphasizes how the museum mediation is largely 
framed as a re-appropriation of the internationally established Second World 
War memory framework, though with a strong element of the counterfactual, 
which allows for a degree of playfulness. Whereas the Cold War museums can 
certainly be understood as a reception and remediation of a Danish political 
Cold War discourse, Farbøl points out a surprising absence of reactions to the 
museums, in spite of their potentially controversial context.
Slawomir Kapralski’s study of Holocaust memory in Poland questions the 
relationship between knowledge in the form of public presence of memory 
and its reception. Kapralski draws on a number of public opinion surveys 
to demonstrate developments in the understanding of and attitude towards 
the Holocaust in Poland. Based on these results, Kapralski argues that the 
 Holocaust has indeed been commemorated publicly and officially in Poland 
since the fall of communism, but it has not become part of the individual re-
membering within members of the Polish population. Though formally pres-
ent in a general Polish memoryscape, the Holocaust has not been received and 
included into individual and emotionally engaged memory.
The chapter by Natalija Majsova looks at the relationship between  memory 
and cinematic aesthetics. Majsova shows how cinematic representations 
of memory narratives constitute a reception and remediation of society’s 
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 established memory narratives. Investigating both the narrative representa-
tion and the formal aesthetics, Majsova demonstrates how post-Soviet films 
of the dawn of the space age challenge dominant memory narratives. Yet, by 
contrasting these readings with review examples of the films’ reception by 
lay viewers, Majsova points out that reception is certainly diverse, as the con-
testing and challenging meanings are not necessarily readable or relevant to 
viewers.
The role of literary memory mediation and long-term reception of literary 
memory is studied in Daisy Neijmann and Gunthorun Gudmundsdottir’s chap-
ter on the reception and afterlife of the memoirs of an Icelandic fighter with 
the International Brigades in the Spanish civil war. Neijmann and  Gunthorun 
Gudmundsdottir demonstrate how literary mediations of memory may remain 
in the shadow of public memory, only to return to public prominence through 
another literary remediation. Indeed, as Neijmann and Gudmundsdottir show, 
the literary reception and remediation may provide memory narratives that 
are otherwise absent from public memory and memorialization.
The internet as a site of transcultural memory, remediation and reception 
is the topic of Anne Heimo’s chapter on online commemoration of the 1913 
Italian hall tragedy, in which 73 people were killed at a Christmas celebration 
in Michigan. Heimo shows how narratives of the tragedy are being shared by 
individuals within online communities and openly accessible on the web. 
Heimo investigates how individuals as non-historians and non-professional 
memory entrepreneurs contribute to creating a spontaneous digital archive of 
such narratives, keeping the memory alive through regular remediation, and 
how other individuals engage and react to this.
The audience’s reaction to memory mediation is the object of Vjeran 
Pavlaković and Benedikt Perak’s chapter, which presents a methodologically 
innovative pilot study of how emotional reactions to memorials and political 
discourse may be measured. Pavlaković and Perak investigate how a group of 
informants react emotionally when confronted with the main monument to 
the victims of Croatia’s Fascist Second World War regime, and how their affec-
tive reactions are influenced when primed by different types of political dis-
course. While the study clearly shows emotional reactions to the monument, 
it also demonstrates that the affective reactions are influenced by the degree 
to which the moral presumptions and standards of the informants are being 
challenged.
In the concluding essay, Wulf Kansteiner speculatively asks what has hap-
pened to the idea of cosmopolitan memory during what he calls ‘the trans-
nationalization of the Holocaust’ and the export of ‘the German model of 
 memory management’ as it was redistributed to and embraced by other 
Törnquist-Plewa, Sindbæk Andersen and Erll 20
300845
 European countries. Questioning to which extent people around the globe are 
able to feel passionately involved in transnational memory and practices of 
belonging, Kansteiner looks at attempts in the 21st century to create engaging 
Holocaust memory through different media, such as video games and Face-
book. Studying the types of responses, or lack thereof, that such projects have 
attracted, Kansteiner’s essay discusses the representation, circulation and regi-
mentation of Holocaust memory in the digital sphere.
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Cross-border Collaboration and the Construction 
of Memory Narratives in Europe
Sara Jones
The study of memory is becoming increasingly transnational, both in terms 
of the scholars who are engaged in it and the subjects which form their focus. 
Memory is being thought of not only in terms of its location in a specific na-
tional or regional context, but also with consideration to how it is situated, 
constructed and translated within and between different national or regional 
memory cultures. Scholars have attempted to conceptualize the interplay of 
national and transnational memories in different ways: as ‘multi-directional,’1 
‘travelling,’2 ‘transcultural,’3 or even ‘global.’4 Central to the study of memory 
across borders has been the recognition that the national and transnational 
are not easily separated, but remain ‘deeply entangled.’5
From an empirical perspective, there have also been recent efforts to chart 
the realms of memory beyond and between nation states. In this context, 
there appear to be two broad trends: in the first, the national or regional re-
mains the primary unit of analysis, even as authors consider cross-fertilization 
between different memory cultures or the reception of memory narratives 
outside of their country of origin.6 In the second, authors examine explicitly 
1 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolo-
nisation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
2 Astrid Erll, ‘Travelling Memory,’ Parallax 17 (2011): 4–18.
3 Lucy Bond and Jessica Rapson, eds, The Transcultural Turn: Interrogating Memory Between 
and Beyond Borders (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014).
4 Aledia Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, eds, Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices 
and Trajectories (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).
5 Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney, ‘Introduction,’ in Transnational Memory: Circulation, Ar-
ticulation, Scales, ed. Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014), 1–25.
6 For example: Erich Langenbacher, Bill Niven and Ruth Wittlinger, eds, Dynamics of Memo-
ry and Identity in Contemporary Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2012); De Cesari and Rigney, 
Transnational Memory; Bond and Rapson, The Transcultural Turn; Michael Bernhard and 
Jan Kubik, eds, Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration 
(Oxford: oup, 2014); Małgorzata Pakier and Joanna Wawrzyniak, eds, Memory and Change in 
Europe: Eastern Perspectives (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2016). For a similar critique, 
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 transnational institutions, such as the European Union.7 In this regard, schol-
ars have emphasized the complexity of remembering across borders, particu-
larly in Europe, a continent divided by war, genocide and ideology. European 
institutions and actors appear preoccupied especially by questions of how to 
remember the right- and left-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century, the 
place of communism in European memory cultures, and the relationship be-
tween remembering the crimes of the Holocaust and the crimes of the gulag.8
In the last decade, a number of European institutions have put forward 
guidelines for developing the kind of negotiated memory that would be nec-
essary for such a divided continent. These include: the European Parliament 
(ep) Resolution on ‘The Future of Europe Sixty Years After the Second World 
War’ (2005); Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1481 
(2006); the ‘Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism’ 
(2008); and the ep resolution on ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism’ 
(2009).9 The Action ‘Active European Remembrance’ (part of the ‘Europe for 
Citizens’ program 2007–2013) aimed to support commemoration of victims of 
both National Socialist and Stalinist regimes by providing funding to memori-
alization projects and activities.
However, resolutions and guidelines do not enact themselves, and a trans-
formation of memory cultures does not emerge from nowhere. Collective 
memory requires actors, both individual and institutional, to construct, trans-
mit and support particular narratives about the past. These actors – for ex-
ample, politicians, scholars, memorial managers, museum curators, historians, 
civil society activists and victim groups – have been described by Elisabeth 
see Aline Sierp and Jenny Wüstenberg, ‘Linking the Local and the Transnational: Rethinking 
Memory Politics in Europe,’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23 (2015): 321–329.
7 For example, Elisabeth Kübler, Europäische Erinnerungspolitik: Der Europarat und die 
 Erinnerung an den Holocaust (Bielefeld: transcript, 2012); Laure Neumayer, ‘Integrating the 
Central European Past into a Common Narrative: The Mobilizations Around the “Crimes 
of Communism” in the European Parliament,’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23 
(2015): 344–363. Aline Sierp provides one of the few analyses that attempt to connect the na-
tional and transnational; however, she does not analyze collaboration between nation states. 
See Aline Sierp, History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions (New York: 
Routledge, 2014).
8 Aleida Assmann, Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gedächtniskultur (Vienna: Picus, 2012); 
Claus Leggewie, Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011).
9 See Neumayer, ‘Integrating the Central European Past’ for a detailed process-tracing of the 
contentious development of these resolutions.
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Jelin as ‘memory entrepreneurs,’10 who by virtue of their power, influence, sta-
tus or dedication to a cause can have an impact on public interpretations and 
understandings of the past.11 A study of agency and its relationship to structure 
is thus essential not only for understanding transnational memory politics in 
Europe and beyond,12 but also the dynamics of memory more broadly. Mem-
ory practices are ‘always simultaneously individual and social,’13 and in order 
to fully comprehend the interaction between the two we need a systematic 
empirical analysis of institutions, actors and practices that shape discourses 
about the past at a local, regional, national and transnational level.14
Indeed, memory entrepreneurs have begun to collaborate across borders in 
increasingly formalized ways. Focusing on Europe alone, the last fifteen years 
have seen the creation of specific networking initiatives such as the Interna-
tional Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (ihra, formerly the Task Force for 
International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Re-
search, 1998 – which also includes non-European members), the European 
Network Remembrance and Solidarity (enrs, 2005), the European Network 
of Official Authorities in Charge of the Secret-Police Files (enoa, 2008) and 
the Platform of European Memory and Conscience (Platform, 2011). These 
networks have themselves been the subject of an emerging field of research: 
initial contributions have considered their ‘epistemic framing’15 or their in-
teraction with the European Commission and other cross-border agencies.16 
Jenny Wüstenberg has used network analysis software to map the personal 
10 Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003).
11 Eşref Aksu, ‘Global Collective Memory: Conceptual Difficulties of an Appealing Idea,’ 
Global Society 23 (2009): 323.
12 Sierp and Wüstenberg, ‘Linking the Local and the Transnational’; see also Annabelle 
Littoz-Monnet, ‘The eu Politics of Remembrance: Can Europeans Remember Together?,’ 
West European Politics 35 (2012): 1182–1202; Neumayer, ‘Integrating the Central European 
Past.’
13 Jeffrey K. Olick, ‘From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and 
Products,’ in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, 
ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 151–161.
14 See Sierp and Wüstenberg, ‘Linking the Local and the Transnational,’ 323.
15 Sebastian M. Büttner and Anna Delius, ‘World Culture in European Memory Politics? 
New European Memory Agents Between Epistemic Framing and Political Agenda Set-
ting,’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23 (2015): 391–404.
16 Oliver Plessow, ‘The Interplay of the European Commission, Researcher and Educator 
Networks and Transnational Agencies in the Promotion of a Pan-European Holocaust 
Memory,’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23 (2015): 378–390.
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 connections between individuals according to their attendance at public 
events associated with these prominent networks to demonstrate the key in-
fluencers in these memory-political initiatives.17
Wüstenberg’s study, which combines an actor-centred approach to transna-
tional memory with an analysis of networks as networks – that is, as a struc-
ture of relational ties – provides an important inspiration for the research 
presented here. Nonetheless, as I will show, it is not only within these named 
networks that European memory entrepreneurs collaborate across borders. 
They also work together outside of these structures, for example, through 
shared exhibitions, collaborative workshops and conferences, information-
gathering exercises, and mutual funding arrangements – initiatives that are 
not captured in Wüstenberg’s methodology. Moreover, Wüstenberg’s focus on 
prominent individuals qua individuals, whilst undoubtedly important, risks 
 underrepresenting the role of memorial institutions that are frequently repre-
sented in collaborative activities not by one, but by several different employees 
or members. In the networks listed above, for example, it is more commonly 
the institution, rather than the individual, who is the named participant.
In the present chapter, I use techniques drawn from social network analysis 
to demonstrate the networks created by and around two institutions in the pe-
riod 2011–2014: the Stasi Prison Memorial at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen and the 
Federal Office for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former German 
Democratic Republic (gdr). The starting date was chosen as it is the year in 
which the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, of which both insti-
tutions are members, was formed. The end date, 31 December 2014, was chosen 
as a cut-off to allow efficient data collection and management. However, this is 
not to suggest that transnational co-operation on the part of these institutions 
is limited to this time-frame (it evidently is not) and it should be acknowledged 
that the nature of these collaborative activities in terms of partners, foci, fund-
ing arrangements and so on changes over time. What is offered in this article 
is, therefore, a snapshot, but it is one that can function as a starting point for 
considering the significance of these cross-border collaborations for how we 
understand the construction of transnational remembering. A longitudinal 
study tracing shifts over time in the networks created around these institutions 
would represent an important extension to the work presented here.
I combine an exploration of the structural features of the networks with nar-
rative analysis of the public presentation of the cross-border collaborations of 
these two significant memory-political institutions in the same timeframe. In 
17 Jenny Wüstenberg, ‘Vernetztes Gedenken?: “Influence Mapping” in der transnationalen 
Erinnerungsforschung,’ Jahrbuch für Politik und Geschichte 6 (2016): 97–113. 
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this way I show not only how and with whom the two institutions collaborate, 
but also what narratives are made available by these collaborations. These are 
narratives about the co-operative activity itself, but more significantly, about 
the national and transnational processes of working through the past and, in-
deed, about the past itself.
In this way, the chapter is also about reception, that is, about how the ef-
forts towards Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung [working through the past] in one 
national context are received and put to use in another. As will be seen, the 
narratives attached to cross-border co-operations are a complex interweaving 
of the national and transnational, as collaborative efforts with partner insti-
tutions abroad are used to comment on (and in some cases express discord 
with) the memorial culture dominant in Germany, in which, as Langenbacher 
argues, the prominence ‘of Holocaust-centre memory was never in doubt.’18 In 
other cases, these collaborations are used to construct a sense of a common 
European or indeed Eastern European past. Thus I conceive of reception not 
as the one-directional movement of memory, of a story about the past being 
‘encoded’ in one context and ‘decoded’ in another.19 Rather, I want to think of 
reception from the perspective of what has been termed ‘histoires croisées.’20 
This approach goes beyond looking at the movement of memory narratives in 
terms of ‘a point of departure and a point of arrival’; rather it considers ‘phe-
nomena of interaction involving a variety of directions and multiple effects.’ 
That is, it considers its subjects with regard to relationships, or what Werner 
and Zimmerman describe as ‘intercrossings.’ The researcher looks not only at 
the ‘component elements’ of these intercrossings, but also at the impact of 
their interaction.21
I thereby develop a new method for analyzing the strategies, interpreta-
tions and narratives that determine the public remembrance of contested 
pasts, which goes beyond a ‘continuous inventory of lieux de mémoire.’22 More 
specifically, I want to introduce the concept of collaboration and collaborative 
memory into our discussion of how memory is constructed and communicates 
18 Eric Langenbacher, ‘Still the Unmasterable Past? The Impact of History and Memory in 
the Federal Republic of Germany,’ German Politics 19 (2010): 35.
19 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding,’ in Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall et al. 
 (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 128–138.
20 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and 
the Challenge of Reflexivity,’ History and Theory 45 (2006): 30–50.
21 Werner and Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison,’ 37 and 39.
22 Gregor Feindt, Felix Krawatzek, Daniela Mehler, Friedemann Pestel, and Rieke Trimçev, 




across borders. This idea of collaboration directs our attention away from the 
artifacts of memory and towards the agents. It highlights the ways in which 
European memory cultures are actively being shaped, not only in the sphere 
of civil society discussed here, but also in politics and culture.23 These ‘inter-
crossings’ have not previously been the subject of sustained analysis; yet the 
study of concrete examples of co-operation can show how alliances are forged 
in transnational memory politics and how such alliances are used to promote 
specific memory-political goals.
 The Case Studies
Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen [Memorial  Berlin-Hohenschönhausen] 
is situated in the former remand prison of the State Security Service (Stasi) in 
Berlin, which was the largest such facility in the gdr. The Memorial and its 
Director, Hubertus Knabe, have played a prominent role in debates surround-
ing the gdr since unification. The site has been criticized for, amongst other 
things, an over-emotionalized presentation of the past, overemphasis on the 
brutality of the 1950s, conflating Nazi and Soviet oppression, and engaging in 
political propaganda directed against the left, particularly against the Partei 
des Demokratischen Sozialismus [Party of Democratic Socialism, pds] and 
DIE LINKE.24 Its growing prominence in German national memory politics has 
been accompanied by an increasing involvement in transnational collabora-
tions.25 As will be discussed, these range from joint exhibitions with European 
23 On the subject of co-operation in transitional justice, see Helga Welsh, ‘Beyond the Na-
tional: Pathways of Diffusion,’ in Post-Communist Transitional Justice: Lessons from 25 
Years of Experience, ed. Lavinia Stan, and Nadya Nedelsky (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2015), 167–187.
24 See, for example, Jürgen Hofmann, ‘Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der Hohenschön-
hausener Gedenkstätte für die Opfer des Stalinismus,’ utopie kreativ 81/82 (1997): 
158–163; Florien Kappeler and Christoph Schaub, ‘Mauer durchs Herz: Inszenierun-
gen von Zeitzeug/innen-Wissen im erinnerungspolitischen Diskurs der Gedenkstätte 
 Berlin-Hohenschönhausen,’ in NachBilder der Wende, ed. Inge Stephan and Alexandra 
Tacke (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 319–329. I offer a detailed analysis of the site’s poli-
tics and aesthetics in, Sara Jones, The Media of Testimony: Remembering the East German 
Stasi in the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014).
25 See Sara Jones, ‘Memory Competition or Memory Collaboration? Politics, Networks and 
Social Actors in Memories of Dictatorship,’ in The Changing Place of Europe in Global 
Memory Cultures: Usable Pasts and Futures, ed. Christina Kränzle and Maria Mayr (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave, 2017), 63–86.
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partners, such as the Memorial to the Victims of Communism and to the Resis-
tance in Sighetu Marmaţiei to extensive co-operations with Tunisian activists 
in the wake of the Arab Spring. As indicated above, Memorial Hohenschön-
hausen is also a member of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience.
The Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der 
ehemaligen ddr [Federal Office for the Files of the State Security Service of 
the Former gdr] – or BStU – was established in 1991 to manage access to the 
Stasi files for victims, informants (under certain circumstances), media and 
researchers, according to the Stasi Records Law passed in December of that 
year. Alongside its involvement in lustration and file access, the BStU also 
has in its remit political education and remembrance. This includes the run-
ning of seminars, workshops and other events, as well as the management of 
regional and national exhibitions relating to the activities of the Stasi. Most 
recently, it has – in collaboration with the civil society group Association for 
Anti-Stalinist Action Normannenstrasse – opened a new large exhibition in 
the former Stasi headquarters in Berlin. The institution and its commission-
ers have played a central role in Germany’s efforts to work through the history 
of the East  German dictatorship. Nonetheless, this role is increasingly under 
question, as its primary function – that is, allowing file access for victims of 
the Stasi – draws to a close and there are plans for the files to be moved to the 
Federal Archive. In the period under consideration here, the BStU’s interna-
tional initiatives included joint exhibitions, conferences, workshops and po-
dium discussions, and visits by foreign officials, heads of archives and other 
organizations dedicated to working through dictatorial pasts. The BStU is also 
a member of the Platform and the enoa, and is an enrs partner institution.
 Social Network Analysis
The methods used in the first part of this paper are drawn from social  network 
analysis. The network perspective guides our attention to the interdepen-
dence of actors, relational ties and the impact of network structure on indi-
vidual action.26 The focus on relationships between actors (broadly defined 
26 See, for example: Alexandra Marin and Barry Wellman, ‘Social Network Analysis: An In-
troduction,’ in The Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis, ed. Peter J. Carrington and 
John Scott (Los Angeles etc.: Sage, 2011), 11–25; Christina Prell, Social Network Analysis: His-
tory, Theory & Methodology (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012); Stanley Wasserman and  Katherine 




to include both individuals and institutions), rather than exclusively on the 
actors themselves, is essential to study collaboration and its impact. Specifi-
cally, network analysis will be used in this paper to develop a map of transna-
tional co-operations involving Hohenschönhausen and/or the BStU. The focus 
on the network surrounding a single institution – defining the boundary of the 
network according to the relationships of that single actor – can be described 
as an ‘egocentric,’ rather than ‘whole network’ approach.27 This map is used to 
identify key partnerships across borders and to demonstrate the structure of 
the network constructed by and through these memory-political institutions.
In order to generate the map, I gathered publicly available documents from 
each institution covering the period January 2011-December 2014 and detailing 
the institution’s activities in that timeframe. In the case of Hohenschönhau-
sen, this included the 2011–2012 and 2013–2014 activity reports,28 press releases 
available on the institution’s website (48 documents in total) and newspaper 
articles detailing events hosted by the Memorial (10 documents in total). The 
activity reports were read in full and passages relevant to transnational col-
laboration highlighted. Press releases and newspaper articles were selected 
for analysis, if, in their title, they indicated cross-border co-operation. For the 
BStU, the corpus included yearly retrospectives (2011–2014), biannual activity 
reports (2011–2012 and 2013–2014)29 and press releases available on the website 
(16 documents in total). Again, the yearly retrospectives and activity reports 
were read in full and passages relevant to transnational collaboration high-
lighted. Press releases were selected for analysis, if, in their title, they indicated 
some form of cross-border co-operation. One limitation of the use of published 
material for identifying collaborations is that this might not capture every sin-
gle event or cross-border relationship; that is, not every activity is necessar-
ily reported. However, institutions are most likely to include in press releases, 
reports and retrospectives those activities that they deem most significant or 
reflective of their mission and self-understanding. Moreover, as the present 
research is interested in how memory entrepreneurs shape public  discourse 
27 See Nick Crossley et al., Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets (Los Angeles etc.: Sage, 2015).
28 Stiftung Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, 6. Tätigkeitsbericht (2011/2012); Stiftung 
Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, 7. Tätigkeitsbericht (2013/2014).
29 Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen ddr, 
Elfter Tätigkeitsbericht des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheits-
dienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik für die Jahre 2011 und 2012; 
Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen ddr, 
Zwölfter Tätigkeitsbericht des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicher-
heitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik für die Jahre 2013 und 
2014. Both accessed 30 June 2016, http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Publikationen/ 
Reihen/Taetigkeitsberichte/taetigkeitsberichte_node.html.
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about the past and the processes of coming to terms with it, it is these publicly 
reported activities and relationships that are of the most relevance.
From these documents, events that indicated a ‘relational tie,’ that is, col-
laboration with a non-German partner institution, were identified and the de-
tails (participants, type of event, date) were gathered into a separate document 
for entry into the online influence mapping software Tartan (© 2011 Ntrepid 
Corporation).30 Following the observation above about the way in which an 
institution is frequently represented by several different individuals, where an 
individual’s affiliation was named in the source documents, I defined the ac-
tor by the institution, rather than by the person representing that institution. 
For each event, both German and non-German participants were recorded. 
This was important in terms of allowing me to identify not only with whom 
Hohenschönhausen and the BStU collaborate transnationally, but also with 
which German actors they collaborate in order to develop these transnational 
links. In several cases, the individuals were not named; instead the document 
just indicated the group of entrepreneurs to which they belonged, for example, 
‘Tunisian civil society activists.’ In these cases, that designation was used to 
define the actor.
Once the actors participating in the given event have been identified and 
the data entered into the program, the software allows the relationships be-
tween them to be coded according to the intensity of the interaction. If two 
actors were both present at a conference, for example, but there was no evi-
dence that they had interacted, I did not create a relationship between them. 
However, if they had participated on a joint panel or in a smaller workshop, I 
considered this a ‘1+ meeting.’ On the other hand, co-organization of an exhibi-
tion or other event that would require closer and more sustained collaboration 
was designated a ‘2+ meeting.’ All relationships were assumed to be reciprocal, 
that is, ‘undirected’ in the terms of social network analysis. Tartan uses data 
provided by the researcher to create a visualization of the links between the 
actors and the resulting networks. It also calculates actors’ centrality and influ-
ence within the network.
 Results: Memorial Berlin-Hohenschönhausen
The material gathered relating Hohenschönhausen in the period 2011–2014 
documents 75 events involving some form of transnational collaboration, from 
joint exhibitions to visits by foreign diplomats or heads of other  memorial 
30 I would like to thank Mat Mathews at Ntrepid Corporation for providing me with free ac-
cess to Tartan, and for his invaluable assistance in negotiating the software. Wüstenberg 
demonstrates the benefits of Tartan for mapping the interactions between individuals in-
volved in existing transnational memory-political networks. See, ‘Vernetztes Gedenken.’
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 institutions. These 75 events involved 114 stakeholders31 from 38 different 
countries. Collaboration was also recorded with multinational groups such as 
Amnesty International and Reporters without Borders. I coded 490 relation-
ships between these stakeholders.
Tartan uses mathematic algorithms – taking into account the number of 
collaborative activities and the intensity or frequency of those activities (as 
defined above) – to calculate ‘degree centrality,’ that is, which actors have the 
most direct connections to other actors and value of that number with rela-
tion to the rest of the network. In this regard, an institution or individual who 
is involved in one or more collaborations with multiple other actors will have 
a higher degree centrality than those involved in bilateral collaborations with 
Hohenschönhausen alone. We can thus infer that the actors at the top of the 
centrality list are important partners for the Memorial, not necessarily through 
close one-to-one collaboration, but because they are repeatedly brought in to 
support larger initiatives.32 Table 2.1 indicates the top nine most central actors 
in the network created by and through Hohenschönhausen in this period (ex-
cluding Hohenschönhausen itself).
If we ignore Hohenschönhausen itself (which, given how the data was col-
lected, is unsurprisingly central to all collaborations), the two institutional 
actors with the highest degree centrality are the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
[Konrad Adenauer Foundation, kas] and the Auswärtiges Amt [German For-
eign Office]. What is interesting here is that neither of these actors is a named 
participant in the established networks relating to memory politics, such as 
the Platform or enoa. Nor do they have memorialization or memory politics 
as part of their official remit. The kas – a political foundation affiliated to the 
Christian Democratic Union of Germany (cdu) – is well known for its involve-
ment in and funding of memory-political activities world-wide; however, this 
is not presented as part of its core mission. On its website, the foundation 
defines this mission as including ‘democracy promotion,’ but does not state 
explicitly that this incorporates memory of dictatorship. The Foreign Office 
is principally concerned with diplomacy and Germany’s image in the world; 
31 ‘Stakeholder’ is the term used by Tartan to refer to the nodes or actors within a given 
network.
32 As Crossley et al. note, centrality measures (and any other ‘whole network’ measures) can 
be calculated on ego-nets, assuming that there are ties present between alters (i.e., the 
other actors within the network). However, we must bear in mind that the boundary has 
been defined according to an alter having a relationship with the ego (principal actor), so 
we cannot know what relationships it might have with actors beyond the ego-net. Cross-
ley et al., Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets, 82.
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this involves, according to its website, promoting ‘intensive exchange with the 
world in economics, culture, science and technology, environment, issues of 
development and many other themes,’33 but the working through of dictator-
ship is not named explicitly. These are important examples of how institutions 
not affiliated with prominent memory networks, and without an obvious inter-
est in memory politics, can nonetheless influence processes of remembrance 
across borders.
If we turn to the most central non-German actors in the  Hohenschönhausen 
network, we can once again see the importance of looking beyond the promi-
nent European networks and indeed beyond Europe in our analysis of transna-
tional memory. The next two most central institutional actors are the Tunisian 
government and the Tunisian memorialization project, Contre l’oubli [Against 
Forgetting], both of which were engaged in a longer term collaboration with 
 Hohenschönhausen between 2011 and 2014. The collaboration included repeat-
ed visits to the Hohenschönhausen Memorial by representatives of the Tunisian 
government and Contre l’oubli, and by representatives of  Hohenschönhausen 
to sites and partners in Tunisia. There was also a  collaborative exhibition, a 
33 Unless otherwise stated, all translations from German are my own.
Table �.� Top nine actors in Hohenschönhausen network (excluding Hohenschönhausen) ac-
cording to degree centrality
Rank Actor Degree centrality strength
1 Konrad Adenauer Foundation 0.223
2 German Foreign Office 0.214
3 Tunisian Government 0.107
4 Contre l’oubli activists 0.107
5 Sven Felix Kellerhoff 
(journalist)
0.089
6 Christoph Shaefgen (attorney 
general)
0.08
7 Deutschlandfunk (radio station) 0.08
8 Institute for National Remem-
brance (Warsaw)
0.071
9 Warsaw Rising Museum 0.063
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joint conference, the writing of a master plan for memorialization in Tunisia 
and the production of a ‘Handbook for Working through the Past.’
An important feature of Tartan is that it allows the user to make a stake-
holder ‘invisible’ before modeling the network. Removing Hohenschönhausen 
from the modeling allows us to see if and how the other actors are connected 
beyond their relationship with the Memorial, that is, it breaks the network 
down into the ‘components’ in which all actors are linked by a path that does 
not go through the central node.34 In this way, one-off bilateral collaborations 
are removed and we get a clearer picture of the way in which connections be-
tween different stakeholders are made by and through Hohenschönhausen.
What is especially interesting in this case is that, despite the removal of the 
primary institution, the model is still of one significant network. The number 
of stakeholders in this network is reduced to 63, indicating that a number of 
collaborations are indeed bilateral between Hohenschönhausen and one other 
actor;35 however, the fact that the network by and large remains intact, indicates 
that Hohenschönhausen repeatedly works with the same partners on different 
projects and that these partners work repeatedly with several other actors. That 
is, multiple connections and relationships between memory entrepreneurs are 
created by and through the activities of the Memorial. As we will see this con-
trasts with the creation of networks around the activities of the BStU.
 Results: BStU
The material gathered relating to the BStU in the period 2011–2014 documents 
81 events involving some form of transnational collaboration. Again, this in-
cludes joint exhibitions and workshops, visits by foreign diplomats or the heads 
of other national archives or memorial sites, and travel by BStU  representatives 
to international conferences. The 81 events involved 116 stakeholders from 39 
different countries. I coded 361 relationships between these stakeholders. We 
can already observe from these figures that the BStU was involved in more col-
laborative activities, but with fewer actors in each.
Table 2.2 indicates the top nine most (degree) central actors in the network 
created by and through the BStU in this period (excluding the BStU itself). 
We can see that the actor with the highest degree centrality is once again a 
 German institution, that is, the German Foreign Office. That this government 
34 For more on ‘components’ and their significance see Crossley et al., Social Network Analy-
sis for Ego-Nets, 12–13.
35 Nine other components were identified, but one of these had only three actors and the 
remaining eight only two, indicating that they represent one-off smaller events involving 
the Memorial, rather than sustained or significant collaboration.
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body plays a central role in the activities of both organizations under study 
here suggests that – at least when it comes to institutions supported by Fed-
eral funds, as is the case with both Hohenschönhausen and the BStU – other 
state actors might play a more active part than is commonly recognized. As the 
Foreign Office’s contribution in both cases for the most part takes the form of 
funding or behind-the-scenes organization, this involvement is also partially 
hidden.
However, unlike the network formed by and through Memorial Hohen-
schönhausen, other German actors are less prominent in the BStU network. 
The actors with the next highest degree centrality are institutions located in 
Germany, but representing non-German interests. Positions two to five are 
occupied by the Slovak Institute, Czech Centre, Czech Embassy and Slovak 
Embassy respectively. Positions six to nine are taken by the Egyptian govern-
ment, Tunisian civil rights activists, the Tunisian government and Egyptian 
civil rights activists. It is easier to see how and why these results emerge if we 
model the network with the BStU made ‘invisible.’ In contrast to the single net-
work created by and through Hohenschönhausen, if the BStU is removed from 
the modeling, four significant components are produced with twenty-nine, 
 fourteen, nine and nine stakeholders respectively.36 What this indicates is that 
the BStU works with discrete groups of actors in a project-style approach, rath-
er than creating connections between different groups.
36 A further twelve components were identified, each with only two actors.
Table �.� Top nine actors in BStU network (excluding BStU) according to degree centrality
Rank Actor Degree centrality strength
1 German Foreign Office 0.132
2 Slovak Institute 0.114
3 Czech Centre 0.114
4 Slovak Embassy 0.114
5 Czech Embassy 0.114
6 Egyptian Government 0.096
7 Tunisian Civil Rights 
Activists
0.088
8 Tunisian Government 0.079





Analysis of the four components highlights this finding and also shows clearly 
what these ‘projects’ were. The first and largest component I will term the ‘Arab 
Spring Network,’ as it results from a concerted effort on the part of the BStU 
(and in a parallel with Hohenschönhausen) to contribute to the process of 
working through dictatorships in Middle Eastern and North African countries 
in the wake of the revolutionary movements in that region. Table 2.3 indicates 
the top five actors in terms of degree centrality.
The collaborations within this component included meetings in Cairo be-
tween BStU representatives and Egyptian government and civil society actors, 
visits by Egyptian, Tunisian and Yemeni activists to the BStU, and participation 
in a conference in Tunisia with, amongst others, Labó démocratique [Demo-
cratic Lab], who were also an important partner for  Hohenschönhausen. Inter-
estingly, this network is not only the largest; it also contains the most  German 
institutional actors, including the German Foreign Office, other  German 
government representatives, the kas, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [ Friedrich 
 Ebert Foundation], Goethe Institut [Goethe Institute], and the radio station 
Deutschlandfunk.
I describe the second largest component created by and through the BStU 
as the Czech and Slovak network. It is here that we see the collaboration with 
the Slovak Institute, Czech Centre, and Slovak and Czech Embassies. The com-
ponent also includes the Prague Institute for Contemporary History, and Insti-
tute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, as well as the Institute for National 
Remembrance in Bratislava. However, these collaborations involve very few 
German memory entrepreneurs and no institutional ones. This network es-
sentially represents the project Fokus ddr-čssr. Alltag und Geheimpolizei in 
zwei kommunistischen Diktaturen [Focus gdr – cssr. The Everyday and the 
Secret Police in Two Communist Dictatorships], which ran as a collaboration 
between the BStU, Slovak Institute and Czech Centre, with the sponsorship 
of the Slovak and Czech Embassies in the period September–November 2011.
Table �.3 Top five actors in BStU ‘Arab Spring’ component according to degree centrality
Rank Actor Degree centrality 
strength
1 German Foreign Office 0.5
2 Egyptian Government 0.357
3 Tunisian Civil Rights Activists 0.321
4 Tunisian Government 0.286
5 Egyptian Civil Rights Activists 0.286
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The third component within the larger BStU network is dominated by the 
Institute for National Remembrance (inr) in Warsaw. The connections all run 
through this institutional actor, except for two additional links made through 
the Heinrich Böll Stiftung [Heinrich Böll Foundation]. What the shape of this 
third component suggests – and what is confirmed by reference to the types 
of event involving this actor – is that this co-operation is essentially an inten-
sive bilateral one between the inr and the BStU. It included a collaborative 
workshop, visits by the President of the inr, and participation by BStU rep-
resentatives in workshops organized by the inr. As both the BStU and inr 
are members of the enoa, this is an example of how members of an estab-
lished network might collaborate intensively both within and outside of that 
network.
The fourth network that emerges when the BStU is removed from the mod-
eling indicates another example of German government actors being directly 
involved in memory entrepreneurship where one might not expect it. Here the 
central figure in the network is Joachim Gauck – former BStU Commissioner 
and Federal President from 2012 to 2017. However, closer examination reveals 
that this amounts to only two collaborations with multiple participants: the 
opening of the exhibition Lernt Polnisch at the Europa-Universität Viadrina in 
Frankfurt Oder and a visit by Gauck to the BStU regional branch in Rostock. 
In both cases, Gauck was accompanied by other heads of state or government 
representatives of other countries so could be said to be acting in his capacity 
as Federal President, rather than as a result of his close links with the BStU.
In sum, the network analysis shows that the Hohenschönhausen Memorial 
has several partners with whom it collaborates frequently on different  projects – 
an approach that creates connections between different actors and a single 
broad network in and through the Memorial. The BStU, on the other hand, 
tends to collaborate transnationally on discrete projects each with a more de-
fined set of actors. These co-operations may be more  intensive;  however, fewer 
connections are created between the actors taking part in the different proj-
ects, resulting in multiple smaller networks. The analysis of  degree centrality 
also indicates the key actors within these networks and, by implication, the key 
partners of these two memory political institutions. What is striking is that, for 
both Hohenschönhausen and the BStU, institutions not normally associated 
with memory entrepreneurship and/or outside of Europe play a central role. 
This not only highlights the need to look beyond  established networks and 
indeed beyond Europe in our analysis of transnational memory, it also raises 
several questions. What is the purpose of co-operations with  non-European 
actors with very different experiences of dictatorship? How does this compare 
with the motivations behind collaboration between European memory en-
trepreneurs? Is it only German institutions who were so involved in memory 
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political activities in the wake of the Arab Spring? That is, is there something 
special about the German case?
 Narratives of Memory
In order to answer the questions raised above, we need to turn to qualitative 
methods to explore how these actors understand and present the cross-border 
collaborations in which they are involved. In view of the role of such memory 
entrepreneurs in constructing public narratives about the past and the pro-
cesses of coming to terms with it, it is particularly the public portrayal that is of 
interest. In this regard, the same material used to identify the events and par-
ticipants for entry into Tartan can be approached in a different way to explore 
what these collaborations meant for the actors involved.
The method used to explore these meanings is developed from narrative 
analysis. Narrative analysis has a long-standing tradition in the humani-
ties and has become increasingly used in the social sciences,37 also leading 
to some fruitful cross-over between the two.38 Social network analysts have 
also turned to narrative to identify the meanings of relationships and ties for 
network members, as well as in recognition that networks themselves are nar-
rative constructions.39 Narrative research is located firmly within a construc-
tivist or postmodern and interpretative paradigm which looks not for a ‘real, 
essential and objective reality reflected in narratives,’ rather ‘it proposes a sub-
jective and relativist reality, largely invented by narratives.’40 In our context, 
the researcher is not looking for information on the ‘real’ motivations behind 
 cross-border collaborations or for an authentic insight into their purpose; 
rather she is  interested in how the narrators (here the authors of the reports 
and press releases or those cited in them) give meaning to these co-operative 
activities.
37 For example, D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and 
Story in Qualitative Research (San Francisco: Wiley, 2000); Lynn Butler-Kisber, Qualitative 
Inquiry: Thematic, Narrative and Arts-Informed Perspectives (London: Sage, 2010); Molly 
Andrews, Corinne Squire and Maria Tamboukou, eds, Doing Narrative Research (Los An-
geles etc.: Sage, 2008).
38 For example, Barbara Czarniawska, Narratives in Social Science Research (London/New 
Dehli: Sage, 2004).
39 For a summary of this research, see Crossley et al., Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets, 
104–125.
40 Gabriela Spector-Mersel, ‘Narrative Research: Time for a Paradigm,’ Narrative Inquiry 20 
(2010): 208.
43Collaboration & Construction of Memory Narratives in Europe
<UN>
Narratives are made up of plot elements (events, people, time etc.), but im-
portantly ‘the same set of events can be organized around different plots.’41 
This is especially significant when the narratives being constructed are not 
about the self, but about what society is, was and should be. What are being 
narrated in the documents under consideration here are co-operations be-
tween memory entrepreneurs in different national contexts. These are stories 
about the motivations of these collaborations and their outcomes, but they are 
also stories about the nature of the past and the processes of coming to terms 
with it that are located in a national and transnational political context. In 
this way, these narratives also relate to questions of power: these stories locate 
institutions, nations and regions in terms of success and failure; they give an 
account of which approaches to the past work and which do not; and they 
identify who should be listening to and learning from whom, that is, who the 
experts of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung really are. In this sense, they are ‘stra-
tegic narratives,’ described by Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle as ‘a com-
municative tool through which political actors […] attempt to give determined 
meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives.’42 
This is not to say that the narrators in this context are completely free to tell 
any strategic story, rather that their narratives are shaped and constrained by 
the political (including memory-political) and social context into which they 
are launched.
In order to identify the strategic narratives created in the storying of cross-
border collaborations, the same documents that were selected for the network 
analysis through Tartan were subject to a process of discursive analysis in or-
der to identify common patterns in terms of the motivations and positioning 
of the different actors involved. The documents were coded systematically 
with regard to narratives produced and the most common ones identified for 
each institution. Given the need to represent narrative holistically,43 in the 
presentation of results only a few examples for each narrative will be provided, 
which are representative of the corpus as a whole.
 Results: Memorial Berlin-Hohenschönhausen
Analysis of the 75 cross-border events in which Hohenschönhausen was in-
volved between 2011 and 2014 brought to the fore three key narratives. I will 
term these: ‘Learning from the Germans,’ ‘Beyond the National/Better To-
gether’ and ‘Learning from Others.’ A single event is often narrated in multiple 
41 Czarniawska, Narratives in Social Science Research, 7.
42 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communica-
tion, Power and the New World Order (New York/London: Routledge, 2013), 5.
43 Spector-Mersel, ‘Narrative Research,’ 214.
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ways; however, as will be seen, these three narratives are generally attached to 
different kinds of cross-border collaboration with different global or European 
partners and in the service of different political objectives.
1 Learning from the Germans
I borrow the term ‘learning from the Germans’ in this context from Andrew Be-
attie. Beattie uses the term to refer to the potential application of the German 
approach to working through conflicted pasts to the pan-European context.44 In 
contrast, here this narrative is most frequently (although not exclusively) con-
structed in relation to the cross-border co-operations of  Hohenschönhausen 
with non-European actors, especially those collaborations which emerged in 
the wake of the Arab Spring. In this narrative, the Memorial is presented as 
representative of a German memorial culture which has developed successful 
strategies for working through dictatorships: collaborative activity in this ac-
count serves the purpose of sharing that expertise with those institutions and 
national contexts constructed as newcomers to the field.
One prominent example of the use of this narrative is in the collabora-
tion between the Memorial and Tunisian memory entrepreneurs. In  October 
2011, Knabe visited the former prison of the state security service in Tunis 
at the invitation of the Tunisian Minister of the Interior Habib Essid. In the 
press release giving an account of the visit, Knabe is framed as an expert who 
‘called on the [Tunisian] authorities to do everything possible to ensure that 
the files of the state security service are retained.’ The reference specifically 
to the opening of the Stasi files sets this expertise beyond the competency of 
the  Hohenschönhausen Memorial and its Director (who do not, after all, have 
responsibility for the Stasi files) and locates it instead in the wider approach to 
memory of the gdr in Germany. That Knabe presents himself and his institu-
tion as representatives of this broader context is also seen in his reported offer 
to support the Tunisian authorities in the drafting of a law to protect the state 
security files, alongside his recommendation to turn the prison into a Memo-
rial. In his conversations with human rights activists who are making efforts 
towards working through the dictatorship in Tunisia, Knabe is reported as 
stating: ‘in Tunisia there are also numerous efforts to work through the crimes 
of the past and ensure justice for the victims. Perhaps our experiences can be 
 useful in this regard.’ It is not clear, however, if ‘our’ refers to the Memorial it-
self, or to Germany.
44 Andrew H. Beattie, ‘Learning from the Germans? History and Memory in German and 
European Projects of Integration,’ PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Stud-
ies, 4 (2007): 1–22, accessed 6 June 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/portal.v4i2.483.
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This rhetoric is repeated in the collaboration with Tunisian memory en-
trepreneurs in the context of the Contre l’oubli project described above. In a 
press release of the 6 March 2012, the Memorial is described as standing by 
experts from Tunisia ‘in an advisory capacity’ and as ‘part of a new project, in 
which the experiences of Germany in the field of working through the past is 
passed onto state and social institutions in Tunisia.’ The repetition in these 
documents of the vocabulary of ‘support,’ ‘advice’ and ‘help’ for the Tunisian 
colleagues constructs a unidirectional transfer of ideas and expertise from 
the German side to the (in this view) emerging democratic state. A similar 
use of language and narrative can be seen, among others, in co-operations 
with Peru in November 2011 (Hohenschönhausen ‘advises the Peruvian truth 
commission’ and offers ‘support’ and ‘help’ in the construction of memorials) 
and Cambodia in January and May 2012 (Hohenschönhausen offers ‘support’ 
to the memorials at the Toul Sleng prison and the central execution site of 
the Khmer Rouge). These non-European actors are not constructed as equal 
partners and the collaborations are not presented as a two-way exchange of 
expertise.
We must consider that part of this emphasis on a particular way of working 
through the past is a result of these documents largely serving promotional 
purposes. However, as seen above, this narrative does not (only) praise the 
Hohenschönhausen Memorial, but German memorial culture more broadly. 
Kaja Kaźmierska has recently argued that a dichotomy has been constructed 
between a ‘Western and “non-Western” approach towards the issues of e.g., col-
lective (national) identity.’45 In his tracing of the similarities between German 
and European memory cultures, Beattie similarly argues that an ‘inaccurate 
east–west dichotomy legitimizes pressure on the eastern side to conform to a 
seemingly unquestionable but, in fact, contested western norm.’46 Here, how-
ever, we see an institution that might find itself on the eastern side of that 
dichotomy in terms of its memory politics (notably, the equation of Nazi and 
Soviet dictatorships frequently seen at the site) appropriating an idealized 
 version of a pan-German coming to terms with the past in a way that constructs 
non-European contexts as not fully developed and in need of assistance.
45 Kaja Kaźmierska, ‘Biographical and Collective Memory: Mutual Influences in Central 
and Eastern European Context,’ in Pakier and Wawrzyniak, Memory and Change in 
 Europe, 109.
46 Beattie, ‘Learning from the Germans,’ 17.
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2 Beyond the National/Better Together
In the second narrative that is constructed around the cross-border collabora-
tions of the Hohenschönhausen Memorial, this sense of German superiority in 
processes of coming to terms with the past disappears. Instead, the Memorial 
is located in either a global or a European community of remembrance. There 
are two slightly different versions of this narrative in the public presentation of 
cross-border activity. In the first, the Hohenschönhausen Memorial positions 
itself as part of a global network of institutions and individuals fighting for 
democracy and human rights. In many cases, these are what I term ‘rhetorical’ 
collaborations, that is, they construct a link with other protest movements or 
activists, but do not involve any actual material links with international part-
ners. One example is the involvement of the Memorial on 20 March 2011 in an 
initiative of the Berlin International Literature Festival to organize worldwide 
readings from the work of Liu Xiaobo, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and 
principal author of Charta 08, which called for democratization in China. The 
press release notes that ‘more than 115 institutions in 73 cities and 30 countries 
on all continents took part,’ emphasizing Hohenschönhausen’s place in this 
international community. Similarly, in articles in Die Tageszeitung and Berliner 
Zeitung dated 23 August 2012, Knabe is reported as wanting to visit the im-
prisoned Russian punk band Pussy Riot and as having written an open letter 
to the Russian Ambassador, Vladimir Grinin, in which he noted that ‘as Direc-
tor of the Memorial in the former central prison of the Stasi, the respect of 
basic rights and freedom of expression is also very important to me in today’s 
context.’ Knabe thereby positions both himself and the Memorial alongside 
international artists and activists who stand for democracy and freedom from 
authoritarian rule, but does not suggest explicitly that other nations might 
learn by the German example.
The second form of this narrative is generally used in reference to 
 co-operations with European partners, which are often more extensive and in-
volve actual contact between memory entrepreneurs from different national 
contexts. Here the narrative of German success frequently becomes one of a 
European failure against which the institutions involved in the collaboration 
are fighting. Notably, it is this narrative that is dominant in the public presen-
tation of Hohenschönhausen’s collaborative activities within the Platform of 
European Memory and Conscience. In a press release about the founding of 
the Platform on the 14 October 2011, Knabe is cited as explaining the reason 
behind the collaboration of the Memorial within the network as the need to 
understand education about the past as a ‘European task’ in need of ‘European 
standards,’ which had, he argued, up until now been lacking. The Hohenschön-
hausen Forum, organized by the Memorial alongside the annual  meeting of 
47Collaboration & Construction of Memory Narratives in Europe
<UN>
the Platform in Berlin on the 7 November 2012, was held under the title ‘Work-
ing through Communism as a European Task.’ In the announcement of the 
program, the event is framed as a step towards rectifying the perceived fail-
ure in Europe to deal with the history of communist regimes: ‘as a rule, the 
 perpetrators remain unpunished, the functionaries often occupy important 
positions in the democratic regime, victims are usually only minimally com-
pensated. Has Europe failed in working through communism?’
Also outside of the official network, the Memorial’s collaborations with 
other (Central and Eastern) European partners are narrated in a way that con-
structs common histories. This is seen, for example, in an extended collabora-
tion with the House of Terror in Budapest and its co-founder and Hungarian 
President, János Áder. On the 11 March 2013, Áder visited the Hohenschönhau-
sen Memorial; in a press release, he is reported as stating ‘how important work-
ing through communism is – also beyond national borders.’ This expressed 
desire for transnational co-operation is soon put into action at a high level. 
On the 16 June 2014, a press release reports that Gauck, Knabe and Áder have 
presented a German-Hungarian project which aims to collect in a register the 
names of all those who were politically persecuted under communism. Again, 
this initiative is set in the context of a European failure which can only be re-
solved through European collaboration: ‘despite all commitments to working 
through the past, nobody has as yet made the effort to record by name those 
persecuted,’ Knabe adds, ‘we want to change that, not only for Germany, but 
for the whole of Europe.’
3 Learning from Others
A third far less prominent, but still important, narrative in the presentation of 
the cross-border collaborations of the Hohenschönhausen Memorial is one not 
of European failure, but of German failure. Here the co-operation across bor-
ders is used not to suggest that others might learn from the German example, 
but that German memorial culture might learn from other national contexts. 
This narrative tends to be interwoven with that of ‘learning from the  Germans’ 
or ‘beyond the national/better together’ described above, but its effect is to 
criticize what is presented as the dominant approach to the past in Germany 
by way of reference to other ways of dealing with dictatorship. For example, a 
press release reports a visit by Knabe to Czech sites of memory on 25 October 
2012. On the one hand, Knabe is described as encouraging his Czech partners 
‘to create a publicly accessible memorial and not to leave the field open to 
commercial providers’ – that is, to learn from the German example. On the 
other hand, Knabe is reported as stating: ‘in contrast to what often happens 
in Germany, in the Czech Republic, National Socialism and communism are 
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not seen as opposites, but as two sides of the same coin. […] In this respect, 
the Czech Republic, which was a victim of both regimes, is a model for other 
European states.’ Similarly, in a Tagesspiegel article reporting a visit by Knabe 
to Tunisia dated 20 May 2011, in the context of the transmission of knowledge 
from Germany to Tunisian partners described above, Knabe is cited as stat-
ing: ‘in contrast to what happened in Germany, the Tunisians continued their 
revolution beyond the collapse of the ruling elite and banned the former rul-
ing party.’ The suggestion of a ‘completed’ revolution in Tunisia resonates with 
the concept of an ‘unfinished revolution’ in Central and Eastern Europe47 and 
clearly implies a need to ban the successor parties to the Socialist Unity Party, 
which ruled in the gdr, in order to achieve full social renewal.
 Results: BStU
Analysis of the 81 cross-border events in which BStU was involved between 2011 
and 2014 brings to the fore two key narratives. I will term these ‘Learning from 
the Germans/Eastern Europeans’ and ‘Beyond the National/Better Together,’ 
although they can be seen to serve slightly different purposes to the similar 
narratives constructed around events involving Hohenschönhausen. A third 
narrative also emerged from the documents, specifically in co-operations with 
other national archives and in particular those from non-Central and Eastern 
European countries. These are framed principally in terms of professional ex-
change and focus on issues of preservation. Although this does of course have 
an important political dimension in terms of the role of archives in what we 
remember,48 it is less explicitly related to memory politics than the first two 
narratives and I will not explore it in detail here.
1 Learning from the Germans/Eastern Europeans
It is striking that the promotional material surrounding the cross-border collab-
orations of the BStU also frequently suggests a narrative of these  co-operations 
being motivated by other countries’ desire to ‘learn from the Germans.’ Once 
again it is frequently in collaborations with non-European countries that 
this narrative emerges and it is especially prominent in the presentation of 
 co-operations with North African and Middle Eastern countries in the wake 
of the Arab Spring. The eleventh activity report states that the citizens’ rights 
activists involved in the Arab Spring ‘are asking themselves similar questions 
47 James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-
Eastern Europe (New Haven/London: Yale up, 2010).
48 See, for example, Dora Osborne, ed., Archive and Memory in German Literature and Visual 
Culture (Rochester, ny: Camden House, 2015).
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to the civil rights movement in the Peaceful Revolution in the gdr, and they 
want to learn from those experiences and from the work being done today in 
the Stasi Records Authority (BStU) and its legal framework.’49 In this context 
too, the language is of ‘support,’ ‘advice’ and ‘help’ for the non-European part-
ners. It is worth reminding ourselves that the network analysis indicates that 
it is these collaborations which most frequently incorporate the involvement 
of state-level German actors, such as the Foreign Office, and political foun-
dations, whose remit does not explicitly include memory politics and whose 
focus is Germany’s image in the world and the promotion of liberal democracy. 
This is also the case for several of Hohenschönhausen’s collaborations with 
post-Arab Spring countries (for example, the project Contre l’oubli was set up 
at the initiative of the German Foreign Office)50 and indicates that the involve-
ment of actors with different stated motivations within the collaborations may 
also have an impact on the way in which these co-operations are narrated.
However, in the case of the BStU we see an interesting shift: learning from 
the Germans also becomes learning from Central and Eastern Europe. For ex-
ample, the eleventh activity report notes the participation of the BStU in a 
workshop organized by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry on the topic of tran-
sitional justice. The reader is informed: ‘the workshop was aimed especially 
at participants from the countries of the “Arab Spring” and served to pass on 
the experiences of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with regard 
to successes and failures in the working through of dictatorship.’51 In many 
regards, this narrative appears similar to that of ‘Beyond the National’ in 
 Hohenschönhausen’s collaborations within the Platform and can indeed be 
seen as a result of co-operations between the BStU and its sister organizations 
within the enoa. However, where the narrative constructed around the Plat-
form events was more often one of the failure of Europe as a whole, here we see 
the idea of Central and Eastern European successes informing the decisions of 
activists in other post-conflict societies.
2 Beyond the National/Better Together
The narratives constructed around the cross-border collaborations of the BStU 
thus appear to be a complex interweaving of the national and transnational, of 
pride in what are perceived as German achievements and subsuming of these 
achievements into a story of Central and Eastern European co-operation. In-
deed, the BStU promotional material in this period reports considerably more 
49 BStU, Elfter Tätigkeitsbericht, 98.
50 Hohenschönhausen, 7. Tätigkeitsbericht, 81.
51 BStU, Elfter Tätigkeitsbericht, 101.
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on the activities of the institution within pan-European networks, especially 
the enoa, than in similar documentation relating to Hohenschönhausen. Here 
the sense of German superiority in working through difficult pasts disappears 
and is replaced by a narrative of mutual support and encouragement, as well 
as a focus on what unites the history of these different national contexts. One 
example of this phenomenon is the close collaboration of the BStU and the 
Polish inr to construct a common exhibition for the enoa showcasing the his-
tory of the secret police in the different countries represented by the network 
members, as well as the different routes to working through the past. Differ-
ences between the national contexts are acknowledged; however, the very fact 
of a joint exhibition places the emphasis on commonalities. The language here 
is not of ‘learning’ and ‘advice,’ but of ‘co-operation’ and ‘exchange.’
However, it is not only within these large networks that we see this narrative 
of a common history, but also with regard to smaller-scale, but more intensive, 
collaborations. This is where we see the impact of the different structure of 
the BStU’s co-operative activity as described above. The emphasis on close col-
laboration with a smaller number of actors can mean a greater focus on what 
more concretely unites the different national histories. For example, in events 
developed as part of the close co-operation with the Czech Centre and Slovak 
Institute (supported by the Czech and Slovak embassies), the emphasis is on 
shared pasts and presents. In the press release for an event on ‘The Czecho-
slovak and East German Opposition,’ the author asks: ‘how did the opposition 
movements influence one another? And what is the continued impact of the 
common [my emphasis] fight for freedom and democracy in today’s society?’ 
Similarly, the exhibition Lernt Polnisch developed by the BStU, but presented 
in collaboration with a number of Polish partners (including, for example, the 
Polish Ambassador in Berlin, the Head of the inr in Poland and former mem-
bers of Solidarność)52 is framed as a study into the influence of the Solidarność 
movement on opposition in the gdr.
The effect of this narrative is to create a Central and Eastern European com-
munity of remembrance, bringing together the partners of the enoa, but also 
Central and Eastern European actors outside of this network. It is here that we 
can see the combining of the two narratives, as this community of Central and 
Eastern Europeans working ‘better together’ is also one from which others out-
side of this community might learn. We see this in the above description of the 
workshop organized by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, where the ‘others’ are 
non-European actors. However, it is also seen in interactions within broader 
European memory politics. On 14–15 September 2011, the BStU co-organized an 
52 BStU, Zwölfter Tätigkeitsbericht, 84.
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international conference on the topic of the files of communist secret police 
services held at the representation of the European Commission in Berlin. The 
BStU’s co-operation partners were the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft [South-East 
Europe Society] and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde [German 
Society for the Study of Eastern Europe]. According to the eleventh activity re-
port of the BStU, the conference considered ‘the relevance of the approach to 
the legacy of the secret police in Eastern European societies and if the discus-
sion in Eastern Europe provides impulses for a pan-European discussion about 
how to deal with the legacies of other twentieth-century dictatorships.’53 The 
report goes onto list the national contexts from which speakers were drawn, 
mostly Central and Eastern European, ‘but also [my emphasis] Greece and 
Spain.’ We can read this as the counterpart to the ‘othering’ of Eastern Europe-
an approaches to the past, as described by Kaźmierska and Beattie; in this nar-
rative, it is the Western European, alongside the non-European, nations who 
might turn to Central and Eastern European countries and contexts (including 
eastern Germany) for inspiration.
 Towards a Collaborative Memory
The analysis of the networks created by and through the transnational collabo-
rations of these two organizations indicates that institutions use co-operations 
across borders to promote their particular approach to working through the 
past, to forge alliances and groupings and to use these collaborations to con-
struct narratives that are located in the German national context, but also seek 
to assert a Central and Eastern European way of seeing. Moreover, the new 
methodology used here, the combination of network and narrative analysis, 
indicates the importance of looking beyond those institutions most obviously 
involved in memory activism to consider the complex interaction of state and 
civil society initiatives. In sum, these co-operations are important not only for 
comprehending the workings of these institutions, they also indicate some-
thing important about memory across borders and about the reception of dif-
ferent pasts at sites of ‘intercrossing’: that is, that both can be understood in 
terms of collaboration.
Through collaborative activity, memory entrepreneurs create accounts of the 
past, which are not ‘de-territorialized’ in Levy and Sznaider’s terms.54  Rather, 
53 BStU, Elfter Tätigkeitsbericht, 91.
54 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in a Global Age (Philadel-
phia, pa: Temple University Press, 2006), 10.
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they are embraced as territorial narratives of one national context, which can 
be used in an effort to create common pasts or even to transform the dominant 
memory narratives of another. This process is qualitatively different to that 
described by Erll in her concept of ‘travelling memory’ – these narratives do 
not ‘move,’ as such, instead they communicate across borders, whilst remaining 
situated in their original context.55 Collaborative memory is also similar to, but 
distinct from Michael Rothberg’s concept of ‘multidirectional memory.’56 Like 
Rothberg, I wish to go beyond debates about ‘collective memory as competitive 
memory’ [emphasis in original] and to show that memory is instead ‘subject 
to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing.’57 Rothberg’s model 
also highlights the interweaving of memory narratives and demonstrates how 
‘groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into 
being through their dialogical interactions with others.’58 However, with his 
focus on aesthetic representations of memory, Rothberg does not fully analyze 
actual collaborative activity between those elites who construct and maintain 
public narratives about the past. In this sense, Rothberg’s work – while semi-
nal for scholars of transcultural or transnational memory – does not take the 
actor-centered approach I advocated at the start of this chapter.
Indeed, the concept of ‘collaborative memory’ leads away from the focus on 
the objects of memory (or lieux de mémoire) and focuses our attention on the 
agents of European and transnational memory cultures. Collaborative mem-
ory incorporates acts of memory that are constructed through  co-operative 
action between partners in different national contexts. By this I mean the 
 cross-border events themselves, as well as the public stories about the past and 
the processes of coming to terms with it that are constructed around these 
events. Collaborative memory in this sense is emphatically not understood as a 
normative (that is, necessarily desirable) concept, rather one that can be used 
to describe and explain empirical phenomena. As seen in the analysis above, 
collaboration can be used in multiple ways which may not necessarily result in 
a progressive memory politics. Development of our memory studies conceptu-
al toolbox towards a ‘collaborative memory’ might thus allow us to more fully 
understand these interactions at a granular level and to explain their impact 
on broader memory cultures.
55 Erll, ‘Travelling Memory.’
56 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory.
57 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, 3.
58 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, 5.
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chapter 3
The Polish Elites’ Struggle for Recognition of the 
Experience of Communism in the European Union
Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach
The course of history placed Poles outside the reflections on the shape of the 
political processes in Western Europe after the Second World War. Neverthe-
less, the origins of various Polish concepts and visions of the country’s place 
in Europe can be traced back to the 15th and 16th centuries and the Golden 
Age of the Jagiellonian Commonwealth. Throughout the difficult years of 
their  troubled history, the Polish elites referred to Western Europe as an impor-
tant cultural source and a civilisation they belonged to. It was also during the 
 period of Communism that – especially for the democratic opposition – West-
ern  Europe was a source of inspiration and resources.1 Europe,  particularly 
Western Europe, was then to Poles a very significant point of reference and one 
which was essential for their collective identity. Whether as a paradise of wealth 
and higher level of consumption, for Poles who dreamt of a better life, or as a 
land of freedom and high culture, for those Poles who had more intellectual 
and cultural ambitions, Western Europe was a dreamland, on the other side of 
the Iron Curtain, accessible only sporadically on occasions of infrequent tour-
ist or professional visits. When Communism ended in Poland and Central and 
Eastern Europe (cee), Poles eagerly and almost immediately declared their 
intention to ‘return to Europe’. Western Europe, or simply ‘the West’, as it was 
then commonly referred to, was seen in Poland as a largely undifferentiated, 
homogenized area of freedom, democracy and prosperity. Little was known 
about the internal diversity of Western Europe, and even less about the differ-
ent problematic issues related to collective memory, sensitivities and conflicts 
of interpretation of European history. An example of the difficult lessons of 
European conflicts of attitudes and interpretations which Poles had to learn 
was the experience of the war against Iraq in 2003, in which some eu member 
states supported the usa, while others refused to participate in the invasion. In 
the decision of the latter group, anti-American sentiments played an important 
1 Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach, “Between Old Fears and New Challenges. The Polish 
Debate of Europe”, in European Stories. Intellectual Debates in National Contexts, ed. Justine 
Lacroix, Kalypso Nicolaïdis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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role. Poles had to understand that they might have to take sides and choose be-
tween different Western countries, which, before 1989, were seen from the Pol-
ish perspective as the unified ‘West’. The situation also stressed the importance 
of how the actions of political actors were perceived and received by Western 
counter partners, and it displayed the interactivity of European politics.
The research on the debate on the future of Europe highlights the fact that 
it has seemed very difficult for Poles, both ordinary people and intellectuals, 
to think in terms of a common, European ‘we’.2 European interests were previ-
ously not perceived as being equal to Polish interests and solidarity did not 
extend beyond national borders. Poles tend to think of the eu predominantly 
from a national point of view. The eu is good if and when it contributes to 
Poland’s strength, prosperity and security. One might say that Europe is seen in 
Poland as an instrumental value, not a value in itself. A pro-European position 
considers European integration as good for Poland, while an anti-European 
approach believes that European integration deprives Poland of values essen-
tial for its identity and well-being – mainly political sovereignty, tradition and 
Roman Catholicism (identified here as the essence of Polishness). At the same 
time, however, Poles express high levels of optimism as regards the eu, and the 
European component is crucial for the Polish collective identification.
The focus of this chapter is on how the experience of Communism still 
shapes the behaviour of Polish elites and politicians and how they use the 
memory of Communism in order to claim recognition within the eu. How has 
the specific historical experience of Communism influenced the reflection on 
Europe, identification with Europe and perception of this political project in 
Poland? How have political actors in the eu perceived such claims? The eastern 
eu enlargement has challenged the established Western European notions of 
the memory of the Second World War and particularly the insignificance of the 
Communist crimes vis-à-vis those of the Nazi regime. As Maria Mälksoo claims 
‘in spite of the institutional unification of the “two halves of Europe” after the 
end of the Cold War, the consolidation of the legacy of the Second World War 
in general, and that of the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe in particular, is long 
overdue. Europe has remained divided when it comes to the political, moral, 
and legal evaluation of the criminal inheritance of the other totalitarian tradi-
tion in the history of the twentieth century – that of Soviet Communism’.3 The 
problem with the recognition of the totalitarian nature of Soviet Communism 
2 Góra, Mach, Between Old Fears; Magdalena Góra, “Solidarity of Citizens and of States in the 
European Union”, Visegrad Insight 2:4 (2013).
3 Maria Mälksoo, “The Discourse of Communist Crimes in the European Memory Politics 
of World War ii”, (paper presented at the Ideology and Discourse Analysis conference 
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and its crimes in cee has already attracted attention, even though it still raises 
many controversies. In this chapter we will use the concept of recognition in 
order to analyze how it is utilized for political purposes in everyday European 
politics. The concept of recognition allows capturing the dialogical nature of 
the processes in European politics and focus not only on the claimants but also 
on the reception of claims.
In the following sections we will first provide a theoretical background of 
our analysis and present the concept of recognition and its role in contem-
porary European politics. In the second part we will explain how the memory 
of Communism and historical politics has functioned on the domestic level 
in Poland. In the final part we will present the analysis of debates from the 
 European Parliament, where claims for recognition of the historical experi-
ence of Poland have stirred up fervent debates.
 Recognition, Collective Identity, Redistribution and  
Collective Memory
Since the 1960s scholars dealing with the functioning of contemporary societ-
ies have been increasingly focusing on the concept of recognition. The process 
of recognition is a crucial element of one’s subjectivity and a foundation of 
a process of identification understood in relational terms when the other is 
necessarily involved in a mutual relationship. According to Charles Taylor’s 
observation, ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer 
real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back 
to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-
recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’.4 Recog-
nition is therefore relational and dialogical in its nature. The reception of the 
claims for recognition and response to it matters. Recognition is not only about 
‘an expectation of the confirmation of abilities and value by the other’,5 it is 
also about socialization and social integration ‘through the regulated forms 
 ‘Rethinking Political Frontiers and Democracy in a New World Order’, Roskilde University, 
Denmark, 8–10 September 2008), 1.
4 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Multiculturalism. The Examination the Politics 
of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25.
5 Christian Lazzeri and Alain Caillé, “Recognition Today. The Theoretical, Ethical and Political 
Stakes of the Concept”, in Recognition, Work, Politics. New Directions in French Critical Theory, 
ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), 92.
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of recognition’.6 Recognition allows us then to grasp the nature of legitimized 
social order being such ‘only to the degree that they [societies] are in a posi-
tion to guarantee reliable relations of mutual recognition at various levels’.7 
Therefore, in the increasingly diverse societies of Western Europe, the concept 
of recognition has become a tool to better grasp the dynamics of relationships 
between various groups: ethnic and national minorities (also immigration 
groups), women, sexual minorities etc. Ultimately, it is worth mentioning that 
the thinkers who introduced and developed the concept of recognition also 
had a normative idea in mind, namely how to build a just, modern society.8 In 
this regard, the concept of recognition ‘defines the conditions of a just society 
through the aim of recognizing the individual dignity of all individuals’.9
This normative aspect has led to the emergence of the politics of recognition 
at least since the 1960s, defined as a need to deal with the existence of multiple 
identities and recognition of the diversity of belongings in the contemporary 
world.10 The issue of recognition becomes central in contemporary societies 
and assumes that it is ‘a complex multilateral web of relations and their affects 
among actors of different types’.11 This multiplicity of dimensions and actors 
in turn has resulted in the introduction of the concept of  recognition order, 
understood as ‘a framework within which individuals and groups are learn-
ing to see themselves as recognised with respect to certain characteristics’.12 
The recognition order was firstly conceptualized and analyzed within nation 
state frames of reference and in such a context the politics of recognition was 
mostly analyzed.
The politics of recognition deals with the question of how domestic institu-
tions such as schools, universities, mass media, health care institutions and 
the army respond to and accommodate the necessity of the recognition of di-
verse social composition.13 It results in an important dilemma of politics of 
6 Axel Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice”, Acta Socio-




10 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts 
( Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Taylor, “The Politics”.
11 James Tully, “Struggles over Recognition and Distribution”, Constellations 7:4 (2001), 474.
12 Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser”, in Fraser N., 
Honneth A., Redistribution of recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (London, 
New York: Verso, 2003) quoted in John Erik Fossum, “Conceptualizing the eu’s Social Con-
stituency”, European Journal of Social Theory 8:2 (2005), 125.
13 Amy Gutman, “Introduction”, in Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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 recognition, stressing that in principle the public sphere should be ‘difference 
blind’ in order to fulfil the principle of recognition.14 Introducing reflection in 
the politics of recognition allows one to reconsider the fundamental condition 
on which contemporary liberal democracy is built in the context of increas-
ingly diverse societies. This reflection is especially potent in the context of the 
politics of recognition entering the supranational arena, particularly within 
the eu. This will be developed further in the next section.
However, the politics of recognition also highlights the important as-
pect of redistribution, as famously raised by Nancy Fraser and debated with 
 Honneth.15 Social movements demanding recognition – such as the women’s 
or African American rights movements – have also focused on more just redis-
tribution. Fraser argues that these are ‘two dimensions of justice’ in contempo-
rary societies that need to be addressed. She claims, ‘it is my general thesis that 
justice today requires both redistribution and recognition, as neither alone is 
sufficient’.16 In order to establish what the relationship between them is, Fraser 
makes the assumption that recognition is a matter of justice: ‘One should say, 
rather, that it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status 
of full partners in social interactions simply as a consequence of institution-
alized patterns of interpretation and evaluation in whose construction they 
have not equally participated and that disparage their distinctive character-
istics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them’.17 As a consequence, 
 misrecognition is a social phenomenon, which influences the position in social 
relations including the redistribution. Fraser therefore proposes a bivalent con-
ception of justice, which ‘does not treat recognition as a good to be  distributed, 
nor distribution as an expression of recognition. Rather, a bivalent conception 
treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimen-
sions of, justice, while at the same time encompassing both of them within a 
broader, overarching framework’.18 We argue that the main link between the 
two is through identity.19 As we have already stated above – the recognition 
is about including various narratives in mainstream collective identification 
and treating them as just and appropriate. Similarly, including certain groups 
14 Taylor, “The Politics”, 40.
15 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution of recognition? A Political-Philosophical 
Exchange (London, New York: Verso 2003).
16 Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, 
and Participation”, (the Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Delivered at Stanford Univer-
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in mainstream identification processes equips them with the legitimization to 
claim for redistribution. This two-dimensional aspect of recognition claims is 
connected with identity-oriented elements and economic demands within the 
recognition order and will serve as the theoretical basis for analyzing the aims 
of the recognition claims of Polish political actors within the eu.
The debates on the politics of recognition have also entered the supranation-
al level, especially in the context of the European integration. Scholars argue 
that, at least since the beginning of the 1990s, the politics of recognition devel-
oped mainly within the national framework has also entered the supranational 
level.20 This is connected with the growing significance of policy-making and 
redistribution within the eu. Therefore, argues John Erik Fossum, the eu can 
become a new, broader recognition order if citizens and political actors seek 
recognition not only in the nation states but also in supranational arenas.21 
Fossum also argues that this may lead to the creation of the eu as a social 
constituency, meaning that the eu will develop beyond a merely functional 
order and will transform into a full-fletched polity, especially for its citizens. 
According to him, this transformation has already started, as was specifically 
visible during the 2004 eu enlargement. After the enlargement of the eu, new 
political actors from cee started to express their particular, historically deter-
mined and hegemonic (in terms of distribution of power) demands of equal 
recognition.22 The new claims and new perspective brought by meps from cee 
regarding the recognition of the Christian elements of European identity and 
politics could serve as an example.23
Such demands for recognition within the eu serve several purposes. Firstly, 
they focus on the recognition of certain collective identifications within Eu-
ropean mainstream narrative and as a result claim belonging to the European 
community. In the context of this chapter, political actors from cee demand 
recognition of their unique historical experience of the Second World War and 
Communism in order to receive equal status in the eu. Secondly, derived from 
the identity-oriented aspect of recognition, the demand allows actors to claim 
fair redistribution within the eu political system. It is an especially important 
20 Zenia Hellgren and Barbara Hobson, “Gender and ethnic minority claims in Swedish and 
eu frames. Sites of Multilevel Political Opportunities and Boundary Making”, in Gender 
politics in the expanding European Union: mobilization, inclusion, exclusion, ed. Silke Roth 
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008).
21 Fossum, “Conceptualizing”.
22 Ibid.
23 Magdalena Góra and Katarzyna Zielińska, “Defenders of faith? Victims of secularization? 
Polish politicians in the European Parliament”, Religion, State, Society 42:2–3 (2014).
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aspect because within the eu new injustices may emerge and, as a result, a 
new axis of conflict could form.24 The important aspect of the claims for rec-
ognition is their reception. It is a dialogical, interactive construction where 
the success of the claimant depends on whether or not claims are received as 
 legitimate. Therefore it is crucial not only to look at the claimants but also at 
the reception of the claims.
The specific aspect of theoretical debate on recognition concerns the role 
of the past experience of groups in their demands for recognition and redis-
tribution. Various groups claim the recognition of their unique historical ex-
perience and heritage. As Carlos Closa puts it, ‘Recognition of memory in a 
given community restores persons’ dignity by means of policies which take 
into account their claims. Recognition thus is an essential component of poli-
cies of memory and politics of memory are the struggles for recognition of 
memory claims’.25 It is an old dilemma in democratic societies how to recog-
nize various, different and often contradicting narratives of past experiences 
and how to deal with the attempts to falsify history. Especially in cee, strong 
conflicts  of memory frequently arise.26 This is especially significant due to 
the role of memory in shaping dominant collective identifications in contem-
porary societies. In the European context, political actors from cee demand 
 recognition of their experience and suffering. According to this concept, if Eu-
ropeans want to construct collective identity on equal terms, various histori-
cal  experiences – also those of Communism – must be taken as equally valid. 
As Carlos Closa states, ‘in the view of its [equal recognition] proponents, the 
dominant narrative on European history (as reflected by education, symbolic 
practices and awareness initiatives) reflects predominantly (and for some only 
exclusively) the experiences of the Western part of the continent whilst the 
historical experience of Central and Eastern European countries has not been 
included’.27 Maria Mälksoo, on the other hand, has stressed that the cee ac-
tors make ‘vocal claims of “equal subjectivity” in the European mnemopoliti-
cal field as well as reverberate their increasing sense of confidence about the 
24 John Erik Fossum and Marit Eldholm, “Conceptualising (and tentatively mapping) the 
eu’s social constituency”, in Civic Resources and the Future of the European Union, ed. Ire-
neusz Pawel Karolewski, Viktoria Kaina (London: Routledge, 2012).
25 Closa, “Negotiating the Past”, 6.
26 Siobhan Kattago, “Memory, Pluralism and the Agony of Politics”, Journal of Baltic Studies 
41:3 (2010); Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, History, Memory and Politics in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Memory Games (Basingstoke: Plagrave Macmillan, 2013).
27 Closa, “Negotiating the Past”, 12.
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density of their ties to the Euro-Atlantic security community’.28 Both scholars 
link ‘equal’ claims to the sense of belonging in community along the lines of 
recognition theory.
There is growing research on the content of these claims. Closa lists sev-
eral elements raised in the European public sphere when equal recognition is 
demanded. The dominant demands are for condemnation of the communist 
regimes: the criminalization of the denial of so-called totalitarian crimes, the 
recognition of commemoration dates which are linked to facts of memory of 
cee countries, and the teaching of history integrating cee perspectives and fi-
nally focusing on memorialization policies.29 Mälksoo focuses on the  demand 
for the recognition of the criminal nature of Soviet Communism and the rec-
ognition of its crimes as genocide.30 Other scholars analyzing the politics of 
memory of Polish actors on the European level stress three main areas where a 
unique perspective is used most frequently: the insistence of the commemora-
tion of the Katyń massacre, the specific Polish experience under Communism, 
and the special relations with Poland’s new Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, 
 Belarus and Lithuania).31 Recently scholars have also focused on the way po-
litical actors from new member states became memory entrepreneurs in order 
to promote their claims.32
During the process of eu accession, one of the most important topics high-
lighted by Western actors was connected with the narrative on the Second 
World War. Specifically in the case of Poland it concerned the Holocaust re-
membrance and the reintroduction to the public discourse of the complicated 
relations between Poles, Jews and the Nazi and Soviet occupiers. Another topic 
has covered the forced transfers of population – particularly German – after 
the Second World War. These attempts were perceived as a Europeanization 
of the discourse on history in Europe. For years, however, the process of the 
Europeanization of historical discourse was asymmetrical – the demands were 
directed mostly at the cee countries.
28 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”, 7.
29 Closa, “Negotiating the Past”.
30 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”.
31 Matt Killingsworth, Małgorzata Klatt and Stefan Auer, “Where Does Poland Fit in Europe? 
How Political Memory Influences Polish meps’ Perceptions of Poland’s place in Europe”, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11:4 (2010).
32 Laure Neumayer, “Integrating the Central European Past into a Common Narrative: The 
Mobilizations Around the ‘Crimes of Communism’ in the European Parliament”, in: Jour-
nal of Contemporary European Studies 23:3 (2015).
Góra and Mach64
<UN>
In this chapter we will look at the other direction of the process of 
 Europeanization of history discourse when political actors from cee direct 
certain claims for recognition to and their reception by the Western European 
actors.
 Collective Memory and Historical Politics in Poland  
after Communism
Polish national identity, collective memory, political culture and the  perception 
of Europe are a result of Poland’s unique location between East and West and 
specific historical processes. The geopolitical location and strong identification 
with Western European civilization versus the East have resulted in constant 
tensions in the region and developed a strong sensitivity towards the past in 
Poland.33 The experience of the Nazi occupation and later of the Communism 
rule has contributed to the sense of betrayal by the West and strengthened the 
endangered collective identity.
Since 1989 the issue of dealing with the past has resurfaced. First and fore-
most, as for previous centuries, the turn to the West as a source of security, 
modernization and prosperity has become a widely accepted policy priority. 
The initial political idea of how to deal with the heritage of Communism was 
the concept of a ‘thick line’ promoted by the first democratic Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He claimed: ‘We split away the history of our recent past 
with a thick line. We will be responsible only for what we have done to help 
extract Poland from her current predicament, from now on’.34 It was meant to 
allow the focus to shift more to the current challenges of the devastated coun-
try and promote a fresh start. However, it was very soon interpreted as a call for 
cutting off what had happened before 1989, avoiding de-Communisation and 
33 Joanna Pękacz, “‘Antemurale of Europe’. From the History of National Megalomania In 
Poland”, History of European Ideas 20:1–3 (1995); Georges Sanford, “Overcoming the Bur-
den of History in Polish Foreign Policy”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Poli-
tics 19:3 (2003); Janusz Tazbir, “Europejska wspólnota obronna”, in Europa. Drogi integracji, 
ed. Aniela. Dylus (Warszawa: Studium Generale Europa, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana 
Wyszyńskiego, 1999).
34 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, “Wnioski Prezydenta prl o odwołaniu ze stanowiska Prezesa Rady 
Ministrów Czesława Kiszczaka oraz o powołanie na stanowisko Prezesa Rady Ministrów 
Tadeusza Mazowieckiego”, in Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej X Kadencji, Sprawozdanie 
Stenograficzne z 6 Posiedzenia Sejmu, 23 i 24 sierpnia 1989, Warszawa 1989, accessed August 
2014, http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenogramyX.nsf/0/259278CD28DE3BBDC1257D20002CC6
FD/$file/006_000006771.pdf (authors’ own translation).
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not punishing those responsible for crimes committed during Communism. 
Very soon the right-wing parties which emerged from the Solidarity camp 
started to question Mazowiecki’s approach and criticize the Round Table ac-
cords as a means for the systemic transition into democracy. They perceived it 
as a rotten compromise allowing the Communist elites to regain power within 
the economic realm and they demanded lustration. There were several at-
tempts to pursue this, none of which ever fully succeeded.35
At the end of the first democratic decade new political forces such as Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość (PiS – Law and Justice), founded in 2001 and based on the 
previous centre-right wing parties, started to call for a new opening and the 
pursuit of historical politics in the country. It was a result of the harsh criticism 
of the first decade of democracy in Poland: ‘this project consisted of several 
clear elements: from the idea of moral pluralism and the neutrality of the state, 
with the conviction of the imitative nature of the Polish transformation, the 
recognition of a fast modernisation as a major goal (including cultural mod-
ernisation), stemming from the lack of trust and reluctance to the national 
tradition, the ban on de-communisation and so on. (…) It did not pay much at-
tention to the question of the affirmative sharpening of identity and collective 
memory’.36 So this affirmative shaping of Polish collective memory became a 
political goal to be pursued on the domestic level. Historical politics became 
a central element of the political programme of PiS and also became popular 
among other centre and right-wing parties in Poland. The content of this af-
firmative shaping concerned predominantly the period of the Second World 
War and specifically the way relations between German and Soviet occupiers, 
the Polish population and Jews were interpreted. A good illustration for this 
wasthe two fierce debates following the publication of the Jan T. Gross books 
in 2001 and 2006.37
35 Natalia Letki, “Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe”, Europe-Asia 
Studies 54:4 (2002); Kieran Williams, Aleks Szczerbiak and Brigid Fowler, “Explaining 
Lustration in Eastern Europe: ‘A Post-communist politics approach’”, sei Working Pa-
per 62 (2003), accessed August 2014 https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file 
.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-62.pdf&site=266; Lavinia Stan (ed.), Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union. Reckoning with the communist past (London: Routledge, 
2009).
36 Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo słowo/obraz teryto-
ria, 2005), 8.
37 Tomasz J. Gross, Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland 
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The second major focus of historical politics in Poland has been dealing with 
the legacy of Communism. Apart from the first attempts at lustration in 1992 
and 1997/8, the new post-Solidarity government initiated in 1997 the creation 
of Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (ipn – the Institute of National Remembrance) 
whose main duty was to gather documents, hold inquiries into Nazi and Com-
munist crimes and to educate people.38 The historical politics and ipn itself 
raised high emotions in domestic politics: ‘ipn became a most important, visi-
ble and controversial institution of contemporary Poland’.39 Yet, the additional 
goal of historical politics in Poland was directed outside the country, especially 
at the European institutions and states, with special attention to the European 
Parliament as the agora of the eu. As the leader of PiS (at that time in opposi-
tion) said in a debate on foreign policy in the Polish parliament in 2003:
And the next issues are very important to our status, but our activities 
are – let’s say – not enough, if not non-existent. These are historical is-
sues, the issue of the dignity of our nation; it is how we assess the Second 
World War, and all this connected with the great liberation from Com-
munism (applause). There is tendency in Europe, not to mention the usa, 
where it is even stronger, to equal guilt and contributions from this pe-
riod, also from the period of the Second World War. Recently such a decla-
ration was made by the European Parliament. It is about, let’s admit that, 
treating all equally – all suffered losses, all committed crimes. And on the 
other hand there is a well-known defamatory campaign against our na-
tion as regards its “involvement”, and I use inverted comas here, in holo-
caust; its alleged co-responsibility for this most horrible crime of the war. 
Now our actions to prevent this are definitely too weak. We can even talk 
about the participation in such defamatory actions of some – not of Pol-
ish diplomacy but – of Polish elites (applause). We need to be clear and 
decided, we need to undertake all possible actions in order to prevent it.40
Similar statements were made frequently, especially in debates related to 
the role in the eu and especially about relations with Germany. In 2005, for 
 instance, another leader of PiS stated: ‘I want to thank for those very clear and 
38 Dariusz Stola, “Poland’s Institute of national Remembrance: A Ministry of Memory?”, 
in The Convolutions of Historical Politics, ed. A. Miller, M. Lipman (Budapest: Central 
 European University Press, 2012).
39 Ibid., 48.
40 Jarosław Kaczyński, “Wypowiedź w debacie”, in Informacja rządu na temat polskiej pol-
ityki zagranicznej w 2003 roku. 4 kadencja, 40 posiedzenie, 2 dzień (22 January 2003), 
 accessed August 2014 http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf (authors’ own translation).
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so far unsaid words on the issue of historical truth and on the issue of German 
responsibility for the crimes committed during the Second World War. If such 
words were spelled out regularly and firmly, parts of the problems in Polish-
German relations would not be present today’.41 Such an approach – to fight 
for the historically understood dignity and honour of the nation – has a long 
tradition in Poland. It stems from the gentry which dominated the political 
culture and difficult past on the one hand, and connects to the vivid memory 
of the glorious times of the Jagiellonian Commonwealth on the other. What 
is especially interesting for this chapter is that such an approach has been 
pursued by significant political actors in Poland not only on the domestic 
level but also that it also had a very clear connection to the debate on the 
role of Poland in the eu on the eve of its enlargement to the East. The peak 
of the attempts to deal with the past, especially of the Communist legacy, was 
reached in the first years following the eu enlargement. In 2005, PiS formed a 
ruling coalition (in office until the pre-term elections in 2007) with the right-
wing Liga Polskich Rodzin (lpr – League of Polish Families) as well as the 
populist Samoobrona rp (srp – Self-defence). As regards historical politics, 
the main elements of this government’s approach on the domestic level were 
focused on lustration. A new law was adopted in 2006, amended in 2007 and 
later rejected by the Constitutional Court. On the international and European 
level, the main aim was to receive recognition of the totalitarian nature of 
Communism and actions against the alleged defamation of the Polish nation. 
It is important to note that such an approach to historical politics was sup-
ported by PiS and lpr as well as by other political parties from the centre-
right wing groups. The second most important party on the Polish political 
scene, the centre-right wing Platforma Obywatelska (po – Civic Platform) only 
 partially – especially its conservative wing – subscribed to such an agenda. 
The left wing and liberal parties and liberal circles openly opposed lustration 
attempts and were much more cautious about the historical politics coined in 
the 2005–2007 period. Ultimately, the Polish historical politics which gained 
attention and strength in domestic politics also become visible in the Euro-
pean arena, especially in the European Parliament which was perceived as an 
agora of the European Union.
Polish representation in the European Parliament in the 6th and 7th term 
in office was the largest among the new member states and consisted of 50–54 
meps (depending on the term in office). In both the 2004 and 2009 elections, 
41 Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski, “Wypowiedź w debacie”, in Informacja Ministra Spraw 
 Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2005 roku, 4 kadencja, 96 
posiedzenie, 3 dzień (21 January 2005), accessed August 2014 http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/ 
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centre-right wing and right wing parties won the majority of the votes. The 
winner of both elections, po, joined the Group of European People’s Party 
(Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (epp-ed) together with Pol-
skie Stronnictwo Ludowe (psl – Polish People’s Party). The two other winners 
in 2004: lpr and PiS joined the right-wing party groups. PiS went for Union for 
a Europe of the Nations Group (uen) and remained in this party for the en-
tire term in office, while the lpr at first joined Independence and Democracy 
Group (Ind/dem). Yet the party split and the majority of the ten lpr meps 
went to other national formations (mostly PiS) and, as a result, joined uen in 
the ep. Similarly srp split (four meps out of six left) as well as psl (three meps 
out of four left). The left-wing parties joined Group of the Party of European 
Socialists (pes), and liberal formation Unia Wolności (uw – Freedom Union) 
joined Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (alde). 
During the elections for the 7th ep (2009–2014) the right-wing (lpr) and popu-
list (srp) parties did not cross the electoral threshold. Their electorate went 
mostly to PiS which doubled its result in 2009. PiS joined the newly created 
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ecr).
In the following we will provide an analysis of Polish meps’ interventions 
in and reception of the 6th and 7th ep. In order to do so we have selected 11 
debates devoted to topics connected with commemoration of totalitarianism, 
programmes financing such commemorations etc. However, we have also in-
cluded debates concerning issues not directly related with collective memory 
or the past. These are debates focusing on issues connected with solidarity and 
redistribution in the eu (see Annex 1).
The purpose of this selection was to analyze the claims for recognition in 
the context of the debates on history and memory, but also in less obvious 
situations. The relevant claims were analyzed as regards their content (what 
should be recognized?), the addressee (by whom?) and for what reason (why 
should it be recognized?). Finally our interest was the reception of the claims. 
It must be noted, however, that the empirical material limits the way that the 
responses to the analyzed claims are captured. The plenary debates in the ep 
allow dialogical exchange of opinions, but the limited time allocated to speak-
ers and the fact that meps rarely reappear during the same debate are imping-
ing the interactivity and dialogue between meps.
 Recognition in European Parliament debates
An analysis of the debates shows that the focus of Polish meps on the recogni-
tion of their historical, unique experience was most important immediately 
after the eu enlargement in 2004. During the 6th term in office of the ep it 
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seems that debates on the crimes of Soviet Communism were more frequent 
and heated. The significance of these issues seems to have faded away in the 
ep’s 7th term in office, although claims for recognition remained important. 
This is probably because the main purpose of the claims was, for those making 
them, to find and assert their own position within the eu and confirm their 
own identity as belonging, although equipped with a different – but equally 
important – historical experience. That had to change with time, and such 
claims became less frequent when political actors started feeling more assured 
in the new institutions. In other words, the discussions in the eu on the past 
and memory seemed to follow from the enlargement. Moreover it is impor-
tant to note that the debates were initiated by the memory entrepreneurs from 
cee.42
The interesting issue remains as to who raised the claims for recognition 
most often among Polish meps. The most actively involved in debates and 
most often using the recognition claims were meps from the centre and right-
wing party groups in the ep – uen, Ind/Dem, epp-ed and ecr. The meps from 
alde and pes participated in these debates much less frequently and used the 
recognition claims even less. This is in tune with the analysis of the histori-
cal politics on the national level. The meps using recognition arguments came 
from parties that were devoted to puruse historical politics on the domestic 
political scene, such as PiS, lpr and partially po.
 Soviet Communism Equals Totalitarianism
One of the main claims of cee actors immediately after the end of the Cold 
War was (and still is) that the atrocities of the Nazi regime be treated equally 
with those of Soviet Communism. This argument still causes controversies in 
academic discussions and raises fervent debates among politicians in Europe.
The demand for equal treatment of the Nazi and Soviet regimes is often raised 
by Polish meps in debates in the ep. The main call is for Soviet  Communism 
to be treated in Western European historiography and politics as totalitarian-
ism, as should the crimes committed under this system. The second most often 
raised claim is recognition of the crimes under Soviet Communism as geno-
cide. These claims mostly concern the period of the Second World War and its 
immediate aftermath. However, they also appear in the debate on commemo-
ration of Holodomor in Ukraine before the war. It is also important to note that 
some meps have stressed that these demands do not diminish the significance 
of the Nazi crimes, especially the Holocaust, as sometimes alleged by their 
opponents,43 but rather that the recognition of the criminal  character of any 
42 Neumayer “Integrating”.
43 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”.
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totalitarian regime makes European societies more immune to its devastating 
effects. Finally, some meps demand recognition of specific crimes against the 
Polish nation which in their opinion are not properly known and commemo-
rated, such as the Katyń massacre. Such claims are also obviously directed to 
the memory politics of Russia. It is important to note that even though some 
meps call for the eu to put pressure on Russia to deal with its past, most of 
them are actually very moderate in their demands toward  Moscow and focus 
rather on the eu and its member states and societies.
These claims are predominantly about ‘inclusion of their [cee societies] 
wartime experiences in the currently West-European bent understanding of 
the implication and ramification of this war’.44 In many meps’ statements, their 
claims have a universalistic, European motivation. As one of them argued, ‘in-
dividual nations had very different experiences of the Second World War, and 
so the debate we are holding today is perhaps the most important debate on 
European identity that has been held for years. If we genuinely wish to join to-
gether to form a single European spiritual community, we must all endeavour 
to gain a full understanding of the historical experiences of Europe’s nations. 
In order to do so, there are certain issues about which we must speak quite 
frankly’.45 According to Polish political actors, a European identity suitable for 
the societies of old and new member states is at stake, as are European values. 
The main motivation expressed for the recognition of the totalitarian nature 
of Soviet Communism is, generally speaking, a  common future in the eu. One 
of the meps from uen argued, ‘The building of a democratic Europe is pos-
sible only on the foundations of truth, including the truth about  anti-human 
communist totalitarianism. We owe remembrance and justice not only to the 
victims of inhuman systems; first of all we owe it to present and future genera-
tions so that this situation does not happen again’.46 Many meps claim that 
this recognition should be granted in order to create a sense of belonging in the 
community. Another frequently raised motivation deals with European values: 
‘The more Europeans know about the true face of  totalitarianism, the better it 
44 Ibid. 2.
45 Wojciech Roszkowski (uen), “The future of Europe sixty years after the Second World 
War”, European Parliament plenary debate (11 May 2005) accessed August 2014, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2
b20050511%2bITEM-016%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN.
46 Mirosław Piotrowski (uen), “Proposed hearing of the Commission on crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by totalitarian regimes” European 
Parliament plenary debate, (21 April 2008), accessed August 2014, http://www.europarl 
.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20080421%2
bITEM-015%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN.
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will be for the future of the European Union. This is not a matter of celebrat-
ing the sufferings of millions of people. It is about understanding the dramatic 
consequences which came from and are still coming from  totalitarian prac-
tices in many countries in Europe. Solidarity, freedom, empathy, toleration, 
dialogue – all of these values look somewhat different if we look at them from 
the perspective of experiences with totalitarianism. Let us remember this’.47
Another interesting aspect of the analysis of Polish meps’ claims is to whom 
they direct their demands. Most often, it is Western Europe in general and its 
societies. Less frequently – and specifically in cases of concrete instruments 
of commemoration – it is eu institutions, especially the European Commis-
sion, that are the addressees of the claims. In a few instances – predominantly 
by meps from centre- and right-wing party groups – the political opponents 
are addressed. Specifically, claims about the totalitarian nature of Soviet Com-
munism are frequently directed to the European Left, whom some right-wing 
meps believe relativizes the crimes of Communism for ideological reasons: 
‘Whoever today relativises the criminal character of totalitarianism, be it Nazi 
or Communist totalitarianism, stands in opposition to the traditions of a coun-
try ruled by law and to democracy. It is, by the way, characteristic that while 
the European Right does not relativise Nazi crimes today, the European Left 
does relativise Communist crimes’.48 However, also voices from the Left itself – 
albeit very few – raise this problem. As a Polish mep from the pes declared: 
‘We are opposed to the manipulation of that memory, and to the insulting of 
that memory, where it is used today in an ideological battle, in a party fight 
in the European political system. We remember the victims. The victims of 
 20th-century totalitarian regimes must be the foundation of today’s democ-
racy in Europe’.49
The claims for recognition of the significance of the crimes of Soviet Com-
munism, especially during the Second World War, serve a double purpose 
for meps from Poland. Firstly, it equates the cee experience with that of 
Western Europe, and therefore combats the Orientalist, essentially colonial 
approach of Western Europeans to this experience.50 As a result, it paves the 
way for an equal position in the eu, making this experience equally  important 
47 Filip Kaczmarek (ppe-de), “European conscience and totalitarianism” European Parlia-
ment plenary debate (25 March 2009) accessed August 2014, http://www.europarl. europa 
.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+ 
V0//EN.
48 Wojciech Roszkowski (uen), “European conscience”.
49 Józef Pinior (pse), “European conscience”.
50 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”.
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and therefore serving the emerging European identity and community of the 
new, united Europe. Secondly, this reaffirms their own identity as fully-fledged 
Europeans and secures their place in the eu. This is also visible in less dra-
matic debates on the experience of living under Communism and fighting its 
system.
The reception of such claims resonates with its prime purpose of  achieving 
an equal position within the community. Frequently the claims are positioned 
as justified. As one of the meps stated: ‘the history of central and eastern 
 Europe is our history. The problem for us British and for us French is that we 
were Stalin’s allies at the end of the War. It took 30 years for the British to ad-
mit that Katyn was a Stalinist crime’.51 It is important to note that especially 
epp politicians used the term of Stalinist totalitarianism in their statements: 
‘Although National Socialist totalitarianism was vanquished in 1945, Stalinist 
totalitarianism divided Europe and imposed its unjust rule on the peoples of 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Hope, though, did not desert the 
less happy survivors of the Second World War – the hope of a shared Europe, 
intellectually, morally and politically renewed, with the prospect of prosperity 
for all its citizens. To this hope they eventually gave shape in a peaceful revolu-
tion, the watchword for which was Solidarnosc’.52 That is consistent with find-
ings of scholars analyzing the process of mnemonic entrepreneurship that was 
especially successful within epp.53
However, representatives for the radical left-wing party group (gue/ngl) 
fiercely opposed during the analyzed debates, not the recognition of Stalin-
ism as totalitarianism, but rather – in the words of an gue/ngl mep – ‘the 
attempt surreptitiously to trivialise Nazism by placing it in a generic category 
that includes, in particular, Stalinism and even the regimes existing in central 
and eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall’.54 Such arguments – 
especially expressed by far left parties – have not changed much over time. 
They were reflected in the interparty conflicts as epp mep stressed: ‘there is 
a further dimension to this debate. It is not only a united Europe that needs 
urgently to look at the entirety of the past, but the same is particularly true of 
the European Left’.55
51 Christopher Beazley (ppe-de), “Proposed hearing”.
52 Hans-Gert Pöttering (ppe-de), “The future of Europe”.
53 Neumayer “Integrating”.
54 Francis Wurtz (gue/ngl), “Proposed hearing”.
55 Gyorgi Schöpflin (ppe-de), “European conscience”.
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 Who Ended the Cold War and Why Does it Matter?
A very frequent claim raised by Polish meps regards the significance of the ex-
perience of the opposition struggles in Poland under Communism for a united 
Europe. This is specifically visible when the Solidarity movement is mentioned 
in the ep. The main argument raised by Polish meps deals with the universality 
of values for which the Solidarity movement fought, as well as their comple-
mentarities with Western European values. The main claim was predominant-
ly about the recognition of Poles as part of the same European family. This 
was – as discussed above – a concurrent theme in the discourse on the eu 
enlargement in Poland. It was mostly about how, due to their religion, history 
and values, Poles belong to the Western European civilization.
One element in statements on the Solidarity movement raised by Polish 
meps seems very interesting in the context of this chapter. It is connected with 
the claim for recognition of the significance of the Solidarity movement and 
its demands from 1980 for global, or at least European, historical processes. Ac-
cording to Polish meps, it was not Hungarian or Czech attempts to overthrow 
the Communist regime, nor the German demolition of the Berlin Wall which 
ultimately ended Communism in cee and the world. It was the Polish Solidar-
ity movement and its unprecedented mobilization of the people that finally 
became decisive. As one of the meps put it, ‘Solidarity was instrumental in 
much more besides. It led to the peaceful revolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Nine years after the so-called outbreak of Solidarity, Czechoslovakia 
underwent the Velvet Revolution, and the fall of the Berlin Wall followed. The 
origins of these events can, however, be traced back to 1980 and to Gdansk, in 
Poland’.56 Such a position in the debate signals the need not yet fully expressed 
by Polish meps to be recognized in the Western European family as signifi-
cant actors who contributed greatly to the changes in the continent. Various 
analyses of the Polish discourse on the Second World War highlight the col-
lective trauma of being betrayed, left alone beyond the Iron Curtain. Passiv-
ity is alien to the Polish political and strategic culture since, at least from the 
period of partition, it was always important to act against the will of the stron-
ger, rather than passively wait for a fate which was decided above their heads. 
This resonated in Polish politics in the interwar period and has returned with 
56 Ryszard Czarnecki (ni), “25th Anniversary of Solidarity and its message for  Europe” 





double strength since 1989.57 The Solidarity movement and its achievements 
are  specifically important because they undo the curse of the Yalta conference. 
One mep made it clear: ‘Attempts had been made previously by the Czechs, 
Slovaks and Hungarians to overthrow that diabolical system, but it was the 
Poles and the Polish Pope who eventually succeeded in dismantling the agree-
ments reached at Yalta’.58
The recognition of the constant Polish fight with Communism, which cul-
minated during the Solidarity period, serves two main purposes for Polish 
meps. First and foremost, as stated above, it is about finding a place in the 
European Community and becoming a fully-fledged member thereof. This is 
done through claiming a strong commitment to the most important values of 
Europe. It is important to stress that the special experience of cee societies 
under Communism, with their then much more caucious attitude towards any 
idealistic, utopian project and yet the particular attention to the individual 
freedom and liberty of which they were long deprived, could  enrich the reflec-
tions on the future of Europe. Secondly, assertions about the contribution of 
Solidarity (and the broader Polish struggles with Communism) to the Euro-
pean peace after the Cold War are connected with redistribution claims. As 
will be discussed in the next part of the paper, assuring an equal place in com-
munity allows demands connected with fair distribution of goods.
The analysis of the reception of such claims confirms that Solidarity occu-
pies an important place in the collective memory of the united Europe and 
that it was strengthened through the Polish political actors’ claims. It has 
also been frequently asserted that the values that the Solidarity movement 
 represented are important for European heritage: ‘Solidarity symbolised then, 
as it does now, hope in the future, the determination of people to build bet-
ter lives for themselves and their families and an unshakeable belief in the 
power of the human spirit’.59 However, the second function of the claims, i.e. 
the redistribution claims finds less response in the analyzed material. In other 
words, Solidarity is widely perceived, in a symbolic sense, as a significant con-
tributor to the European experience. However, it has not yet been translated 
into the acceptance of the right of claimants to demand a different position as 
regards redistribution. That will be further elaborated in the following section 
of the chapter.
57 Góra, Mach, “Between Old Fears”.
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 This is Why You Need to Pay
The claims for the recognition of the experience of Communism also serve 
other purposes. As mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper, Nancy 
 Fraser argues that part of the struggles for recognition is the right to be treated 
equally when redistribution is in question. Following this line of argumenta-
tion, some claims for the recognition of the experience of Communism pro-
vide political actors with the necessary instruments to demand either special 
treatment under eu law or to bargain for redistribution.
The case of the Polish shipyards was one of the most difficult and compli-
cated issues. The European Commission stood against the Polish government 
for its non-compliance with competition law since it was heavily subsidizing 
shipyards in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin. At the same time, this particular 
industrial sector occupies a special place in the Polish experience, as these 
were the cradles of opposition against Communist rule, and specifically the 
Solidarity movement. The long negotiations between the ec and Polish gov-
ernment proved to be extremely difficult, and the debate finally entered the 
European Parliament in 2007 and 2008. Ultimately, the ec and Commissioner 
Neelie Kroes decided against the subsidies of the Polish shipyards, arguing that 
state aid was illegal.
Most of the arguments in the debates were of an economic and political 
nature; however, many meps used arguments that pointed to the special char-
acter and symbolic meaning of the shipyards, and therefore the right to spe-
cial treatment of them. As one of the meps stressed, ‘The Gdansk Shipyard, 
the cradle of solidarity, the chief actor in the struggle against communism, a 
 shipyard which suffered discrimination and which by the political decisions of 
the communists was brought to a poor financial condition, today awaits a posi-
tive decision from the European Commission’.60 The crucial argument for the 
anticipated special treatment was that the sector had already been destroyed 
by the Communist economy, and that an attempt to save it was just and ap-
propriate. Moreover, according to some meps, the entire eu owes its current 
well-being and prosperity to the struggle of workers under Communism: ‘Pol-
ish shipyards, particularly the Gdansk shipyard, are a symbol of the struggle 
against the Communist government. They symbolise the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain which had divided Europe in two. That is why the flagpoles, which stand 
outside the European Parliament buildings, and which fly flags of the Member 
60 Elżbieta Tomaszewska (uen), “Reform programme of Polish shipyards” European Par-





States, were made in the Gdansk shipyards. It is thanks to the heroic actions of 
Polish shipyard workers, who fought for a re-united Europe, that today we are 
able to meet here together. These people deserve our respect, they deserve a 
dignified life and a decent living’.61
In the discussed debates dealing with the issues of redistribution, the topic 
of the recognition of past experience appears much less frequently. The main 
arguments link the lower level of development in former communist countries 
and the need for greater solidarity with the Cold War division of Europe. In 
special circumstances – such as in the case of the Polish shipyards – the role in 
the historical processes of the continent is perceived as an appropriate justifi-
cation for special treatment in contemporary European politics.
The symbolic significance of shipyards was recognized in the debates al-
though the prime interest was the economic aspects of the conflict. The leader 
of pes stated ultimately that ‘The Polish shipyards, sites such as Gdansk and 
Szczecin, were an important symbol for us all, of the Polish people’s democrat-
ic struggle against dictatorship. That is another reason why these yards must 
not be closed’.62 However, the claims that the experience of Communism and 
its economic heritage could be used as an argument for the non-compliance 
with eu regulations, were not supported. The reception of such claims was 
different predominantly due to the explicit, individual – often clearly eco-
nomic – interest behind the demands. The case of shipyards confirms that, 
as much as there is an economic heritage of Communism with which new 
member states are struggling, it is not widely perceived as an excuse for dif-
ferent treatment.
 Conclusions
The progress of European integration, and also the enlargement in which for-
mer communist countries joined the eu, has created a new, much broader and 
demanding frame of reference within which the European politics of memory 
and recognition can be developed. The European, enlarged space of historical 
debate has also become a frame for the construction of collective identities. 
As identity is a process of dialogue, an interaction with ‘significant others’, an 
involvement in meaningful relations with partners, the enlarged Europe has 
become a place of struggle for the recognition of those who have previously, 
in the divided Europe, not participated in the process of the construction of 
61 Adam Bielan (uen), “Reform programme”.
62 Martin Schultz (pse), “Reform programme”.
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European memory and identity. For Poland and its people, as for other new 
members of the eu, it has become crucial to make themselves heard and re-
spected in their memories and interpretations of the past. The struggle for 
recognition consists in an attempt to introduce new topics into the European 
discourse – those which did not exist before 1989 or were only in the mar-
gins. The demand is that particular national or regional historical experiences 
and memories should become recognized by all Europeans and represented in 
mainstream European narratives. Also, Central and Eastern Europeans have 
tried to win recognition of their interpretations of events and processes which 
already exist in European memory.
It seems – based on our analysis – that the success of the struggle for rec-
ognition depends on whether Central and Eastern Europeans are able to offer 
their own, new interpretation of those issues which are seen as essential for 
the whole of Europe and not only for the region of cee. The key problem here, 
however, is that new members of the eu must, in order to be accepted as equal 
partners in the dialogue, in order to be recognized, speak a language which 
is understood and respected. The concepts, metaphors, symbolic references 
and emotional expressions used in communication create the impression of 
familiarity or alienation. It is therefore important that new members of the 
network of communication know, understand and learn to use the language 
which is seen as the idiom of the European common platform of dialogue. 
Our analysis shows that the plenary sessions of the ep has served as a forum to 
express claims directed to Western Europe in its broadest sense and its societ-
ies. The eu institutions have been much less frequently addressed with such 
claims. Moreover, the main motivations given for such claims have been pre-
dominantly universally European, referring to European values and the future 
of European integration.
In order to be successful in their struggle for recognition, the new member 
states also need to address issues, questions and problems which are impor-
tant for Europe and promise to contribute something to European common 
understanding. Our analysis shows that the new members have been able to 
introduce new topics of discussion which are seen as an important contribu-
tion to the common European heritage. Their voice is heard and their experi-
ence at least partially recognized. In particular, former communist countries 
will be recognized as equal if they can demonstrate not only that the experi-
ence of communism is important for them, but that it is important for the 
whole of Europe. As visible in our analysis, they have rather quickly learnt how 
to frame their demands. The well-being of Europe and the eu, as well as Euro-
pean values and principles, have often been used in the justifications of Polish 
meps and that has resonated well in the ep.
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Finally, we argue that the eu has become – even if only partially – a new 
recognition order for political actors from Poland. It has become a significant 
place for claims related to identity as well as for redistribution. The debates on 
the Polish shipyard sector show how the recognition of historical experience 
can be utilized in political battles to receive special treatment, in this context 
connected with the economic aspects of integration.
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chapter 4
Answering Back to Presumed Accusations: Serbian 
First World War Memories and the Question of 
Historical Responsibility
Ismar Dedović and Tea Sindbæk Andersen
In the autumn of 2013, as the centenary of the First World War was looming in 
the near future, Tomislav Nikolić, president of Serbia, officially rejected that his 
country could in any way be held responsible for the beginning of that war. In 
an open letter published in the distinguished newspaper Politika, Nikolić wrote 
that voices were heard which tried to redefine the ‘Vidovdan assassination’, the 
Serbian phrase for the murder of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, as a terror-
ist attack. The aim of this, according to Nikolić, was to declare Serbia a priori 
guilty. ‘Will the victorious powers allow attempts at revising history by the in-
vention of a terrorist attack as the cause for the beginning of the First World 
War? Are the victims of a righteous battle for freedom in vain?’ asked Nikolić, 
stating that ‘We have no right to remain silent even if this lie were represented 
by one single voice.’1
The voices mentioned by Nikolić remain undefined and anonymous. Nev-
ertheless, there is no doubt that Nikolić’s passionate letter is composed as a 
response to what is perceived as accusations and attempts to blame Serbia for 
the beginning of the Great War. After posing his questions, Nikolić moves on to 
explain what he sees as the causes of the war, positioning them firmly outside 
Serbia, and to remind his readers of the catastrophic losses and suffering that 
Serbia endured during the wartime years.
While Nikolić’s letter has the appearance of a reaction, the exact origin of 
the accusation is not mentioned in it. However, in a speech given in June 2014, 
at the eve of the centenary of the First World War, Nikolić clearly identifies 
Christopher Clark’s book from 2012 The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War 
in 1914 as the primary source of revisionist attempts to blame Serbia for the 
1 Tomislav Nikolić, “budimo dostojni junačke prošlosti,” Politika, 10  November 2013, accessed 
15 September 2016, http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/275423/Budimo-dostojni-junacke- 
proslosti.
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 outbreak of the war.2 Yet, these statements from Serbia’s president are certainly 
not the first examples of attempts to contradict or reject presumed accusations 
that Serbia could be held responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. 
A long tradition of such rejections can be detected nearly all the way through 
the century since the War began. Thus, while Nikolić’s statements constitute a 
highly politicized reception of, among others, Clarke’s book, they are certainly 
also highly premediated repetitions of an old argument.3 Yet, Nikolić is also 
claiming to protect Serbia’s memory of the First World War, a war that cost 
Serbia very dearly, but also ensured the country’s position among the victori-
ous Entente powers and led to the creation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918. 
Indeed, Nikolić’s letter is titled ‘Let us be proud of our heroic past’.4
This chapter investigates Tomislav Nikolić’s statements in connection to the 
First World War centenary, both as remediation of Serbian memories of the 
outbreak of the Great War and as reception of Clark’s book. We trace what we 
see as a powerful premediation of Nikolić’s statements in the tradition of re-
jecting Serbia’s potential responsibility for the war in history books and school 
textbooks on history. We argue that this is an essential element of Serbia’s war 
memory. Moreover, we propose that this tradition of rejecting war responsibil-
ity could be understood as reception of real and perceived accusations, and 
we suggest that the urge to stand up to these perceived accusations will render 
Serbia’s First World War memory a certain urgency and a sense that it needs 
protection, which will increase its actuality and relevance in the present.
 Serbia and First World War Memory
The First World War, Europe’s ‘great seminal catastrophe’ in the words of 
George Kennan,5 is widely and massively commemorated throughout Europe.6 
2 “Govor Predsednika Republike, sanu – Veliki Rat. 13 June 2014.” (A print of the speech was 
kindly supplied at request from the press centre at the office of the President of the Republic 
of Serbia).
3 Astrid Erll, “Remembering across Time, Space and Culture: Premediation, Remediation and 
the ‘Indian Mutiny’,” in Mediation, Remediation and the Dynamic of Cultural Memory, edited 
by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 111.
4 Nikolić, “budimo dostojni junačke prošlosti”.
5 George Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order. Franco-Russian relations, 1875–1890 
(Pinceton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.
6 For example: George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars 
( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The 
Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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As a hugely complex ‘site of memory’, the First World War is an essential focus 
point of both European and national collective remembrance and of histori-
cal meaning, attracting intense attention from those involved in remembering 
and constantly being invested with new meaning.7 Like other well-established 
sites of memory, it possesses a massive tradition or ‘genealogy’ of remediation8 
across various modes of cultural memory, one of these being historiography.9 
Indeed, the origins and causes of the First World War are among the most dis-
cussed historical problems of Europe’s 20th century.10
In Serbia, the First World War is a strongly established and hugely politi-
cized site of memory. Indeed, Serbia’s First World War history supplies abun-
dant material for a heroic national narrative. Attacked in 1914 by a much 
stronger neighbouring Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Serbian army success-
fully defended the country’s borders until the winter of 1915–1916 when, over-
powered by the joint offensive from Germany, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, 
the army retreated together with the Serbian government and the royal house 
through the mountains of Albania, abandoning Serbia to be occupied by the 
Central Powers. When they reached the Adriatic coast, Serbia’s military forces 
were sailed to Corfu, where they were reorganized in order to be deployed as 
part of the Entente forces at the Salonica front. Here they contributed to the 
break-through of the Bulgarian lines of defence and the reconquering of Ser-
bia, returning to Belgrade in October 1918. Serbia thus emerged as a victorious 
7 On the concept of site of memory, see Ann Rigney, “Plenitude, scarcity and the circulation 
of cultural memory,” Journal of European Studies 35, 1 (2005): 18. See also the description 
by Nora, who originally coined the phrase: Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: 
Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (1989): 7–24.
8 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, “Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics,” in Me-
diation, Remediation and the Dynamic of Cultural Memory, edited by Astrid Erll and Ann 
Rigney (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2009), 5.
9 As Astrid Erll has pointed out, history may well be seen as “yet another mode of cultural 
memory” with historiography as its specific medium. Astrid Erll, “Cultural Memory Stud-
ies: An introduction,” in A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies, edited by Astrid Erll 
and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 7.
10 For overviews of these discussions, see e.g. James Joll and Garton Martel, The Origins of 
the First World War, 3rd edition, (London: Routledge, 2007). For overviews of the wave of 
new studies published around the centenary of the war, see e.g. Hew Strachan, “Review 
article: The origins of the First World War,” International Affairs 90, 2 (2014): 429–439; An-
drew G. Bonnell, “New Histories of the Origins of the First World War: What happened to 
the ‘Primacy of Domestic Politics’?” Australian Journal of Politics and History 61, 1 (2015): 
121–127; William Mulligan, “Review-Article: The Trail Continues: New directions in the 
Study of the Origins of the First World War,” English Historical Review 129, no. 538 (2014): 
639–666.
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Entente ally and played a dominant role in the creation of a new large South 
Slav state in 1918, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia 
from 1929) was established through a unification of the kingdoms of  Serbia 
and Montenegro with the formerly Austro-Hungarian regions of Slovenia, 
 Croatia and Bosnia. Yet, the costs of this uncompromising war effort were ter-
rible; presumably a quarter of Serbia’s pre-war population was killed fighting 
or died from war-related hunger or epidemics in the trenches or back home in 
the occupied country.11
The heroism and suffering of Serbia’s army became key elements of the 
national mythology in the new Kingdom. Serbia’s fallen soldiers on the allied 
side were widely commemorated with enthusiastic support, both personally 
and materially, from the Serbian royal house.12 From its very outset, Serbia re-
garded the Great War as a defensive struggle against the imperial ambitions of 
Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. ‘Brave little Serbia’, as the story went, was he-
roically defending its freedom against a manifold larger and stronger foe, and 
despite innumerable hardships it managed to survive and even triumph over 
the invading forces. This narrative was elaborated and institutionalized after 
the end of the war, becoming the official narrative of the newly formed King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia).13 
It was during the first post-war years that several elements of the narrative 
template of Serbian First World War memory were first put in place: the brave, 
little state defending itself against the aggressions of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and managing to win spectacular victories, the suffering and patient 
nation, living through occupation and the terrible Albanian winter as the army 
11 For an overview of Serbia’s war history, see Andrej Mitrović, Serbia’s Great War (London: 
Hurst, 2007); John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 101–117; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia. The History 
 behind the Name (London: Hurst, 2002), 93–110.
12 John Paul Newman, Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War. Veterans and the limits of State Build-
ing 1903–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 69; John Paul Newman, “Al-
lied Yugoslavia: Serbian Great War Veterans and their Internationalist Ties,” in The Great 
War and Veterans’ Internationalism, edited by Julia Eichernberg and John Paul Newman 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 110–112.
13 Danilo Šarenac, Top, Vojnik i Sećanje, Prvi Svetski Rat i Srbija 1914–2000 (Belgrade: Institut 
za savremenu istorju, 2014), 178–240; Olga Manojlović Pintar, Arheologija sećanje. Spo-
menici i identiteti i Srbiji 1918–1989 (Belgrade: Čigoja, 2014), 134–142; Ismar Dedović and Tea 
Sindbæk Andersen, “‘To Battle, go forth all heroes’. World War i Memory as a Narrative 
Template in Yugoslavia and Serbia,” in Re-visting World War i. Interpretations and Perspec-
tives of the Great Conflict, edited by Jaroslaw Suchoples and Stephane James (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2016), 247–270.
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retreated to safety in Greece, and finally, the resurrection of the nation and the 
state as the Serbian army broke out from the front at Thessaloniki and liber-
ated its country from Austria-Hungary and other occupiers.14
This narrative has, with modifications, dominated the perceptions of the 
Great War in Serbia and Yugoslavia since its establishment. Always focused 
primarily on the heroic Serbian side of wartime history, the narrative tended 
to exclude the memories of the millions of Yugoslav citizens who had expe-
rienced the war from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire or had fought in 
the Empire’s armies.15 Yet, in spite of the strongly pro-Serbian leaning, efforts 
were made in the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia to create a more inclusive 
all-Yugoslav line of commemoration, for example by letting school book narra-
tives emphasize the Yugoslav aspirations of Serbia’s war effort or by construct-
ing pro-Yugoslav monuments, such as the Monument to the Unknown Hero on 
mount Avala outside Belgrade.16
At the same time, the new state elevated Gavrilo Princip and his fellow 
conspirators to the status of national heroes and heralds of freedom for the 
South Slavs. This was a paradoxical move as it opened the state to interna-
tional criticism for glorifying an assassin that – in the eyes of the world – put 
in motion a process leading to the Great War.17 But the Princip cult was at the 
same time a very potent symbol of the struggle of the South Slavs for their 
freedom. The graves of Princip and his fellows became sites of pilgrimage for 
young nationalists and in 1930 a memorial plaque was erected on the site of 
the assassination.18
14 See for example: Vladimir Ćorović, Istorija Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Narodno Delo, 1933), 
609–618; Z. Špoljar, Povijest Hrvata, Srba i Slovenca za mladež nar. Osnovnih škola (Zagreb: 
Vlastita Naklada, 1927), 61–62; Dragan M. Adamović, Istorija Jugoslovena za podoficire (Za-
greb: Merkantile, 1938), 137–145; Milan A. Kostić & Mat P. Ljujić, Istorija Jugoslovena (Srba, 
Hrvata i Slovenaca) sa učenike iii razreda osnovnih škola u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji (Belgrade: 
Knjižarnice Milorada P. Mihailovića, 1939), 42–43.
15 Newman, Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War; Dedović and Sindbæk Andersen, “‘To Battle, go 
forth all heroes’”.
16 On Avala, see for example: Aleksandar Ignjatović, “From Constructed Memory to Imag-
ined National Tradition: The Tomb of the Unknown Yugoslav Soldier (1934–38),” Slavonic 
and East European Review 88, 4 (2010): 624–651.
17 Paul B. Miller, “Compromising Memory: The Site of the Sarajevo Assassina-
tion,” (Meeting Report 333, Woodrow Wilson Centre, ees Noon Discussion, Sa-
rajevo, 10 January 2007), accessed 8 August 2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/333-compromising-memory-the-site-the-sarajevo-assassination.
18 Muharem Bazdulj and Nebojsa Grujičić, eds., Stogodišnji rat. Sarajevski atentat i tumačenja 
(Beograd: Vreme, 2014), 45–47 and Selma Harrington, “The Politics of Memory: The Face 
and the Place of the Sarajevo Assassination,” Prilozi, 43 (2014): 123.
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With the establishment of communist rule in Yugoslavia in 1945, commem-
oration of the Second World War, which had brought the Communist party 
to power, completely dominated public memory. Yet, in the background, the 
established memory narratives of the First World War remained, with history 
books and textbooks still focusing on Serbian heroism and suffering, only with 
a Marxist interpretation added, presenting the war as a result of the imperialist 
politics of Europe’s great powers.19 In the socialist period, the cult of Gavrilo 
Princip was strengthened and received substantial official support. The Prin-
cip of the Communists became a revolutionary hero, struggling for national 
freedom and social justice.20
First World War memory attracted more attention in Yugoslavia after the 50 
years anniversary of the War’s outbreak in 1964, when new monuments were 
erected.21 Especially during the so-called ‘outburst of history’ in the 1980s, the 
Great War once again became an important and also controversial topic, par-
ticularly in Serbia.22 One of the strongest Serbian reassessments of First World 
War memory figured in Danko Popović’s hugely popular short novel The book 
about Milutin, which was published in 1985. Milutin, a Serbian peasant who is 
being mobilized for the Serbian army, hears of the murder of Franz Ferdinand 
and is less than impressed: ‘It is easy to kill a prince and a woman, but a war 
is not won by killing a prince and a wife’ he thinks, wondering why Serbian 
peasants have to pay for this, and who will help Serbia, while the country’s 
soldiers are fighting for the South Slavs.23 Popović thus lets Milutin undermine 
the heroic interpretation of Gavrilo Pincip and his fellow conspirators, and 
then moves on to underline the meaninglessness of the war and Serbia’s huge 
sacrifices. In essence, Popović and other authors questioned the legitimacy 
and prudence in creating the common Yugoslav state, while emphasizing the 
suffering of Serbia for the Yugoslav cause. They also emphasized the futility of 
19 See for example Ivan Božić et al., Istorija Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1973), 380–397; 
Fuad Slipičević, Opšta i nacionalna istorija. Udžbenik za podoficire – pitomce vojnih ak-
ademija jna (Belgrade, Kultura, 1968), 234–235; Šarlota Đuranović and Mirko Žeželj, 
Prošlost i sadašnjost 3. Udžbenik za viii razred osnovne škole (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1974), 
19. Husein Serdarević and Stanko Perazić Stanko, 8 Povijest. Udžbenik za viii razred os-
novne škole (Sarajevo, Svjetlost 1977), 14.
20 Vera Katz, “Ideological use of Inauguration of Memorial Plaque Dedicated to Gavrilo Prin-
cip in the Raising and Education of Young Generations in BiH,” Prilozi 37(2014): 99–111.
21 Olga Manojlović Pintar, “Tradicije Prvog Svetskog Rata u Srbiji,” in Kultura Sjećanja 1918, 
edited by Tihomir Cipek & Olivera Milosavljević (Zagreb: Disput, 2007), 159–162.
22 Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation”. Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Re-
vival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002), 77 and 89–100.
23 Danko Popović, Knjiga o Milutinu (Belgrade: Niro “Književne Novine”, 1986), 6.
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that sacrifice, since a majority of the other Yugoslav peoples seemed ungrate-
ful to Serbia for liberating them in the Great War. In doing so, they rejected the 
Yugoslav aspect of Serbian First World War memory and paved the way for a 
narrowly national Serbian war memory.24
After the collapse of the Yugoslav state in 1991 the perception of the First 
World War in Serbia became increasingly nationalized. The country was still 
represented as an innocent victim, heroically defending its freedom against 
insurmountable odds, while the creation of the Yugoslav state was regarded as 
more of a problem than a positive outcome of the war.
 Rejecting Presumed Accusations
It was this well-established and very national Serbian First World War memory 
that Tomislav Nikolić was defending in his letters and speeches in 2013 and 
2014. Yet, Nikolić specifically felt the need to emphasize that Serbia could not 
be held responsible for the outbreak of the war. While this was at least partly a 
reaction to Christopher Clark’s book, it still seems puzzling that the president 
himself must repeatedly use this somehow vague argument. However, Presi-
dent Nikolić was in fact repeating a pattern of discourse that can be traced 
back throughout Serbian (and Yugoslav) First World War history writing. As 
Astrid Erll has pointed out, ‘existing representations which circulate in a given 
society provide schemata for new experience and its representation’.25 This 
kind of premediated schemata was one of the reasons behind Nikolić’ reaction.
Since the end of the Great War, it has been an integral part of the Yugoslav 
(and later Serbian) memory tradition to present the war in a way that could 
absolve the country of the responsibility for the outbreak of war. From the es-
tablishment of the Yugoslav state, the defence against possible accusations of 
war guilt has taken the form of attempts to separate what were presented as 
the ‘causes of war’ from the actual ‘pretext for war’, the latter being the Sarajevo 
assassination. This rhetorical move has served to underline Serbia’s innocence 
and justify Serbia’s actions. There is a clearly distinctive ‘genealogy of remedia-
tion’26 of that argument within Serbia’s First World War memory.
24 See also Aleksandar Pavković, “The Serb National Idea: A Revival 1986–92,” Slavonic and 
East European Review 72, 3 (1994), 3, 451–453; Dragović-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation”, 
89–100.
25 Erll, “Remembering across Time, Space and Culture,” 111.
26 Erll and Rigney, ‘Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics’, p. 5.
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According to history books from the interwar period, the causes for the war 
were to be sought in Austria. One book, a history teaching manual for junior 
officers, simply declared that ‘the causes to the war lay in the great hatred that 
Austria felt towards Serbia.’27 History textbooks for primary and secondary 
school suggested that Austria-Hungary was worried by Serbia’s expansion in 
the Balkan wars, and that the Empire wanted to prevent any further strength-
ening of the Serbian state.28 According to one of Serbia’s leading historians 
in the interwar period, Vladimir Ćorović, Austria-Hungary feared a united 
Balkans dominated by Russia. Therefore ‘leading circles in Vienna found that 
the only medicine for everything would be just to break Serbia.’29 Yet, Austria 
needed an excuse – or a pretext – for attacking, and that was the assassina-
tion of Franz Ferdinand, even though Serbia could not at all, according to the 
books, be held responsible for that. A primary school textbook stated that: ‘one 
day in the year 1914, without any just cause, Austria-Hungary declared war on 
little Serbia. As at that time on Vidovdan in Sarajevo the Austro-Hungarian 
heir to the throne was murdered by a young Serb from Bosnia, Gavrilo Prin-
cip, it [the Empire] declared that Serbs from Serbia were involved in this. And 
that was the pretext to declare war on Serbia.’30 A secondary school textbook 
simply writes: ‘To find an excuse for war, Austria-Hungary accused Serbia for 
the murder of their heir to the throne.’31 And Ćorović emphasized how Austria 
‘without any proper documentation’ accused Serbia itself for the murder of 
Franz Ferdinand, though Serbia was not involved.32
In history books from Yugoslavia’s socialist era, this division into causes 
and pretexts remained clearly visible. It is present in history textbooks printed 
shortly after the end of the Second World War and it has been continuously 
remediated in various forms since then. Yet, during the socialist period this 
defensive rhetoric was given a different and more Marxist approach. The text-
books first present the international situation prior to the outbreak of war, 
emphasizing the colonial crises, the ambitions of the imperialist powers, the 
arms race and the inevitability of war owing to the logic of capitalism. Finally, 
Princip’s assassination of Franz Ferdinand is presented as a mere pretext for 
27 Adamović, Istorija Jugoslovena za podoficire, 136.
28 Špoljar, Povijest Hrvata, Srba i Slovenca, 61; Kostić & Ljujić, Istorija Jugoslovena, 42; 
Lazarević, Istorija jugoslovena, 175.
29 Ćorović, Istorija Jugoslovije, 609.
30 Kostić & Ljujić, Istorija Jugoslovena, 42. See also Adamović, Istorija Jugoslovea za podo-
ficire, 137; Špoljar, Povijest Hrvata, Srba i Slovenca, 61; Ćorović, Istorija Jugoslavije, 610.
31 Lazarević, Istorija jugoslovena, 175.
32 Ćorović, Istorija Jugoslovije, 609–610.
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Germany or Austria-Hungary to start a war.33 An example of this is evident in 
an eighth grade history book from 1984. After presenting the numerous crises 
pre 1914, the text continues:
… the war was inevitable and both sides were putting enormous sums 
into armaments. Germany was the leading party in this and was just wait-
ing for an opportune pretext to launch the war. The assassination on the 
Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne on 28 June 1914 was exactly this kind 
of opportunity.34
History books by socialist Yugoslavia’s great historians also follow this pattern. 
Vladimir Dedijer, communist veteran from the Second World War and author 
of the official biography of President Tito, as well as several studies of the mur-
der of Franz Ferdinand, wrote in 1973: ‘Claiming that the Sarajevo assassination 
was the basic or immediate cause for the war would be an exaggeration … the 
opposition between the European Great Powers were so tense, the reorganiza-
tion and arming of the German armies had already reached such a level that 
only the smallest excuse was needed for the beginning of the conflict.’35 And 
according to Branko Petranović’s three-volume standard work on Yugoslav 
history, a war party in Vienna wanted to ‘settle accounts with Serbia’ and ‘the 
murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand gave the war party a pretext for war …’36
All these books about the First World War clearly made an effort to emphasize 
that the outbreak of the war should certainly not be seen as something for which 
Serbia could be held responsible, as if to pre-empt any potential accusation 
against Serbia. One book, published for the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Kol-
ubara, where the hard-pressed Serbian armies successfully repelled an Austrian 
attack in November and December 1914, explicitly pointed to such accusations: 
immediately after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo … 
an indictment was prepared against Serbia and the Serbian nation as 
33 See for instance: Vojna akademija jugoslovenske armije, Katedra vojne istorije: Opšta vo-
jna istorija: tekst. Sv. 2, Prvi svetski rat (Belgrade: Štamparija Vojne akademije jugosloven-
ske armije, 1950), 3–5; Đuranović and Žeželj, Prošlost i sadašnjost 3, 9; Tomo Čubelić and 
Dragutin Pavličević, Povijest xx. Stoljeća – sa odabranim povijesnim tekstovima. Udžbenik 
za stručne škole (Zagreb: Školska knjiga 1975), 9; Serdarević and Perazić, 8 Povijest, 14; 
Slipičević, Opšta i nacionalna istorija, 234–235.
34 Stanko Perazić and Husein Serdarević, Istorija – Povijest. Udžbenik za viii razred osnovne 
škole (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1984), 7.
35 Božić et al., Istorija Jugoslavija, 374.
36 Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988. Prva Knjiga. Kraljevina Jugoslavije (Bel-
grade: Nolit, 1988), 7.
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 instigators of the war, and afterwards also the historical responsibility for 
the European (later called the World) War was loaded on their backs. His-
torical research has long ago established the actual responsibility for the 
war, but the old accusations, invented from the side of Serbia’s enemies, 
are still talked about and appear to be fundamental.37 
The authors remind their readers that a large amount of literature repeating 
these accusations is still present in the libraries and issue a warning: ‘we must 
not forget that this was used as preparation for the attack on Yugoslavia in 
1941.’38 The authors thus underline how potentially dangerous such a war guilt 
could be, thereby actualizing the need to protect the Serbian version of First 
World War memory and to reject any possible blame.
These arguments were continuously remediated after the fall of Yugoslavia, 
still serving the purpose of removing the war guilt from Serbia. Almost all post-
Yugoslav Serbian textbooks examined for this chapter repeat the pattern of 
those of the socialist period: On the first page(s) of the chapter on the Great 
War, a more or less detailed description of the world situation prior to 1914 is 
given, with an emphasis on the crises and conflicts of the Great Powers. A high 
school textbook from 2012 writes: 
The causes of the outbreak of the First World War are to be found in the 
imperialist interests of the great European powers and their struggle for 
political and economic domination over the Old Continent at the end of 
the 19th and beginning of the 20th Centuries.39 
In this way, it is made explicitly clear that the Great Powers would have gone 
to war even if the assassination in Sarajevo had never happened. Thus, they 
largely copy the socialist argument, even though they do not use quite the 
same Marxist rhetoric anymore.40
37 Dušan T. Bataković and Nikola B. Popović, Kolubarska bitka (Belgrade: Biblioteka „Litera“, 
1989), 5.
38 Ibid.
39 Đorđe Đurić and Momčilo Pavlović, Istorija – za treći razred gimnazije prirodno-
matematičkog smera i četvrti razred opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera (Belgrade, Zavod za 
udžbenike, 2012), 72. See also Mira Radojević, Istorija – za treći razred gimnazije prirodno-
matematičkog smera i četvrti razred opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera i opsteg tipa i četvrti 
razred srednje stručne škole za obrazovne profile pravni tehničar i birotehničar (Belgrade: 
Klett, 2014), 86.
40 Only two of the textbooks do not fit this frame neatly: they place the cause of the war 
in the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Serbia from 1903 to 1914 and the unresolved 
national questions of the Dual Monarchy, as well as Serbia’s perceived desire to expand 
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Just like in the Yugoslav period, the assassination itself is presented as 
a ‘pretext for war’. Sometimes this is clear from the text itself while in other 
textbooks it is done in a headline that frames the understanding of the text 
in advance.41 Several textbooks also emphasize that Serbia had nothing to do 
with the assassination and therefore the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was un-
reasonable. Clearly casting Serbia in the role of the victim, a high school text-
book from 2012 states: ‘Although the Serbian government was not responsible 
for the Sarajevo assassination, war circles in Vienna immediately launched a 
campaign, which accused the official Serbia of carrying it out. They reasoned 
that a war should be waged against a manifold weaker Serbia to defeat and 
humiliate it militarily.’42
The question of war guilt was thus being answered in a very uniform man-
ner in Serbia. The fact that all textbooks use the same language, pointing to 
‘cause’ versus ‘pretext’ when describing the run up to the war and that all have 
the same basic argumentative structure in their chapters on the Great War is 
indicative of a broader and strongly premediated memory tradition. Indeed, 
this had been the language and argumentative structure of Serbia’s First World 
War memory scheme for nearly a century by the time Christopher Clark’s book 
shook the Serbian public opinion and prompted President Nikolić to react.
 Clark and Nikolić
Christopher Clark wrote in The Sleepwalkers that ‘Since Srebrenica and the 
siege of Sarajevo, it has become harder to think of Serbia as the mere object or 
victim of great power politics and easier to conceive of Serbian nationalism as 
its territory to include all lands in which Serbs or South Slavs lived. It should be noted that 
these two textbooks, although published a few years apart and for different audiences, 
were written by the same pair of authors, making their view all the more a minority one 
among the authors of modern textbooks in Serbia. There is no question of the authors im-
plying Serbian responsibility for the war itself. Rather, the text should probably be under-
stood as an indictment of Austro-Hungarian aggression against Serbia. See Radoš Ljušić 
and Ljubodrag Dimić, Istorija 8 – udžbenik za osmi razred osnovne škole sa čitankom i rad-
nom sveskom (Belgrade: Freska, 2012), 72 ; Radoš Ljušić and Ljubodrag Dimić, Istorija – za 
treći razred gimnazije prirodno-matematičkog smera i četvrti razred opšteg i društveno-
jezičkog smera (Belgrade: Freska, 2014), 64.
41 Radojević, Istorija – za treći razred gimnazije, 86–87.
42 Đurić and Pavlović, Istorija – za treći razred gimnazije, 73. See also: Predrag M. Bajagić and 
Stošić, Nenad, Istorija 8 – udžbenik za osmi razred osnovne škole (Belgrade: Klett, 2011), 
74; Predrag Simić and Ivana Petrović, Istorija 8 – udžbenik za osmi razred osnovne škole sa 
tematskim istorijskim atlasom (Belgrade: Logos, 2016), 62.
Dedović and Sindbæk Andersen94
<UN>
an historical force in its own right … Putting Sarajevo and the Balkans back at 
the centre of the story does not mean demonizing the Serbs or their statesmen, 
nor does it dispense us from the obligation to understand the forces working 
on and in those Serbian politicians, officers and activists whose behaviour and 
decisions helped to determine what kind of consequences the shooting at Sara-
jevo would have.’43 Thus, he certainly pointed towards Serbia in his attempt to 
explain the outbreak of the First World War, suggesting that both the assassins 
and Serbia’s politicians were at least partly responsible. Moreover, Clark explic-
itly argued that for Austria-Hungary ‘the Sarajevo murders were not a pretext for 
a pre-existing policy of invasion and warfare. They were a transformative event, 
charged with real and symbolic menace.’44 Knowingly or not, Clark thus direct-
ly rejected the essential elements of Serbia’s narrative of innocence, which was 
based on the claim that the assassination was exactly not a cause, but a mere 
pretext. Furthermore, Clark suggested that Serbia’s heroic fighting and status as 
belonging within the victorious camp of the Entente had somehow prevented 
Western historians from looking seriously at Serbia’s role in the crisis that led 
to the First World War, and only the infamous events during the Yugoslav wars 
1991–1995 had enabled them to look critically at Serbian nationalism. While he 
refused to ascribe guilt to any one side, but rather located parts of the guilt with 
every major player in the crisis,45 Clark could hardly have made a more direct 
attack on Serbian First World War memory and Serbian nationalism.
In Serbia, Clark’s book was met with a response which far surpassed that of 
any other country. Not surprisingly, this was primarily a reaction to the parts 
of The Sleepwalkers that concentrated on Serbia’s role in both the Sarajevo as-
sassination and in the breakout of war in general. While these analyses and 
conclusions were considered the methodologically and theoretically weakest 
parts of the book, Serbian academic circles denounced the whole study as un-
scientific and lacking scholarly weight, while Serbian pundits and politicians 
regarded the work as not only lacking in merit, but as an attack on Serbia and 
its sacrifices during the Great War.46
Yet, the most clear and elaborate public reaction to the arguments in Clark’s 
The Sleepwalkers came from Serbia’s president, Tomislav Nikolić.  Indeed, as was 
43 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin 
2013), xxvi–xxvii. The book was first published by Allen Lane in 2012. It was published in 
Serbian in 2013.
44 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 559.
45 Ibid, 560–561.
46 See for instance: Danilo Šarenac, “O knjizi Mesečari. Kako je Evropa ušla u rat 1914, profe-
sora Kristofera Klarka,” Vojnoistorijski glasnik (2013), 1: 267–280 ; Milica Jovanović, “Sukob 
oko velikog rata,” Peščanik 10 November 2013, accessed 10 November 2016, http://pescanik.
net/sukob-oko-velikog-rata/.
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already obvious from his open letter to the newspaper Politika in  November 2013, 
Nikolić had casted himself as defender of Serbia’s First World War memory.47 
On 10 November 2013, just before Armistice Day, Nikolić was also present at the 
reburial of Serbia’s famous female First World War veteran, Milunka Savić, in 
Belgrade. Having briefly described Savić’s life and praised her courage in the Sec-
ond Balkan War and the First World War, the President compared the  heroine to 
Serbia, as being both thoroughly good, but unappreciated and misunderstood: 
‘Milunka Savić so resembles her country. Courageous when needed, invincible 
and upright, ready to help everyone, but again pushed aside when others think 
that she might get in the way, being so great and strong.’ Indeed, according to 
Nikolić, Savić was a ‘symbol of Serbia’s struggle for freedom.’48 Thus, in Nikolić’s 
narrative, Serbia’s war history was, like Savić’s, pure, brave and righteous.
In June 2014, just before the centenary, the Serbian Academy for Science and 
Arts (sanu) organized a conference on ‘Serbs and the First World War’. Speak-
ing as a guest of honour, Nikolić summarized the significance of that war for 
Serbia: ‘A small, brave, country entered into a just fight for freedom, by the Grace 
of God it achieved victories, survived a Golgotha and, like Nathalie’s ramonde 
under a drop of rain, it rose from the ashes and was revived’.49 This is a distilled 
version of the official Serbian representation of the First World War and as such 
it is not in any way surprising to find it repeated in the Presidential address. But 
the real aim of Nikolić’s speech was not to repeat the official Serbian narrative, 
but rather to reaffirm and defend it against a perceived new threat. According 
to Nikolić, Serbs were confronted with an ‘attempt at falsification of history in 
relation to the causes of the breakout of the First World War’. This falsification 
was driven by ‘individuals from the echelon of the powerful’ who would ‘take 
facts out of context, twist them, alter their meaning, dress them in a new at-
tire and give them a new look whereby a lie will become a globally accepted 
truth’.50 And, Nikolić continued, this attempt at a historical revision was mainly 
47 Nikolić, “budimo dostojni junačke prošlosti”.
48 “Govor Predsednika Republika na ukopu posmrtnih ostataka M. Savić u Aleji Velikana,” 
Belgrade, 10 November 2013 (A print of the speech was kindly supplied at request from the 
press centre at the office of the President of the Republic of Serbia). See also E.V.N., “Milunka 
Savić: Nepobediva kao Srbija,” Večernje novosti, 10 November 2013, accessed 10 October 2016, 
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:463025-Milunka-Savic- 
Nepobediva-kao-Srbija; “Nikolić o heroini Milunki Savić; Njen život je kao priča iz holivudskog 
filma,” Blic, 10 November 2013, accessed 10 October 2016, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/
nikolic-o-heroini-milunki-savic-njen-zivot-je-kao-prica-iz-holivudskog-filma/s0nf15y.
49 “Govor Predsednika Republike, sanu – Veliki Rat”. Nathalie’s ramonde, or Ramonda Na-
thaliae is a small purple flower named after Serbia’s queen Natalija. It grows in the South 
of Serbia. Since 2012 it has been a symbol of Serbia’s Armistice Day.
50 Ibid.
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aimed at Serbia: ‘The Serb struggle for freedom, which has for an entire century 
been a worldwide symbol of the fight for justice and truth, a great deed, is now 
to be dragged through the mud.’ The aim of this revision, according to Nikolić, 
was ‘to make the world believe that Serbs caused a war, which took 10,000.000 
lives’. Later in his speech, President Nikolić pointed specifically to the work of 
Christopher Clark as the primary source of this revisionism: 
‘In his book, Professor Clark describes the Great Powers of the time as 
sleepwalkers who staggered into war, though they in fact did not wish 
that … Clark even connects the assassination in Sarajevo with the crime in 
Srebrenica in 1995, and because of that he says it is difficult for him to see 
Serbia as a victim! Luckily, there is a minimal number of such  extremes 
within science or, rather, quasi science. Nobody, and really  nobody serious, 
accuses Serbia of being the cause of the Great War … Serbia entered the 
war to survive. It entered the war because there was no alternative.’51
The fact that a scholarly work is interpreted as an attack on a sovereign  country 
is to an extent puzzling and requires further examination. The first point to 
note here is that President Nikolić seemingly does not understand the nature 
of historical research. In his speech he states that ‘After the publication of 
the book by the famous German historian, Fritz Fischer, it was believed that 
the question of war guilt was finally solved.’52 It seems that Nikolić does not 
quite understand that historical questions – especially more complex ones 
such as the causes of the Great War – are rarely answered once and for all and 
that, for this reason, it is to be expected that historians will use an opportunity 
like the Centennial to once more bring up this theme.
The outrage levelled against Clark’s work does not seem to have the charac-
ter of a mere historical argument. The emotional appeals in Nikolić’s reaction 
are very much about the present: he talks about lies and falsifications that take 
place in the current moment, and he fears that Serbia’s great sacrifices are now 
to be ‘dragged through the mud’. Clark’s own rather un-historical connection 
between the Srebrenica massacre and Serbia’s role in the events leading up to 
the First World War obviously touches a sore point and makes his argument 
even more unacceptable to Nikolić, who represents a state that still finds it diffi-
cult to recognize that massacre and admit to Serbia’s co-responsibility for it, and 
the role that Serbian forces played in it. This makes Clark’s parallel particularly 
problematic, as it constitutes a double accusation against Serbian  nationalism, 
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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both of which Nikolić denies. What really provokes Nikolić is the suggestion 
that, because of Srebrenica, Serbian nationalism is no longer innocent, and 
thus Serbia’s status as a righteous victim in the First World War is threatened.
It is unlikely that a President would address this topic if it were relevant to 
historians only. Indeed, Nikolić’s speech was not an isolated act: in the run up 
to the centennial, numerous Serbian articles, op-eds etc. dealt with the issue 
of the outbreak of war in general and Clark’s book in particular. By and large 
this media campaign expressed the same views as the President in his speech 
to members of sanu.53 Nikolić’s speech thus seems to reflect and protect a 
dominant and widespread presentation of the Great War in Serbia. However, 
this does not necessarily explain why a president would chose to throw him-
self into the fray like Nikolić does. One explanation, suggested by the historian 
Dubravka Stojanović, is that the speech itself and the general debate on the 
war in Serbia was instrumentalized by the political elites in order to distract 
the populace from unpopular reforms and a faltering economy by whipping up 
nationalist frenzy. This would, furthermore, have the effect of signalling to na-
tionalists in Serbia that the pro-eu course of the state was only a necessary evil 
while the real ambitions of Serbia were rooted in the nationalist framework 
and its history.54 One argument in favour of this explanation is that the First 
World War as a contested topic seemingly disappeared as soon as the main 
festivities and ceremonies were over.
53 E.g.: Zoran Radisavljević, “Gavrilo Princip je pucao u okupatora,” Politika 20 September 
2013, accessed 14 November 2016, http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/270687/Gavrilo-
Princip-je-pucao-u-okupatora; D. Stanisić, “Kusturica: Gavrilo Princip je branio ideju 
slobode,”, Politika 5 December 2013, accessed 14 November 2016, http://www.politika.rs/
sr/clanak/277735/Kusturica-Gavrilo-Princip-je-branio-ideju-slobode; Gradimir Aničić, 
“Princip nije fanatik”, Politika, 10 June 2014, accessed 14 November 2016, http://www.poli-
tika.rs/sr/clanak/296051/пpинцип-ниje-фaнaтик.; Aleksandar Nikolić, “Srđan Koljević: 
Svakoj generaciji treba Princip,” Blic, 29 June 2014, accessed 14 November 2016, http://
www.blic.rs/vesti/tema-dana/srdan-koljevic-svakoj-generaciji-treba-princip/sptvesc; Tat-
jana Nježić, “Legenda Gavrilo: Poznati srpski pisci odgovaraju na pitanje ko je bio Princip,” 
Blic, 29 June accessed 14 November 2016, http://www.blic.rs/kultura/vesti/legenda-gavri-
lo-poznati-srpski-pisci-odgovaraju-na-pitanje-ko-je-bio-princip/4vn35xp; Miljana Les-
kovac, “Princip nije kriv za rat”, Blic, 1 June 2014, accessed 14 November 2016, http://www 
.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/princip-nije-kriv-za-rat/5cvjtmt; Tanjug, “Dodik: rs ne pristaje na 
politizaciju Prvog svetskog rata”, Blic, 11 June 2014, accessed 14 November 2016, http://www 
.blic.rs/vesti/politika/dodik-rs-ne-pristaje-na-politizaciju-prvog-svetskog-rata/g813qs0.
54 “Ljudi iz šume,” Interview with Dubravka Stojanović, Peščanik, 29 November 2013, ac-
cessed 14 November 2016 http://pescanik.net/ljudi-iz-sume/, and “Mitski rat,” Interview 
with Dubravka Stojanović, Peščanik, 27 June 2014, accessed 14 November 2016 http://pes-
canik.net/emisija-27-06-2014/.
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However, this functional understanding does not quite explain why Nikolić 
and other parts of the Serbian public reacted so strongly to Clark’s rethinking 
of the causes for the First World War, or indeed, why the First World War as 
such could become such a vital topic. Why this particular history? As has been 
shown in this chapter, the First World War is a well-established and very pres-
ent memory in Serbia. The heroic and tragic narrative of Serbia’s First World 
War is well known and certainly has the potential to be emotionally affective. 
Moreover, through the century that has passed since the war, Serbian (and 
 Yugoslav) narratives have consequently rejected that Serbia could in any way 
be held responsible for the war’s outbreak. And while Princip and his fellow as-
sassins have been presented as heroes, their deed has never been accepted as a 
cause for the war; it was, in the Serbian phrase, only a pretext. Yet, Princip’s he-
roic status is seemingly less important than Serbia’s status as an innocent and 
heroic victim of the war. Indeed, given the catastrophic consequences of the 
First World War for Serbia, with the loss of about one quarter of the country’s 
population, it would seriously question the legitimacy of Serbian nationalism 
and nationalist politics if exactly that nationalism were to be seen as the main 
cause of that war. Thus, Nikolić confirms the established narrative that Serbia 
was forced into the war, and thus he defends its status as an innocent victim of 
Great Power politics. As such, his reaction was highly premediated; indeed he 
repeated an argumentative scheme that was established in the interwar peri-
od and has been remediated in Serbian and Yugoslav history books ever since.
The repeated rejection that Serbia in any way could be held responsible for 
the outbreak of the war inevitably had the effect of suggesting that such an 
accusation could indeed be made. The defensive discourse created the under-
standing that there was a need for Serbia to defend itself. Thus, it actualized 
the memory of the First World War as something that had to be protected, ren-
dering it with certain urgency. Indeed, President Nikolić’s reaction to Clark’s 
book did have the appearance of an urgent need to protect Serbia’s national 
memory. Moreover, the established memory narrative portrays the victory in 
the First World War as decisive for Serbia’s existence; in Nikolić’s rhetoric it was 
an unavoidable Golgotha of the Serbian nation, a war that Serbia entered to 
survive. Thus, it is the memory of a fatal and definitive event that Nikolić had 
taken upon himself to defend.
 Conclusion
The existence of Serbia’s strong tradition of First World War memory and the 
pervasiveness of the ‘anti-war guilt rhetoric’ help explain the need of Nikolić 
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and other parts of Serbia’s elites to react strongly to Clark’s shifting of the re-
sponsibility from Germany towards Serbia. Not only was he thereby challeng-
ing the established truth on the war in Serbia; he was also adding new weight 
to an idea that – however unspoken – has always been present in the text-
books: namely that Serbia will always be thought of as potentially responsible 
for the outbreak of the war. The defensive argument is necessary to disprove 
such accusations.
In his speeches and statements in the run-up to the centenary of the First 
World War, Serbia’s President Nikolić clearly confirmed and remediated a well-
established narrative and argumentative scheme of Serbian First World War 
memory. Yet, his statements were also clearly a reaction to the publication of 
Christopher Clark’s rethinking of the causes to the First World War, and as such 
Nikolić’s speeches and letters are probably the most public and political re-
ception of Clark’s book. Nikolić’s response was highly premediated; in essence 
he was repeating the defensive arguments that had been present in Serbian 
and Yugoslav history books for nearly a century. Apparently, Nikolić perceived 
Clark’s argument as if he was stating the accusations that the Serbian tradition 
had been rejecting since the end of the First World War. Indeed, the fact that 
Clark’s book fitted so neatly into the fears and argumentative patterns of Ser-
bia’s First World War memory was probably the main reason why it attracted 
so much attention in Serbia.
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chapter 5
Beyond Local Memories: Exhumations of 
Francoism’s Victims as Counter-discourse  
during the Spanish Transition to Democracy
Zoé de Kerangat
The Spanish Civil War started in July 1936, when military generals conducted 
a coup against the Second Republic. As they failed to conquer the entire terri-
tory, the coup unfolded into the Civil War. At the start of the war, repression 
against civilians was dreadful. In the areas that remained loyal to the Repub-
lic, uncontrolled groups of people killed members of the clergy and landown-
ers who were seen as exploiting the labour force. In the areas that had turned 
against the Republic, instructions were given to the population by rebel gener-
als to violently repress anyone who was suspected of supporting the Republic 
or being left-wing. The objective was to erase the roots of the left completely. 
The number of civilian victims is still debated, but it is estimated that almost 
60,000 were killed on the rebel side, and more than 100,000 on the side that was 
loyal with the Republic.1 A great proportion of those crimes took place in the 
first months of the war. When the Second Republic recovered control after an 
initial period of confusion, illegal repression against the conservatives virtually 
stopped and the executions became part of processes of justice. The rebels’ 
repression continued throughout the war and the first years of dictatorship, 
although to a lesser extent than in the first months of the Civil War. General 
Francisco Franco soon became the leader of the rebel side. In April 1939, when 
the war ended with the Francoist victory, he became the head of the dicta-
torship. Most of the dead on the Francoist side were exhumed and honored 
directly after the end of the war, as part of the construction of the Francoist 
rhetoric of martyrdom.2 However, the thousands of victims of Francoism were 
left buried in unmarked mass graves across the Spanish territory. These mass 
1 Julián Casanova, España Partida En Dos: Breve Historia de La Guerra Civil Española (Barce-
lona: Crítica, 2013).




graves were part of what has been called the ‘topography of terror’,3 acting as 
an instigator of fear in society, by reminding people about the consequences of 
opposing the Francoist regime.
Dictator Franco died while he was still in power in 1975. Soon after his death, 
the period of transition to democracy started. It was a very intense period in 
terms of institutional and political negotiations, but also a period of conflict, 
fear and uncertainty. As democracy developed, a tacit agreement among 
politicians was reached in order for the transition to be smooth. An amnesty 
law was passed in 1977, freeing the political prisoners jailed by the Francoist 
authorities, but also preventing the Francoist perpetrators from being pros-
ecuted. Under the so-called ‘Pact of Silence’, there would be no mention of the 
victims of Francoist repression. Paloma Aguilar defines the ‘Pact of Silence’ as 
a ‘tacit agreement during the transition to silence the crimes of the Civil War 
and Francoist repression’.4 In this sense, silence was intentional. However, the 
‘Pact of Silence’ was in fact limited to the institutional sphere and not a real 
social agreement. What is more, according to Aguilar,5 the memory of the Civil 
War was indeed highly present in the sense that most Spanish people thought 
a new armed conflict was possible at the time. Thus, the argument not to bring 
the history of the repression into debate was in fact triggered by the very mem-
ory of the Civil War. The Spanish society wanted to avoid a new conflict at 
all costs, and – according to the discourse of consensus – to maintain peace, 
it was necessary to avoid looking back. The new dominant discourse of na-
tional reconciliation was hence based on intentional ‘oblivion’. What was not 
possible, under the ‘Pact of Silence’, was to use the recent history of violence 
and demands of justice for the repressed as political leverage in the new Span-
ish democracy. Political actors such as the Socialists and Communists, illegal 
and repressed during the dictatorship, were allowed to come back from exile 
or clandestinity, under the condition that they would abide by this unwritten 
rule. Nevertheless, the limit of what was allowed was not clearly stated. As the 
nature of the so-called pact was tacit it was rather a try – and – see process.6 As 
3 Francisco Ferrándiz, El Pasado Bajo Tierra: Exhumaciones Contemporáneas de La Guerra Civil 
(Barcelona: Anthropos, 2014), 192.
4 Paloma Aguilar, “Justice, Politics and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” in The Politics of 
Memory. Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Car-
men González Enríquez, and Paloma Aguilar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 92–118.
5 Paloma Aguilar, Políticas de La Memoria Y Memorias de La Política : El Caso Español En Per-
spectiva Comparada (Madrid: Alianza, 2008), 250–303.
6 Lidia Mateo Leivas and the author are currently publishing an article entitled “The limits of 
remembrance during the Spanish Transition: Questioning the “Pact of Oblivion” through the 
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we will see in the following, in some places the recovery of the memory of the 
victims of Francoism went further than in others – because of the restrictions 
some people were faced with or the audacity some showed – and it is neces-
sary to make the difference between what happened at State level and the local 
actions and initiatives across Spain.
As a result of the ‘Pact of Silence’, the institutional initiatives regarding repa-
rations to the victims of past violence remained limited to the pension law 
of 1979. The law gave the widow/ers and children of people who died during 
the Civil War the right to receive a pension. This meant that the dead on the 
Republican side were now also taken into consideration. In order to claim the 
pension, the widows or relatives had to show proof of the death of their rela-
tive under the conditions contemplated by the law.7 Exhuming the remains, in 
some cases, was a way to produce or induce the pieces of evidence and testi-
monies necessary to get a death certificate, although indirectly, as no forensic 
identification or certification of death was issued at the time. The pension law 
was not the direct trigger for the exhumations of the late 70s and early 80s – 
many in fact took place before – but as the only institutional policy to deal 
with reparations, it is definitely a significant element to take into account.
This chapter studies the wave of mass grave openings in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. The interest for this topic emerges from the realization that many 
exhumations in fact took place before the ‘boom’, starting in 2000.8 Indeed, 
when some of the graves were opened in the 21st century, parts of the bod-
ies were missing, meaning that the grave had been opened before and that 
someone had taken the remains. On the other hand, the higher media impact 
of the 21st-century exhumations meant that an increasing number of people 
came forward to tell their story of the Civil War and of the repression, includ-
ing people who had taken the initiative to exhume some of the graves decades 
ago. It is time to look into these exhumations as it is important to acknowledge 
them as one of the phases of mass grave openings since the Civil War.
analysis of a censored film and a mass grave exhumation” about the containment of memory 
during the Spanish Transition, in which we analyze two examples of what was allowed in 
terms of memory initiatives at the time.
7 “Real Decreto 2635/1979, de 16 de Noviembre, Para La Aplicación Y Cumplimiento de La 
Ley 5/1979, de 18 de Septiembre, Sobre Concesión de Derechos a Los Familiares de Los 
Españoles Fallecidos Como Consecuencia O Con Ocasión de La Pasada Guerra Civil,” 16 
November 1979, Agencia Estatal Boletín del Estado, https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-1979-27535.
8 Emilio Silva, Las Fosas de Franco (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2005).; Ferrándiz, El Pasado Bajo 
Tierra: Exhumaciones Contemporáneas de La Guerra Civil.
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The research carried out in Spain is based on different kinds of material. 
The main sources of investigation are interviews with the people who were 
involved in the exhumations of the bodies from mass graves, and/or local ac-
tivists who have researched the repression in their village or area and know 
how the victims were exhumed and later honoured. These people often have 
pictures, or even audio and video recordings of the events. In some cases, a few 
official documents are available in the local archives (such as reports of the 
plenary sessions at the town hall where the re-burial is discussed). We can also 
find informal documents people have saved, with information about the costs 
of the exhumations and re-burials, for example, or reports of their informal 
meetings. In a few cases, there are short press reports published in the local 
media about the ceremonies after the exhumations. Last but not least, the sec-
ondary sources on the Civil War and repression in specific areas are very help-
ful to gather more information, corroborate or contrast the data.
In the case of Arnedo presented in this chapter, the main source of infor-
mation is an interview with Carlos Solana, a local activist who participated in 
activities for the recovery of memory and interviewed the people of Arnedo 
about the stories of their families. He also showed pictures of the ceremony 
of re-burial which he attended and had an audio-recording of the mass that 
was celebrated. Also, the book Aquí nunca pasó nada by Jesús Vicente Aguirre 
contains helpful information about what happened in Arnedo.
The methods used are the hermeneutical analysis of the interviews com-
bined with the interpretation of the information given by the pictures, audio 
and video recordings, official documents and secondary sources. It has to be 
said that, as the repression and most of the exhumations of remains from mass 
graves we are dealing with were informal, the information is sometimes confus-
ing or contradictory. However, the interest of this piece of research lies in ana-
lysing the meaning that was given to those initiatives of recovery of memory in 
a context of fear and silence, right after the end of Franco’s dictatorship. In this 
sense, and given the type of sources analyzed in this piece of research, it can 
be defined as ‘history from below’ in Jim Sharpe’s terms,9 in which the point of 
start is the local people and their cases of exhumations. The  case-studies are 
then framed both in their broader political and historical context, and in the 
conceptual and theoretical framework developed through the analysis.
In the following, the exhumations of the Spanish transition will first be pre-
sented as part of the construction of local counter-discourses to the ‘Pact of 
Silence’. In the second part, the framework will be expanded beyond Spain, to 
9 Jim Sharpe, “Historia Desde Abajo,” in Formas de Hacer Historia, ed. Peter Burke, Segunda 
edición (Madrid: Alianza, 2003), 39–58.
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 relate the Spanish exhumations to the ones of the Greek transition in particu-
lar, showing that the local counter-discourses in fact go beyond the local sphere 
of memory practices and discourses. Looking at the kind of counter-discourse 
they produced, this chapter aims at opening up the view on grass-root memory 
practices such as the exhumations in Spain to new interpretations of the Span-
ish transition, also in connection to other cases such as the Greek one.
 Exhuming the Past: A Negotiated Counter-discourse  
to the ‘Pact of Silence’
Despite the difficult political circumstances of the transition, hundreds of peo-
ple, mainly families of the victims, decided that now that Franco was dead and 
the dictatorship over, they could finally unearth the remains of their relatives 
in order to give them a proper burial and to have them rest in a dignified grave.
These processes started and remained informal, with no official policy sup-
porting them. In fact, there was no specific policy whatsoever on what to do 
with the thousands of mass graves around Spain. As a result of the mostly infor-
mal nature of these processes, they did not leave much written documentation 
behind. When requested by the promoters of the exhumations, permissions 
to excavate were granted by the local authorities, but not without problems. 
There were threats, and concessions had to be made. To give an example, in 
Casas de Don Pedro in 1978, the procession for the re-burial of the remains 
was allowed by the Civil Governor under the condition that there would be no 
political slogans.10
Indeed, the conditions in which these groups of people carried out the ex-
humations were far from ideal. Although the dictatorship was over, fear among 
the population was still very present. Apart from the difficulties to find the 
graves and the occasional resentment of the local administration to allow the 
exhumation, the people involved were also despized by their fellow villagers. 
In some villages, the attendants were insulted during the procession.11 More-
over, they could not count on scientific support during the exhumations. There 
were, most probably, many mistakes made and no forensic identification. In 
most cases, the remains were reburied in collective vaults. What bound these 
groups together and formed a community was the desire to give dignity back 
to the victims through the re-burial of their remains.
10 Personal communication with Felisa Casatejada, Casas de Don Pedro, May 2015.
11 Josefina Campos Orduña, Los Fusilados de Peralta, La Vuelta a Casa (1936–1978). Operación 
Retorno (Pamplona/Iruña: Pamiela, 2008), 334.
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The transition exhumations show aspects of both resistance and compli-
ance, as the case of Arnedo – a village in La Rioja, in the north of Spain – exem-
plifies. In Arnedo, 46 people were murdered during the repression of the Civil 
War against the left.12 They were taken in different sacas (the term used when 
people were taken out of jail or their homes to be killed elsewhere, most often 
outside the village), and murdered in different places in La Rioja or the neigh-
boring region of Navarra, where they were buried in unmarked mass graves 
and left there for the entire dictatorship. 
When Franco died, a movement started in Navarra and La Rioja to exhume 
the remains of the victims of Francoist repression.13 The phenomenon spread 
on both sides of the Ebro River, with the help of a group of priests who ac-
tively supported and participated in these initiatives. In Arnedo, too, families 
decided to go and unearth the victims’ remains. They first had their meetings 
almost clandestinely, in the backroom of a bar.14 They were trying not to at-
tract attention. Most of the times, they knew the place where their relatives 
had been buried. The location and the history of the mass graves were usually 
known among the population, although not talked about during the dictator-
ship and sometimes not even today, because of fear. 
The families of Arnedo started opening the graves in 1978, with the help of 
diggers. They even removed the last bits of earth with spoons in order not to 
damage the remains.15 They exhumed bodies in various villages of La Rioja 
and Navarra – Ausejo, Lerín, Arnedillo or Calahorra – and they put the remains 
together in one coffin each time. Awaiting the funeral, the coffins with the 
remains were stored in the premises of the Red Cross. The mayor who was 
elected in the first democratic local elections in 1979 in Arnedo was a known 
Francoist. He was now part of Alianza Popular, the party founded by former 
politicians of the Francoist system after the dictatorship. However, when asked 
for permission to rebury the remains of the victims of Francoist repression 
in the cemetery of Arnedo, he was pleased with the idea.16 He made things 
easy, and the piece of land of the cemetery where the pantheon was built was 
unanimously ceded to the families, at no cost and in perpetuity. In May 1980, 
the re-burial took place with a church funeral followed by a silent procession 
with the coffins to the cemetery.
12 Jesús Vicente Aguirre González, Aquí Nunca Pasó Nada. La Rioja 1936, 5a edición (Logroño: 
Editorial Ochoa, 2008), 288.
13 These two were not the only regions where exhumations took place in the late 1970s, but 
there the grave openings had a kind of a domino effect, the word spreading from village 
to village that the relatives of the victims were bringing their loved ones ‘back home’.





On the one hand, despite the threats and people’s fear, political symbols 
were present. In Arnedo, huge Republican flags were used in the streets  during 
the procession and funeral of the victims after the exhumation (see Figure 5.1). 
They were even displayed at the church where the funeral took place.17 This 
happened when the Spanish Communist party itself had given up on display-
ing Republican flags during their events (and instead had adopted the official 
Spanish flag at the time) since 1977,18 as the party was looking for inclusion 
into the political system and was thus complying with the discourse of con-
sensus and apparent silence. It seems to have been the first time those flags 
came back to the public space of Arnedo in such a visible way since the end of 
the Second Republic.19 Even though the political symbols and discourse may 
not have been as visible in some other cases, the very act of exhumation is 
17 Ibid.
18 Joaquín Prieto, “La Bandera Nacional Ondeará En Los Actos Del Partido Comu-
nista de España,” El País, de abril de 1977, http://elpais.com/diario/1977/04/16/
espana/229989610_850215.html.
19 Personal communication with Carlos Solana, Arnedo, December 2014.
Figure 5.� Arnedo (La Rioja, Spain), 4 May 1980
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 political,  because dead bodies turn into political symbols20 when they bring a 
violent past into the present and as they are moved from one place to another. 
In short, the exhumations and the presence of these symbols were dissident in 
the context of the transition to democracy.
On the other hand, the processes of exhumation and re-burial were also im-
pregnated by religion – Catholic in most Spanish cases – although the Church 
had taken an important part in the Francoist repression of the 1930s. Many 
local priests were actively involved in the exhumations. They helped search-
ing for information and organizing funerals which were often requested by 
the families. In Arnedo in 1980, the local parish priest – who was apparently 
obliged by the Bishop21 – attended the procession and funeral (see Figure 5.2). 
During the funeral, another clergyman, who came from Navarra and was one 
of the priests who had supported all the exhumations, added something quite 
exceptional to the church service, given the context: he asked for forgiveness 
20 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 3.
21 Personal communication with Carlos Solana, Arnedo, December, 2014.
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in the name of the Church for its involvement in the repression.22 It has to be 
mentioned as well, that the mayor who authorized the remains to be reburied 
in the village cemetery thought it was a good idea to do it ‘como Dios manda’ 
[As God ordains].23
Religious rituals and symbols were also very present. Indeed, in many of 
the funerals organized after the exhumations, Christian crosses were displayed 
and women followed the custom of wearing black clothes as a sign of mourn-
ing. The religious aspect was also part of the families’ public recognition of the 
death of their relative as such, completing the traditional process of mourning 
they had been denied during the dictatorship. Basically, it was a claim for the 
right to comply with cultural customs: ‘their’ victims had a right to a funeral 
and decent grave. But in doing so, and by making concessions, they were also 
complying with the established order. That is, they were simultaneously dis-
rupting and complying with the transitional order.
This double sense given to the exhumations gave rise to situations that 
may seem contradictory, such as priests taking part in a procession where Re-
publican flags were displayed. Nevertheless, they reveal that these practices 
were in fact the local results of a negotiation between resistance and (self-)
censorship. Although this might reflect a contradiction, we can also consider 
it a strategical move in order to make sure that the exhumation and reburial 
would actually be approved. Because the discourse of silence was enforced 
upon them,24 the groups of people who wanted to exhume the bodies had to 
be discreet to reach their goal. They adapted their practices and discourses to 
the circumstances, that is, the limits given by the ‘Pact of Silence’ within which 
they (thought they) could act.
Despite the concessions, these initiatives were transgressive of the estab-
lished order, because they represented a crack in the discourse of silence and 
the consensus promoted during the transition. The transgression might not 
have been strong enough to worry the elites, but it was nevertheless an in-
flection on the dominant discourse in the public space, at a local level. They 
avoided a direct clash, while trying to remain as faithful as they could to the 
memory of the victims in their tribute. These exhumations were a form a sub-
tle resistance to the ‘Pact of Silence’, as part of the ‘infrapolitics of subordinate 
groups’ defined by James Scott as ‘low-profile forms of resistance that dare not 
22 Funeral a Los Fusilados de Arnedo (Arnedo, 1980).
23 Aguirre González, Aquí Nunca Pasó Nada. La Rioja 1936, 278.
24 Andrea Davis, “Enforcing the Transition: The Demobilization of Collective Memory 




speak in their own name’.25 In this sense, mourning the dead – mourning those 
precise dead in that precise context – was part of a counter-discourse to the 
‘Pact of Silence’.
The counter-discourses were the result of the reception of the ‘Pact of 
Silence’ and of the reaction to this dominant discourse. According to Wulf 
Kansteiner, cultural memory is the result of three interacting factors: intel-
lectual and cultural tradition that frames all our representations of the past, 
memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions and 
memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artifacts according to 
their own interest.26 In this setting, the three factors interact. Memory con-
sumers, when transforming the representations, also become memory makers 
as they mediate new representations of the past. In this sense, they receive 
memory discourses and produce new ones.
The discourse of the ‘Pact of Silence’ was received and consumed by many 
families of the victims of Francoism, who in turn became memory makers by 
adapting this dominant discourse to their own situation. Exhuming the re-
mains from the mass graves contributed to the creation of a different repre-
sentation of the victims than that imposed by the order of the transition. The 
exhumation of the bodies and their re-burial in a decent grave play a part – by 
turning the body into symbol – in the revaluation of the status of the victims. 
This diverging representation emerging from the exhumations produced a 
memory discourse promoting the dignification of the memory of Francoism’s 
victims to counter the official silence about them. Without being explicit, the 
families demonstrated that paying a pacific tribute to the dead through the 
grave openings did not mean looking for another conflict. They showed it was 
possible – and actually fair – to dignify the victims in the context of the transi-
tion. Thus the discourse promoted was one of symbolic justice in the memory 
of the Civil War and the deathly repression during the dictatorship. In turn, the 
emergence of counter-discourses affected the dominant one, in the sense that 
it forced the elite to find ways of discreetly making sure those local counter-
discourses would not spread by implementing new mechanisms of contain-
ment and silencing.27
25 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance : Hidden Transcripts (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1990), 19.
26 Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective 
Memory Studies,” History and Theory 41 (2002): 180.
27 See the forthcoming article by Lidia Mateo Leivas and the author: “The limits of remem-
brance during the Spanish Transition: Questioning the “Pact of Oblivion” through the 
analysis of a censored film and a mass grave exhumation.”
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Despite their emergence, the exhumations of the 70s and 80s received lim-
ited media attention.28 As a result of the limited media impact of the exhu-
mations, their silencing and their relative discretion, the counter-discourses 
produced by these acts remained invisible to the national sphere and stayed 
confined to local areas at a grass-root level. They did not enter what Foucault 
calls the ‘regime of truth’: the types of discourse which society ‘accepts and 
makes function as true’.29 In this struggle of memory discourses, the different 
representations of the past were made visible to a very uneven degree. Al-
though the counter-discourses did not get to be mediated in the main channels 
of communication and institutions, it is important to take them into account, 
as they offer a different point of view on the history of the transition. The tran-
sition was not indeed all about leaving the past behind. The study of grass-root 
actors demonstrates that the ‘oblivion’ of the transition is in fact one of many 
assumptions about that period. There was opposition to silence and it is neces-
sary to look for it, away from the dominant discourse.
 Exhumations across Time and Space
This type of local counter-discourse against silence actually fits into a larger 
historical and transnational discourse than that of the Spanish transition, and 
the grave openings should not be considered isolated events. Indeed, exhum-
ing the victims of political violence was not anything new. The post-World War 
i30 and World War ii31 periods saw the unearthing and moving of victims’ re-
mains across different European countries. As far as the exhumations of bod-
ies from the Spanish Civil War mass graves are concerned, the ones carried out 
in the 1970s and 1980s were not the first either. The genealogy of exhumations 
28 One of the exceptions in the national media is the magazine Interviú, in which thirteen 
reports on the mass graves were published between 1976 and 1984, although Interviú was 
not part of the mainstream media. For more on this topic see: Paloma Aguilar and Fran-
cisco Ferrándiz, “Memory, Media and Spectacle: Interviú’s Portrayal of Civil War Exhuma-
tions in the Early Years of Spanish Democracy,” Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 17, no. 
1 (2016): 1–25, doi:10.1080/14636204.2015.1135599.
29 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power (interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale 
Pasquino),” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, Pantheon (New York, 1984), 72–73.
30 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
31 Jean-Marc Dreyfus, “Une Renationalisation Des Corps ? La Mission Française de Recher-
ches Des Cadavres de Déportés En Allemagne, 1946–1958,” in Cadavres Impensables, Ca-
davres Impensés, ed. Elisabeth Anstett (Paris: Pétra, 2012), 67–78.
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can be divided into the following phases: the postwar (mainly Francoist, but 
also Republican clandestine exhumations), the moving of thousands of bodies 
to Franco’s future mausoleum – the Valle de los Caídos – during the dictator-
ship, the transition exhumations and finally the latest wave of exhumations 
that started in 2000.32 Each phase had its own form of necropolitics.33 If we 
focus on the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina was also the scene for exhumations 
of the victims of past violence. At the end of the Junta dictatorship, in 1984, 
the search for the desaparecidos – the people who had been abducted, de-
tained and killed illegally by the military – became official. The Madres and 
Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo had been looking for their children and grand-
children for years, but now that the dictatorship was over, the search was in 
the hands of justice. The first exhumations of bodies were conducted by the 
authorities, but there were many mistakes made and evidence was uninten-
tionally destroyed.34 Soon, independent forensic anthropologists35 took over 
and have worked on the search for disappeared people in Argentina and across 
the world ever since.
All in all, exhuming the victims of violence for the purpose of dignification – 
be it returning them to their families, as part of a State policy of honouring the 
‘fallen’, or a justice procedure – is embedded within the so-called Western tra-
ditions. Hence, the grave openings we are dealing with in this chapter do not 
emerge out of nowhere.
Most interestingly, similar exhumations to that of the Spanish transition 
took place in Greece in the same period.36 The Greek Civil War (1946–1949) op-
posing the left-wing forces of the Democratic Army of Greece and the armed 
section of the Greek Communist party on the one hand, and the right-wing 
Greek government on the other, also left many unmarked graves as a result of 
the atrocities committed on both sides. When Greece’s dictatorship was over 
in 1974, the policies of national reconciliation were not comprehensive and did 
not contemplate exhumations of the bodies in the mass graves. Katerina Stefa-
tos and Iosif Kovras even speak of a ‘subtle agreement […] reached to silence 
32 Ferrándiz, El Pasado Bajo Tierra: Exhumaciones Contemporáneas de La Guerra Civil, 148.
33 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.
34 Mauricio Cohen Salama, Tumbas Anónimas. Informe Sobre La Identificación de Restos de 
Víctimas de La Represión Ilegal (Buenos Aires: Catálogos editora, 1992); Christopher Joyce 
and Eric Stover, Witnesses from the Grave. From Mengele to Argentina’s “Disappeared” – The 
Stories Bones Tell (London: Grafton, 1993).
35 The Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (eaaf in Spanish)
36 I would like to thank Iosif Kovras and Katerina Stefatos for discussing this with me and for 
shedding light upon the Greek case. For more information, please refer to their publica-
tion listed in the bibliography.
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certain inconvenient aspects of the violent past’.37 Indeed, the institutional 
memory politics of the Greek democratic consolidation share characteristics 
with those of the Spanish transition. It is also worth noting that both post-
dictatorial processes coincide in time. Another point of convergence is the 
politics regarding reparations to former leftist veterans of the civil war. While 
the Spanish pension law was passed in 1979, similar measures were adopted in 
Greece in 1985 with a law restoring pension rights to public servants formerly 
dismissed for political reasons and providing for pensions to disabled or partly 
disabled veterans of the resistance.38
Amid partial silence on the past from the side of the government, the Greek 
island of Lesvos was the scene of the very few exhumations of the bodies of 
former resistance and Communist fighters that had died during the civil war. 
Stefatos and Kovras distinguish between three periods of exhumations: secrecy 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the most visible wave in the 1980s and a renewed inter-
est for exhumations in 2009.39 Again, this sequence is reminiscent of the Span-
ish one. In the 1980s, the bodies from Civil War mass graves were exhumed 
in the Agiasos pine forest (1982), in Mytilene (1982), Lambous Mylous (1983), 
Aghia Paraskevi (1983) and there was an unsuccessful attempt in Eressos (1985). 
Similarities can be found in the practice of exhuming and dignifying the vic-
tims. In both cases, scenes of people gathering around the open coffins or the 
boxes containing the remains to take pictures after the exhumations can be 
observed. Another similarity is that there is little information about them, ex-
cept for oral testimonies and material traces. Moreover, the mix of religion and 
politics can be found in the features of Lesvos identity, with a blend of Ortho-
dox faith with leftist-communist convictions.40 This is reflected in the re-burial 
ceremonies as well: there were religious ceremonies officiated by priests and 
women wearing black and crying as part of the mourning process, while lo-
cal Communist party members were present. The exhumations in Lesvos were 
also described as local and informal ones: ‘[…] with no official endorsement by 
political parties or the government. They were initiated by the local communi-
ties’.41 We have to bear in mind, nevertheless, that Lesvos was an outlier case 
37 Katerina Stefatos and Iosif Kovras, “Buried Silences of the Greek Civil War,” in Down to 
Earth: Exhumations in the Contemporary World, ed. Francisco Ferrándiz and Antonius 
Robben (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 165.
38 David Close, “The Road to Reconciliation? The Greek Civil War and the Politics of Memo-
ry in the 1980s,” in The Greek Civil War. Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences, 
ed. Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 266.





and that most of the mass graves of the Greek Civil War remain unopened. It 
does demonstrate, however, that in Greece, too, we need to look closer at the 
local level to find disruptions in the reception of and reaction to the dominant 
discourse of silence.42 The case of the Lesvos exhumations reveals a negotiated 
and localized counter-discourse to State silence similar to that of Spain. There 
too, the hegemonic silence was received and recycled into a different represen-
tation of the past, through the re-burial of the left-wing victims.
 Local Memories within and beyond National Silence
During the dictatorship and to a large extent the transition period, the memo-
ries of the left were, both in Spain and in Greece, ‘underground memories’.43 
They were forced into public silence, but the events were not forgotten by civil 
society. As Michael Pollak puts it, when the past remains silent, it is often the 
work of memory according to its possibilities of communication.44 Silence 
does not mean that memory is not working behind the scenes. Silence can 
be the form in which memory actually expresses itself in the public sphere, 
because other forms are impossible at that moment. What is more, Jay Winter 
has argued that silence must be examined as part of the cartography of recol-
lection and remembrance.45 As exhumations in that period show, we should 
not only focus on the institutional silence on the past during the Spanish and 
Greek transitions, but also on memory working at a local level, in the form 
adapted to the apparent realm of possibility.
There are striking similarities between the exhumations carried out in Spain 
and in Greece. However, they do not seem to be directly connected. In both 
cases, they were local initiatives coming from below, emerging independently 
from one another. This points to a transnational reception of the discourses 
promoting and implementing silence about the violent past from above. In 
this sense, we are not referring to the movement and interaction of memo-
ry discourses across space,46 but more to a common cultural and  political 
42 Ibid., 176.
43 Michael Pollak, Memoria, Olvido, Silencio. La Producción Social de Identidades Frente a 
Situaciones Límite. (La Plata: Ediciones Al Margen, 2006).
44 Ibid., 31.
45 Jay Winter, “Thinking about Silence,” in Shadows of War. A Social History of Silence in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Efrat Ben-Ze’ev, Ruth Ginio, and Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511676178.002.




ground – or intellectual and cultural tradition in Kansteiner’s scheme47 – on 
which similar and simultaneous forms of counter-discourses to a dominant 
discourse are constructed.
Rituals of death and burials are culturally and historically bound, but they 
can also get to represent a discourse that transcends those cultural borders. 
The exhumations responded to a moral imperative – dignifying the dead – that 
is larger than the national and local cultural contexts. Although practices of 
dignification take different forms and cannot be generalized, the fact that local 
counter-discourses to State silence about violent pasts took similar forms in 
different places at the same time points to the greater transcendence of mem-
ory and resistance to silence. The local memory practices are entangled within 
a larger set of transnational practices of mourning and of memory embedded 
within a larger discourse based on the moral obligation to respect and honor 
the dead. But these practices also blend with transnational political discourses 
of memory and justice. As a result, the local memory discourse  bypasses the 
national discourse of silence about the past to reach another level. In more 
recent periods, the human rights paradigm has been a crucial framework 
to develop a transnational memory discourse of truth, justice and repara-
tion, in which the practices and terminology have become transnationally 
 connected.48 Nevertheless, even without a clear connection and interaction, 
transnational discourses of the dignification of victims were at play before the 
globalized discourse on human rights.
Suggesting another point of view and shedding new light upon the memory 
practices that were hitherto not considered transgressive or dissident shows 
that the transitional silences on the past have actually been responded to. The 
reactions to the dominant discourse are not always spectacular, and some-
times they need to be made visible and recognized as part of the politics of 
memory, with their contradictions or particularities.49 Making those silenced 
voices audible also shows that they have an important role in the struggle of 
memory discourses, in this case revealing the transcendence of the desire to 
dignify one’s victims.
47 Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Mem-
ory Studies,” 180.
48 Francisco Ferrándiz, “Exhuming the Defeated: Civil War Mass Graves in 21st-Centry 
Spain,” American Ethnologist 40, no. 1 (2013): 38–54, doi:10.1111/amet.12004.
49 Zoé de Kerangat, “(In)visibilidad Y Lucha Familiar: Mujeres Y Memorias de La Represión 
En Las Décadas de Los 70 Y 80,” in Pasados de Violencia Política. Memoria, Discurso Y Pu-
esta En Escena, by Memorias en Red, ed. Jean-François Macé and Mario Martínez Zauner 
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chapter 6
Double Victims and Agents of Change in Europe’s 
Margins: Estonian Emigrants Sharing ‘Their’ 
Repressive Soviet Past in the Netherlands
Inge Melchior
Many [Western Europeans] do not know about the Soviet period and the 
deportations and about those politics. Many do not even know that Esto-




Linda, born in 1942 in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, recalls, while 
 telling me her story, how Soviet soldiers entered their house in 1949 to deport 
her sick father to Siberia. For her, the idea that Western Europeans do not share 
in this memory of Soviet repression, or might not even care, is very painful. She 
wants to belong to Europe. Since Estonia regained its independence in 1991, 
the new nation-state has successfully framed its identity as ‘European’, as al-
ways having belonged to Europe, as an antipode to Soviet.1 Not only Estonians 
from the generations who actually experienced Soviet repression, but also the 
younger generations born in the 1970s and 1980s, who grew up during the strug-
gle for independence, have voiced their concerns to me about  ‘Western Europe 
not being able to comprehend’ the Estonian historical experience (Sirje, 1982).
Based on previous extensive ethnographic fieldwork, I have argued that 
 Estonians from various social groups perceive their national memory narrative 
to be inferior to the dominant Western European one.2 This leads to feelings of 
1 Eiki Berg, “Local resistance, national identity and global swings in Post-Soviet Estonia,” 
 Europe-Asia Studies 54–1 (2002): 109–122.
2 Inge Melchior, “Guardians of Living History: The Persistence of the Past in post-Soviet Es-
tonia” (Phd diss., vu University Amsterdam, 2015). Inge Melchior, “Forming a common 
 European memory of wwii from a peripheral perspective: Anthropological insight into 
the struggle for recognition of Estonians, wwii memories in Europe,” in Disputed memory: 
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insecurity, of not belonging to the ‘European family’ and not being taken seri-
ously as equal partners. For this chapter I have followed Estonians who moved 
to the Netherlands, in order to get a deeper understanding of what actually 
happens when the ‘Estonian memory narrative’ is transported into Western 
Europe. What do Estonian grassroots’ memory agents do when they experi-
ence different reactions to/receptions of their understanding of the past? In 
what kind of contexts does this exchange of stories happen?
This chapter will reveal that in addition to the ‘double victims’ that I have 
described extensively in my previous work, Estonians who moved to the Neth-
erlands present themselves sometimes as ‘agents of change’. Both double vic-
tims and agents of change cannot just do ‘nothing’; both feel the need to create 
understanding and recognition among the Dutch, to pay respect to the stories 
of their relatives. For many this also means they feel the need to ‘defend’ or 
at least explain their national politics, which are much entangled with their 
family stories. Agents of change, however, believe that they have a voice that 
counts in that foreign context. They believe that they can make a change, that 
they can teach a life lesson that their Dutch friends are unable to learn from 
their own ‘rather uncomplicated’ history.
Based on the above, this chapter will provide a deeper understanding of 
memory reception. I will first explore the theoretical background of memory 
making and reception in the context of migration. Then I will explain how and 
among whom I have gathered my data. In the empirical part I will show what 
happens when migrants share their memory narratives in a host country with-
in a rather dominant discourse.
 Theory on Memory Reception
Representations of the past are being produced in museums, textbooks, monu-
ments by cultural, intellectual and political elites, as well as during family din-
ners. However, as Wulf Kansteiner has elaborately pointed out, this does not 
necessarily mean that these representations turn into memory; meaning that 
the authors/tellers successfully tie the representations to specific social groups.3 
Thus, instead of ‘presuppose[ing] a rarely acknowledged but not  particularly 
surprising desire for cultural homogeneity, consistency and  predictability’ in 
 emotions and memory politics in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, eds. Tea Sindbæk 
Andersen et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016) pp. 203–226.
3 Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding meaning in memory: a methodological critique of collective mem-
ory studies,” History and Theory 41.2 (2002): 192, 179–197.
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memory studies, we should have a closer look at what happens on the recep-
tion side of memory.4 As an anthropologist I am not  interested in the direct 
reception of a collective representation of the past. Rather, I am interested in 
how individuals, who have incorporated a certain memory of the past, interact 
with individuals who adhere to different representations of the past. How do 
the traces of the past that last within people, act upon them and make them 
act in a context among ‘others’?5
The answer to this question depends on the context. Memories of suffering 
are different from other kind of traces from the past. Several memory scholars 
have written about such ‘traumatic memory’: the kind of memory that does 
not find meaning in a narrative and thus retains its strong and uncontrollable 
affective force. In those cases, speaking about the past is of immense impor-
tance for a sense of liberation from that past. Firstly, it will remind the world of 
its responsibility to acknowledge truths that have been denied. Secondly, it will 
heal the self by the very act of speaking and being heard, as it allows the birth 
of a narrative that provides meaning to the pain.6
The listener also plays a crucial role in the extent to which the past per-
sists into the present. If there is no listener, the terrible event does not exist 
in the historic record.7 Perhaps even more painful is the ‘unwitnessed event’, 
described by psychoanalysts as the ‘annihilating force when others are around 
and do not acknowledge the inhumanity in front of them’.8 Or as anthropolo-
gist Michael Lambek puts it: ‘[t]here is nothing worse than making the effort to 
speak of terrible things and being ignored’.9 The empathy of the listener is not 
only crucial at the moment of storytelling, but also in what he/she does with 
the story afterwards.
Several memory scholars have argued that not only those who lived 
through a traumatic event have a memory that can extend into the present, 
but that also the post-generation can embrace the memory as their own, as 
4 Kansteiner, “Finding meaning in memory,” 193.
5 David Berliner, “The abuses of memory: reflections on the memory boom in anthropology,” 
Anthropological Quarterly 78.1 (2005).
Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, “Social memory studies: From ‘collective memory’ to the 
historical sociology of mnemonic practices,” Annual Reviews of Sociology 24 (1998).
6 Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone. “Remembering suffering: trauma and history,” 
in Contested pasts: the politics of memory, ed. Katharine Hodgkin et al. (London: Routledge, 
2003).
7 Nancy R. Goodman, and Marilyn B. Meyers, ed., The power of witnessing: Reflections, rever-
berations, and traces of the Holocaust (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), 3.
8 Goodman, The power of witnessing, 10.
9 Michael Lambek, “Foreword,” in Memory and World War ii: An Ethnographic Approach, ed. 
Francesca Cappelletto. (Oxford: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xi.
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a  ‘post-memory’.10 The descendants of victims – such as young generations 
Estonians – feel so deeply connected to the traumatic experiences of their 
(grand)parents, ‘that they need to call that connection memory and thus that, 
in  certain extreme circumstances, memory can be transmitted to those who 
were not actually there to live an event’.11 The second generation has made 
the stories with which they grew up their ‘own’ to such a large extent that the 
experience of the trauma extends into the present.
The desire to ‘compensate’ the others’ losses12 is especially strong in times of 
uncertainty, when the wounds of the past hurt the post-generation more, and 
coherent stories of the past are more essential to the healing process.13 ‘When 
identity is not in question, neither is memory’.14 In other words, in times of 
crisis or uncertainty the post-generation will be more likely to demand recog-
nition for their story. The peculiarity of the Estonian post-generation on which 
I will focus in this chapter, is that they live in a foreign society.
Generally, migrants face more uncertainty than natives do. According to an-
thropologist Liisa Malkki, this is due to the fact that migrants are seen, and see 
themselves, as ‘uprooted’. Like most people, migrants long for roots, in order to 
feel at home in a place and to have intimate ties with other people. Migrants 
face more challenges than natives in rooting themselves as they move between 
physical spaces and between cultural communities. They live as if they were 
‘in-between’ cultures. They have their roots in a different society than the place 
where they are living. They constantly need to ‘decide’ to which social and cul-
tural rules they will adhere, with whom they identify and to whom they are 
loyal. This makes them unpredictable and therefore they are sometimes seen 
as ‘scary’ by their host society. A strong story or narrative provides guidance in 
this chaos and cultural ‘in-betweenness’.15 Eastmond argues that stories and 
narratives help people in times of migration to establish identity in their rup-
tured life paths.16
10 Marianne Hirsch, “The generation of postmemory,” Poetics Today 29.1 (2008).
11 Hirsch, “Postmemory,” 105–106.
12 Kansteiner, “Finding meaning in memory,” 184.
Olick, “Social memory studies.”
13 Hodgkin, “Remembering suffering.”
14 Michael Lambek and Paul Antze, “Introduction: Forecasting memory,” in Tense past: 
Cultural essays in trauma and memory, ed. Michael Lambek et al. (New York: Routledge, 
1996), xxii.
15 Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and exile: violence, memory, and national cosmology among hutu 
refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
16 Marita Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 20.2 (2007).
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Based on the preceding paragraphs we might expect that those Estonians 
who live in the Netherlands and feel that their Estonian identity is under 
threat, are more likely to defend and demand recognition for the story of Soviet 
repression. In the new context where they live, that story is being challenged, 
and therefore can become an identity marker of Estonian national identity. 
For those who do not strongly identify with the victims of Soviet repression 
or with the Estonian nation, or who do not feel that their Estonian identity 
is under threat in their new homeland, we might expect the opposite: that 
the physical distance to the homeland creates more emotional distance to its 
identity markers.
I have thus singled out several contextual factors that feed into the linger-
ing effect of the past into the present, and thus the need that people feel to 
share their story with others: a violent and traumatic past, the absence of an 
empathetic listener, a high degree of identification with the victims, as well 
as a strong sense of insecurity and chaos in the present. A contextual factor, 
which is especially important to add to this list in the case of migrants, is the 
power of the particular migrant(group). First of all, migrants who enter a new 
society through a refugee camp have completely different possibilities to turn 
their experiences into narratives and share them with their new compatriots, 
than those who integrate into an urban area.17 But even though most Estonian 
migrants in this chapter live in Dutch urban areas and are well educated, they 
face the fact that the ‘established’ have more power because they have better 
access to institutions, more knowledge about the society in which they live and 
a stronger social network.18 As the ‘outsiders’, migrants have less legitimacy to 
their own story in their new homeland – especially if the narrative challenges 
the dominant story.
In this text I will focus on the reception in the Netherlands of the Estonian 
grand narrative on the Soviet repressions, which challenges the Dutch narra-
tive on the Holocaust. It concerns a violent past that lingers on in the present 
for many of my interviewees, in their search for an empathetic listener.
 Methodology
Wulf Kansteiner argues that reception is too little studied in the field of mem-
ory studies.19 Too often do memory scholars assume that the dominant story 
17 Malkki, Purity and exile.
18 Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, The established and the outsiders (New York: The Hu-
manities Press, 1966).
19 Margaret Archer in Kansteiner, “Finding meaning in memory,” 194.
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in the media correlates with the perspective of its users, also called the ‘down-
ward conflation’ of structuralism.19 Therefore, I have chosen an ethnograph-
ic fieldwork approach in order to be able to focus on the social practices of 
remembering and to avoid sticking solely to the level of representation and 
memory producers. Ethnography also enables a focus on the agency that peo-
ple have and on emotions that can be found below the surface.
Since 2007, when I conducted research for my Master thesis in Estonia, I 
have participated in activities of the Eesti Kool [Estonian school] in the Nether-
lands, after returning from fieldwork. Once a month they organize ‘classes’ for 
the children of Estonian parents in order to improve their Estonian language 
and to nourish their Estonian identity, and they provide language lessons for 
adults. 1100 Estonian citizens are officially registered in the Netherlands. I par-
ticipated in the language classes until they no longer contributed to my lan-
guage skills. I continued to attend events such as the St John’s celebration every 
year in June. For this text I have carried out participant observations during 
monthly school days and interviewed several Estonian emigrants. These Es-
tonians have moved to the Netherlands to study, work or because they have 
a Dutch partner. They are thus institutional or labor migrants who emigrated 
voluntarily. I approached them by posting a message in the Facebook group 
‘Eestlased Hollandis’ (Estonians in the Netherlands). The network has 1962 
members (on 8 March 2016). I also invited several Estonians directly; either ac-
quaintances from my time in Estonia who had emigrated, or people I had met 
during my previous participation in activities of the Estonian School. Eventu-
ally I managed to gather stories from seven Estonians, all conducted in the 
Estonian language, either written or by Skype interview.
This data collection should be seen as building on my previous ethnograph-
ic fieldwork research in Estonia between 2007 and 2015, where I participated 
in commemorations, song festivals and folk dance classes, in family dinners, 
berry picking excursions and relatives’ graveyard visits, while conducting an 
extensive amount of formal and informal interviews.
I did not further select those Estonian emigrants who were willing to talk 
to me. After all, what I am interested in is the fact that they as Estonians live 
within the Dutch memory landscape, and how they deal with that. Based on 
my previous fieldwork I would not expect major differences between individu-
als, as I saw how the stories of Soviet repression mattered to my informants 
from all parts of society, as they all identify with the Estonian nation and feel 
responsible for its preservation and continuation, especially, I would expect, 
in a foreign context, where they live among people who adhere to different 
stories about the recent past. They are confronted with them on a daily basis. 
Reception and incorporation of the Soviet narrative might therefore be dif-
ferent for them than for Estonians who live in Estonia. After all, they are also 
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exposed to another memory narrative of that same time period, namely the 
one which is dominant in the Netherlands. 2014–2016 forms a very interesting 
time to collect data in the Netherlands, as – I will argue – the image of Russia 
has recently changed, due to current political developments.
 The Memory Narrative of Soviet Repression
On the 25th of March 1949 we were taken away from our house. […] We 
had seen how they set everything on fire, and how they filled their pock-
ets with the things that were useful to them. From the trip I remember 
mainly how those Russians were screaming at us: ‘fascists’. And the cold. 
There was so much snow outside and people were sleeping in front of the 
door. We had 5 families in our cattle wagon. […] We were in the train for 
about a month before we arrived.
eliisa, �940
Eliisa was deported to Siberia as a 9-year old girl, together with her mother. 
Apart from her, another 33,861 Estonians (=3% of the total population of 1939) 
have lived parts of their lives in Gulag (Soviet forced labour camps) accused of 
being ‘enemies of the people’.20 This number excludes political prisoners sent 
to Russia, men mobilized into the Red Army and people arrested and mur-
dered on the spot. In total, 134,600 Estonians – men, women, elderly people, 
children, intellectuals, farmers and workers – were repressed by the Soviet re-
gime between 1939 and 1991 in one or another way. Not only Estonian families 
have been deprived of their freedom by the Soviet authorities. People of all 
ethnicities living in Soviet territory – Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Geor-
gians, Uzbeks, Jews, Chechens, etc. – were in potential danger if they did not 
live according to the Communist rules.21 Historians have estimated that be-
tween 1928 and 1953, about 25 million people in total had circulated through 
the Gulag system.22
20 Aigi Rahi-Tamm, “Human losses,” in The white book: losses inflicted on the Estonian nation 
by occupation regimes 1940–1991, ed. Vello Salo et al. (Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Pub-
lishers, 2005).
21 Richard M.C. Mole, The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Iden-
tity, discourse and power in the post-communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(London: Routledge, 2012).
22 Jehanne M. Gheith and Katherine R. Jolluck, Gulag voices: Oral histories of Soviet incar-
ceration and exile (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3.
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Eastern Europeans grew up in the ‘bloodlands’, the land between Moscow 
and the German border, the place where Hitler and Stalin fought each other’s 
armies and where terror would inevitably intrude in the everyday lives of the 
locals at some point.23 Estonia became a kind of plaything of history, being 
a small country (1,133,917 inhabitants in 1939, source: stat.ee) with a short in-
dependent history (1920–1939) and a strategic geo-political location. In 1939, 
the country was annexed by the Soviet Union. In 1941 the German troops ar-
rived and took over control. Estonian men were mobilized both into the Soviet 
and German army. In 1944, when the Soviet army again approached the Bal-
tic States, ten thousands of Estonians joined the German army voluntarily in 
order to defend their home country. On the battlefields they faced their own 
brothers, fathers, friends and neighbours, men who had been recruited into 
the Soviet army. Eventually the Soviet authorities expelled the German rulers 
and stayed in control until 1991.
In those almost 50 years of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (essr), a 
public memory of the deportations, as the ultimate symbol of Soviet repres-
sion, did not exist. Eliisa returned with her mother in 1958, and told me how she 
was not ‘allowed’ to talk about the deportations. First of all, former deportees 
had problems entering certain jobs and universities. Secondly, the public narra-
tive framed the deportees as criminals and enemies of the state, who had been 
transferred to Siberia in order to safeguard the rest of society. People like Eliisa 
thus felt ashamed mentioning the fact that they had been one of the deportees.
Only in the late 1980s, in the period of glasnost and perestroika, did a public 
memory narrative of Soviet repression find daylight. In the essr this started 
with the publication of ‘Maria in Siberian lands’ [Maria Siberimaal]. Heino Kiik 
wrote this novel about his deported mother and brother and arrested father al-
ready in 1978, but it only made it to the wider public after 1985 (Eesti  Päevaleht, 
15 May 2009). With that, the Soviet deportations had come to  occupy a place in 
the cultural memory of the essr as a narrative about the repression of inno-
cent people rather than the punishment of criminals. The publication of this 
book and the first newspaper articles on this topic (for example, on 27 Novem-
ber 1987, historian Evald Laasi wrote an article about the Soviet deportations 
in the main Estonian cultural magazine Sirp ja Vasar (‘Hammer and sickle’)), 
broke a taboo in Soviet Estonian society. Similar events were taking place in 
Soviet Russia and other Soviet republics.24
23 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 
2010), vii–viii.
24 Nanci Adler, “The Gulag Survivor: Beyond the Soviet System,” in On Living Through Soviet 
Russia, edited by Daniel Bertaux, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004).
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Alongside the creation of this cultural memory, politicians also began to 
openly create a safe space for sharing stories of Soviet repression, even though 
Estonia was still part of the Soviet Union and politicians were still subject 
to Soviet authority (more on this in Melchior, 2015, pp. 91–100 and 116–136). 
On 25 March 1989, exactly 40 years after the second mass deportation, head 
of state Arnold Rüütel held a public speech and on 14 June, the date of the 
1941- deportations, three government officials made an ‘Address to the people 
of Estonia’; both acts ‘politically’ recognized the victimhood of the deportees.25
This new public memory touched the former deportees deeply. Leena, who 
had been deported in 1949 at the age of 6, recalls in our interview what had 
happened to her when she first got hold of a copy of ‘Maria in Siberian lands’: 
‘I just read and cried. It tore open all the old wounds. I did not want to experi-
ence it anew […]. When I read the book at home, my children told me not to 
read the book, because I just cried the whole time. But I had to read and cry 
anyway. When I recall that time and read some old letters from that time, my 
heart starts to hurt’ (Leena 1949). Once the story of Soviet repression was out in 
the open, things developed quickly. On the radio a series was launched called 
‘Unwritten Memoirs’ [Kirjutamata memuaare], where deportees told their sto-
ries publicly.
In addition, young and critical intellectuals founded the Heritage So-
ciety in 1987 and started to collect life-stories. In the wake of Jakob Hurt, a 
great Estonian folklorist and linguist from the period of National Awaken-
ing, these young intellectuals believed that real history existed in the stories 
of the people, untouched by politics.26 National history in Estonia was thus 
rewritten by intellectuals, dissidents and ordinary citizens collectively, from a 
 non-academic and personal perspective. A broad share of the population was 
involved, as basically every Estonian knew someone who had been deported 
and/or was confronted with the wounds of the past. In the wake of the wider 
‘Singing Revolution’ – in which those intellectuals, dissidents and the majority 
of  Estonian-speaking citizens peacefully participated in song festivals to ex-
press their cultural strength and demand freedom – Estonian deportees were 
explicitly called for filling in the gaps in the official history. Former deportees 
received special status and became ‘irreplaceable’ compatriots for having the 
25 Terje Anepaio, “Reception of the topic repressions in the Estonian society,” Pro Ethnologia 
14.9 (2002): 50.
26 In my doctoral dissertation I dedicated a full chapter to the tracing of the mobilization of 
history-writing of the Estonian nation.
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knowledge that others did not have.27 It could be argued that production and 
reception of memory in those early 1990s were inextricable linked. ‘The people’ 
produced and ‘the people’ received, at least that was how my informants per-
ceived the situation at that time.28
Obviously, this relationship changed when time passed by. The intellectuals 
and dissidents who had been the unofficial and ordinary leaders of the ‘Es-
tonian people’ in the late 1980s, became the politicians of the new Estonian 
state re-established in 1991. In the late 1990s, their focus was no longer with the 
past but with the future, according to Anepaio.29 Society by that time had split 
into two: the independence winners and the losers. The losers increasingly 
felt that they were not being represented by the political elite. They began to 
share stories of the good and secure Soviet life in their personal sphere. In the 
2000s, these stories of innocent Soviet nostalgia also entered the public stage, 
but only in the cultural (writers and film / theatre directors) and intellectual 
(academia) arena and the topic was very cautiously addressed.30 Attempts by 
intellectuals or cultural figures to talk about the ‘normal’ Soviet life, were eas-
ily quelled by calling them ‘Communist’ or ‘national traitor’. On a political and 
legal level the memory narrative of Soviet repression never lost ground. Esto-
nian ethnologist Kirsti Jõesalu argues that all presidents between 1991 and 2012 
frame the Soviet period as a rupture, an abnormal and non-Estonian time.31 
Moreover, the ideology of ‘legal restorationism’ implemented in Estonia in the 
early 1990s frames the Soviet period in legal terms as illegal.32
Since 2004 Estonia is a member of the European Union (eu). This has posed 
new challenges to the memory narrative of Soviet repression. After all, ‘old 
 Europe’ does not have the same historical experiences with Communism and 
27 Anepaio, “Reception.”
Ene Kõresaar, “Memory and history in Estonian post-Soviet life stories” (PhD diss., 
Tartu University, 2004).
28 See Melchior, Guardians of living history.
29 Anepaio, “Reception.”
30 Kristi Grünberg, (2009). “Remembering the Soviet past in Estonia: the case of the nos-
talgic comedy ‘the light blue wagon’,” Atslegvardi / Keywords: Academic Journal for New 
Research in humanities and Social Sciences in the Baltic States (2009), accessed 23 August 
2010 available at http://www.satori.lv/projekti/keywords/Kristi_Grunberg.pdf.
Melchior, Guardians of Living History.
31 Kirsti Jõesalu, “The role of the Soviet past in post-Soviet memory politics through exam-
ples of speeches from Estonian presidents,” Europe-Asia Studies 64.6 (2012): 1007–1032.
32 Vello A. Pettai, “Framing the past as future: the power of legal restorationism in Estonia” 
(PhD diss., Columbia University, 2004).
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the Soviet Union as ‘new Europe’ has. Besides that, a common European his-
tory based on the Holocaust as a unique crime against humanity was already 
in the making when Estonia entered. This has incited debates in Estonian so-
ciety on how to deal with their memory of Soviet repression. Can they allow 
a Holocaust narrative into their historical consciousness without betraying 
their memory of Soviet repression? And if they are expected to incorporate 
the Holocaust narrative dominant in the west, does that mean Estonians can 
expect Western Europeans to do the same with the memory of Soviet repres-
sion? Helena, one of my informants, a history teacher born in 1975, explained 
to me her fear: ‘I am curious whether that means that France is going to learn 
about Estonian history as well then. Did you learn anything in school about 
Estonian history? […] It is just not fair. Why do we need to learn about France 
and England and the Netherlands, and no one is learning about us?’ (Helena 
1975). Helena is afraid that within the European family, the memory narrative 
of Soviet repression is not strong enough to persist. At the same time, she and 
the majority of Estonians do not want to turn their backs to Europe either, as 
they very much want to belong to Europe.33 Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka 
traces this ‘emergence of the crippled, inferior, deficient and defensive iden-
tity of “incomplete Europeans”’ to the period of modern capitalism and the 
Cold War, both periods in which the region lost its temporary importance in 
Europe.34
This is the memory narrative of Soviet repression in which the interviewees 
in this chapter were raised and the story they carried with them to the Neth-
erlands. But how do they relate to that narrative in the Netherlands? Which 
meaning does it have in their everyday lives in this ‘foreign’ context? What do 
they do with the story?
 The Story of Soviet Repression in the Netherlands
As mentioned before, the story of Soviet repression is not ‘rooted’ in the 
 Netherlands. The Netherlands was never part of the Soviet Union, nor were 
their citizens directly affected by the Soviet authorities due to the lack of a 
relevant historical or political affiliation. Soviet repression is thus not part of 
the collective memory of the Dutch community, which also implies that few 
33 Melchior, Guardians of Living History. Melchior, Forming a common European memory. 
34 Piotr Sztompka, From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Identities and Boundaries 
in the New Europe (Wassenaar: nias/Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the 
 Humanities and Social Sciences, 2004).
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Dutchmen have knowledge of what happened behind that iron curtain. It 
was a far from their bed show. My informants mention that when the Soviet 
past comes up in a conversation, it is mostly when contemporary politics 
evoke a debate. The topics that most easily evoke discussion when Dutch 
interact with Estonians are the role of Russia and the minority rights/refugee 
crisis.
Siim, born in 1997, moved to Maastricht for his first years of study. He got 
befriended with two Estonians, one Dutch and one Slovak guy. ‘Russia’ and 
‘Putin’ regularly entered their conversations: ‘I would say that our thoughts 
and feelings were not completely different, but in the beginning I definitely 
noticed some differences. For example when I think of Putin’s or Russia’s 
politics I am quite negative. But they were not very excited about the theme, 
they were relatively neutral towards Russia and Putin’ (Siim, 1997). Anna, born 
in 1991, studied in Utrecht for some time, and had the most serious discus-
sion when she invited a friend from the Netherlands over to Estonia during 
the summer. Even though he was a history teacher and Anna expected him 
to understand that Estonian history is different from the Dutch one, he was 
posing her very critical questions about the minority question in Estonia. It 
gave her the feeling that he did not understand her (and the general Esto-
nian) perspective on the matter, and that he assumed that his perspective was 
somehow superior.
For both Siim and Anna, the story of Soviet repression did not lose its im-
portance because they were living far away from their homeland. It rather in-
creased because it was constantly being challenged and they felt the need to 
defend their standpoint. Moreover, for Estonians, the Soviet repressions are 
not solely a story of their nation, as we just saw, but a family story as well, 
with a strong sense of loyalty towards relatives. Important to stress here is that 
both Siim and Anna were born in independent Estonia, are highly educated 
and outward-looking individuals, and yet that painful national history affects 
the present. Siim explained as follows why the Soviet narrative is important to 
him, regardless of the place he lives:
wwii and the Soviet period are very much entangled with my family 
and therefore this topic is of great interest to me personally. The family 
of my grandfather on father’s side was not deported, but their suitcases 
were packed and they were ready to go, but fortunately no one came 
to knock on their door. […] The whole family of my grandmother on 
 father’s side was deported to Siberia in March 1949, somewhere close 
to Omsk and Kazakhstan. My grandmother Eda turned 9 years old in 
that animal’s wagon on the way to Siberia. […] My great-grandfather on 
mother’s side, Karl Vares, disappeared without a trace. One thinks that 
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he died  somewhere in Siberia. He had been on the side of the Germans. 
[…] My grandmother on mother’s side was an Ingrian. Also her family 
has suffered a lot because of wwii. […] the family fled the war to Russia, 
from where they were deported to Siberia and eventually they returned 
to  Viljandi (Estonia).
siim, �997
Seeing his family history and his interest in that family history, it is understand-
able why the story of Soviet repression is close to his heart and has not lost its 
significance in the Netherlands. Also Liisa, born in 1977, who married a Dutch 
man in 2000, immediately recalls her family stories while explaining to me why 
the story of Soviet repression lingers in her life:
You know it is a wound (haav) and it is still fresh. We have only been 
free for 20 years. It still hurts. My grandfather, my own grandfather, he 
was on the list to be deported. He was an entrepreneur, he owned apple 
trees. They came to get him twice. One time he was in the swamp, the 
second time he was literally on top of a tree in the garden, hiding, while 
his wife and children were in the house. He was in danger but luckily 
he was never deported. You know, one evening they could come to pick 
you up to fight in the Soviet army and the next one – or sometimes 
even the same evening – for the German army. There was not a matter 
of choice.
liisa, �977
Because of its close ties with one’s family, the story of Soviet repression does not 
lose significance in the Dutch context. Kadri (1984) moved to the Netherlands 
in 2009, two years after she got into a relationship with a Dutch man whom she 
had met in Estonia. For Kadri the Soviet repressions are not only important be-
cause of her family story but because she as a citizen is directly related to that 
history. ‘It plays a big role in the identity of Estonians. The Soviet occupation 
and the Singing Revolution are at least to my generation an important part of 
our identity’ (Kadri, 1984). Only one of the interviewees, Marii, 32 years old, 
mentioned that the Soviet repressions did not interest her that much. Marii, 
who moved to Eindhoven to pursue her PhD research, never asked her family 
for their story, and apparently her relatives did not feel the need to share it with 
her either. For Marii, the story does not play any role in defining who she is, as 
a person or as an Estonian. Except for her, all interviewees mention that the 
story of Soviet repression not just passively lingers on in the Dutch context, but 
rather seems ‘activated’ as it is constantly being challenged.
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 An Equal Listener?
Once the Estonian emigrants share the story of Soviet repression with their 
Dutch classmates, neighbours and colleagues, their Dutch interlocutors either 
react (1) indifferently or judgmentally, or (2) with surprise and interest. As ar-
gued before, it is very important for the healing process and for establishing a 
fruitful relationship with others that one feels understood.35
Siim explained to me that he often felt misunderstood by his Dutch friends 
‘who had much more liberal worldviews’ when he spoke about the danger of 
Russia. During these conversations he got the impression that the Dutch are not 
very interested in the Baltic region, or make any effort to learn more about it:
They could not place themselves in my perspective, and in general Esto-
nia, as an Eastern European state and as neighbour of Russia, was not a 
topic that touched them in any way. […] Here, I want to strongly stress 
that Dutch people in the beginning thought that the Baltic States, includ-
ing Estonia, are ‘basically Russia’. Of course I did not like this at all and 
I tried to explain to them, again and again, that Estonia and the other 
Baltic States are independent and significantly different from Russia. I 
would bring examples about our culture, our language, that we have the 
Latin alphabet, not Cyrillic and that our languages are completely differ-
ent. And that we are different as a Volk. We are Finn Ugric people, not 
Slavic, and so forth.
siim, �997
Kadri shares the same feeling that the Dutch are indifferent towards what hap-
pened in that eastern region; they do not really care:
I think that the majority of Dutch people is not interested in Estonian 
history and does not understand it very well. Generally they still think 
about Eastern Europe as one single eastern bloc and they know that 
those  countries were once part of the Soviet Union. More nuances gener-
ally do not fit to that world view. Europe ends with the eastern border of 
Germany and anything that comes after that does not evoke any interest. 
Of course there are also people who are interested in Estonian history, 
but those are the people who learned about it at university.
kadri, �984




Anna’s Dutch friend who came to visit her in Estonia – a history teacher – was 
not indifferent towards Estonian history; he was rather interested and asked 
many questions. But like those Dutch interlocutors mentioned before, he did 
not give Anna the feeling that he was making an effort to understand her or ‘the 
Estonian’ perspective. He was rather judgmental in his response to her stories:
When I elaborately tried to explain Estonian history to him, I got the feel-
ing that he did not understand it very well. Especially when we spoke 
about the relationship of Estonians with Russia and the Russians living 
here. He suggested many things and drew parallels with what was hap-
pening in the Netherlands. That people who come to the Netherlands 
are immediately forced to study the language, so that they will quickly 
integrate into their new society. It was difficult to convince him that it is 
not so easy to accomplish that in Estonia.
anna, �99�
In order to avoid the pain of being misunderstood, Saara (1970) rarely speaks 
with Dutch people about the Soviet past, even though the topic forms an 
important part of who she is. ‘That is why we like to meet among Estonians, 
because we understand each other and we know the cultural background.’ 
Among Estonians she does not have to defend or explain herself and they re-
gard the Soviet repressions more or less similarly.
Liisa is one of the few who has had a different experience. The responses 
she sees among her Dutch interlocutors ‘are mostly one of surprise. Did that 
happen such a short time ago? In your family? It suddenly seems near to them.’ 
The story of Soviet repression is, like for the other interviewees, very important 
to Liisa because of her family history, but in contrast to the others, Liisa does 
not experience the same fear of contemporary Russia:
I think that what happened in the Ukraine cannot happen in Estonia, it is 
a different story. Dutch people ask me all the time whether I am afraid of 
Russia. No, I am not. It is our big brother, it will always be our neighbour 
and we need to have a diplomatic relationship with Russia. I also ques-
tion why Russia would want to have Estonia. We do not have gold, no 
energy sources, nothing. We only have a good location, also in connection 
to the sea, but Russia, too, has that.
liisa, �977
The difference between the experiences of Liisa and the others illustrates how 
important it is to feel taken seriously and be equal partners. Because of the 
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responses they got while explaining the sufferings during the Soviet period, 
Siim, Kadri and Anna have the feeling that they are not seen as equal partners 
by their Dutch compatriots. They have the feeling to be expected to respect 
their Dutch compatriots, whereas they cannot expect the same from them. 
This places them in an inferior position, which is especially hurtful in times of 
insecurity. Liisa, in contrast, perceives her story to be taken seriously, and talk-
ing to her Dutch compatriots as an equal.
 Double Victims and Agents of Change
The inequality that Siim, Kadri and Anna perceive with the Dutch while talk-
ing about the Soviet repression, hurts not only because it misrecognizes the 
sufferings of their loved-ones, but also because their Soviet past excludes them 
from the European family. Italian anthropologist Cappelletto has referred to 
this phenomenon as ‘double victimhood’: as the post-generation they have 
not only become victims of the mass deportations to Siberia, they become vic-
tims for the second time because they are not being heard (in this case by ‘old 
Europe’).
The way in which Liisa relates to the story of Soviet repression is not as a 
‘double victim’, but rather as an ‘agent of change’. The latter term is coined by 
Iranian Dutch anthropologist Halleh Ghorashi who studied Iranian refugees 
who arrived in the Netherlands in the 1980s and post-1990s.36 As an agent of 
change, Liisa realizes she has a voice that counts. She believes that the experi-
ence of Soviet repression should not only be seen as a burden that needs to 
be carried around, but also as an asset in comparison to Dutch people. She 
explains to me that the pain of being deported – ‘a pain of a people (rahvava-
lu)’ – also allows Estonians to put their lives into perspective to an extent that 
Dutch people cannot. According to Liisa, Dutch people often express: ‘“I don’t 
like that”, “I don’t want that”. They are very ego-centric.’ Also Marju, born in 
1979 and married to a Dutch man, is able to derive positive lessons from her 
difficult national past:
I have noticed that my experiences and the way in which I grew up are 
completely different from the people here. I relate differently to food, for 
example. I eat even the very last piece, I don’t throw anything away. Or 
when bread is a little bit old, I don’t throw it in the bin. You have to eat 
36 Halleh Ghorashi, Agents of Change or Passive Victims: The Impact of Welfare States (the 
Case of the Netherlands) on Refugees, Journal of Refugee Studies 18.2 (2005).
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everything. […] the same with living space. Here people want the biggest 
houses and apartments, I am used to small rooms, people lived on top of 
each other. I don’t need so much space. People here are more demand-
ing. […] History as such does not really trouble me here. But the fact that 
I have lived through it, that I have the experience of not being free, that 
we were becoming independent, that has been very … that you can value 
what you have, that makes a big difference. And because we did not have 
much during my first years, I now very much value the fact that we have 
more than we used to have.
marju, �979
Liisa and Marju thus not only share the story of Soviet repression in the 
 Netherlands because they feel this is their responsibility towards their relatives 
and their compatriots, but also in order to teach their Dutch friends life les-
sons they are not able to derive from their own history. By doing so, they do not 
feel the homesickness and lack of power that double victims express. Agents of 
change actually feel empowered by sharing their memory of Soviet repression. 
They see and grasp opportunities. They believe they have the right to tell their 
story and that they have a voice that counts in the Netherlands.
For Liisa, one such act of grasping opportunities was establishing the ‘Es-
tonian School in the Netherlands’. Our interview took place during one of its 
school days: ‘When we established the Estonian School in the Netherlands, it 
was a really emotional moment for me. You do this with all your heart. It is the 
language of your heart (südame keel) which speaks here. We want to pass on 
our culture and language to the next generation.’ Instead of feeling disappoint-
ed that she could not raise her children in an Estonian context, Liisa grasped 
the opportunity to create this Estonian School far away from her homeland. 
The foundation of this school was important to her for various reasons. First 
of all, many Estonian emigrants find it important to raise their children with a 
‘national consciousness’ and with an ‘Estonian cultural spirit’. Estonian intel-
lectual Jakob Hurt said already in 1870: ‘We can never become great in strength 
and numbers, but we can become great in spirit and culture!’ Since then, his-
tory has proven that culture is the strongest power tool Estonians have, mani-
fested, for example, with the ‘Singing Revolution’. Liisa and the other founders 
hope that the children of Estonian migrants will feel closer connected to the 
Estonian community by learning its language and social and cultural rules. 
Secondly, the Estonian school also familiarizes the Dutch with the Estonian 
culture and language.
Several Estonian emigrants acted as agents of change when they organized a 
public commemoration of the Soviet deportations in Amsterdam on 25 March 
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2011, as portrayed on figure 6.1. Instead of commemorating the event in the safe 
space of their homes or in company of their Estonian friends, they decided to 
claim a central public spot (the Dam square in Amsterdam) and the right to share 
their story of Soviet repression in Dutch society. However, the incentive to or-
ganize a public meeting did not come from the Estonian migrants. They were 
invited to participate by the Estonian organization Tulipisar, which approached 
figure 6.� Remembering the Soviet deportations on the Dam square in central msterdam, 25 
March 2011.
Source: Tulipisar.ee. Permission granted
Melchior�40
<UN>
the Estonian School to ask if they wanted to light candles to commemorate the 
22,000 Estonians who were deported to Siberia on  Estonia’s  Remembrance Day. 
Estonians all over the world would join them. In  Amsterdam around ten Esto-
nians attended, while Dutch people passed by. Backed by the Estonian commu-
nity all over the world, they dared to act as agents of change and make their voice 
heard. They lit several candles near the National  Monument on Dam Square.
A particular person cannot be characterized as being either a double victim 
or an active agent. Of course one’s personality influences how one positions 
oneself in a foreign context. But the context is at least as important. When 
Liisa’s Dutch friends would unquestionably judge nationalism politics in Esto-
nia, she might act as a double victim, feeling misunderstood by them. On other 
occasions, she might act as an agent of change, because she sees opportunities 
to teach them something new.
A good example of a recent contextual change are the political developments 
between the Netherlands (and other ‘old Europeans’) and Russia.  Several inter-
viewees mention that the public discourse in the Netherlands – and thus the 
‘safe space’ to share their stories of Soviet repression – has changed drastically. 
A look into the newspaper articles that have appeared in the Dutch newspaper 
Volkskrant – aiming at the highly educated and slightly leftist/central popula-
tion, and one of the three Dutch quality papers – reflects that change.
Right after the Baltic States entered the eu in 2004, the Dutch newspaper 
did not present a very understanding perspective on the fear that Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian politicians expressed towards Russia. The fact that the 
presidents from Estonia, Lithuania and Georgia declined the invitation by Putin 
in 2005 to commemorate the end of wwii in Moscow, as the end of wwii was 
for them not a victory but the beginning of the subsequent Soviet occupation, 
the message was that emotions should not determine politics in a democratic 
world (Corine de Vries, Volkskrant, 10 May 2005). In the years that followed, the 
rational and pragmatic approach of the Dutch towards Putin’s anti-democratic 
politics (for example his reaction to the murder of journalist Anna Politkovs-
kaja, one of the most critical opponents of the Russian president) was praised 
(Bert Lanting, Volkskrant, 19 October 2006). Many eu  countries depended on 
Russia for gas and oil, and closer cooperation was the goal. When Medvedev 
became Russia’s new president in 2008, the eu commissioner Benita Ferrero 
Waldner spoke about investing in a ‘partnership of equals’: ‘That is of great 
importance to our companies’ (Volkskrant, 27 June 2008).
Understandably, sharing stories of Soviet repression in the Netherlands 
at this time dit not feel ‘safe’. Especially when the five-day summer war be-
tween Georgia and Russia broke out, there was an increased wish on the part 
of the Estonian migrants to be understood, as they wanted to warn their Dutch 
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 interlocutors of the danger of Russia. They as ‘experience experts’ had knowl-
edge that the Dutch did not have. However, the attempts by Polish, Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian presidents to call upon the eu and nato to decrease the 
intensity of cooperation with Moscow and to warn of the dangers of  Russia, 
were interpreted as unrealistic fears that should not be taken too seriously (e.g. 
‘Polen weet wat het betekent’, Volkskrant, 12 August 2008; Wim Bossema, Volk-
skrant, 19 January 2009). Eventually the eu chose not to enforce peace and put 
sanctions on Russia, but to send observers only (Theo Koelé, Volkskrant, 14 Au-
gust 2008). Afraid that their stories of Soviet repression would be interpreted 
in a similar way as those of the presidents, my informants found it very hard to 
share their stories and opinions at that time. At the same time, it was also pain-
ful to say nothing at all, with respect to their relatives who suffered.
Only three and a half years later, when the political situation in the Ukraine 
started to deteriorate, the fear felt by the Baltic States and Poland began to 
be represented as a fear that should be taken seriously. Putin had reacted 
quite aggressively and undemocratically to the pro-European steps that the 
Ukraine was taking. Especially the referendum which Putin initiated about the 
independence of the Crimea was presented as a farce, and the Russian sol-
diers sent to the Crimea as an illegal annexation that should be condemned 
(Hans  Glaubitz, Volkskrant, 2 September 2014). The eu denied visas to Europe 
for certain  Russian citizens and the European Commission decided to cancel 
the next eu-Russia summit. On 20 March 2014, the eu council concluded: ‘The 
European Council firmly believes that there is no place for the use of force 
and coercion to change borders in Europe in the 21st century. The Russian ac-
tions are in clear breach of the Helsinki process, which in the past 40 years has 
 contributed to overcoming divisions in Europe and building a peaceful and 
united continent.’
The eu followed the us and nato in its condemnation of Russia’s aggres-
sive behaviour. Obama explicitly promized and sent the Eastern European 
countries military support and showed indefinite support for Ukraine’s inde-
pendence (Jan Hunin, Volkskrant, 5 June 2014). In this changing discourse, it 
was suddenly deemed a possibility that Putin would distort peace in Europe 
and send Russian jet fighters into European airspace (Stieven Ramdharie, Volk-
skrant, 30 October 2014). Moreover, what has changed for the Dutch since July 
2014 is that emotions are allowed to play a role in the political relationship 
between Russia and the Netherlands, when the MH17 flight from Amsterdam 
to Kuala Lumpur was shut down by pro-Russian separatists on Ukrainian terri-
tory. According to Dutch minister Bert Koenders, a ‘new equilibrium’ should be 
found with Russia, but that ‘business as usual is for the Netherlands no longer 
an option’ (Theo Koelé, Volkskrant, 14 May 2015).
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In the present discourse, my Estonian interviewees have the feeling that 
there is more ‘space’ for their story of Soviet repression. It resonates better. Also, 
they have seen that Baltic and Polish politicians are taken more seriously by 
the old Europeans nowadays. The new members are acknowledged as  having 
knowledge and experience that the Western Europeans lack. In this period, 
Estonian president Ilves, whose Facebook messages I closely follow, increas-
ingly presented Estonia abroad as an ‘experience expert’ of Russia, that should 
be taken seriously: as an agent of change rather than a double victim. By tak-
ing that lead, Estonians like Liisa feel more confident sharing their stories as 
well. Liisa mentions that during the Ukraine referendum in the  Netherlands, 
Dutch people started asking for her stories about Russia. Suddenly those sto-
ries resonate more with how their Dutch interlocutors and friends perceive 
the world. At that moment in time, Estonian emigrants felt that they could 
openly acknowledge their fear of Russia without the inherent need to defend 
that fear. It has become an increasingly common fear, instead of one of the 
new Europeans only.
 Conclusion
In a previous extensive ethnographic study, I argued that the history of Soviet 
repressions is ‘living’ in Estonia. ‘Living’ here refers to the fact that Estonians 
from various generations are easily emotionally touched when it comes to sto-
ries of the repressive Soviet past. The memory of Soviet repression was written 
in the early 1990s as a ‘people’s story’, in a time when every Estonian citizen 
was made and felt responsible to contribute to their small, young and newly 
established nation-state. Not incorporating the story of Soviet repression as 
part of one’s identity as an Estonian is even nowadays often regarded as being 
a national betrayer.
By following Estonians who moved to the Netherlands (after 2000), I discov-
ered that the Soviet repressions stay with those who have left their homeland. 
It can even be argued that it becomes more important, as the story is con-
stantly being challenged by their Dutch interlocutors, who have no emotional 
 connection to the Soviet repressions at all. The ethnographic approach taken 
in this chapter, combined with a focus on people who live outside of their 
homeland, has revealed that the ‘agency’ of people should not be overlooked 
when studying memory reception. After all, as I have found out, the Soviet re-
pressions do not only make Estonians act upon their troubling past as ‘double 
victims’ but also as ‘agents of change’.
Both within my (previous) fieldwork in Estonia and in the Netherlands, 
I have mostly encountered double victims. Double victims still suffer from the 
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Soviet repression, because of the wounds that have not been healed and have 
been passed on to the next generation, and because the empathetic listener 
that is so essential to the healing process is not being met among the Dutch 
(or old Europeans in general). Many of the Estonians I spoke to – regardless 
of age and social background – experience a form of misunderstanding in 
 Europe. They demand explicit external recognition as they feel ‘existentially 
insecure’ as a people; they are afraid that Estonians as a people might disap-
pear and believe that keeping Estonian culture and history alive will prevent 
that from  happening.37 Double victims defend the story of Soviet repression 
when they meet different understandings of recent history, yet at the same 
time they already expect ‘the Other’ to be unable to really understand the 
 Estonian perspective.
In contrast, we met a few agents of change among the Estonians who live 
in the Dutch context. Agents of change do not defend the Soviet story as an 
inferior story that needs to be protected from being forgotten, but share it with 
their Dutch friends as a story from which they can learn something. Agents 
of change do not see themselves as backwards but as experience experts, not 
post-Soviets but equal Europeans, who can be teachers of the old Europeans, 
not only pupils.
The fact that I encountered possibly the first few ‘agents of change’ in 2015, 
might be related to changing public discourses, as I have pointed out in this 
chapter. The political relationship between the eu and Russia has become in-
creasingly tense as the eu has condemned some of Russia’s political moves. 
Thereby the public discourse has altered to a discourse that now resonates 
more with Estonian stories on the danger of Russia. Estonian emigrants, as op-
posed to Estonians living in Estonia, might see that there currently is a space 
in old Europe to share stories of Soviet repression in a sphere of equality and 
understanding. Moreover, Estonian emigrants might feel even more morally 
obliged to use the opportunities they have while living among ‘the significant 
Other’; to share their story and educate the others with their unique  knowledge. 
Former victims, who truly know the value of freedom in comparison to the 
Dutch to whom freedom is a given, become experts on Russia.
If the Estonian agents of change successfully manage to turn the Soviet suf-
ferings from food for a European memory battlefield into important life les-
sons for all Europeans, then their ancestors will have suffered a little bit less 
in vain. Besides that, their compatriots back home might not judge them for 
leaving their homeland for a better life somewhere else, but praise them for 
being such good Estonian citizens, far away from home.
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chapter 7
Commemorating a War That Never Came: The Cold 
War as Counter-factual War Memory
Rosanna Farbøl
The fall of the Berlin Wall made the Cold War a historical era. It does no longer 
exist as an ideological and security policy challenge, but as cultural memory 
and imaginary, political guideline and moral compass, it has a lingering con-
temporaneity. Still, the Cold War has not received much attention within the 
field of memory studies.1 Whereas scholars of this discipline have long had a 
strong commitment to studies of war memory and commemoration of con-
ventional ‘hot’ wars, such as the First and Second World Wars,2 the Cold War 
has not been a popular topic. It has been argued, by among others Jan-Werner 
Müller, that the Cold War does not easily lend itself to commemoration be-
cause it was a cold war.3 Though it involved fierce rivalry in politics, economics, 
culture, and, not least, in the military arms race, it never became a war in a 
classical sense: declared, open and armed warfare between armies of adver-
sarial political communities.4 To add to the Cold War’s peculiar character as an 
absent war, it lasted half a century, it was a war without a clear and undisputed 
1 David Lowe and Tony Joel: Remembering the Cold War: Global Contest and National Stories 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2014). The Vietnam War is a major exception to this rule, 
though it is often treated as a “separate” event, and not in a Cold War context.
2 See i.e. Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 [1995]); Ashplant et al.: The Politics 
of War Memory and Commemoration (London & New York: Routledge 2000); Martin Evans 
and Ken Lunn, eds., War and Memory in the Twentieth Century (Oxford & New York: Berg, 
1997); Winter and Sivans, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); A. Whitmarsh: ‘“We Will Remember Them” Memory and 
Commemoration in War Museums’, Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies 7 (2001), ac-
cessed 2 June 2016, doi:10.5334/jcms.7013.
3 Jan-Werner Müller: “Introduction: the power of memory, the memory of power and the pow-
er over memory” in Memory and Power in Postwar Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past, 
ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 2.
4 This understanding is inspired by the entries ‘war’ in Encyclopedia Britannica, http://global 
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/635532/war and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/ [both accessed 19 January 2015].
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beginning and ending, and the losing side never suffered total defeat like Nazi 
Germany. The Cold War, thus, lacks some of the most important and powerful 
lieux de mémoire, which usually function as facilitators of cultural memory and 
as occasions for mediating myths and narratives, thereby confirming the unity 
and identity of the community adhering to them.5
Yet, this article argues, in Denmark the Cold War is remembered and com-
memorated, to a great extent, as a war.6 And, in the proccesses of establish-
ing this Cold War cultural memory as a war memory, it has become part of a 
transcultural passion for memories of traumatic pasts: war, violence, catastro-
phes, loss and victimhood.7 In this article, I will present a brief overview of 
commemoration of the Cold War as heritage, and more specifically war heri-
tage. I highlight the notion of absence, both in relation to the character of the 
Cold War itself and in terms of reception, remembrance and commemoration. 
However, instead of considering the absence of war and destruction an ob-
stacle that renders the Cold War unfit for memory work, I contend that this 
anomaly actually makes the Cold War a very usable past. I call the war memory 
of a war that never happened a counter-factual war memory. I also argue that 
the Cold War as cultural memory is multi-directional in the sense that it can-
not be understood without paying attention to the Second World War as narra-
tive and mnemonic template.
As case studies, I examine Danish museums and heritage sites. In the last 
decade, the Cold War has officially been embraced as Danish heritage, and 
concurrently there has been a remarkable multiplication of Cold War muse-
ums, many opened on the initiative of local communities. Even though ‘heri-
tage’ and ‘memory’ tend to be treated as separate, even occasionally mutually 
exclusive concepts, I contend that they can fruitfully be employed in the same 
analysis, because ‘heritage’ is a form of (problematic) identity building and 
memory structuring. Hence, I consider heritage sites and museums power-
ful agents of cultural memory. The memories, narratives and interpretations 
endorsed at such institutions are awarded a certain legitimacy, because they 
are sanctioned by sites that signify knowledge, authority and power. They are, 
5 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, Representations 26 
(1989), 7–24.
6 This article is a development of some ideas and reflections from my PhD dissertation and my 
latest article “Commemoration of a cold war: The politics of history and heritage at Cold War 
memory sites in Denmark”, Cold War History 15/04 (2015), 471–490.
7 On traumatic pasts as a key area of memory studies see e.g. Astrid Erll, “Traumatic pasts, 
literary afterlives, and transcultural memory: new directions of literary and media memory 
studies”, Journal of aesthetics and culture, 3 (2011).
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therefore, potentially very influential in the processes of Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung.8 Furthermore, museums and heritage sites constitute an intersection 
where political, public and academic narratives meet. Thus, it is a field par-
ticularly useful for examining the construction, contestation and reception of 
narratives and memories of the Cold War.
My findings reveal a paradox: the museums and heritage sites in Denmark 
present a war narrative of the Cold War, yet, beyond these official memory in-
stitutions, I find that a public culture of war commemoration of the Cold War 
is largely absent; the war memory is not reflected in a larger war commemora-
tion culture. Moreover, from a perspective of memory reception, it is remark-
able that the museums and the heritage project, though popular, do not seem 
to foster any particular reaction in society, either from politicians or citizens. 
The article therefore ends with a discussion of some paradoxes of the counter-
factual war memory. However, to begin with, some remarks about the context 
of the discussion are necessary because the commemoration of the Cold War 
as a war is not uncontested and consensual.
 Contestation of Cold War Memory in Denmark
Despite Denmark’s, for the most part rather insignificant and uncontroversial, 
involvement in the Cold War, a fierce debate has raged since the fall of the 
Wall over how to interpret the period. The Cold War is a very contested past in 
Denmark, not least in comparison with the other Scandinavian countries.9 The 
conflict has increasingly become entangled in contemporary party politics, and 
political and cultural elites (as well as the population) are divided into differ-
ent memory communities. The tensions that have risen from memory clashes 
between these communities have had direct political consequences and have 
8 Sharon Macdonald, Memorylands. Heritage and Identity in Europe Today (New York: Routledge 
2013); Sharon Macdonald, “Introduction” in Theorizing museums, eds. Sharon  Macdonald and 
Gordon Fyfe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1996); Gaynor Kavanagh, “Making Histories, mak-
ing Memories” in Making Histories in Museums, ed. Gaynor Kavanagh (London: Leicester 
University Press 1999), 1–15; Lucy Noakes, “Making Histories: Experiencing the Blitz in Lon-
don’s Museums in the 1990s” in Evans and Lunn, War and Memory, 89–105.
9 Thorsten Borring Olesen, “Truth on demand. Denmark and the Cold War”, in Foreign Policy 
Yearbook, eds. Nanna Hvidt og Hans Mouritzen, diis 2006, 80–114; Tor Egil Førland, “Den 
danske debatt om Den Kolde Krig”, Historisk Tidsskrift, hft. 2, 2002, 586–598; Tor Egil Førland, 
“Den kalde krigen, historikerne og ytringsfriheten”, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 3/31, 2014, 210–224; 
Rosanna Farbøl, Koldkrigere, medløbere og røde lejesvende. Den Kolde Krig i dansk historiekul-
tur 1985–2015 (under publ).
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lead to a large scale political showdown. The Cold War was, for instance, a ma-
jor part of the discussions about the Danish involvement in the war in Iraq 
in 2003, and more generally about the Danish foreign policy profile, and sins 
and errors of the past were used to legitimize contemporary policy options. 
The show down has also taken the form of a trend that can be called ‘truth on 
demand’: The Danish Parliament has so far commissioned specific Cold War 
research for more than 13.5 million euros to ‘set the historical truth right’.
It is not just a simple ‘right-wing versus left-wing’ conflict. There are, in fact, 
three competing Cold War narratives. The first I call the conflict narrative. The 
Cold War is interpreted as an all-embracing ideological war between the good, 
democratic West and the evil and communist East, where neutrality was not 
an option. The Cold War is seen as a war against totalitarianism, and thus a 
continuation of the Second World War. In stark opposition, we find a protest 
narrative, which understands the Cold War as an ordinary geo-political and 
economic super power conflict (and, importantly, not a war) between two im-
perialist countries. Also in this narrative it is crucial that totalitarian Fascism 
was not beaten in 1945, but seen to have survived inside the Western so-called 
democratic states. In between the two narratives, there is a third, the consensus 
narrative that shares characteristics with both of the others. The Cold War is 
here understood as conflict both in terms of ideology and super power real-
politik. Denmark’s role is seen as that of a balanced, responsible and morally 
superior small state.
These three narratives are employed by the competing memory commu-
nities to structure, interpret and make sense of the past. They also function 
as mobilization for actions in the present, with the past used as a guide. This 
became particularly apparent in Denmark in the 2000s, when the then Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen re-appropriated the conflict narrative to le-
gitimize Danish participation in the ‘war on terror’.10 During both the Second 
World War and the Cold War, he argued, Denmark had failed our allies by lead-
ing a cowardly policy of neutrality. In the eyes of Fogh Rasmussen, the war on 
terror was a direct continuation of the wars against totalitarianism. Because of 
10 Rosanna Farbøl, “Framing the Past, Shaping the Future: the Political Uses of the Foreign 
Policy Tradition in Contemporary Danish Politics” in Nordic Cold War Cultures: Ideologi-
cal Promotion, Public Reception, and East-West Interaction, eds. Valur Ingimundarson and 
Rósa Magnusdóttir (Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute 2015), 189–206; Rasmus Brun Peder-
sen, “Past, present, and future: the role of the Cold War in legitimizing Danish foreign 
policy activism”, Cold War History 16/1 (2016), 101–20.
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the ‘double shame’ of the past, Denmark now had the moral and political duty 
to assist those who had saved us twice.11
This example illustrates that Cold War remembrance and the reappropria-
tion of it as a war can have direct political bearings. Furthermore, the con-
testation of narratives and competition between memory communities is of 
consequence for the paradoxical and counter-factual war memory examined 
below. Now, we will turn our attention to how the Cold War is being narrated, 
mediated and aestheticized as a war memory.
 Cold War Heritage
In the last decade, but in particular the last three or four years, the number of 
Cold War related museums in Denmark has increased noticeably. There are 
now a total of seven Cold War museums, which is quite a large number for such 
a small country.12 In general, the Danish Cold War museums portray the Cold 
War in the way ‘hot’ wars usually are presented in historical tourism both na-
tionally and internationally: with a strong focus on the political-military per-
spective of the conflict, on weapons, technology, soldiers and major political 
and military decisions (although, in contrast to other war museums, there is an 
obvious absence of battle decriptions). Five of the museums are even located 
in former Cold War military and civil defence fortifications. It is the hypotheti-
cal and counter-factual war that forms the basis of their Cold War narratives. 
For instance, at Odense Bunkermuseum, which is located in a former com-
mand centre, the whole exhibition is concentrated on the military and civil 
defence of Odense during the Cold War and, importantly, how it would operate 
during war. It is the ‘during war’ or if-perspective that rules the exhibition: the 
military threat scenario, the phases of state of emergency, and the procedures 
for how to operate during ‘hot’ war.
11 It should be noted that the other political parties likewise found their reasoning in their 
Cold War narratives. The left wing saw the whole mission as yet another result of Ameri-
can imperialism and desire for global dominance, whereas the advocates of the consen-
sus narrative had some difficulties deciding whether they could support the war or not, if 
the un got involved.
12 Until 1997, the Langelandsfort was the only museum dedicated to the Cold War. Stevns-
fort became a museum in 2008, and in 2012 Odense Bunkermuseum and the Ejbybunker 
opened, followed by Panzer Museum East and Silkeborg Bunkermuseum in 2014 and 
Dansk Koldkrigsmuseum in 2016.
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In particular the smaller museums present an exclusively military defence-
dominated Cold War narrative, whereas the two largest museums, Stevnsfort 
and Langelandsfort, attempt to make the presentation more complex. Lange-
landsfort used to be a museum primarily of interest to those with an intel-
lectual passion for military hardware. The exhibition was mainly concerned 
with bunkers, cannons, missiles, jet fighters and submarines.13 However, this 
has changed in recent years. Today, the museum is keen to situate the fort in a 
broader Cold War framework, connecting the island of Langeland to the nato 
defence system and the development of the conflict, thus connecting local, na-
tional and global history. At present, both Langelandsfort and Stevnsfort place 
considerable emphasis on presenting, on both a national and international 
level, the cultural, social and political developments that influenced life in the 
forts and in Denmark. Yet, they do this without relinquishing the military per-
spective. The forts were built for war, crewed by marines and visited by nato 
generals. Their whole existence was based on imminent war and, as such, the 
war is present as a master narrative.
This representation of war is important because, firstly, objects, events and 
interpretations are provided with a particular legitimacy when they are dis-
played at a museum. The history and narratives that are institutionalized in 
this way often have at least the potential to become dominant in the visitors’ 
construction, adaptation and reception of memories.14 Secondly, it reflects a 
tendency, deliberate or not, to represent the Cold War along familiar narra-
tive memory frames. Specifically, the representations resemble the way the 
Second World War is exhibited in Danish museums at, for instance, the Re-
sistance Museum in Copenhagen and at museums in former German bunkers 
along the West coast of Jutland such as the Hanstholm Museum. In the way the 
‘war’ is presented at Cold War and Second World War museums, there is much 
cross-referencing and borrowing of exhibition formats, aesthetics and narra-
tive templates: the presentations of themes, soldiers, weapons and the geo-
political and military context are strikingly similar – even though the Cold War 
never became hot. Instead of finding a novel and original way of constructing 
the past as cultural memory, old templates are reused. Arguably, what we wit-
ness is the Cold War as a remediation of the Second World War. As a lieu de 
mémoire, it seems to refer not only to the actual event, the Cold War, but to 
the canon of representations of the Second World War, the ‘established’ way of 
how to represent war memory.15
13 Ole Mortensøn, Fortet og den kolde krig, Museum Langelandsfort 2006.
14 Noakes: “Making Histories”, 89–105.
15 See Astrid Erll’s use of the concept of remediation in “Traumatic pasts, literary afterlives, 
and transcultural memory: new directions of literary and media memory studies”, Journal 
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However, there are two major differences compared to war exhibitions in 
general: Firstly, the museums’ representation of a war memory lacks an impor-
tant characteristic of ‘classical’ transcultural war memory: there is no display 
of death, loss or suffering, and there are no victims or martyrs. Negative con-
sequences of war are totally absent, so what remains is a purely celebratory, 
not a mourning, commemoration.16 The actors are presented as stereotypical 
heroes: brave and jolly Danish soldiers constantly on the look out for, even 
at times engaging with, the enemy or spies (significantly it is only occasional 
contact, never actual combat).
Secondly, the museums go to great lengths to make the visitors’ experience 
transgress the lines between observing and participating. Indeed, I would ar-
gue, they go further than would be generally accepted at museums dealing 
with the Second World War. At Langelandsfort, for instance, a whole bunker 
is dedicated to a thematic exhibition of the counter-factual Third World War 
and the Danish preparations for it. Most spectacularly, visitors can push two 
buttons on a screen showing a quote by a famous lieutenant general about the 
possible nuclear attack on the island of Langeland: The visitor has unleashed 
a nuclear attack. Suddenly, hidden loud speakers in the roof make a terrible 
noise, the light flickers, then goes out and the floor begins to quake. The video 
on the screen shows footage of nuclear explosions, the blasts and the terrible 
destruction it causes, all the while the visitors can ‘hear’ the explosions and 
‘feel’ the blast waves.17 This is a remarkably transgressive interaction with the 
past. Whereas it would be unthinkable that a museum would allow its visitors 
to interact with the Second World War to an extent that included the possibil-
ity of, for instance, denying the Holocaust or pretend to release gas over pris-
oners, there is apparently no similar hegemonic moral and ethical paradigm 
of aesthetics and culture, 3 (2011). Also in Berlin, commemoration of the Second World 
War and the Cold War seem to be intricately linked, though it’s arguably not directly a re-
mediation process, see Keith R. Allen, “Wall Remains, Holocaust Memorials, and Prussian 
Heritage: Reflections on Cold War Commemoration in Germany”, Perspectives on History, 
82(2), 2014.
16 It could be argued here, that regarding this particular aspect, Cold War commemoration 
at Danish museums actually resembles “old-fashioned” war commemoration practices at 
museums, because museums during the 20th century developed a tradition of portraying 
a sanitized and glamorized version of warfare, see Andrew Whitmarsh, “We Will Remem-
ber Them: Memory and Commemoration in War Museums”, Journal of Conservation and 
Museum Studies 7 (2001).




concerning the loss of human lives in a nuclear apocalypse.18 I suggest this 
is because it is already counter-factual. Precisely because the Cold War never 
became a hot war, it lends itself so easily to the counter-factual play and imagi-
nation of what could fill out the absence of war if …
Alongside the musealization of the Cold War, it was also officially declared 
‘Danish national heritage’ in 2013 by the state Agency for Culture. This was the 
climax of a project, inspired by smiliar projects in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, that aimed to map all Danish Cold War installations and areas and 
subsequently designate and preserve 33 of them estimated to be of ‘national 
significance’. The results were published in a book called Kold krig [Cold War] 
and online.19 The project had been underway since the turn of the millenni-
um with the full political, if not economic support, of the Minister of Culture 
2001–08 Brian Mikkelsen (Conservative). Mikkelsen was very interested in the 
Cold War and had been a keen participant in Cold War related discussions in 
public debate.20 At a conference in 2008, the Minister explained why it was so 
important to him to designate this specific past ‘heritage’.21 The Cold War was 
central to Danish identity and for the Danes’ ability to manoeuvre in the con-
temporary world, he claimed. The Cold War had been a battle of values, and 
the war on terror was a continuation of that battle. Only by understanding the 
present conflict in a Cold War perspective could the clash between the West 
and Islamist terrorism be fully understood, according to Mikkelsen.
The selection and designation of heritage is a normative action. Heritage is 
not something that ‘exists’ as independent entities of the past, but something 
we socially and culturally create in the present by selecting objects, events and 
traditions (among other things) from the infinite amount of traces of the past 
and elevating them to a special status, heritage, because we consider them to 
18 A similar counter-factual possibility for museum visitors to “drop” a nuclear bomb is 
found at the Lithuanian Cold War museum Plokštinė missile base.
19 Morten Stenak et al., eds., Kold Krig. 33 fortællinger om den kolde krigs bygninger og anlæg 
i Danmark, Færøerne og Grønland, (Kulturministeriet: Kulturstyrelsen, 2013) and http://
slks.dk/kommuner-plan-arkitektur/kommune-og-turisme/kold-krig/ [acessed 19 January 
2015].
20 Brian Mikkelsen, “Ti scener fra Den Kolde Krig”, Berlingske Tidende, 11 June 2003; Brian 
Mikkelsen, “Trusten fra Sovjetimperiet var reel”, Jyllands-Posten, 5 September 2005; Brian 
Mikkelsen, “I den sorte gryde”, Weekendavisen, 27 June 2003; Brian Mikkelsen, “Reagan var 
en helt”, Jyllands-Posten, 11 June 2004; Brian Mikkelsen, “Det handler om frisind”, Politiken, 
4 September 2003; Brian Mikkelsen, “Kulturpolitiske visioner”, Information 6 September 
2008; Brian Mikkelsen, “Historien frikender ingen”, Berlingske Tidende 21 January 2007.
21 www.artilleriet.dk/artikel/3608-Historie--krigen-der-aldrig-kom.htm orlogsmuseet [ac-
cessed 8 May 2014].
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be vital to our history and our identity.22 Like the museums, the Agency pres-
ents a master narrative of war. With the possible exception of a conscientious 
objector camp, all 33 areas and installations chosen were part of the ‘total de-
fence’: the military and civil defence. On the list are e.g. the two major forts 
at Stevns and Langeland (which are now museums), the nato head quarter 
in Western Denmark, a naval station, Thule air base in Greenland, barracks, 
control centres, depots, air defences as well as stations of civil defence. All 
the sites were constructed with a view to the war that never came. Some were 
 operational during the Cold War, others were on standby, ready for the worst 
case scenario. In addition to the material sites, the Agency included a number 
of chapters in the book about Denmark’s integration into nato, war technol-
ogy, protection of civilians, the intelligence services, military architecture etc. 
It is the (absent) nuclear, catastrophic and counter-factual war that is the sym-
bolic and narrative structure for the Cold War experience.
Altogether, the project conveys the image that during the Cold War, in con-
trast to 1940, Denmark was ready to fight in the war. The Cold War is in this 
project reappropriated through a narrative of a heroically fighting Denmark 
(or at least a Denmark prepared to do so). The war narrative must be under-
stood in light of the collective memory of the German occupation during the 
Second World War, of the shame of collaboration, as well as heroization of the 
Resistance movement.23 Since the 1970s, historians have steadily deconstruct-
ed the glorifying master narrative by breaking down myths of widespread re-
sistance, of the strategic value of sabotage and of the heroic and democratic 
motives of the freedom fighters and the Danes who saved Jews. The Agency’s 
reappropriation of a heroic narrative of a war and battle-ready Denmark can, 
in this light, be seen as a national redemption project.
 Reception of the War Memory
Langelandsfort and Stevnsfort each has approximately 40,000 visitors per year, 
which is a relatively high figure for a Danish historical museum.24 The  interest 
22 This concerns of course not only the heritage site as an object, but rather the immaterial 
mythical meanings attached to it.
23 Claus Bryld and Annette Warring, Besættelsestiden som kollektiv erindring (Frederiksberg: 
Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 1999); Uffe Østergaard, “Swords, Shields or Collaborators? 
Danish Historians and the Debate over the German Occupation of Denmark” in Nor-
dic Narratives of the Second World War. National Historiographies Revisited, eds. Henrik 
Stenius, Mirja Österberg and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 31–55.
24 http://www.langelandsfortet.dk/sdu-langelandsfort_dkl.htm; https://www.kalklandet.
dk/sites/default/files/arsberetning_2013_0.pdf. For the sake of comparison, the open-air 
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in the material landscape of the Cold War is part of the constructions and ne-
gotiations for a cultural memory, and it is therefore significant that both the 
museums’ and the Agency’s efforts can be seen as an aesthetization of war 
memory. Moreover, this seems to be perceived and received by the public as 
unproblematic, convincing or even natural – or perhaps of no consequence. 
It does not result in any noticeable reactions from the visitors. Only Stevns-
fort has made user surveys among their visitors. These are primarily statisti-
cal analyses of how satisfied the visitors are with the general experience of 
the museum, the exhibitions, the atmosphere, the level of service etc., as well 
as demographic, gender and motivation analyses of the visitors themselves. 
They have not made qualitative reception analyses, so in order to examine the 
visitors’ reactions to specific exhibitions or the war narrative, we have to rely 
on a sparse and relatively limited source material from the public sphere, for 
instance newspapers or social media. On the online travel review-site Trip- 
Advisor, only 39 Danes have rated Langelandsfort in the period 2014  (July)-2016 
(October).25 The reviewers were in general excited about the museum, and in 
particular they mentioned the submarine, the jet fighter, the thrill of being 
inside military installations, as well as the pretty grounds. None of them men-
tioned the interactive exhibitions, and none of them reflected on what kind 
of Cold War narrative they had been told.26 Stevnsfort received 64 reviews on 
tripadvisor from 2014 (August)-2016 (October). Like the reviews of Langelands-
fort, they were very positive. The visitors were especially thrilled that many 
of the guides were former marines who had worked at the fort. It gave them a 
feeling of getting a close and personal connection to history. One of the visitors 
called it ‘a jump back to the time of war, which comes really close to you’.27 It is 
also  noteworthy here, of course, that the visitor talks of ‘the time of war’. He 
does not reflect on this, however. The visitors are also fascinated by the military 
museum The Old Town in Aarhus had approx. 480,000 visitors and the Second World War 
museum in Hanstholm approx. 51,000 visitors in 2013, http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/em-
ner/museer-og-kulturarv/museer.aspx [accessed 8 January 2015].
25 The earliest reviews of Langelandsfort are from 2012. However, in this research, I have 
focused on the period 2014–2016 because I was particularly interested in responses to the 
interactive exhibition that opened in 2014. However, surprisingly, this is not mentioned in 
the reviews.
26 https://www.tripadvisor.dk/Attraction_Review-g189521-d1137517-Reviews-or30-Museum_
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hardware, canons, tanks, missiles etc. and Stevnfort’s role in nato. Only one 
visitor comments directly on the war narrative he is presented with: ‘… excit-
ing stories, but, as usual, with a fascination with war and military tradition’.28
With the exception of the quote above, the tripadvisor reviews represent 
uncritical reception and engagement with the war narrative presented at the 
museums. In addition, they are rather limited fora that you visit if you have 
been to one of the museums and have an opinion you would like to share with 
other visitors or, of course, with the museum staff. They speak primarily to 
‘those already in the know’, not the general public at large, and they do not 
generate a public discussion of how Danish museums represent the Cold War. 
Such a discussion could perhaps more likely be found in newspapers, either in 
review articles or in letters to the editor. However, a search in the Danish on-
line archival system for newspapers, infomedia, results in many articles about 
the forts, but no discussions or critical engagements with their exhibitions. The 
reporters and visitors seem to either just absorb and receive the war narrative 
uncritically or agree to an extent that they do no feel the need to critize or 
object to the narrative. This is, of course, a tentative conclusion as the source 
material is very sparse.
The museums and heritage sites are popular, but even with the above reser-
vation in mind, it seems safe to conclude that they do not cause any significant 
reation or debate in society. This is perhaps surprising, when it is taken into 
account that the Cold War causes much conflict in the political sphere. One 
explanation could be that Danish museum visitors are uncritical and easily 
satisfied. Another is that the world of museums and heritage has succesfully 
managed to stay clear of the political and ideological Cold War battle.29 A third 
possibility is that the war narrative presented here is sufficiently vague to be 
acceptable to both the conflict and the consensus narrative. One the one hand, 
it does aestheticize the Cold War as a war and the threat as a real threat, which 
is a key point in the conflict narrative. On the other hand, it portrays a Denmark 
that was prepared to fight for sovereignty and democracy and that took its de-
fence responsibilities seriously. Thus, it complies with the consensus narrative 
in stressing that Denmark was a loyal nato ally. The Cold War as a war is ac-




29 I have developed this line of argument in Rosanna Farbøl, “Commemoration of a cold 
war: The politics of history and heritage at Cold War memory sites in Denmark”, Cold War 
History, 15, 2015, 471–90.
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The fascination of the Cold War as a war is matched by a generel popular 
interest in war history, which is reflected in the large sales of books on war 
history, visits to war museums etc.30 This should probably be understood in 
connection with the present status of Denmark as a country at war. Since the 
end of the Cold War, most fervently in the 2000s, Denmark has assumed a new 
role of being at the front line of the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya 
and Mali, as well as in hunting pirates on the coast of Somalia and fighting 
against isis. The current militarized foreign policy is a profound change in the 
country’s ‘small state mentality’ (an expression used by, among others, former 
Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen), a self-perception as a bridge-builder, the 
‘un’s best friend’ and a stout advocate of diplomatic solutions and dialogue.
On an existential level, as humans, we often project the challenges of the 
present onto the past. In times of war – with the cost of dead and wounded 
soldiers – it comes as no surprise that we find war history interesting and rel-
evant, because we can use the past to explore what it means to be ‘at war’ and 
how to handle this as a nation and as humans. On a more practical and politi-
cal level, Liberal and Conservative politicians have repeatedly compared the 
war on terror with the fight against Nazism and Communism in newspapers 
and speeches, thus making the connection between past and present wars ex-
plicit.31 The past experiences of Communism and Nazism are reappropriated 
to frame and make sense of the war on terror.
Both on the existential and the political level, linking the Cold War to the 
Second World War is necessary in order to make the Cold War function not 
only as orientation and explanation (the Cold War as a universal, essential and 
existential war between ‘good’ and ‘evil’), but also to mobilize action in specific 
contemporary settings. There was an absence of war in the Cold War, as the 
Western world never went to hot war for democracy and freedom – unlike in 
the Second World War. However, the narrative frames and memory templates 
30 Niels Kayser Nielsen, Historiens forvandlinger (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2010); 
Lars Ole Knippel, “Museer om forsvaret: Eksplosiv interesse for krigshistorien”, Jyllands-
Posten, 18 January 2007; Karin Dahl Hansen, “Krigshistorie på vej tilbage”, Kr. Dagblad, 26 
November 2008; Mikkel Vuorela, “Den kolde krig har fået greb i danskerne”, Politiken, 22 
July 2013.
31 For example in debates in the Parliament: Folketingstidende (ft) 2002–03 B 118 1. Beh; 
ft 2003–04 F7; ft 2003–04 B 213 2. Beh; ft 2003–04 – S 2927; ft 2004–05, 1. saml. B 42, 
1+2 Beh.; 2004–05 2. saml. B 89; In newspapers see for example Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
“Hvad kan det nytte” Berlingske 2 March 2003; in speeches see Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
4.5.05, Tale i Mindelunden 4.5.05 http://www.stm.dk/_p_7500.html [accessed 21 Febru-
ary 2011]; Fogh Rasmussen, Anders 15.6.05, Tale ved Folketingets åbning http://www.stm 
.dk/_p_7495.html [accessed 21 February 2011].
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used to make a previous war a cultural memory are transferred to the Cold 
War, and the cultural memory of the Cold War becomes a remediation of the 
Second World War, thus the Cold War memory can be used to call for action.
 (Absence of a) Cold War Commemoration Culture
However, now we encounter a paradox: On the one hand, cultural memory 
of Cold War is part of a transcultural fascination with war memories, and is 
constructed in much the same ways. On the other hand, compared to ‘classic’ 
culture of war commemoration, Danish Cold War remembrance lacks many 
important features. Modern wars have given rise to in many ways similar forms 
of cultural remembrance: memorials, traditions, national holidays etc., in the 
Western world.32 Danish Second World War commemoration includes all of 
this. However, there is nothing of that kind specifically connected to the Cold 
War in Denmark. There is not a Cold War commemoration culture. This is not a 
uniquely Danish phenomenon, though. In other countries, such as Britain and 
Canada, authors have noted that the Cold War is largely ‘uncommemorated’.33 
Germany seems to be the only European country with a firmly established 
commemoration culture.34 In Central and Eastern Europe, the picture is more 
complicated. The Communist period, not the Cold War, is commemorated 
32 On war memorials and commemorations of war see for instance Whitmarsh, “We Will”; 
Mosse, G, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (Oxford University 
Press 1990); A. Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919–1946 (Oxford: Berg 
1994); A. Forty, “Introduction” in The Art of Forgetting, eds. A. Forty and Küchler, S., (Ox-
ford: Berg 1999) J. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European 
Cultural History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); J. Winter and E. Sivan 
(eds.), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1999); J. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (London: 
Yale University Press 1993); M. Evans and K. Lunn, (eds.), War and Memory in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Berg 1997).
33 C.S. Dobinson, J. Lake & A.J. Schofield, “Monuments of war: Defining England’s 20th-cen-
tury defence heritage”, Antiquity 71.272 1997, 288–299; David Neufeld, “Commemorating 
the Cold War in Canada: Considering the dew Line”, The Public Historian, Vol. 20, no. 1 
(1998); Of course, the usa is an exception to this rule; American soldiers killed in Korea 
and Vietnam are commemorated at many memorials, memorial services, rituals, etc. In 
countries where the Cold War became hot, such as Korea and Vietnam, it is, not surpris-
ingly, commemorated as an “ordinary war”.
34 Keith R. Allen, “Wall Remains”; Duncan Light, “Gazing on communism: heritage tourism 




and repressed at the same time. One line of explanation stresses a discourse 
and memory not of war but of terror and victimhood. Often, the Communist 
past is repressed and instead a (post-Communist) democratic identity and a 
return to Europe is emphasized.35 Another explanation focuses on a certain 
form of (n)ostalgia or disappointment with the developments following the 
fall of Communism that is not conducive to commemoration or anniversary 
celebrations.36
What makes the Danish case interesting is that in spite of the lack of war 
commemoration culture, the Cold War is commemorated at museums and 
heritage sites and commemorated as a war. Besides the Cold War museums 
and the numerous Cold War installations scattered around the country, other 
typical physical commemoration symbols are absent. For instance, there are 
no memorials or statues commemorating events or people from the Cold 
War.37 In this way, the Cold War as cultural memory becomes both event-less 
and face-less. Equally strikingly absent are immaterial or temporal sites of 
memory; there are no traditions connected to the Cold War experience and no 
calendar of commemorative dates. Not even 9 November, the day of the fall of 
the Wall, has become a generally accepted historic date to be commemorated. 
Nor does Denmark celebrate 23 August as commemoration of the victims of 
totalitarianism.
The absence of a traditional culture of war commemoration can, I believe, be 
attributed to a set of interrelated factors. One of them is that national cultures 
of commemoration are usually unifying and homogeneous, and such com-
memoration is difficult to institutionalize in countries like Denmark, where 
there is a continuing competition between memory communities. There is no 
politically and publicly shared master narrative, no agreement on what or who 
should be commemorated, or what form the commemoration should take. 
Right-wing politicians have fought for the erection of a Reagan statue, which 
35 Marki Lethi, “Eastern or Western, New or False? Classifying the Balts in the Post-Cold War 
Era”, Wider Europe, Danish Institute of International Studies, 2006, 69–88; Mälksoo, “The 
Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective 
Memory of Europe”, European Journal of International Relations, 15/4, 2009, 653–668; C. 
Onken, “Memory and Democratic Pluralism in the Baltic States – Rethinking the Rela-
tionship, Journal of Baltic Studies, 41/3 Sep, 2010, 277–294; Light,” Gazing.
36 Aleksandar Smolar, “History and Memory: the Revolutions of 1989–91”, Journal of Democ-
racy, Vol. 12(3), 2001, 5–19.
37 The authoritative book on Danish lieux de mémoire is Inge Adriansen, Erindringssteder 
i Danmark: Monumenter, mindesmærker og mødesteder (København: Museum Tuscula-
num, 2010). In this book, Adriansen documents and analyzes monuments and memorials, 
however, none of them refer to the Cold War experience.
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would fit perfectly with the conflict narrative, but the American president and 
his role in the ending of the Cold War is still too disputed in Denmark to reach 
the necessary political consensus on the need and propriety of a celebratory 
commemoration. A statue would mean recognition of him as a hero, and this is 
incompatible with the consensus and protest narratives. The left-wing and So-
cial Democrats cannot allow it; it would imply that they were wrong then and 
wrong now in their analyses of why they Cold War started, why it ended and 
what lessons there are to be learned and implemented today. This dispute can 
perhaps seem odd in a broader European context. Former Warsaw Pact capi-
tals such as Budapest and Warsaw have erected Reagan statues. Hungary and 
Poland, of course, are cee countries who quickly and successfully embarked 
on a ‘return to Europe’. Honoring Reagan and emphasizing a national parallel 
to the conflict narrative seem logic in that regard.
Besides the lack of a unified Danish remembrance community in the pres-
ent, another factor can be found in the historical past. One issue here is the 
relatively peaceful and in many ways ‘un-war-like’ experience of (Western) 
countries such as Denmark in the Cold War. War, yet alone apocalyptic war, 
was never part of the Danish Cold War experience. The Danes managed to par-
ticipate in the conflict with the least possible effort in terms of military spend-
ing and military engagement. The country did not experience any losses, and 
still, in contrast to the Second World War, it was on the ‘right’ or winning side 
all the time. Commemorations of war memories often seem to be intimately 
connected to national catastrophe, loss, trauma, sacrifice and heroes and, in 
particular after the Second World War and the Holocaust, victimhood and 
genocide.38 The role of victimhood has, according to Lowe and Joel, become a 
central element in the politics of war memory: ‘Once shunned as both a bitter 
reminder of the past or continuing domination and a signal of historical or 
enduring inferiority, victimhood now has become a prized commodity.’39 This 
transnational and transcultural obsession with victims and trauma is difficult 
to internalize or reappropriate to fit Danish (and Western European in general) 
38 Lowe and Joel, Remembering; Jay Winter, “The Generation of Memory: Reflections on the 
‘Memory Boom’ in Contemporary Historical Studies”, ghi 27 (2000); Dominick LaCapra, 
History and Memory After Auschwitz (Ithaca, 1998); Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, eds, 
Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory (London, 1996); Eltringham and Ma-
clean, eds., Remembering Genocide (London and New York Routledge, 2014). Ashplant et 
al., The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration (Routledge, 2000); John R. Gillis, “In-
troduction” in Commemorations: the Politics of National Identity ed. John R. Gillis (Princ-
eton University Press, 1996), 3–27; David Lowenthal, “Identity, Heritage, and History” in 
Gillis ed, Commemorations, 41–61; Müller, “Introduction”.
39 Lowe and Joel, Remembering, 6.
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Cold War experience, because there are no losses to commemorate. Further-
more, because of the peculiar character of the Cold War as an in many ways 
absent war, there is no memory paradigm, such as the Holocaust paradigm, 
to set the limits for how and what to communicate and commemorate. This 
makes the counter-factual potential unlimited.
It might also be a factor that even though we live in a globalized age,  Danish 
culture of commemoration in general still to a large degree remains intimately 
linked to the national state and national identity. There is no complete regis-
ter of Danish memorials, but the Agency for Culture has registered more than 
2,000 erected between 1830 and 2000, and they commemorate exclusively Dan-
ish historical events and persons. The, sparse, existing scholarship on the topic 
confirms the image that Danish commemorative culture is nationally local-
ized and oriented.40 Many of the major Cold War events with the potential of 
becoming significant transcultural lieux de mémoire, such as the Berlin Wall, 
the uprising in Hungary 1956, the Vietnam War and the Gulag are not received 
and  reappropriated in a Danish context and not treated as part of a common 
heritage. If a commemorative act that does not carry an explicit reference to 
Denmark is difficult to bring about in the current circumstances, there could 
be many ways to make international experiences part of a cultural memory in 
Denmark. One could have imagined, for instance, a memorial to refugees from 
East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, who drowned in the Baltic 
Sea heading for Denmark, or an exhibition about Danish communists who be-
came victims of Stalin’s purges. However, like the Holocaust, which in Dan-
ish cultural memory is seen as something that happened ‘elsewhere’ (whereas 
the Danes in cultural memory are proud to have saved (most of) the Danish 
Jews), the catastrophes of the Cold War were far away and not directly and 
unambiguously related to Denmark. It is indeed a narrow, even nationalistic, 
perspective, yet, because memory is closely related to identity, the past must 
be seen as relevant to the identification of the community in question in order 
to ‘function’ as a lieu de mémoire.
 Conclusions
The last few years have witnessed a remarkable multiplication of Cold War mu-
seums in Denmark. At the same time, the state Agency for Culture has recognized 
the Cold War as national heritage. This testifies to a desire to institutionalize the 
40 Adriansen, Erindringssteder.
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memory and narratives of the Cold War from ‘above’ and ‘below’ and to a fruitful 
merging of interests.
This article demonstrates that the Cold War is, to a large extent, 
 commemorated as a war at these sites; war in a narrow political-military un-
derstanding. It is generally military and deference-related aspects of the war 
that have become institutionalized in the Cold War museums and in the offi-
cial list of Cold War heritage – even if actual warfare was not part of the Danish 
Cold War experience. The representations centre on the hypothetical war situ-
ation, and the starting point is the total defence, which does not make sense 
without a war aspect. The history of the Cold War is modelled to follow the 
templates of the history of the Second World War, but with one crucial dif-
ference: it is a heroic and positive history without one of the most important 
characteristics of war commemoration of hot wars: victims, loss and sacrifice. 
The Danes manage to celebrate a war memory without having to deal with 
the unpleasant sides of warfare. There are no victims or veterans to take into 
consideration.41 It is an interesting commemorative strategy: reappropriation, 
heroization and militarization but without victimization. The public who is ar-
guably the most interested in the Cold War apparently receives and perceives 
the war memory as unproblematic, if they notice it at all, in spite of the context 
of heated discussions about the past in the public sphere.
The article claims that the absence of war makes it a malleable and usable 
past, while at the same time finding a paradox in the counter-factual war  memory 
that becomes the result of commemorating a war that never happened. Most 
importantly, the article discusses the lack of a war commemoration culture. 
This paradox reflects, I suggest, on the one hand, the lack of a generally accepted 
master narrative of the Cold War in Denmark, which is a result of the continuing 
‘memory war’, and, on the other hand, the peculiar character of the Cold War as 
a war that never broke out and the absence of a fixed memory paradigm.
The article has revealed a need for examining in more detail the Cold War as 
cultural memory, and the degree to which memory communities’ competition 
impedes a functional commemoration culture. There remains likewise a need 
to embed the analyses of national cases of memory culture within a trans-
national or transcultural comparative framework to examine to what degree 
41 The lack of fallen soldiers is, however, also an impediment to a unifying commemoration 
culture, as the commemoration and memory of the fallen are often used to legitimize 
the war effort. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006 [1983]); John R. Gillis: “Introduction” in Com-




countries and communities share a similarly structured terrain of Cold War 
memory sites, perhaps in opposition to other memoryscapes. Also, the layers 
of memories and the dynamics and durability of mnemonic templates merit 
further examination, and provide an excellent opportunity for deepening our 
understanding of cultural memory.
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chapter 8
Jews and the Holocaust in Poland’s Memoryscapes: 
An Inquiry into Transcultural Amnesia
Slawomir Kapralski
The Holocaust wiped out the world of Polish Jewry. Out of a Jewish population 
of more than three million in pre-war Poland, only about ten percent survived 
and many of the survivors decided to emigrate to the West.1 The material traces 
of the centuries of Jewish presence in Poland were eradicated during, or after, 
the war and the socio-economic space once occupied by the Jews was soon 
filled by non-Jewish Poles as part of the radical transformation of Poland’s so-
cial structure.
As a result, writes James Young,2 the non-Jewish Poles have been left with 
their own, uncontested, memories of the past. Post-war Polish authorities at-
tempted to shape the country’s memory to give it a new meaning according 
to their communist worldview while the vast majority of Polish society, reluc-
tantly approaching the new political system, tried to safeguard its memory of 
the past in the private sphere of family life, supported by the structures of the 
Roman-Catholic Church.
The remnants of Jewish memory were therefore located in a space  controlled 
by two frames that are conventionally called ‘nationalist’ and ‘communist.’ 
For the nationalists, whose ideal was an overlap of the political and cultural 
boundaries,3 the presence of Jews in Poland’s memory proved that the latter 
is heterogeneous, which subverted their national project. For the communists, 
the ethnic and/or religious differentiation of the memory subverted their vi-
sion of history, in which ethnicity and religion supposedly had no meaning, 
having been replaced by economic divisions and gradually levelled by the 
dominant position of the working class.
Contrary to Young, it is therefore possible to say that the postwar memory 
of the non-Jewish Poles has not been homogeneous and uncontested. Poland 
1 Michael C. Steinlauf, “Poland,” in The World Reacts to the Holocaust, ed. David S. Wyman (Bal-
timore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 109.
2 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 116.
3 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.
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has in fact been a battlefield of different visions of the past that have mutually 
contested one another, although not all of them have had sufficient power to 
significantly control public and communicative memories. But in one thing 
Young was right: in spite of the differences between communist and nation-
alist memories, there has not been any space for the Jews in either of them. 
What has united these otherwise opposing forms of memory has been an act 
of symbolic violence: an erasure of the Jewish memory, which in a way has 
contributed to the annihilation of the Holocaust victims.
Memory is understood here as a synthesis of mnéme (the reminiscence of 
the past that is stored and transmitted in the acts of remembrance), and anám-
nesis (a contextually conditioned re-collection of something that not necessar-
ily forms a permanent part of our stock of memories but could be consciously 
commemorated).4 Memory emerges therefore as a result of two processes. 
The first one starts with the individual remembrances or recollections of the 
past events that are subsequently communicated and discussed by individuals 
and as such form their social memory. In the second one, the cultural frames 
and social institutions support (and sometimes induce or even create) certain 
forms of social memory (and weaken or eliminate others), deciding in this way 
which of the individual recollections will have a chance to become a topic of 
conversation, what shape they may take and what will be officially and pub-
licly commemorated as important for the group. This officially approved vision 
of the past, together with commemorative practices that sustain it, forms the 
collective memory of a given community.5
Therefore, the crucial segment of memory is the social memory, which is a 
place where two genealogies meet one another, and which serves as a space of 
encounter of the top-down and bottom-up memory work. Sometimes a battle-
ground, sometimes an alliance of different tendencies, social memory is the 
central place in the process of collective remembering.
To catch the complex nature of social memory with one word, I employ 
here the concept of memoryscape that refers to a material and symbolic 
space, in which social memory is expressed6 although here the concept will 
be interpreted metaphorically and without direct reference to physical places. 
4 Yosef H. Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle: University of 
 Washington Press, 1996), 107.
5 Aleida Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” Social Research 1 (2008): 
55.
6 Hamzah Muzaini, and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “War Landscapes as ‘Battlefields’ of Collective 




 Memoryscapes form a matrix of possible attitudes towards the past that can be 
activated in the commemorative actions of individuals and groups. They are 
spaces of coexistence of various groups’ visions of the past that could be in a 
symbolic conflict, precisely the way their holders could be in real conflict. For 
this reason, the memories contained in memoryscapes constitute an impor-
tant realm of the struggle for power, understood here as the right to marginal-
ize, exclude or even criminalize those visions of the past that diverge from the 
sanctioned ideal. A memoryscape is therefore a ‘site of concentrated cultural 
practice,’ in which power relations are negotiated.7
Memoryscape, however, is not only a result of power relations and past 
events: it, too, has the power to generate memories and amnesias. Consequent-
ly, memoryscape has a peculiar characteristic of being, in Clifford Geertz’s 
terminology, both ‘model of ’ and ‘model for.’8 Memoryscapes are ‘models of ’ 
because they become, over time, representations of the remembered past. Yet, 
memoryscapes may also be consciously designed to emphasize and amplify 
those aspects and interpretations of the past desired by those with the power 
to shape them. In this way, memoryscapes are ‘models for’: they are instruc-
tions or frames for our memories in which certain recollections are more likely 
to emerge than others.
It is argued here that in post-war history Jews and the Holocaust have largely 
been absent in Poland’s memoryscape, either because they have not been pres-
ent in the individual remembrance (and the memoryscape has not served as a 
‘model of ’ them), or because there has not been any institutional, public com-
memoration of the Jewish past in Poland and its tragic end (so that the memo-
ryscape has not served as a ‘model for’ them), or both. The intention of this 
paper is to present an interpretation of this situation and different examples of 
the absence of the memory of Jews and the Holocaust in Poland’s social mem-
ory, with particular emphasis on the post-communist period since the 1990s. 
Since then, it is argued here, there has been an increase in the number of com-
memorations of the Polish Jews, but they have nevertheless remained absent 
in the individual remembrance (in the way the terms are understood here).
 Periodization of Poland’s Attitude to Her Jewish Past
Michael Steinlauf has distinguished five periods in the Polish history after 
the Second World War, in which Jews and the Holocaust were differently 
7 William H. Jr. Sewell, Logics of History. Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 172.
8 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretations of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 90–91.
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 remembered/forgotten: the period of ‘wounded memory’ (1944–1948), of ‘re-
pressed memory’ (1948–1968), of ‘expelled memory’ (1969–1970), of ‘recon-
structed memory’ (1970–1989) and of regained memory (1989–1995).9
In the first of them, Jewish memory was represented mainly by the Jewish 
survivors, in particular those who had survived the Holocaust in the ussr and 
returned to Poland only to face the fact that their relatives had perished and 
that their non-Jewish neighbors were not particularly happy with their return. 
On the other hand, the fate of the Jews was freshly imprinted in the memory of 
their neighbors, although ambiguously perceived.
The time immediately following the end of the Second World War, which 
for many Poles only meant the replacement of Nazi-German occupation with 
 Soviet Communism, was characterized by the psychological states of fear, anxi-
ety and terror, accompanied by conspiracy theories developed to ease the sense 
of insecurity, and by the anti-Jewish pogroms that were the consequence.10
Polish communist authorities supported the program of the Central 
 Committee of Polish Jews that aimed at the revival of Jewish life in Poland. A 
manifestation of this attitude was the official commemorative activity of the 
Polish government regarding the Jews and the Holocaust, although treated 
instrumentally in order to get political legitimization and Western support. 
Thus the commemoration of Jewish resistance (first of all) and victimization 
was politically used to discredit the anti-communists who were equated with 
 antisemites and with the Nazis in general.11
A good illustration of this attitude was the unveiling of Nathan Rapoport’s 
Ghetto memorial on the fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1948), 
while the memorial of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, led by the  non-communist 
Polish resistance, had been allowed only in 1989 when communism was  already 
on the decline.
Rapoport’s monument stood alone in a vast field of rubble, easily red by 
Poles as a symbol of the new government’s decision to honor the Jews, 
while consigning the Polish national struggle to the dustbin of  history. 
Similarly, Polish secondary school textbooks of the early 1950s de-
vote more attention to the history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust 
than any subsequent versions, but the context for this information is a 
 narrative in which the ak [Armia Krajowa = Home Army, Polish main 
9 Michael C. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead. Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust (Syra-
cuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
10 Marcin Zaremba, Wielka trwoga. Polska 1944–1947: ludowa reakcja na kryzys (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo Znak i isp pan, 2012).
11 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 111.
Kapralski�74
<UN>
 non-communist anti-Nazi military organization – S.K.] is described as 
hindering Polish resistance.12
In the first years after the Second World War in Poland, the presence of Jewish 
survivors, together with relatively fresh memories of the Holocaust and official 
commemorative politics of the government, allowed for the remembrance and 
commomeration of Jews and their fate.
In the period of ‘repressed memory’ (1948–1968) the individual remem-
brance of the Holocaust by the non-Jewish Poles gradually weakened, while 
many Jewish survivors left Poland, together with their memories, in the wake 
of the wave of post-war pogroms. As for the authorities, in 1949–1956 they fol-
lowed the Stalinist orientation in constructing a vision of the past, in which the 
entire Polish past was erased as prehistory13 and in the official Marxist-Leninist 
approach to history all ethnic conflicts and enmities were reduced to an epi-
phenomenon of class struggle and an interplay of the economic forces. Jews 
were thus excluded from the Communist vision of history in which, as in the 
Marxist dream, ethnic identities would dissolve in the fundamental economic 
dichotomy.
Together with the destalinization of the Polish communist regime after 1956, 
the authorities, although still formally adhering to the Marxist philosophy of 
history, started to gradually include the reference to the Polish national tradi-
tion in their legitimating efforts, attempting to present their rule as firmly root-
ed in Polish history and as a ‘return’ to the geopolitics and social  homogeneity 
of the first Polish statehood. In the 1960s, the nationalist and often antisemitic 
wing of the communist party grew in importance, which eventually, together 
with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s support of Israel, resulted in the 
state-sponsored antisemitic campaign of 1968.
The campaign, according to Steinlauf,14 marked the beginning of the period 
of ‘expelled memory’, because as a consequence many Polish Jews decided to 
emigrate or were in various ways forced to leave their country. The sociotech-
nical means used in the campaign awoke popular antisemitism, constantly 
 present as a dormant cultural code,15 usually activated in times of crisis to give 
its participants an illusion of being able to intellectually control the events. As 
a result, from 1968 Jews and the Holocaust have neither been remembered, nor 
commemorated.
12 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 111.
13 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 111.
14 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead.
15 Wolfgang Benz, Anti-Semitism in Europe. Traditions, Structures, Manifestations (Uppsala: 
Uppsala University, 2004).
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The lack of remembrance and commemoration also characterized the peri-
od of 1970–1989, although relative cultural liberalization and the development 
of democratic opposition that established its structures in the late 1970s, and 
which included the attempt to reclaim memory from the  communist-controlled 
agenda, made the Jewish past slightly more visible in Poland’s memoryscape. 
Known as the attempt to ‘fill in the blank spots’ in the map of collective memo-
ry, this process contributed to the re-emergence of previously erased chapters 
of Polish-Jewish history. A number of official films and publications dealing 
with the Jewish past of Poland appeared, together with clandestine literature. 
Jewish history and culture became a field of study at universities. Public de-
bates by Polish intellectuals, and the international conflict about the  Carmelite 
Convent at Auschwitz, made a wider audience aware of the problem and 
helped the elites develop their arguments and revise their standpoints. In 1989 
Poland entered the postcommunist period of its history with the clear knowl-
edge, at least among the elites, that a certain part of Polish memory had been 
erased or manipulated and that the ‘de-communization of memory’ should 
include an attempt to re-examine Poland’s Jewish past and the Holocaust. This 
attempt, called by Steinlauf ‘reconstruction of memory,’16 has continued with 
greater success in postcommunist Poland.
Here, the division of postwar Jewish-Polish history presented by Steinlauf 
has been supplemented with two concepts: remembrance and commemora-
tion that help convert historical periodization into sociological typology. Thus, 
in the period immediately following the end of the Second World War, the Jew-
ish past and the Holocaust is individually remembered and publicly commem-
orated. From 1950 to 1968 individual remembrance weakens although is still 
present, while the state subdues public commemoration as contradicting the 
official vision of history constituted by a specific mixture of communist ideol-
ogy and nationalism. With the antisemitic campaign of 1968, Poland enters 
a long period in which Jews and the Holocaust are neither remembered nor 
commemorated. This situation changes slightly in the 1980s when the Jewish 
history of Poland becomes one of the motifs of the opposition’s clandestine 
revision of the official vision of the past. Eventually, after 1989 and the collapse 
of communism, the institutional framework of memory radically changes and 
Jews and the Holocaust are commemorated again (although differently than 
in the past), but this commemoration, it is argued here, does not translate 
into individual remembrance. In post-communist Poland, Jews and the Holo-
caust remain commemorated but not remembered. This thesis will be devel-
oped in the subsequent part of this article. Now, however, it is necessary to go 
deeper into the particular nature of the relation between remembrance and 
16 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead.
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 commemoration to uncover less evident causes of silencing the Jewish past in 
postwar Polish history.
 The Absence of the Holocaust in Poland’s Memoryscape
To interpret the disappearance of the fate of Jews as an important element in 
the recollections of the past by non-Jewish Poles and in their social memory, 
we need to say, first of all, that in spite of being eye-witnesses, they did not have 
an adequate knowledge of what they had actually witnessed. The non-Jewish 
Poles saw what happened but did not know what happened.17 That does not 
mean that they were not aware of the fact that their Jewish neighbors had been 
murdered. But the interviews collected by the Institute of Sociology of the Jagi-
ellonian University in the beginning of the 1990s in the project ‘The Memory of 
Jewish Culture in Southern Poland’ show that although they were able to pro-
vide details of the fate of individuals they had known (and often with compas-
sion and sorrow), most of them had problems with acknowledging that they 
had witnessed a horrible, inconceivable and transforming event on a scale that 
surpassed previous experiences. Little empathy was expressed for the fate of 
Jews in general and, while on the topic, many respondents started to refer to 
antisemitic clichés even if they did not expose antisemitic views in other parts 
of the interview.
One reason for this that can be mentioned here is the separation, which 
was often hostile, between Jews and non-Jewish Poles. The latter lived in the 
same physical space and historical time as their Jewish neighbors, but the 
two groups did not share the same social space and time.18 Jews did not form 
a social community with the non-Jewish Poles. The contacts between the 
groups were limited to economic relations, and closer ties, friendships and 
social encounters were very rare among adults. Both groups formed separate 
worlds that existed in physical proximity, but were separated by the barrier 
of custom, endogamy and prejudice, and their members largely ignored each 
other.19 This separation was deepened by the Nazi policies of segregation and 
17 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead.
18 Diane K. Roskies and David G. Roskies, The Shtetl Book: An Introduction to East European 
Jewish Life and Lore (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1975); Slawomir Kapralski, “People 
of Different Times,” in The Jews in Poland, Vol. 2, ed Slawomir Kapralski (Kraków: Judaica 
Foundation, 1999).
19 Ewa Banasiewicz-Ossowska, Między dwoma światami. Żydzi w polskiej kulturze ludowej 
(Wrocław: Polskie Towarzystwo Ludoznawcze, 2007), 88–89.
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separation of Jews into the ghettos, as well as by the differentiating approach 
of the Soviets occupying the eastern part of Poland in the first period of the 
Second World War.
Jews were therefore excluded from the Polish national/local communities. 
From the non-Jewish point of view, they were not part of the Polish ‘Us’ and 
therefore the memory of their tragic fate was not perceived by non-Jews as 
‘their’ memory. The postwar exclusion of the Jews from the Polish ‘mnemonic 
community’20 was a consequence of their previous social exclusion. Conse-
quently, with a significant role of traditional anti-Judaism and modern pre-
war antisemitism, the non-Jewish Poles widely perceived Jews in the time of 
the Holocaust as having been ‘beyond the Polish universe of obligation.’21 The 
postwar dissociation of the non-Jewish Poles from the memory of the Jews 
could show an attempt to dissolve the link between memory and continuity 
and, therefore, between memory and the responsibility that makes human be-
ings capable of accountability as moral subjects.22
Generally then, the non-Jewish Poles did not perceive the fate of the Jews as 
something that would affect their own collective identity. They did not iden-
tify with the memory of the Holocaust because they did not identify with its 
 victims.23 Moreover, the non-Jewish Poles themselves felt victims of Nazi terror 
and had good reasons to believe that: ‘after the Jews and the Gypsies, the Poles 
were the most relentlessly victimized group in Hitler’s Europe.’24 Their loss was 
of course not equal to the Jewish one. The non-Jewish population of Poland 
was decimated while ninety percent of Polish Jews perished. ‘ Nevertheless,’ 
Steinlauf comments, ‘nowhere else in Europe would such a comparison be 
necessary; nowhere else did the murder of Jews unfold amidst such slaugh-
ter of the coterritorial people.’25 If we take into account the religiously tinted, 
messianic mythology of victimhood and suffering that since the nineteenth 
century has been an important part of the Polish national tradition, we may 
understand that the non-Jewish Poles focused on their own, enormous suffer-
ing, and perceived the suffering of the Jews as competition, largely ignored 
20 Maria G. Cattell and Jacob J. Climo, “Introduction. Meaning in Social Memory and Histo-
ry: Anthropological Perspective,” in Social Memory and History. Anthropological Perspec-
tives, ed. Jacob J. Climo and Maria G. Cattell (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2002), 35.
21 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 107.
22 W. James Booth, “The Work of Memory: Time, Identity, and Justice,” Social Research 1 
(2008).
23 Jeffrey C. Alexander, Trauma. A Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 19.
24 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 81.
25 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 99.
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‘because of the Polish self-image of Poles as victims par excellence.’26 This per-
ception could have been supported by the generalized experience of the first 
two years of the occupation when ‘it may not have been entirely clear that Jews 
had it worse.’27
Another reason for silencing the memory of the Holocaust was a morally 
dubious profit that the non-Jewish Poles made as a result of the persecution 
of the Jews.
Beyond the money to be made through smuggling to and from the ghet-
tos as well as blackmailing and informing on Jews hidden on the Aryan 
side, activities that involved only a small minority of Poles, the German 
expropriation of the property of 3.5 million Jews amounted to an eco-
nomic revolution. While the Germans took the lion’s share …, the left-
overs went to Poles. Throughout Poland, ownerless stores, merchandise, 
workshops, raw material, land, and houses quickly found new owners.28
The revolution Steinlauf writes about was, however, not only economic. It is 
difficult to overestimate the consequences of the expropriation for the social 
structure: the void in the social tissue had been quickly filled in by the non-
Jewish Poles for whom this was by and large a social promotion into middle 
class. According to Andrzej Leder, this genealogy of the ethnically Polish mid-
dle class had a tremendous impact on social memory and identity of Polish so-
ciety. Members of a large segment of society, who marched to their new social 
position over the corpses of murdered Jews, prefer not, for obvious reasons, to 
reflect on their origins. They tend to repress their own sociogenesis and replace 
it with mythologies, in which antisemitism often plays a role of protection and 
justification of their uncertain identity.29
Finally, we should mention the issue of trauma that the non-Jewish Poles 
suffered as passive witnesses (and sometimes active co-perpetrators) of the 
crimes. As Steinlauf notes, ‘[t]he effects of witnessing murder on such a scale, 
at such close range, and over such a long time are of course complex. To in-
quire about the Polish reaction to the Holocaust is to investigate the effects of 
26 Stanisław Krajewski, Poland and the Jews. Reflection of a Polish Polish Jew (Kraków: Auste-
ria, 2005), 212.
27 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 101.
28 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 101.
29 Andrzej Leder, Prześniona rewolucja. Ćwiczenie z logiki historycznej (Warszawa: Wydawnic-
two Krytyki Politycznej, 2014), 90–92.
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a mass psychic and moral trauma unprecedented in history.’30 In the concept 
of trauma it is assumed that those who have participated in a horrifying event 
are unable to adequately react to it in a psychological sense, including lack of 
an adequate representation of such event in memory (assuming that such an 
adequate reaction and representation are possible at all, which is arguable, 
especially in the context of the Holocaust debate), that leads to amnesia (total 
or selective) or such reconstructions of the past that erase the traumatizing 
event.31 The memory of the event, however, continues to exist in a hidden form 
and unconsciously influences psychological structures of individuals and col-
lective consciousness of groups.
The lack of adequate psychological reaction is caused simultaneously by the 
nature of the traumatizing event and by the lack of appropriate cultural frame, 
in which this event could be interpreted.32 The former process is important in 
studying memory in the mode of mnéme, that is when we focus on how past 
events form the ways they are remembered. The latter is crucial for studying 
memory as anámnesis, that is when the focus is on how present conditions in-
fluence the way in which past is remembered. This second approach to trauma 
we can find in the work of Jeffrey C. Alexander,33 for whom trauma is not a 
feature or a direct consequence of a historical event but of the way in which a 
community approaches it. In other words, trauma is a social-cultural construc-
tion that defines the way in which the community experiences past events: 
namely, as something that has threatened its collective identity.
Witnessing the Holocaust certainly threatened the identity of non-Jewish 
Poles, leaving them with questions regarding their positive self-image, moral 
integrity, audacity, human solidarity, religious values etc. Such questions cause 
discomfort and the forgetting of the situation that gave reason to ask them is 
a convenient way to avoid the answers. From a cognitive perspective, equally 
important is that to adequately remember the past, people need a classificato-
ry scheme, a narrative, a concept that would organize their personal recollec-
tions, give them a meaning, and a language in which they could be expressed. 
This was clearly missing in the non-Jewish Poles’ interpretation of the events 
they witnessed, partly because of the nature of their involvement, partly be-
cause of the lack of such a discourse.
30 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 81.
31 Barbara A Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 
2003), 141.
32 Jeffrey Prager, Presenting the Past. Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Misremembering 




The lack of a discourse is crucial in the perspective of social trauma theory: 
if there is no language, in which a past experience can be expressed, the event 
associated with that experience cannot be properly recalled (or even, in fact, 
experienced). Therefore, the experience without a discourse that informs it is 
necessarily inadequate. To remember mass murder of Jews as the Holocaust, 
one needs first of all the elaborated discourse of the Holocaust. As Levy and 
Sznaider argue, ‘[f]or the Holocaust to be recognized as something unique, a 
discursive and political frame of reference needed to be put in place.’34
In the first decade after the Second World War, the Polish perception was 
not different from the general view in Europe, the United States or Israel. ‘This 
period was marked by silence concerning the destruction of European Jewry, 
which at that time did not even have a name and was broadly subsumed under 
the atrocities of the war.’35 Of course, one cannot say that there was complete 
silence regarding the fate of the Jews in the years immediately following the 
end of the War. The memory of what had happened was retained among sur-
vivors36 but it did not form part of the mainstream perception. Moreover, the 
survivors’ message was largely rejected in a world that aimed to rebuild the 
sense of normality and to start history again,37 with ‘a stable life, a steady job, 
and a nice family.’38
In the 1960s and 1970s we may observe a desynchronization regarding the 
Holocaust discourse. While in this period, and for various reasons, the term 
‘Holocaust’ becomes commonly accepted in ‘the West’ as describing the cru-
cial point of history, the social consciousness in communist Poland was al-
ready controlled by different master narratives (Marxist and nationalist), in 
which there was neither a place for the tragedy of the Jews, nor for any subse-
quent universal meaning for the whole of humanity. The ‘Iron Curtain’ meant, 
among other things, the exclusion of Poland from the developing universalist 
Holocaust discourse as the main narrative of world’s history.
Before the fall of communism, the memory of the Jews and the Holocaust 
was therefore absent in Poland’s memoryscapes due to a number of reasons: 
(1)  The exclusion of Jews from mnemonic community as a consequence of 
34 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2006), 59.
35 Levy and Sznaider, The Holocaust, 16.
36 Hasia R. Diner, We Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Si-
lence after the Holocaust, 1945–1962 (New York: nyu Press, 2009); David Cesarani and Eric J. 
Sundquist, ed., After the Holocaust: Challenging the Myth of Silence (New York: Routledge, 
2012).
37 Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory. The American Experience (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2001).
38 Levy and Sznaider, The Holocaust, 57.
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(often antisemitic) social exclusion that increased during the occupation due 
to the segregationist Nazi policies and Soviet differential treatment of both 
groups. (2) The belief that the fate of the Jews had not affected the identity 
of the non-Jewish Poles. (3) The belief that there was something wrong with 
 being a passive witness of the Jewish tragedy (and sometimes collaborat-
ing with the Nazi perpetrators), leading to the erasure of the memories that 
caused discomfort. (4) The focus of the non-Jewish Poles on their own suffer-
ing, thus neglecting the tragedy of the Jews as a competition that challenged 
Polish national identity. (5) The fact that large segments of the Polish society, 
even if unintentionally, benefited from the murder of the Jews, which lead to 
the erasure of the memory of the links between the Holocaust and the post-
war Poland’s social structure. (6) The lack of access to the Holocaust discourse 
in which the fate of the Jews could be expressed.
 The Perception of Jews and the Holocaust after  
the Fall of Communism
The decade of the 1990s was marked by further intensification of the ‘revival’ of 
Jewish memory, partly assisted by the political authorities. Michael Steinlauf39 
has listed a significant number of cultural and educational initiatives, publica-
tions and conferences on Jewish–Polish relations, which took place in the first 
years of the decade, and more recent developments have been described, for 
example, by Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs40 and Annamaria Orla-Bukowska.41
Most important among these developments have been changes in the school 
curricula and special programs addressed to teachers in the field of education 
about the Holocaust. In addition, a number of commemorative ceremonies 
with the participation of authorities have helped to focus public opinion on 
the previously neglected Jewish aspects of Polish history, events which have 
received a substantial share of attention in the mass media. The process of 
39 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead.
40 Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, “Memory and Civic Education: Holocaust and Coming to 
Terms with National History,” in The Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity, 
ed. Lucia Faltin and Melanie J. Wright (London: Continuum, 2007).
41 Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, “New Threads on an Old Loom. National Memory and Social 
Identity in Postwar and Post-Communist Poland,” in The Politics of Memory in Postwar 
Europe, ed. Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2006); Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, “Gentiles Doing Jewish Stuff. 
The Contribution of Polish Non-Jews to Polish Jewish Life,” in Rethinking Poles and Jews: 
Troubled Past, Brighter Future, ed. Robert Cherry and Annamaria Orla-Bukowska (Lan-
ham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007).
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change has included the area of Auschwitz-Birkenau where the museum ex-
hibition has been refurbished with the participation of Jewish institutions to 
emphasize the role of the place as the symbol of the Holocaust and to clearly 
indicate that it was the first of the sites of mass extermination of men, women 
and children, sent to their deaths because they were Jewish.42
Poles started to interact more frequently with the ever greater number of 
Jewish visitors to Poland, which included, for example, meetings between Pol-
ish and Israeli high school students. At the same time, the revival of Jewish life 
in Poland includes a growing number of people who either have discovered 
their Jewish roots or decided to ‘come out’ and return to their previously re-
pressed or rejected Jewishness. This process has been assisted by various Jew-
ish organizations, which have become visible not only in the context of the 
protection of the material remnants of Jewish culture in Poland, but also as 
supporters of religious, cultural, and educational initiatives. Correspondingly, 
a number of Poles, acting out of genuine interest, curiosity or economic mo-
tives, have engaged in various initiatives, from opening a ‘Jewish’ restaurant 
and setting up a band playing Jewish music, to organizing a festival of Jewish 
culture, all of which have contributed to the phenomenon described by Ruth 
Gruber as ‘virtual Jewishness’: a certain form of Jewish culture produced by and 
addressed to non-Jews.43 The intellectual debate about Polish–Jewish relations 
in the time of the Shoah has continued, now free from the constraints induced 
by censorship. It came to a peak after the publication of Jan T. Gross’s book, 
Sąsiedzi (‘Neighbors’) in 2000.44 In the resulting discussion of the crime com-
mitted by the Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne on their Jewish neighbors, the 
‘whole of Polish society was convulsed by an extraordinary self-examination.’45 
The discussion, to which I will return later, has greatly  contributed to the 
42 Laurence Weinbaum, The Struggle for Memory in Poland. Auschwitz, Jedwabne and Beyond 
(Jerusalem: Institute of the World Jewish Congress, 2001); Marek Kucia, Auschwitz jako fakt 
społeczny: historia, współczesność i świadomość społeczna kl Auschwitz w Polsce (Kraków: 
Universitas, 2005); Slawomir Kapralski, “The Role Played by the Auschwitz-Birkenau State 
Museum in Public Discourse and the Evolving Consciousness of the Holocaust in Polish 
Society,” in Jewish Presence in Absence. The Aftermath of the Holocaust in Poland 1944–2010, 
ed. Feliks Tych and Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska (Yad Vashem, 2014).
43 Ruth E. Gruber, Virtually Jewish: Reinventing Jewish Culture in Europe (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2002).
44 Jan T. Gross, Sąsiedzi. Historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka (Sejny: Pogranicze, 2000); 
published in English as Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community 
in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
45 Laurence Weinbaum, “Penitence and Prejudice: The Roman Catholic Church and Jed-
wabne,” Jewish Political Studies Review 14 (2002): 3–4.
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 ‘return of memory’ of the time of the Holocaust, but it has divided various sec-
tors of Polish society and caused a backlash that hampered the reception of 
the Holocaust discourse.
It would seem self-evident that the continuation of the ‘memory work’ in 
the post-communist period of Polish history must bring about growing accep-
tance of the truth about the history of Polish–Jewish relations and of the Holo-
caust. However, if we take society as a whole, this does not seem to be the case 
and the results of the surveys are ambiguous.
If we compare the results of sociological surveys carried out by Ireneusz 
Krzemiński’s team in 1992, 2002 and 2012, we would see that in 1992 Poles with 
antisemitic attitudes (in the form of modern, political antisemitism) made 
up seventeen percent of the population. In 2002 their number had risen to 
 twenty-seven percent, to eventually drop to twenty percent in 2012 – still 
slightly higher than in 1992.46 These results, in a country in which Jews form a 
tiny fraction of the population, show that in spite of the radical transformation 
of the cultural frames of memory, an increased educational effort, and a gen-
erational change, antisemitic beliefs still form an important part of Poland’s 
memoryscape and indicate that antisemitism and, in general, the perception 
of Jews, does not really depend on the stored recollection, but on the dynamic, 
reconstructive memory work – anámnesis – done with reference to the pres-
ent concerns, rather than to the past.
On the other hand, in the same time period we have observed a steady 
growth of anti-antisemitic attitudes: from eight percent in 1992, to fifteen 
 percent in 2002, and to twenty-one percent in 2012, which may indicate a 
 growing polarization of Polish society regarding the attitude toward Jews.47 
The research by Marek Kucia and his own survey of 2010 shows a similar ten-
dency with a more optimistic conclusion based on the fact that in that year 
the percentage of those with strong anti-antisemitic feelings (twenty-three 
percent) exceeded the percentage of strong antisemites in the modern, po-
litical sense ( twenty-two percent) for the first time since such research was 
initiated.48 This makes the author claim that ‘in the last couple of years we 
46 Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Uwarunkowania i przemiany postaw antysemickich,” inŻydzi– 
problem prawdziwego Polaka. Antysemityzm, ksenofobia i stereotypy narodowe po raz 
trzeci, ed. Ireneusz Krzemiński (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 
2015), 24.
47 Krzemiński, “Uwarunkowania i przemiany,” 24.
48 Marek Kucia, “Polacy wobec Auschwitz, Zagłady i Żydów w świetle badań socjologicznych 
z 2010 roku i badań wcześniejszych,” in Antysemityzm, Holokaust, Auschwitz w badani-




have become less antisemitic and are increasingly rejecting antisemitism.’49 
This thesis, however, does not take into account the fluctuating nature of anti-
semitic attitudes and their dependency on contingent factors that do not allow 
us to speak about a stable tendency.
An important finding of Kucia’s research is the surprisingly significant 
presence of ‘post-Holocaust’ elements of antisemitic attitudes expressed by 
respondents. That means that one-fifth of them agreed with the thesis that 
although the Holocaust was a hideous crime, it is good that it resulted in the 
riddance of Jews in Poland.50 One needs to add that this form of antisemitism 
also has the highest percentage of opponents (sixty-eight percent), but it is 
nevertheless an appalling result in acountry that experienced the Holocaust. 
Besides, a striking feature of Polish antisemitism is a relatively high proportion 
of educated people among the antisemites, which leads Kucia to the conclu-
sion that an increased level of education in Polish society in the last twenty 
years has not been accompanied by a proportional decrease in antisemitism, 
and that the education about the Holocaust, introduced in Polish schools at 
the end of the 1990s, does not produce expected results.51
In this context it is interesting to compare the results collected by Poland’s 
Center of Public Opinion Research regarding the changing perception of 
 Auschwitz-Birkenau in Polish society. The results are presented in52 Table 8.1.
49 Kucia, “Polacy wobec Auschwitz,” 31.
50 Kucia, “Polacy wobec Auschwitz,” 27.
51 Kucia, “Polacy wobec Auschwitz,” 33.
52 cbos Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, Auschwitz-Birkenau w pamięci zbiorowej. 
Komunikat 11, (Warszawa: cbos, 2015), 6.
Table 8.� Changing perception of Auschwitz-Birkenau in Polish society.
Auschwitz is for me predominantly the site of: (%)
The suffering of  
the Polish nation
The Holocaust  
of the Jews
Other Difficult to say
2015 45 33 20 2
2005 37 17 43 2
1995 32 18 48 2
Source: cbos.52
�85Jews and the Holocaust in Poland’s Memoryscapes
<UN>
It turns out that in 2015, after twenty years of educational work, radical 
transformation of the way Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum is presenting the 
 Holocaust, and, generally, a substantial change of the social frame of the Holo-
caust memory, the percentage of those who identify Auschwitz predominantly 
with the suffering of the Polish nation had increased. On the other hand, we 
may also observe an increasing percentage of the answers pointing out the 
Holocaust of the Jews as the first association with Auschwitz, which indicates 
that the educational change and transformation of the commemorative envi-
ronment had yielded some effect. Taking the decreasing figure of those who 
have different, more universal associations with Auschwitz (for example ‘site 
of the crime against humanity’), we may say that public opinion has become 
increasingly polarized regarding the issue of the meaning of Auschwitz.
However, the thesis of polarization has been challenged by the 2010 research 
by Marek Kucia, who allowed respondents to mention more than one asso-
ciation with the word ‘Auschwitz.’ It turned out that more than 90 percent of 
those to whom Auschwitz was predominantly the site of Polish suffering, asso-
ciated Auschwitz also with the Holocaust of the Jews.53 It seems thus that Poles 
do have relevant knowledge about Auschwitz and the Holocaust and if they set 
aside the murder of the Jews in their enunciations it is not because of amnesia, 
repression or ignorance, but as a result of a conscious value-choice to focus on 
those with whom they identify, the people they call ‘we.’ Their social memory 
is increasingly less determined by personal recollection and  transgenerational 
communication; instead, the external cultural frames, including education, 
impact the way they see the past. However, it is to a larger degree mediated 
by the imperatives of their attempts to build and protect their identity in dif-
ficult times, as well as by the hidden cultural codes that draw the horizon of 
their particular self-descriptions. Memory, at least in the mode of anámnesis, 
is a function of the social construction of identity. Referring to this concept, 
I will now try to interpret the increase in antisemitism in the 1990s and the 
value-choices that make the Holocaust discourse, now fully accessible, only a 
secondary frame in the interpretation of history.
 Factors Influencing Poland’s Memoryscape
It seems that although Polish society, liberated from communist control, was 
exposed to the truth in the new social frames of memory in the decade of the 
1990s and in the beginning of the twenty-first century, the information about 
53 Kucia, “Polacy wobec Auschwitz,” 16.
Kapralski�86
<UN>
the Holocaust and the Jews has not been well integrated into the existing cog-
nitive structures.
This has partly been caused by the peculiarity of the process of ‘regain-
ing’ the Jewish memory in Poland, partly by the widespread (especially in the 
older generation) existential insecurity and the perception of post-communist 
transformation as a threat to identity, and eventually by the peculiar features 
of the encounter of the Poles with the globalized Holocaust discourse.
 The Progressing Threshold of Shame
The memoryscape of post-communist Poland, in which Jews and the  Holocaust 
reappeared as objects of remembrance and commemoration, has been shaped 
by a number of public debates that have dominated Poland’s intellectual life 
since the end of the 1980s. The first of them, still limited by the communist con-
trol of the media, was initiated by the presentation of Claude Lanzman’s Shoah 
on Polish tv in 1985. Although the documentary was generally perceived by 
the Polish audience as ‘tendentious,’ it nevertheless constituted the first blow 
to the Polish mythology of the Second World War and confronted the public 
with the erased issue of the Holocaust. Two years later, an essay published by 
Jan Błoński in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny stirred public opinion 
and produced a debate about the guilt and responsibility of the Poles as pas-
sive witnesses of the Holocaust who did not express compassion and often 
seemed to be pleased with the Nazi persecutions of the Jews.54
The main issue debated in the years 1985–1993 was the conflict over the 
 Carmelite convent on the site of the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp, which 
lead to controversies regarding the organization of the 50th anniversary of 
the liberation of the camp in 1995 and the conflict over the presence of the 
so-called ‘Papal cross’ in the area formerly designed for the convent.55 These 
disputes did not only expose the incompatibility of the Jewish and Catholic 
approaches to commemorating the tragedy of Auschwitz, but also society’s 
reluctance to recognize the camp as a symbol for Jewish tragedy, and, conse-
quently, the impropriety of Catholic symbols and practices in this context. De-
nying the propriety of religious commemoration of the victims was a shock to 
many Poles, leading to a series of defensive reactions, often involving a  specific 
mixture of traditional, religiously motivated anti-Judaism (Jews as ‘enemies of 
Christianity’) and modern antisemitism (Jewish ‘anti-Polish conspiracy’, de-
priving the Poles of the right to commemorate the past in the manner  accepted 
by their culture).
54 Jan Błoński, “Biedni Polacy patrzą na getto,” Tygodnik Powszechny, 18 January 1987.
55 Geneviève Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz. Nationalism and Religion in Post- 
Communist Poland (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006).
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The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by the publication of 
Jan T. Gross’s Neighbors (2000), which revealed to a wider audience that in 1941 
the Polish inhabitants of the town of Jedwabne murdered the Jewish inhabit-
ants of the town. This book opened up the most heated debate about Polish-
Jewish relations during the time of the Holocaust56 and it has been fueled by 
other books,57 with the result that today’s Poland is a place where Jews are 
remembered entirely differently than in the 1990s.58
The most striking feature of those debates has been the process, which I 
would call ‘the progressing of the threshold of shame.’ Each round of the de-
bate has brought about more severe accusations and revealed more facts, with 
which it has been increasingly difficult to come to terms. If the general im-
pression after Lanzman’s Shoah was that some sectors of Polish society (poor, 
uneducated and corrupted by the time of the war) might have shown lack of 
compassion for the Jewish tragedy, some of the views, expressed in the ‘Błoński 
debate’, have suggested that such an attitude was far more widespread, and 
that it was not limited to a lack of sensitivity, but included a clear, although 
passive, support for the persecution of the Jews. The ‘Jedwabne debate’ re-
vealed that Poles, in certain circumstances (forced or encouraged by the oc-
cupying  German forces), might have been not only passive supporters of the 
persecutions but also active perpetrators. Subsequently, in view of the next 
books by Gross, the Polish readers would have to accept that after 1945 Poles 
did not need to be forced or encouraged by the Germans to persecute Jews.
The process of advancing the threshold of shame has two contradictory 
consequences. On the one hand, it has made it easier for the Poles to accept 
the revelations brought by the subsequent phases of the debate. A new piece 
of the truth has been easier to digest because of the memory work done previ-
ously. On the other hand, the gradual character of the process has also helped 
to develop defensive reactions. Some of those who have come to terms with 
the unpleasant information received at a certain stage of the debate and who 
have done work to revise their views might have been reluctant to accept a new 
challenge, treating it as an unfair continuation of demands and accusations. 
The rationalization which has been used in such defensive strategies could be 
56 Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic, ed., The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over 
the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Joshua D. 
Zimmerman, Contested Memories. Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and its Aftermath 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
57 Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpre-
tation (New York: Random House, 2006); Jan T. Gross and Irena Grudzińska-Gross, Golden 
Harvest (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
58 Piotr Forecki, Od “Shoah” do “Strachu”. Spory o polsko-żydowską przeszłość i pamięć w de-
batach publicznych (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2010).
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summed up as: ‘We did our job; what else do they want?’ For the less engaged, 
the return of the issues previously debated might have been a source of irrita-
tion: ‘do we need to go through that once again?’, resulting in the broader audi-
ence shifting away from the debate.
In consequence, the different approaches by Polish people to the past split 
into critical re-examination of difficult aspects of the Polish-Jewish history and 
affirmative attitude. The latter is often defensive regarding the results of the 
critical work and usually intensifies in the periods of social crisis. This split took 
the form of the antagonistic binary opposition of memories.59 Polish debates 
thus proved unable to develop ‘polycentric memory’ in the sense advocated 
by Richard Sennett. This kind of memory requires that the groups involved 
accept that none of them is at the centre of memory and that the memory 
process presupposes an interaction between different centres rather than the 
defense of the fortress of one’s own memory. Polycentric memory ‘requires a 
social structure in which people can address others across the boundaries of 
difference.’60 We may argue that such a social structure has not fully emerged 
in the course of the Polish debates, which have resulted in the fragmentation 
of memoryscape that continues to deepen, most recently in connection with 
the historical politics of the new government elected in 2015.
 The Holocaust Discourse
The fall of communism meant to Poland the opening of ideas previously 
blocked by the communist ideology. This included the international Holocaust 
discourse and coincided with the process of its ‘cosmopolitanization’ that Levy 
and Sznaider interpret as part of the effort to establish value-consensus and 
reorganize international cooperation. ‘With the fall of the Iron Curtain … the 
Holocaust has provided a political and cultural basis for establishing new sen-
sibilities and solidarities.’61
In spite of such a practical function, the Holocaust discourse was also part 
of contemporary postmodern culture and shared its ambiguous status. Our 
era, on the one hand, is often described as a post-historical period, in which 
history does not matter the way it did in the past. Nevertheless, contempo-
rary ‘amnesiac societies’ are believed to develop a ‘passion for memory,’ which 
manifests in the growing popularity of commemorative activities and the sites 
59 Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism (Vienna: Department of 
Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies, 2000).
60 Richard Sennett, “Disturbing Memories,” in Memory, ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn 
Patterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22.
61 Levy and Sznaider, The Holocaust, 17–18.
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with which they are associated, as well as in the proliferation of literature that 
evokes the past.62
It seems that Holocaust remembrance shares the fate of other forms of 
memory in our age: it is omnipresent but its relevance may be called into ques-
tion. For Eva Hoffman, the memory of the Holocaust is precisely a ‘hypermem-
ory’ in the postmodern sense of hyperreality, something that makes it in fact 
a ‘secondary amnesia’ – the ‘kind of amnesia in which the Shoah is in danger 
not so much of vanishing into forgetfulness as expanding into an increasingly 
empty referent, a symbol of historical horror, an allegory of the Real, the famil-
iar catastrophe and a stand-in for authenticity and for history.’63
This may well be one of the reasons why the Holocaust discourse has not 
managed to get a strong footing in post-communist Eastern Europe. The reality 
of the Holocaust, highly mediatized and dramatized through commemorative 
activities, might seem to the unprepared eye of a Polish spectator as something 
‘out there,’ which does exist in the realm of the mass media or ‘big politics,’ 
and which may raise concern, but not for too long, as long as it does not clash 
with the historical narratives more familiar to the Polish audience, for example 
religious or nationalist narratives. Moreover, the external character of the Ho-
locaust discourse has contributed to the feeling that the previous historical 
master narrative, imposed by the communist authorities, is being replaced by 
another one, again imposed on people who would rather prefer to avoid such 
impositions.
This feeling has overlapped with the widespread perception that the histori-
cal suffering of the non-Jewish East Europeans is not properly recognized in 
Europe (in opposition to the Jewish one). This specific form of the  ‘competition 
of victims’ often corresponds with the belief that ‘the focus on the Holocaust … 
prevents people from investigating or taking equally seriously cases which do 
not appear to be exactly like it.’64
Finally, the Holocaust discourse has contributed to political divide and 
unrest, augmented by the transformation of social structure. According to 
Levy and Sznaider, globalization does not mean homogenization of stand-
points but rather ‘divides each national political culture into several compet-
ing  worldviews, some of which are more globalized than others. The central 
62 Barbara A. Misztal, “The Sacralization of Memory,” European Journal of Social Theory 1 
(2004): 57.
63 Eva Hoffman, After Such Knowledge. A Meditation on the Aftermath of the Holocaust 
(London: Vintage, 2004), 177.
64 Dan Stone, “Beyond the Mnemosyne Institute: The Future of Memory after the Age of 
Commemoration,” in The Future of Memory, ed. Richard Crownshaw, Jane Kilby, Antony 
Rowland (New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 28.
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characteristic of the social carriers of global memory is that their personal 
 relationships are determined less by the nation-state than by the world of 
which it is a part, and this leads them to interpret the world in a different 
way.’65 There is also a global elite in Poland today that serves as the social car-
rier of the Holocaust discourse. The rejection of the Holocaust by those mem-
bers of society who did not benefit from the transformation process has often 
taken the form of social resentment, unrelated to the actual content of what 
has been rejected and directed at the elites that used the Holocaust discourse 
to critically re-examine Poland’s history and its perceptions.
 In Defense of Identity
The Polish debates about the country’s Jewish past and the reception of the 
Holocaust discourse occurred in the atmosphere of instability and insecurity 
that was connected with the social, political and economic transformation. 
They increased the ‘structural trauma,’ which was the response of large parts 
of the post-communist society to the immense change in their lives. The anxi-
eties associated with the structural trauma of the present might sometimes 
have an impact on the ‘historical traumas’ experienced in the past and thus 
contribute to the deflection of memories.66 This might be the case of the large 
sectors of the Polish society in the 1990s: the anxieties of that time set in mo-
tion identity-protection mechanisms which largely ruled out the chance of 
self-critical historical examination and identification with the Jewish victims 
of the Holocaust. Instead, Poles preferred to recall a nostalgic image of the past 
that would bring some comfort into their identity crisis.67
In such a context, the attempts of the Polish intellectual elites to face the 
problem of the Holocaust and to include the memory of the Jews in the col-
lective memory of Polish society did, in the eyes of many Poles, undermine 
the nostalgic image of the past. The attempts enforced a critical rethinking of 
identity, rather than the affirmation of its mythologized forms, and have thus 
been met with distrust. Therefore, the rejection of the Holocaust discourse 
by large sectors of the Polish society can be interpreted as part of the post-
traumatic syndrome, bearing in mind that the trauma in question is rather 
the structural trauma of the post-communist transformation that evokes the 
historical trauma of the witnesses of the Holocaust.
65 Levy and Sznaider, The Holocaust, 18.
66 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 2001).
67 Piotr Sztompka, “Cultural Trauma. The Other Face of Social Change,” European Journal of 
Social Theory 4 (2000): 284.
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It is particularly important that the memory of the Holocaust brings into 
question two crucial features of Polish national identity: the belief that (eth-
nic) Poles have been the main victims of history in general and of the Second 
World War in particular, and the belief in national history as the continuous 
unfolding of the virtues of the (ethnic) Polish nation, against all odds and 
plots. In the context of the identity crisis that has marked the  post-communist 
transformation of Poland, the nation needed to be re-invented, and the 
 continuity of its past and future had to be re-created. It goes without saying 
that if the future is to be anticipated with hope, the past must be constructed 
as a glorious one, at least if we operate within a paradigm of ethnic, particu-
laristic nationalism, and thus the process of the post-communist recovery of 
memory often means ‘rather the defense of a particular selection from among 
… facts, one that assures its protagonists of maintaining the roles of hero or 
victim when faced with any other selection that might assign them a less 
glorious role.’68
Memory as a convenient selection that serves to establish the continuity of 
past, present and future, and works out the essence of nationhood as unfold-
ing in time, often focuses on the traumas of the past to reassure the pattern 
of survival which gives hope in overcoming the trauma of the present. This 
involves the ‘construction of a narrative community with the dead’ and the 
pathos of such memory work may sometime legitimate ‘expiatory violence.’69 
It seems that the memory of the Holocaust has been treated by some sectors 
of Polish society, mostly those affected by the trauma of transformation, as 
interfering with the Polish memory as the celebration of nationhood (for it 
has questioned both the heroism of the Poles and their self-proclaimed sta-
tus as the main victims), which has largely protected it from being included 
in Poland’s memory, in spite of noble efforts, and has divided public opinion, 
thus leading to the polarization of standpoints revealed by the surveys’ results. 
The time of the transformation is not the most convenient period for a criti-
cal re-examination of the past: even if it calls for the revision of mythological 
views, it is usually a tiny fraction of society that advances critical memory. For 
the remaining part, threatened in their ontological security, memories serve as 
trenches and myth as a protection.
68 Tzvetan Todorov, “The Uses and Abuses of Memory,” in What Happens to History. The Re-
newal of Ethics in Contemporary Thought, ed. Howard Marchitello (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2001), 21.





In this text the author employs Memory Studies concepts, such as memo-
ryscape, remembrance, commemoration, mnéme, anámnesis, social and col-
lective memory in a study of Poland’s memory of Jews and the Holocaust, 
especially in the post-communist period. In result, Steinlauf ’s historical 
 periodization has been transformed into a sociological typology, in which the 
period of 1944–1948 is marked by individual remembrance and public com-
memoration. In the period 1948–1968 individuals still keep the memory of Jews 
and the Holocaust alive, but they are not publically commemorated until 1956 
because of the Marxist orthodoxy. Then, due to the growing nationalism with-
in the communist party, in the period 1968–1989 there is neither remembrance 
nor commemoration, while after 1989 Jews and the Holocaust are publically 
commemorated again but with a limited impact on individual remembrance. 
The author’s main task was therefore to explain why, in the post-communist 
memoryscape of Poland, Jews and the Holocaust are commemorated but not 
remembered.
To answer this question, the author turns firstly to the way Polish-Jewish 
prewar coexistence and the Holocaust have been remembered in the mode of 
mnéme, that is according to the perception that it is predominantly the nature 
of past events that has determining impact on people’s future memories. Here 
the text focuses on the, often antisemitic, social and cultural exclusion of Jews 
from the prewar Polish community, which lead to the fact that the Holocaust 
did not affect the identity of the non-Jewish Poles, which in turn accounted for 
the postwar exclusion of Jews from the ‘mnemonic community.’ An additional 
factor was the suffering of the non-Jewish Poles during the Second World War 
that occluded in their memory the tragedy of the Jews. However, one needs 
to mention the trauma of witnesses (and sometimes accomplices) of the Ho-
locaust. Although the Holocaust itself did not seem to affect the identity of 
the non-Jewish Poles, the witnessing of the Holocaust did. Some of the most 
important and often mythologized features of Polish collective identity might 
have been subverted by the memory of the Holocaust and thus this memory 
has been largely erased. Finally, one must refer to the issue of material and 
social benefits gained by the non-Jewish Poles as are sult of the Holocaust. For 
large segments of postwar Polish society the murder of Jews offered a chance 
to fill in the gaps in the economic and social space for social advancement. For 
various reasons such genealogy of the contemporary Polish middle class is usu-
ally carefully erased from memories.
A complementary way of answering the main question refers to the circum-
stances in which the visions of the Jewish-Polish past have been produced, i.e. 
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to examine memory in the mode of anámnesis: a perception that it is mostly 
the nature of the present of the remembering subject(s) that determines the 
content of memory. Here the author follows Jeffrey Alexander’s social theory 
of trauma as well as Levy and Sznaider’s view on the importance of the Holo-
caust discourse. The lack of such discourse during and immediately after the 
war accounts for the lack of adequate recognition of the murder of Jews. Then, 
when the discourse was already developed, Poland was isolated behind the 
Iron Curtain and it did not have a significant impact as a factor that organized 
collective/social memory. Finally, after the collapse of communism Poland was 
exposed to the globalized version of the Holocaust discourse which contrib-
uted to its rejection in large segments of society.
In the post-communist Poland, the Holocaust discourse was often perceived 
as an instrument of cultural domination that replaced in this function the 
communist vision of history; moreover, as not corresponding with the need 
of many Poles to commemorate the (ethnically) Polish victims of Nazism and 
communism, something they were not allowed to do in communist Poland.
The discourse found, however, its followers among the elites, which contrib-
uted to the translation of the conflict of memory into social conflict between 
the beneficiaries of the neoliberal transformation of Poland’s economy and 
politics on the one hand and, on the other hand, the impoverished sectors of 
the society. Therefore, the serious debates about Polish-Jewish past launched 
by intellectuals and artists caused defensive reactions as part of the social 
cleavage and also due to their internal dynamics presented in the text as the 
‘progressing threshold of shame.’
From a more general perspective the defensive reaction to the attempts to 
include Jews and the Holocaust into Poland’s memoryscape can be understood 
as a mechanism of protecting the collective identity, already threatened by the 
radical social transformation, in which, as in LaCapra’s model, structural trau-
ma of the present finds its expression in the historical trauma of the past and 
the latter hardly accepts competition: in this case in the form of the murdered 
Jews and their destroyed world. In particular, the memory of having been wit-
nesses of the Holocaust turned out to be incompatible with the mythology of 
the Polish nation and thus was largely rejected while the memory of Jews has 
been retained in the form of a, equally mythologized, nostalgic vision of peace-
ful multiculturality of the past.
These factors may help to understand why in post-communist Poland, in 
spite of serious commemorative efforts, intellectual revisions and reformed 
education, Jews and the Holocaust remain commemorated but not remem-
bered in the social memory of large segments of society. Taking into account 
the new historical politics of the government elected in 2015, we may predict 
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that in the near future the official commemoration of Poland’s Jewish past 
will be systematically waning. This politics of memory has been clearly mas-
terminded for those sectors of society, whose existential insecurity recently 
seems to have been anaesthetized by a mixture of xenophobic nationalism and 
populist economic programs, thus legitimizing the new rulers. The fact that for 
the last twenty-five years, various neoliberal governments have not managed 
to find a better alternative for these sectors is of course important but cannot 
be analyzed in detail in this paper.
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chapter 9
Neither Rupture Nor Continuity: Memorializing  
the Dawn of the Space Age in Contemporary 
Russian Cinematography
Natalija Majsova
Around half a century after the launch of the Sputnik in 1957 and the first feats 
of space programmes, and a couple of decades into the so-called commercial-
ization of outer space, scholars in the humanities and social sciences seem to 
be returning to the question: ‘Wherein lies the significance of the space age in 
the first place?’, a question which may hardly be addressed properly using a 
single theory or methodological toolbox due to its complexity. At first glance, 
there appears to be a general consensus on the global, if not universal, signifi-
cance of the event. The dawn of the space age and its resonant events, such 
as the launch of the Sputnik, Gagarin’s flight or the Moon-landing, are often 
seen as great milestones in scientific and technological progress: a symbol of 
humanity’s unity in its terrestrial origin, a signpost signaling the humility and 
loneliness of life on Earth in the vast cosmic space. On the other hand, these 
memory narratives of the dawn of the space age mostly remain constrained 
to national or regional frameworks.1 Nevertheless, the general consensus per-
sists that the aforementioned achievements are of global and transcultural 
relevance.
The aim of this text is to add to existent debates by exploring memory nar-
rative reception through two particular cinematic (re)appropriations of the 
1 For instance, a quick overview of existent scholarly literature shows that American space 
policy has, from its inception, predominantly been focused on the political, military and 
societal aspects of spaceflight. European space policy, on the other hand, has positioned 
itself in alignment with the economic and scientific benefits of space technologies, while 
the  Russian space program has thus far devoted most attention to the cultural dimension of 
space exploration. Furthermore, memorialization media, such as popular globally ‘iconic’ 
imagery of/from outer space mostly involve images taken by nasa [National Aeronautis and 
Space Administration] and esa [European Space Agency], and not by other space agencies; 
sites of memory and media of memory narrative construction, such as space history and 
space technologies museums around the world tend to favor local national achievements, 
rather than focus on the space age as a global achievement.
�99Neither Rupture Nor Continuity
<UN>
narrative of the dawn of the space age. The text will examine how an audio-
visual medium, such as cinema, can productively contribute to existent and 
persistent memory practices that mark our understanding of humanity’s first 
tangible encounters with outer space in the late 1950s and early 1960s.2 The 
analysis shall be limited to a particular case study: contemporary Russian cin-
ematic production on the advent of the space age. However, it will be argued in 
the conclusion that such local manifestations have multifaceted significance 
for a potential transcultural European narrative on the issue.
Following a brief contextualization of the place of the dawn of the space age 
in contemporary cinema, particularly Russian cinema, the text will examine in 
detail two cases in point. Two case studies of contemporary Russian cinema 
(Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] (dir. Alexei Uchitel’, 2005) 
and Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon] (dir. Alexei Fedorchenko, 2004) will be 
used to examine the following pertinent issues. Firstly, are cinematic accounts 
focusing on the beginning of the space age mere reiterations of mainstream 
narratives about the history of space flight or do they call for reinterpretations 
of prevailing narratives on the significance of spaceflight? Secondly, are cin-
ematic accounts focusing on the beginning of the space age nationally bound, 
i.e. do they reflect nationally specific narratives, attitudes, cinematographic 
canons and reference frameworks or do they appropriate and (re)interpret 
these narratives, attitudes, canons and reference framework in order to high-
light issues of transnational significance? If the latter is true, what are these 
underlying issues and how do contemporary cinematic productions approach 
them? In addressing these questions, the text will argue that (neo)formalist 
film analysis – i.e. analysis particularly attentive to cinematic form3 – plays 
an important role in highlighting cinema’s significance as a reception practice, 
and should supplement audience film reception analyses.
2 It has been noted by Erll and Nünning that film ‘exists in a relationship to contemporary 
discourses of memory and illustrates functions, processes, and problems of memory in the 
medium of fiction through aesthetic forms’ (Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, “Concepts and 
Methods for the Study of Literature and/as Cultural Memory,” Literature and Memory. Theo-
retical Paradigms. Genres. Functions (2006): 11–28.). In this chapter, I would like to take this 
argument a little further in order to suggest that cinematic fictional construction of memory 
narratives is also a level of reception of these narratives: cinematic adaptation may be seen as 
a level of memory narrative reception. Quite often, cinema intentionally plays around with 
officially approved memory narratives, in order to construct new ones.
3 Cf. Kristin Thompson, Breaking the glass armor: neoformalist film analysis (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 1988).
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 A Note on Method: Films, Memory, and Reception
Film analysis is a tricky issue, because it involves ‘translating’ the cinematic 
audio-visual medium into text, i.e. sequences of written words. This process of 
interpretation is highly subjective, and reflects numerous factors, which shape 
the interpreter’s commentary and reception. A film critic will often focus more 
on different aspects of a given film than a lay spectator, who is not consciously 
attentive to cinematic form and whose film-viewing practices are informed 
and shaped by a given context and daily routine. However, cinematic remedia-
tions of cultural narratives emerge precisely at this intersection of a thousand 
plateaus of reception practices. This chapter explores the implications of look-
ing at different reception plateaus side by side, in order to explore the different 
facets of the cinematic medium that take part in memory reception processes.
While narrative analysis may be the most obvious way of looking at how 
films participate in cultural memory production and remediate, i.e. trans-
pose into a different medium, re-tell, re-shape, in order to shift emphases and 
meanings, recent studies increasingly point to the importance of assessing 
other features of the cinematic medium: ‘/b/y communicating memories and 
counter-memories as well as the loss of memories the films not only share the 
recollections of their protagonists, and their ways of evoking certain events 
of their past, with the audience; they also use the cinematic apparatus and 
visual language to (re)present and (re)shape our understanding of memory-
constitution.’4 Films are therefore more than just motion pictures that illus-
trate novels and short stories. Cinematic form (lighting, mise-en-scène,  music, 
colour, timespace construction) conveys a lot of non-verbal information about 
a film. Sometimes, this information is difficult to verbalize, and is only tac-
itly reflected in (particularly non-scholarly) film reviews: a reviewer may note 
that a film is ‘grim’ without explaining how this grimness is constructed for-
mally. Such observations are precious comments on how films participate in 
memory processes: they point to divergences between narrative and form, and 
to  ambiguities, which are key to the power of some memories; sometimes, 
an impression is created precisely because a certain narrative is insufficient 
for explaining a certain ‘overall ambience’ of an event. Or, in other words: 
‘film’s impact lies less in its empirical qualities than in its powerful capacity 
4 Verena Susanna Nungesser, “I Forgot to Remember (to Forget): Personal Memories in 
 Memento (2000) and Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004)”, in Media and Cultural 
Memory, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 
31–48.
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to  influence public consciousness, mould collective memory and retrieve sup-
pressed or marginalised histories.’5 This ‘powerful capacity’ of film lies in its 
always-incomplete coalescence with verbalized film reviews.
Therefore, while considering the cinematic medium as a memory practice, 
and looking at how it contributes to memory reception, this text relies on 
several methodological remarks. The starting premise is that ‘rather than as-
suming that the world on film should somehow adhere to the standards of 
written history, why not see if it has created its own standards over the last 
century, techniques for turning the past into history which are appropriate 
to the possibilities and practices of the medium, including those of drama, 
which is the standard way in which film tells its stories, past or present.’6 This 
premise allows us to consider the films themselves as memory practices and 
memory reception tools at the same time. In relation to memory, films are 
not only remediations of certain historical narratives, but also, at the same 
time, receptions of certain narratives: films are interpretations of narratives, 
constructed and approved by individual film auteurs of governance bodies 
that had commissioned the production of a film or both. Since this text looks 
closely at two auteur films, the former dimension will be considered as domi-
nant over the latter. Therefore, cinematic interplay in memory reception pro-
cesses is a ‘double-bind’: spectator reception is always reception of a certain 
reception, particularly in a case like ours, when fiction cinema is examined. 
Fiction cinema does not require a spectator to look for facts or coherence; it 
typically evokes diverse responses, only some of which note its possible con-
textual references.
In this text, lay spectators’ reception will be juxtaposed with neoformalist 
analysis, which will provide insight into two issues: firstly, into the formal, aes-
thetic and stylistic reception of the narrative of the dawn of the space age, 
given by the two films, and, secondly, into the convergences and divergences 
between the official (verbal) narrative of the dawn of the space age and its 
significance, the aesthetic reception of these accounts, provided by two auteur 
film directors, and the reception of these cinematic accounts by lay audiences. 
This triple-loop will allow us to trace the subtle transformations that memory 
processes undergo in various phases of remediation and reception.
5 Jennie M. Carlsten and Fearghal McGarry, “Introduction”, in Film, History and Memory, ed. 
Jennie M. Carlsten and Fearghal McGarry (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1.
6 Jennie M. Carlsten and Fearghal McGarry, “Introduction”, in Film, History and Memory, ed. 
Jennie M. Carlsten and Fearghal McGarry (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 6.
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 Memorializing the Dawn of the Space Age in the 21st Century
Current debates on the significance of man’s first indirect (satellites and space-
craft carrying plants and animals) and direct (manned spaceflight) ventures 
into the upper parts of Earth’s atmosphere and beyond tend to focus on several 
key dimensions. One of them is narratives that shape our understanding of the 
socio-political and cultural context of these unprecedented events. These nar-
ratives typically contextualize the groundbreaking nature of the dawn of the 
space age within national and international frameworks, more or less narrow 
in scope. Narrower frameworks scale the significance of humanity’s ventures 
into outer space down to sociopolitical, cultural and science and technological 
histories of spaceflight, while analyses aiming at broader horizons focus on 
frameworks of international and global politics.7 While such rationalist narra-
tives that tend to focus on the political, military and economic Cold war race 
for primacy in outer space, as well as those that highlight man’s unconditional 
faith in scientific progress, persist,8 they cannot fully account for the equally 
persistent fascination enveloping the globally resonant space-related events of 
the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Echoing this point, Shukaitis9 convincingly argues that the rationale guid-
ing investments into outer space exploration (as well as space conquest and 
space tourism) of the 20th and early 21st centuries can essentially be inter-
preted through two sequential matrices. The first, relevant for the period prior 
to the end of the Cold war, is a political matrix, i.e. the framework of the race 
for space, where dominion of the heavenly realm was seen as an analogy to po-
litical, technological, and therefore military supremacy on Earth. The second, 
foregrounded after the end of the Cold war and a short period of the prevalence 
of environmentalist arguments against investments in costly space programs, 
is a matrix following the logic of capitalist expansion. Here, outer space is con-
ceptualized as a plausible solution, a welcome aid for managing structural cri-
ses of capitalism, which have to be addressed by new investments into ever 
7 For a good overview, consult Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, Imagining Space: 
Achievements, Predictions, Possibilities 1950–2050 (San Francisco, ca: Chronicle Books, 2005).
8 Here, I am referring to works such as Asif A. Siddiqi, The Red Rocket’s Glare: Spaceflight and 
the Soviet Imagination, 1857–1957 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). and Eva 
Maurer, Julia Richers, Monica Ruthers and Carmen Scheide, eds., Soviet Space Culture: Cos-
mic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) which highlight the 
cultural context of space enthusiasm in the Soviet Union.
9 Shukaitis, Stevphen. “Space is the (non)place: Martians, Marxists, and the outer space of the 
radical imagination.” The Sociological Review 57 (2009): 98–113.
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further horizons.10 In both cases, outer space essentially functions as a semi-
fictional (i.e. unknowable) horizon upon which the logic of Earthly affairs (pol-
itics, economics) is simply extrapolated with very few – if any – adjustments. 
Shukaitis argues that these approaches evidently ignore the unknowability of 
outer space, and its capacity to function as an ‘imaginal machine’11 expanding 
our horizons of thought. There appears to be little room for fascination with 
the unknown in the domains and language used by politics and economics.
Indeed, if anywhere, the issue of the fascination of outer space, the un-
known and inherently unknowable cosmos, is addressed in sociological and 
media studies analyses of representations of outer space, the dawn of the 
space age and its future in cultural production. Starting off with this very pre-
sumption about the possibility of conceptualizing outer space and humanity’s 
interaction with it in a different way, analyses such as Llinares’12 examination 
of the figure of the astronaut in popular culture and Marie Lathers’ analysis of 
women in American science fiction,13 Rogatchevski’s14 exploration of  Soviet 
and Russian outer space cinematic production, among others, reinterpret 
media texts in order to demonstrate that, by and large, they fail to alter nar-
ratives on the dawn of the space age and its significance, generated by other 
disciplines. The first cases of manned space flight thereby remain interpreted 
as achievements, entirely reducible to their immediate, contextual conditions 
of possibility. Although several authors, such as McCurdy, Harrison, Geppert 
and Dick15 do acknowledge that ‘imagination’, a concept which here refers to 
10 Shukaitis, “Space is the Non-Place”, 110.
11 More precisely: ‘Outer space, far from being a pure space that is always available for re-
composing imaginal machines, also connects areas of political thought that veer off in 
strange and bizarre directions, showing that, as Deleuze and Guattari would concur in 
their more sober moments, absolute deterritorialization can easily end in death, insanity, 
or absurdity,’ Shukaitis, “Space is the Non-Place”, 100.
12 Dario Llinares, The astronaut: Cultural mythology and idealised masculinity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011).
13 Marie Lathers, Space Oddities: Women and Outer Space in Popular Culture 1960–2000 (New 
York: Continuum Books, 2010).
14 Andrei Rogatchevski, “Space Exploration in Russian and Western Popular Culture: Wish-
ful Thinking, Conspiracy Theories and Other Related Issues.” In Soviet Space Culture: 
Cosmic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies, ed. Eva Maurer, Julia Richers, Monica Ruthers, 
 Carmen Scheide (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 211–265.
15 Cf. Stephen J. Dick, “Space, Time and Aliens: The Role of Imagination in Outer Space,” 
In Imagining Outer Space: European Astroculture in the 20th Century, ed. Alexander C.T. 
Geppert, 27–45. Basinstoke, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012; Alexander C.T.  Geppert, 
ed., Imagining Outer Space: European Astroculture in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American 
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the free play of human mental capacities, is an important dimension of these 
conditions, and proceed to link ‘imagination’ to the realm of aesthetics, there 
appear to be no analyses of contemporary artistic reflections on the narrative 
of the dawn of the space age that begin with, and concentrate primarily on, a 
formalist analysis of their aesthetics. However, as I will attempt to argue in this 
contribution, aesthetics is an important dimension of memory reception and 
reinterpretation, and should be given more emphasis in debates on cultural 
production of memory narratives than is currently the case.
 Looking for a Transcultural Narrative on the Memory of the Dawn 
of the Space Age through Cinematic Aesthetics
Casting the intriguing sociopolitical, economic and technological context aside 
for a moment, the dawn of the space age may also be regarded as a philosophi-
cally intriguing point in history; a point of recurrence of an exceptionally old 
question about the place of humankind in the world at large, i.e. in the cosmos, 
rather than in a certain state, region or even on a certain planet. Philosophical 
and artistic reactions to the advent of the space age often focus on this very 
aspect of the event in question, testifying to its transculturality and universali-
ty.16 This issue is particularly prominent in the works of Russian cubofuturists 
and suprematists of the early 20th century, as well as in the works of a wide ar-
ray of 20th century philosophers of differing provenance and theoretical back-
grounds (e.g. Hans Blumenberg, Günther Anders, Hanna Arendt and Jacques 
Lacan);17 it has also been explored performatively in science fiction literature. 
Today, over half of a century after humanity’s first direct encounters with outer 
space, the question of the relevance of these encounters and their legacy for 
redefining humanity’s conceptualizations of its place in the world, and even of 
life as such, is no less relevant, as demonstrated by projects at the intersection 
of art and science, such as Vermeulen’s Seeker18 inter alia. In these projects, 
 Imagination. Baltimore (ma: jhu Press, 1994); Albert A. Harrison, Spacefaring: The Hu-
man Dimension (Berkeley, ca: University of California Press, 2002).
16 Cf. Christine Poggi, Inventing futurism: The Art and Politics of Artificial Optimism (Princ-
eton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009).
17 For more on contemporary philosophical accounts on the implications of the dawn of the 
space age, see Natalija Majsova, “The Metaphor of the Dawn of the Space Age in Contem-
porary Social Sciences and Humanities,” Družboslovne razprave 31 (2015): 13–30.
18 ‘Seeker’ is artist Angelo Vermeulen’s worldwide community art project creating 
starship prototypes, initiated in 2009. Accessed at http://www.angelovermeulen 
.net/?portfolio=seeker, 12 May 2016.
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aesthetics functions as a propulsive force in the domain of artistic practice. 
Aesthetics has the potential to drive and shift our horizons of thought, the co-
ordinates framing our understanding of the world around us and its priorities. 
However, contemporary artistic production, practices and experience do not 
only explore the prospects of space exploration, but also address the legacy 
of the dawn of the space age. It is argued in this chapter that analyses of such 
artistic productions also need to be examined through the lens of aesthetics, 
in order to cast a new light on the memory narratives on the dawn of space 
exploration prevalent in western literature today.
Russian cinematic production is a telling case in point, and may be consid-
ered underresearched due to a lack of analyses focusing on aesthetics. Indeed, 
Russian cinema on outer space hinges on the tradition of Soviet cinematic pro-
duction dealing with outer space, comprising genres such as scientific fantasy,19 
children’s scientific fantasy, popular-scientific fiction cinema, biographical 
dramas focusing on the lives and aspirations of prominent figures in the  Soviet 
history of spaceflight, and even cyberpunk, as well as the commercial and dys-
topian science fiction which appeared during the perestroika period. Space re-
lated cinematic production, particularly fiction, of the Soviet era up until the 
perestroika period is of special significance, as it is positioned directly at the 
nexus of ideology, framing Soviet cinematic production,20 and aesthetics, so 
evidently dominant in films such as Tarkovsky’s Solyaris [Solaris] (1972).
Comparatively, contemporary (post-2001) Russian cinematography has far 
greater capacities for exploring outer space and the legacy of the dawn of the 
space age in terms of aesthetics as it is not governed by a single aesthetic canon. 
Conversely, post-2001 Russian cinema on outer space is a productive medium 
for exploring memory practices related to the dawn of the space age, and is of 
analytical interest for different reasons than Soviet space related production, 
marked by the aforementioned tension between aesthetics and the socialist 
realist canon on the one hand, and an enthusiasm about space-related films, 
stemming from the fact that Soviet outer space supremacy was portrayed as 
19 For the history of the term ‘scientific fantasy’ and its relation to science fiction, see Darko 
Suvin, Russian Science Fiction 1956–1974 (Elizabethtown, ny: Dragon Press, 1976).
20 Certainly, communist ideology and the canon of socialist realism greatly influenced outer 
space related fiction in other media, such as literature; however, if independent cinematic 
production capacities were virtually non-existent, writers and poets still had the option 
of resorting to, for example, samizdat. Cf. Matthias Schwartz, “Die Besiedelung der Zuku-
nft. Zur Neubegründung der sowjetischen Science Fiction nach dem ersten Sputnikflug 
1957,” In Bluescreen. Visionen, Träume, Albträume und Reflexionen des Phantastischen und 
Utopischen, ed. Walter Delabar and Frauke Schlieckau (Bielefeld: Magazin für Literatur 
und Politik, Heft 43–44, 2010), 105–122.; Suvin, Russian Science Fiction 1956–1974.
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a building block of Soviet (supra)national identity, on the other. After the fall 
of the Soviet Union, which produced over 40 outer space related feature films, 
there were virtually no films on this topic produced in Russia until 2004.21 A 
renewed rise of interest for outer-space-related feature film production of vari-
ous genres in Russia observed after 2001 is likely to be a combination of various 
factors, such as a renewed political interest in the achievements of the Soviet 
era and its nation-building myths, increased resources for film production af-
ter the turbulent 1990s, as well as an updated marketing and branding strategy 
of the Russian space agency, Roscosmos, which established its own television 
studio, Tvroscosmos, in 2006, which performs many outer-space-achievements 
promotion activities etc.
While it is impossible to give a complete explanation for why the rate of pro-
duction of outer space related feature films has returned to that characteristic 
of Soviet production, amounting to more than one space related fiction feature 
film per annum;,it is possible to give an overview of the overarching features of 
this production. Tvroscosmos, as well as certain other forums, insists on listing 
all outer space related fiction feature cinematography in one category: ‘on out-
er space’, rather than categorizing the films into more established genres such 
as melodrama, scientific fantasy, comedy, children’s comedy etc. The archive 
of this category of films currently comprises ten feature films (1994–2013, with 
only one film produced in 1994, i.e. Chetvyortaya planeta [The Fourth Planet] 
(dir. Dmitry Astrakhan), including three science fiction films, two art cinema 
dramas, one children’s science fiction film, a mockumentary, two biographi-
cal dramas and one historical drama.22 The two art cinema films (Bumazhnyi 
soldat [Paper soldier], 2008, dir. Alexey German Jr.) and Kosmos kak predchu-
vstviye [Dreaming of Space] dir. Alexey Uchitel’, 2005) and the mockumentary 
(Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon, dir. Alexey Fedorchenko, 2004]) have thus 
far received the most academic and critical attention. However, none of these 
existent reviews and analyses seem to focus on their aesthetic impulse: re-
viewers focus on the fictional worlds constructed by the films, their driving 
dynamics and their inherent preoccupations, preferring rather to foreground 
their historical references (or lack of them) and overarching message (or lack 
thereof). The following analysis attempts to do the very contrary in order to 
bring out the productive, re-interpretative momentum in cinematic memori-
alizations of an event, i.e. the dawn of the space age. This is done in order 
to demonstrate that, firstly, the transcultural reverberations of this event as a 
universally  significant transformation of our reality persist, and should be ac-
21 Cf. the archives of Tvroscosmos, available at the Tvroscosmos website.
22 All information on Tvroscosmos and its archives is available on the organization’s website.
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corded more emphasis if a transcultural narrative of the dawn of the space age 
is to emerge, and, secondly, that formalist analysis of aesthetics should be in-
corporated into memory narrative reception analyses, dealing with the visual 
arts and complementing analyses of audience reception of these films.
 Russian Cinematic Memories of the Dawn of the Space Age: Two 
Case Studies
For the purposes of this text, case studies of two of the fiction films belonging 
to the category ‘on outer space’ delineated above shall be presented: an art film 
directed by Alexey Uchitel’, Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] 
(2005), and a mockumentary directed by Alexey Fedorchenko, Pervye na Lune 
[First on the Moon] (2004). Both films belong to the popular Russian cultural 
production on outer space, a significant percentage of which is concerned with 
memories of the glorious days of the Soviet space program, rather than with 
its future, or science fiction.23 These films are no exception. Kosmos kak pred-
chuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] is a melancholic account about the lives of 
two men and two women, and their relations in the Russian North, just after 
the launch of the Sputnik, and before Gagarin’s flight. Pervye na Lune [First on 
the Moon] is a mockumentary about the Soviet space program in the 1930s, 
when a manned spacecraft was allegedly launched to the Moon, and crashed 
in Chile. Both films were produced with the support of the Russian Ministry of 
Culture, and had rather generous budgets (usd 2,000,000 in the case of Kosmos 
kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] and usd 1,000,000 in the case of Pervye 
na Lune [First on the Moon]). Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon] received an 
ironic award: it was announced to be the best documentary of the year at the 
film festival in Venice in 2005; it also reaped the awards of the best debut and 
best film according to film critics at the Kinotavr festival in 2005, as well as best 
feature film in Zagreb in 2005. Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] 
reaped numerous awards in Russia, e.g. best feature film at the Moscow Inter-
national film festival in 2005, best operator and best male actor at the Nika film 
festival in 2006, as well as best director and best script at the 2006 Zolotoi Oryol 
Film festival.24
Both films were received ambiguously by the home and foreign audiences. 
As it will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, despite positive  expert 
23 Cf. Rogatchevski, “Space Exploration in Russian and Western Popular Culture,” 212–216.
24 Information on the production and reception context of the films was acquired on the 
films’ websites and internet movie databases, in this case Kinopoisk.ru and imdb.
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reception, online layman reviews accessible on international Russian and 
English-language cinema portals (Kinokultura, Kinopoisk.ru, Ruskino.ru, Kino-
teatr.ru, imdb), which frame many potential spectators’ first impressions of 
the film and influence their decisions on whether they will proceed to watch 
the films or not, often fail to recognize a direct relation between these cin-
ematic texts and the topic they claim to be addressing: memories of the dawn 
of the space age. In the following analysis, it will be attempted to re-establish 
this connection: the two films will be analyzed as reinterpretations of narra-
tives on the key factors of the global and universal significance of the dawn of 
the space age.
 Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space]
At the beginning of our analysis of the first of the two films in question, let us 
make a brief digression to the translation of the title of the film into English, 
in order to exemplify the aforementioned entanglements between text and its 
production and reception context. Had the title been translated with greater 
precision, Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] would be known 
as ‘Space as a Premonition’, inaugurating the film with a slightly different con-
notation. Nevertheless, most reviews of the film tend to disregard the title and 
focus on everything but outer space. As pointed out by a reviewer on imdb 
who clearly has a precise opinion about contemporary Russian cinema and its 
quality:25
… What is this movie really about? How bad it was to live in ussr? Or 
how American music was supposedly better than Russian? And what 
does all of that have to do with space travel? My take on this: even though 
made in Russia, this movie was made for the West. Why? Well, first, the 
story line is primitive and characters are not developed (anticipating 
viewers add and taste). A Western viewer, if he ever goes to see a  foreign, 
or, even worse, Russian movie, expects simple things: grotesque scenes 
from Russian life, plump Russian girls, drunk Russian guys,  ‘superior’ 
25 The imdb review was accessed at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0464665/reviews?ref_=tt_
urv, 3 May 2015. It is one of five reviews on the film available at the website. All five reviews 
conclude that the film is, in one way or another, a reconstruction of the depicted era; only 
one reviewer admits that the film is also a metaphysical exploration of the way ’Homo 
sovieticus’ has engaged with the cosmos. However, none of the reviews manage to ap-
preciate the film beyond its contextual references to the ussr and its space program.
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American music and lifestyle, and, of course, something peculiar to 
Russia – in this case, Yuri Gagarin. It’s too bad Mironov has degraded to 
movies such as this one or Pobeg. Evgenii Tsyganov’s role is too simple: 
there’s almost no acting and he is far from his best (as in ‘Deti Arbata’). It 
would be really nice if Russian dvds had labels such as: ‘this movie was 
made for Westerners’ or ‘for Moscovites only’ :), so I would know what to 
avoid…
An equally eloquent review on a Russian online film database Kinopoisk.ru26 
is similarly skeptical:
There isn’t much to criticize in this film, nor is there much to praise. It is 
a background movie, a collage of the aura of a bygone epoch. The atmo-
sphere, everyday life and the way people in the 1950s thought, are pre-
sented quite credibly. It reminds me of Kuprin’s novels: you open them, 
read them, and it seems you are breathing the air of those days. A pic-
ture comes to life. Tsyganov’s performance is beyond all praise, probably 
one of his best roles. The episode where Horsie meets Gagarin, then a 
young student, who had not even dreamed about space back then, is a 
good shot. However, don’t set your expectations too high. The film does 
not evoke strong emotions, doesn’t make you gasp by the end. It seems 
that there wasn’t much expected from the film in the first place. How-
ever, there is nothing to criticize. A nice, light, hearty movie. Fun to watch 
once.27
Thes reviews as such are not the focus of this article, and were not chosen as 
representative feedback on the film in question. They are presented as illustra-
tions of the ambiguity of the film’s narrative, noted by many other reviewers of 
various levels of expertise; the selected two reviews succinctly sum up that it 
might be somewhat unproductive to analyze the film solely through the prism 
of its narrative or its references to historical and contemporary reality. Indeed, 
26 The review was accessed at http://www.kinopoisk.ru/film/103737/, 30 March 2015. It is 
one of 22 reviews of the film available at the website; 10 reviewers rated the film posi-
tively, 10 were neutral, and two rated it negatively. While the vast majority of the reviewers 
acknowledge that the film is either a reconstruction of the Soviet epoch, an exploration of 
the self or an homage to the dawn of the space age, one satisfied reviewer states that the 
film is preoccupied with the conditions and implications of a groundbreaking scientific 
event – the dawn of the space age.
27 All translations from Russian are the work of the author of the text unless stated otherwise.
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at first glance the spectator is offered a glimpse into the life of two men in 
the provincial Soviet north, their relations with two women, as well as their 
involvement in the cosmonaut training program. Space is there, but it seems 
marginal, lurking in the shadows, easily mistakable for a picturesque excuse 
for a melodrama. However, it is possible to subvert this reading, by proposing 
that this film is not concerned with representation or psychology at all. Rather, 
I will argue that it is obsessed by an idea, which is not directly transferrable to 
or deducible from a character or a cinematographic technique.28
This peculiarity surfaces as soon as one attempts to dissect the film accord-
ing to established analytical categories, such as character analysis. One of the 
protagonists, German (a possible allusion to German Titov, the cosmonaut 
initially intended to become the first man in space, only to be substituted by 
Yuri Gagarin at the very last moment), is a highly motivated fellow, who is 
apparently a bit too intelligent for his own good: he is studying English and 
 apparently trying to find a way out of the ussr, seemingly either via ship or 
via spaceship. His space enthusiasm is caught on by a more simple-minded 
creature that goes by the name of Konyok, a cook in a local restaurant – not an 
antagonist but simply a less intelligent and more gullible figure than German. 
The two men represent one subject: in the film, they do not really function 
without one another, and appear static and flat. Together, however, they are 
the driving mechanism of the film, which may thence be read as a profound 
and meticulous exploration of subjectivity rather than a shallow melodrama 
set in the Soviet north before the launch of the Sputnik.
The director employs several different techniques in order to create this 
double-headed subject, whose heads are facing the obscure goal that can pro-
visionally defined as ‘going to outer space’, and whose body is torn apart by 
the differing psychological motives of the two men. Throughout the first half 
of the film, the camera follows Konyok who appears to be stalking German, 
an intriguing stranger. Around halfway through the film, the point of view 
changes, and the camera starts squinting at both characters, examining them 
from the side, in medium shots. In the final third of the film, the director in-
tentionally, almost loudly, shifts the gaze of the camera by another quarter: a 
tracking shot, following someone dressed like German, suddenly is followed 
by a medium close-up that shows us the person en face. And the person we 
are suddenly faced with is not German, but Konyok, who is merely wearing 
 German’s clothes.
28 An extended version of the author’s analysis of the films in question (Kosmos kak pred-
chuvstviye and First on the Moon), focusing on the concept of the province and provincial-
ity, is available in a vol. 10, iss. 3.
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Apart from the gaze of the camera, other circumstances reinforce this split 
and illogical unity embodied by German and Konyok. For instance, there are 
curiosities of the fabula, which seem to drive the social-realist canonical logic 
of irrational connections29 to the extreme: Konyok is entirely ignorant about 
German’s provenance, his trade, and the reasons for his interest in foreign lan-
guages and his rigorous and regular physical training. Despite all of this, he 
firmly decides to befriend this stranger and to follow him around everywhere 
he goes. He does not reconsider this decision despite German’s apparent lack 
of enthusiasm, and despite the fact that German proceeds to coldly seduce his 
girlfriend. Meanwhile, the camera insists: long shots that show the coast, the 
bridge, a common meeting place and the forest, where Konyok often falls off 
his bike with a girl in the back seat – all of this is consistently fuzzy, unclear. 
Medium shots, on the other hand, are always in motion, they shake, shift, slide. 
The cinematic subject is caught somewhere between these extremes: it is cap-
tured in the medium long shot, not as a stabilization and a clarification of the 
image, but as a caricature: like the figure of Konyok who, once he puts on his 
idol’s clothing, transforms into a caricature of German. He does not become 
German, he becomes his inefficient replica.
It can be argued that this split has nothing to do with a single person; rather, 
it is the split that marks the way the film is driven forward, the way it works; 
it enacts the film’s obsession with the nearing, but faraway, imminent, but in-
comprehensible advent of the space age. This statement is reinforced by the 
relationship between the sound and the image. Most of the music in the film is 
diegetic, which is might be a stylistic allusion to the socialist realist tradition of 
Soviet cinematography. Most of the music heard in the film comes from radio 
transmitters on the set; and wherever there is music the source of which can-
not be traced as easily, such as the music accompanying the closing credits, it is 
thematically directly linked to the ideas picked up on by the narrative, such as 
the Soviet national idea, which seems to provide explanations for inexplicable 
actions. However, it is not the presence and the function of the music in this 
particular movie that is striking; what strikes most is its loudness: compared to 
the dialogue, the music is exceptionally loud and sounds forced into the shots. 
The dialogue, on the other hand, seems to have been muted intentionally, so 
that it is unclear and muffled: this stylization, which foregrounds the music, 
creates a remarkable contrast between the visual and sonic images and the 
spoken word, between technology and the ambient it intrudes into.
29 Mikhail Epstein, The Paradoxes of Postmodernism and Contemporary Russian Culture 
(Amherst: Massachussets University Press, 1995), 180–210.
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Layered upon one another, all of these techniques almost seem excessive; 
yet, there is no real closure, no catharsis; the film does not make much sense if 
seen through a progressive or a deconstructionist lens, as demonstrated by the 
reviews quoted at the beginning of our analysis. However, if watched from the 
standpoint of post-Soviet reflections on the impending space age, the film pro-
duces a sense of uncomfortable unity, marked by the gap between the event 
of the dawn of the space age, and existent explanatory frameworks for it. It 
manages to construct a subject, which both is and is not human, which seems 
to be driven somewhere into the darkness, and does not have much of an ear 
for what might be expected of it on Earth.
 Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon]
Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] is not the only post-Soviet 
 Russian film focusing on the beginning of the space age, which neither denies 
existent memory narratives nor reaffirms them, creating a fictional world driv-
en by an altogether different logic, and therefore proposing that a new high-
light be added to existent narratives on both the history of Soviet spaceflight 
and the history of the beginning of the space age on a more general level.
Alexey Fedorchenko’s mockumentary on the memorialization of the So-
viet space programme Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon], which appeared 
in the cinemas shortly prior to Uchitel’s Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming 
of Space], arguably achieves a similar result, employing a different strategy; 
in fact, this contrived history of the Soviet space program in the 1930s is the 
only humorous reference to the history of Soviet spaceflight apart from Dmitry 
 Astrakhan’s 1994 feature film Chetvyortaya Planeta [The Fourth Planet].
In order to provide Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon] with a coherent, 
lighthearted and suggestive storyline, Fedorchenko resorts chiefly to the strat-
egy of postmodernist deconstructive reconstruction. The film does not mock 
the Soviet space program as such, but rather memories and myths related to 
it, produced and reproduced by it. The film, also driven by a similar sort of 
visually explicit spatial frustration as Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of 
Space], employs most of its capacities to play around with space and time in 
order to focus on memory: the memory of the mythical Soviet space program. 
The spectators are invited to follow researchers who are investigating the un-
reliable evidence of the existence of the space program in the 1930s in order to 
track down the details of Ivan Kharlamov’s flight to the Moon, which acciden-
tally ended somewhere in Chile.
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The film abuses the authority of archival footage30 and neutral narration, 
as well as construed testimonies of fake witnesses to present a story of what 
appears to have been the logical step that had to be taken before Yuri Gagarin’s 
first spaceflight in 1957. Many spectators were actually convinced that the di-
rector intended to ridicule the history of spaceflight, while some interpreted 
his intention in the very opposite way; according to certain layman reviews, 
the film reconstructs the mythology of the history of Soviet achievements in 
space exploration by adding a supplementary myth. According to an elaborate 
review on Kinopoisk.ru, the quality of this undertaking, whichever way one 
interprets it, leaves much to be desired:
… I’ve wanted to watch this mockumentary for a while. Finally, I man-
aged to find an hour to do this yesterday (luckily, the film is not long). I 
am sorry I wasted my time on Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon]. I think 
everything is bad: the idea, the realization, the actors. Ok, so they shot a 
scene, aged the shots using scratches and blotches. Well, you might as well 
have done something with the sound, it obviously doesn’t correspond to 
1930s chronicles. Could they at least have watched something from those 
times? Or they hoped their memory was good enough? This soundtrack 
makes one suspicious of every shot, as you no longer believe the fiction 
or the fake ‘interviews’ or the ‘hidden camera’ episodes. Maybe the direc-
tor should have used more archive materials or watched Kuryokhin’s Two 
Captains 2 – what a great mockumentarist! One to learn from!… Or, you 
could have tried to find working equipment from those times, tried to 
film using it, at least to understand what things were supposed to look 
like. … Also, they should have read Pelevin’s Omon Ra. And maybe done 
an adaptation of that novel, instead of coming up with their own. I’ll give 
it a slightly higher grade than I normally would have, because my wife fell 
for it. …31
30 Although seemingly full of archive materials, the film actually does not use more than 10 
per cent of authentic archival footage. The rest of the shots were skillfully edited in order 
to appear old. (Kinopoisk.ru).
31 The review was accessed at http://www.kinopoisk.ru/film/160990/, 15 May 2015, and is 
one of seven reviews on the film available at Kinopoisk.ru. It is an example of the only 
negative review of the film; the other six reviewers gave it a positive mark. However, all 
of these seven reviewers share the view that the film is first and foremost a mockumen-
tary, and that it plays with the mythology of Soviet supremacy in outer space. Notably, 
one reviewer observes that there is a ‘mystical’ quality to the film, not directly related 
to its contents or formal qualities as such, but related to the mysticism related to the 
Majsova��4
<UN>
Indeed, the film succeeded in one matter: in creating plenty of confusion. Up 
until the very end, the film insists on sticking to the form of the documentary, 
like a persistent historian, digging through the archives and following its ob-
ject of research regardless of the absurdities and illogical elements that tend 
to undermine the thesis set out at the beginning. The film manages to create 
a liminal timespace:32 it is not yet in the realm of unbelievable parody and no 
longer a serious conspiracy theory.
This aspect of the form of the film seems to mirror the irrational, blind per-
sistence that guides all basic research (research for its own sake, the primary 
aim of which is not applicability, but scientific discovery) and that occurred 
before the actual beginning of the space age. This blind belief in the necessity 
to continue working toward success created the conditions, albeit not always 
the best ones, for people to stick to patterns of behaviour that might, at one 
point, bear results (although not necessarily): spaceflight. This is a confusing 
situation: the space age demanded exceptional effort from the people, and, at 
the same time, there was never any guarantee that, even if achieved, it would 
have any direct impact on the lives of the people who were workinh toward 
creating it. The film focuses on this confusion behind the space age, and shows 
confusion as crucial for the dynamics that brought about its dawn. There is, for 
instance, a telling sequence where horsemen ride up to the rocket before its 
launch. It seems that their helmets are pointing to the absurdity of the entire 
endeavor: why would one invest in the space program at a time when even 
tanks and cars were still almost the stuff of science-fiction?
Fedorchenko’s film starts off with confusion, but offers no way out of it. 
Such incoherence often characterizes the dynamic of memory narratives, 
when the latter are dictated by the ideological centre (the metropolis, per-
ceived as a mythical, unattainable centre of progressive thought, planning 
and lifestyle) and allowed to trickle down to the backward periphery, which 
always only receives and does not produce progress.33 Memory narratives re-
ceived by the geographical and mythical (backward, faraway) periphery from 
the  ideological and mythical centre are therefore often inconsistent with local 
 utter unknowability of the cosmos. The film was also reviewed by four imdb users; three 
found it to be an amusing and humorous mockumentary, while one stated it is largely 
 incomprehensible to a spectator not familiar with Russian and with the Soviet context of 
the narrative.
32 Elana Gomel, Postmodern Science-Fiction and Temporal Imagination (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2009), 10.
33 Cf. Aleida Assman and Linda Shortt, Memory and Political Change (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012), 1–2.
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(provincial or peripheral) memories, which makes these ‘instructive’ memo-
ries,  disseminated by the centre, seem superficial, elevated from everyday 
 reality and therefore somewhat fairytale-like.
The film exploits the conventions of the documentary in all of their rich-
ness, often providing testimonies of the first Soviet ‘cosmopilot’, who allegedly 
flew to the Moon, had an accident in Chile, was admitted to a psychiatric ward 
in Chita and ended up playing the part of Prince Alexander Nevsky in a circus. 
His colleagues from the crew of potential cosmopilots, the constructor of the 
first rocket, one of the cameramen following them around instructed by the 
secret services, an employee from the psychiatric ward in Chita – all of them 
prove to be exceptionally enthusiastic respondents to the questions posed by 
the film crew.
‘Everything that happened there got recorded. And if it was recorded, it had 
to be true,’ says one of the employees of the archives when introduced to the 
film crew. Humour here neutralizes the confusion generated by the film, but 
this at a price: we have to acknowledge that the characters involved in this bur-
lesque are also exceptionally funny. The ex-potential cosmopilot Fattakhov, an 
orphan, ‘raised with love by the Soviet people,’ as explained by the omnipres-
ent narrator, and now working as a guard at the zoological museum, spending 
his days surrounded by huge model insects; the midget who is now a performer 
at a midget circus, where he is filmed by the crew … The film deconstructs a 
myth about a myth. The deconstruction is humorous, but allows for no em-
pathy whatsoever, because all of the characters involved are elevated to the 
level of a myth and therefore deprived of everything human. The Bakhtinian 
carnival: the dance of bizarre, eccentric figures who once, a long time ago, 
participated in a common task, and are now once again brought together in 
its name, rendered powerful (they speak the truth, as they are witnesses) and 
powerless (they speak nonsense, because they are caught up in a nonsensical 
play of empty signifiers, awoken within the mockumentary), appears to be per-
manent; the carnival is the dynamics of the film.34
The visuals are accompanied by Soviet patriotic songs from various periods 
and Soviet sci-fi ‘beeps’; the shots, on the other hand, are another bricolage 
of sorts: historical data is shown alongside pseudo-documentary montage 
and shots out of Soviet space films. The only film that is shown to be undeni-
able fiction, is Kosmicheskiy reys [Cosmic voyage] (dir. Vasily Zhuravlev, 1936), 
which also examines the possibility of flying to the Moon.
34 Cf. Michael V. Montgomery, Carnivals and Commonplaces: Bakhtin’s Chronotope, Cultural 
Studies, and Film (New York: Peter Lang, 1994).
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The only firm anchor of the film is therefore, ironically, fiction, which does 
not, in postmodernist terms, replace the reality which is lost and perhaps 
 never was, but appears as an image, pointing to a horrific void behind closed 
curtains. This is why the affirmatively fictional shots from Kosmicheskiy reys 
are important: they guarantee that there remains a little something to be trust-
ed: at least some of the fiction is truly fictional. Other shots mainly manoeuvre 
between fiction and reality, such as the shots of the cameras supervising the 
cosmopilots. There are even excerpts from advertisements for these cameras 
in the movie which makes the entire film even more uncanny: everything is 
shown to be contrived. This is a documentary based on staged, fake evidence.
The film presents the dynamics of the myth of the Soviet space program 
as confused, contrived, and as a product, greatly conditioned by the tension 
between the centre and the periphery. It demonstrates that narratives and the 
imagery of memorialized events may only be perceived as objectively valid, 
complete accounts of events by subjects who do not fully belong to the centre.
 Conclusion
The two films explored in this chapter highlight a striking ambivalence 
 persistent in memories of the space age and space programs; an enthusiasm 
allegedly characteristic of the bygone era has been replaced by melancholic 
disillusionment. This is noted in a large proportion of layman reviews of the 
two films: they note that the films are reflections on the past, and that this re-
flection is not positive or assertive, but somewhat contrived: the past is shown 
in an idealized or a satirized manner; the dawn of the space age is shown as 
something that was highly mythologized.
On the other hand, cinematic narratives, such as those presented in Kos-
mos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] and Pervye na Lune [First on the 
Moon] clearly state that there is something more to the space age, something 
that eludes rationalizations, which reduce the dawn of the space age to the po-
litical, economic or technological circumstances in which it occurred. As stated 
above, only some particularly meticulous reviewers note this quality of the two 
films. Nevertheless, closer readings of both Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dream-
ing of Space] and Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon] demonstrate that the 
films resonate greatly with Shukaitis’s reflection on outer space as an imaginal 
machine, a realm offering an opportunity for humanity to radically change its 
coordinates of social reality instead of reiterating patterns from current affairs 
on Earth. Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of Space] highlights the am-
bivalence of a space-bound human subject, its premonition about  impending 
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change, and its anxiety in view of this change. It contextualizes the dawn of 
the space age in the ussr within the framework of global politics on the one 
hand, and with references to individual concerns, which are only partly relat-
ed to political power constellations, on the other. Pervye na Lune [First on the 
Moon], although very different from Kosmos kak predchuvstviye [Dreaming of 
Space] in terms of genre and plot, highlights a very similar tension: the tension 
between canons of historiographical accounts, the subordination of these ac-
counts to certain ruling political options (the Communist party, in the case of 
the ussr), and the inconsistency of both of these sets of guidelines with inter-
pretations given by the individuals involved in the actual events. Furthermore, 
Pervye na Lune [First on the Moon] ridicules the narrative authority of the for-
mat of the documentary, but does not necessarily do so in order to criticize it. 
Rather, it attracts the spectator’s attention to the underlying ideas, i.e. to the 
idea of the necessity and imminence of the space age, and the radical nature 
of the transformations it might invoke. Contrasts, such as the contrast between 
horsemen and a space rocket, illustrate clearly what kind of a leap in thought 
and technology was required in order to launch the first satellite.
Therefore, both of the films discussed in this chapter are more than re-
inspections of an important aspect of Soviet (supra)national mythology, the 
myth of supremacy in the race for space. Both films not only subvert the simple 
narrative of this myth, which glorifies Soviet scientists, engineers, cosmonauts 
and politicians, but also provide reflections on a different key dimension of 
the dawn of the space age; they foreground the fact that it involved various 
efforts of common, by no means perfect individuals, who relied on the logic of 
scientific, mathematical language, to launch them into the unknown domain 
of outer space. Furthermore, the films, particularly Kosmos kak predchuvstviye 
[Dreaming of Space], emphasize that a transformation, such as the beginning 
of space exploration, entails a re-examination of the coordinates of our socio-
cultural and political reality, and an individual’s place in it. This dimension of 
the two films in question is by no means nationally bound, returning our atten-
tion to the global significance of humanity’s first direct encounters with outer 
space and ultimately arguing that humanity’s space-related achievements are 
more than mere byproducts of technological progress and politics.
Interestingly enough, as I have attempted to demonstrate in my analysis of 
the films in question, a lot of analytical attention to the contextual, cultural 
and national details is required in order to avoid conclusions, which persist 
in reducing cinematography on the dawn of the space age to reiterations of 
nationally dominant memory narratives, such as the cited film reviews do. 
In order to avoid this trap, it seems relevant to return to the formal proper-
ties of the cinematic medium, and the formalist aspects of cinematic poetics. 
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 Supplementing narrative, thematic, character and plot analysis with an analy-
sis focusing on formal features, such as rhythm, sequences of shots and frames, 
as well as composition, provides a more nuanced insight into cinematic mean-
ing-making, and allows the spectator to enter into dialogue with the cinematic 
medium as both an agent in memory reception, which presents and argues 
for its own, original reappropriations of dominant narratives, and an agent of 
memory narrative production.
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Literary Mediation and Reception of Memories 
of War: Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson’s ‘Under the 
Republic’s Flag’
Daisy Neijmann and Gunnthorunn Gudmundsdottir
In 1941 a short text with an unusal story was published in Reykjavík. Its 
 reception and afterlife in Icelandic literature are no less unusual and, we think, 
worth exploring as a case study in the workings of the cultural memory of a na-
tion coming to terms with its entrance on the international stage. The text was 
called Undir fána lýðveldisins [Under the Republic’s Flag] and was the autobio-
graphical account of Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson (1910–1942), a young Icelandic 
labourer and communist, of his experiences as a member of the International 
Brigades in the Spanish Civil War in 1937 and 1938. This text, although it is not 
particularly well known today and has not been the focus of any major study, 
has inveigled itself into Icelandic literature on war and trauma time and again 
since its publication, thus becoming part of cultural memory in a particular 
way. In this paper we aim to address Ann Rigney’s question what role liter-
ary texts play in the formation of cultural memory by tracing the trajectory 
and transformation of Hallgrímsson’s text in Icelandic literature and public 
memorial culture from 1941 to 2001 and beyond, adopting Rigney’s diachronic 
perspective into the genesis and reception of the work in order to examine its 
role in ‘memorial dynamics’.1
Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson was born in 1910 in the eastern part of Iceland. He 
moved to Reykjavík in 1930 and became a member of the Communist Party 
and a union activist. He first came to the attention of the media and the au-
thorities when he climbed on board the German cargo ship Eider while it was 
moored in Reykjavík harbour in 1933 and cut down its swastika flag. He went 
on to fight with the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) 
for two years in 1937 and 1938, and on his return he wrote long articles on his 
experiences which were published in a left-wing newspaper. He was jailed in 
1941 for his part in the so-called ‘flyer-case’, where Icelandic union activists dis-
tributed flyers among British soldiers occupying Iceland at the time,  warning 
1 Ann Rigney, “Portable Monuments: Literature, Cultural Memory, and the Case of Jeanie 
Deans,” Poetics Today 25: 2 (Summer 2004): 362.
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them from taking on jobs while Icelandic workers were on strike. This, the 
government decided, amounted to inciting the soldiers to revolt against their 
superiors, and Hallgrímsson was jailed for his part in this for eighteen months, 
but was set free after eleven months in prison. It has been conjectured that 
the harsh sentence he received for what seems like a minor offense was in part 
retaliation by the government for his fighting in the Spanish Civil War, an act 
which the authorities had made illegal.2 While in prison, he collected his arti-
cles and turned them into a book, which was published in August 1941. Shortly 
after being released from prison he was a passenger on board the fishing boat 
Sæborg, which disappeared off the east coast of Iceland after leaving harbour 
and was never seen again. It is thought that it was hit by a German mine – of 
which there were many in Icelandic waters at the time. His short life and fate is 
thus intimately entwined with world events at the time.
The text of Undir fána lýðveldisins is a gripping and well-written narrative. It 
is clearly focused and concentrated on Hallgrímsson’s journey to Spain, his ex-
perience of the war and his journey back, with a few asides about the political 
and global situation at the time. Hallgrímsson explains in a brief introduction 
to the work that he ‘is not a poet’ and thus has made no effort to ‘fictionalize’ 
events even though those events ‘could have been “imposing” if I had ridden 
Pegasus across the battlegrounds in the mountains of Aragon and vineyards of 
Catalonia.’ Instead he chose to refer ‘only to that which I experienced myself or 
had confirmed news of.’3 Despite his protestations of not being a poet, the text 
is carefully written and compelling. He has a particular knack for describing 
people and the physical environment and is able to convey complicated turns 
of events during shambolic and confusing battle scenes. Although he focuses 
very little on his inner life, he expresses convincingly his viewpoint of people, 
places, war, etc., throughout. The narrative is generally in chronological order 
with a clear focus on events, but there are instances towards the end of the 
text that show a more fragmentary type of narrative, describing a dreamlike 
state when the experiences he has had wash over him on the slow and arduous 
journey back across the French border:
Not to retreat, just replaced. – Sierra Caballs in good hands. Division 
de Campesino. – Away from the fire, to the hinterland, al la retaguar-
dia. – Rest, rest, Descanso. – Reorgnisacion? – Repatriacion? –  Going 
2 Róbert Sigurðarson, ¡Viva la República! – ¡Viva la libertad! La participación de islandeses en la 
Guerra Civil Española, BA-thesis in Spanish Studies, University of Iceland, February 2014, 34.
3 Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson, Undir fána lýðveldisins (Reykjavík: Björn Bjarnason, 1941), 7–8. All 
translations from Icelandic texts are ours.
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home?  – Out on the hill, looking out. – The boys’ state of mind. – 
 Morale.  – Fighting morale, moral de combate. – A hurt mule in the 
valley, a kicking mule on open ground. – Machine gun fire from the 
summit. Rad-ad-ad-ad-ad.4
These descriptions represent disjointed but pressing memories in a mixture 
of Icelandic and Spanish: memories of particular events, but also the repeti-
tion of certain concepts and phrases that echo in his mind. These pages are, 
however, exceptions in the text. It is also interesting to note that the terms that 
he uses from the military and the war have carried on in other Icelandic works 
on the Spanish Civil War, including the novel by Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir dis-
cussed in this chapter. In an appendix entitled ‘Explanations of military terms,’ 
Hallgrímsson points out that when ‘an Icelander reads a war book, he con-
stantly comes across words and concepts which he either does not understand 
at all or to a limited degree, − because we are a nation without an army and 
most things military are alien to us.’5 He is thus acutely aware that his military 
experience and knowledge is highly unusual in Iceland, as will be discussed 
further below.
The contemporary reception of Hallgrímsson’s book is highly illuminating 
as regards the historical and political circumstances of the time. It seems that 
only one review was published, in a left-wing newspaper, and that a couple 
of newspaper advertisements for the work appeared. However, we have not 
been able to find any contemporary interviews or detailed articles on the work 
or on Hallgrímsson’s experience. His obituary, which came only a year after 
the book was published, is in some way part of the reception of the work. All 
appeared in left-wing papers and all emphasized Hallgrímsson’s idealism and 
his commitment to the fight against fascism. Einar Olgeirsson, the leader of 
the Icelandic Socialist party, says in Hallgrímsson obituary: ‘The Icelandic state 
gave him a year’s time in prison and took his human rights away, this man of all 
people, who had risked his life, almost the only Icelander to do so, to protect 
human rights against the attack of fascism.’6 Thus, the circumstances of the 
national politics at the time, Hallgrímsson’s own particular circumstances (he 
was in prison when the book was published), his Communist credentials, they 
all colour the contemporary reception of the work.
There are several aspects of the reception of the text and the public discourse 
relevant to it that denote particular national frameworks. First, it is often not 
4 Hallgrímsson, Undir fána lýðveldisins, 206.
5 Hallgrímsson, Undir fána lýðveldisins, 237.
6 Einar Olgeirsson, “Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson,” Þjóðviljinn, 10 December 1942.
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a discussion of the ideals or motivation to take up arms that is at the forefront 
of the reception of the writings of Icelanders who fought in the Spanish Civil 
War, but simply the fact that they had become soldiers – be it in the news of 
wounded men and how they generally fared, or in right-wing historians’ no-
tions of how they were being trained to take up arms for the communists in an 
expected revolution in Iceland.7 In order to understand the views and attitudes 
involved, we need to establish some historical facts. Iceland has never had its 
own military forces, and taking up arms was thus completely alien to people. 
During the first half of the twentieth century in particular, the idea took root 
that Iceland had always been a peaceful country without arms. For many peo-
ple, peace and pacifism came to characterize Icelanders and Icelandic history, 
and they became part of collective memory and the national self-image. This 
idea crystallized in the ‘neutrality’ clause of the 1918 sovereignty agreement 
between Iceland and Denmark, where permanent unarmed neutrality became 
Iceland’s official security policy. As Pétur Guðmundur Ingimarsson points out 
in his study on arms and security in Iceland during the struggle for national 
independence:
For many Icelanders there seems to have been a connection between the 
idea of neutrality and the idea of sovereignty. Sources from the 1930s also 
mention for instance the pacifism of the Icelandic general public, which 
the socialists were fighting for, and which included an antipathy to any 
kind of militarism and war.8
This also explains the complete shock of the Allied occupation of Iceland in 
World War ii, when thousands of soldiers flooded the country.
The other point that needs to be made is that Spain was an incredibly im-
portant market for Icelandic goods before the Civil War, with a third of the 
country’s exports from 1921 to 1935 going to Spain. Thus, as so often is the case, 
trade brought about transnational influences in places one would not neces-
sarily suspect at first sight; alternative routes of memory across the Atlantic in 
this case. As Astrid Erll has pointed out, transnational memory not only per-
tains to our globalized world, but ‘has a long genealogy’ and it is ‘a perspec-
tive of memory that can in principle be chosen with respect to all historical 
7 See for instance Þór Whitehead, Sovét-Ísland: Óskalandið (Reykjavík: Ugla, 2010).
8 Pétur Guðmundur Ingimarsson, “Vopnlaus þjóð,” BA-thesis in History, University of Iceland, 
2011, 4. See also Guðrún Björk Guðsteinsdóttir, “Rediscovering Icelandic Canadian Pacifism,” 
Rediscovering Canadian Difference, ed. Gudrun Björk Gudsteins (Reykjavík: University of 
 Iceland Press, 2001), 50–60.
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periods and with a view to both the synchronic circulation of representations 
(e.g. of “traumatic pasts”) as well as to the diachronic dimension of memory.’9 
This very important trade also influenced the attitude toward the Falangists 
in the right-wing press in Iceland. The Left often accused the Right of being in 
the clutches of the capitalists, which meant that markets mattered more than 
the fight against fascism. The fish traders tried, for instance, to get the Icelandic 
government to acknowledge Franco’s regime in early 1939, before the dissolu-
tion of the Spanish Republic, but were forced to wait until later that year.10 An 
indication of the importance of this market (which, we have to note, had been 
in decline for some time before the war), was when an Icelandic official was 
sent to Barcelona to secure deals in the middle of the shelling of the city in 
1938, and then sent over to Burgos to attempt to sell fish to the Francoists.11 The 
trade with Spain was thus of prime importance and obviously influenced the 
way in which the war was viewed, and also meant that Icelanders were better 
informed on Spanish politics than one may have assumed. Whether it has had 
any effect on how the war is remembered sixty years later is another matter.
In his study of the Spanish Civil War in contemporary newspapers in 
 Iceland, Aitor Yraola explains that ‘the civil war had both a direct and an indi-
rect impact, which caused upheavals and changes in society in the three years 
the war lasted.’12 He also points out that news from the main events of the war 
was not censored or silenced, so Icelanders were relatively well informed. The 
ideological stance of each paper, however, dictated their sympathies with one 
or the other side.13 As Stefán Svavarsson notes, the Icelandic papers published 
sharp missives and debated the issues hotly in a manner which was later to 
characterize their writings during the Cold War.14 Thus, the reporting on the 
war was highly partisan, and the positions taken by each side, as well as the 
very sharp division between the Left and the Right that were to characterize 
Icelandic journalism and culture up until the very end of the Cold War, had 
already become prominent.
This is not to say that there was no censorship at all during this time. Accord-
ing to Yraola’s account the state radio had planned to broadcast a lecture by 
9 Astrid Erll, “Traumatic Pasts, Literary Afterlives, and Transcultural Memory: New Direc-
tions of Literary and Media Memory Studies,” Journal of Aesthetics and Culture, vol 3 
(2011): 5.
10 Stefán Svavarsson, “Spænska borgarastríðið í íslenskum samtímaheimildum,” Sagnir 26 
(2006): 52.
11 Svavarsson, “Spænska borgarastríðið,” 52.
12 Aitor Yraola, “Íslensk viðbrögð við spænsku borgarastyrjöldinni,” Skírnir 163 (1989): 363.
13 Yraola, “Íslensk viðbrögð,” 374.
14 Svavarsson, “Spænska borgarastríðið,” 52.
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Hallgrímsson on his experiences during the war in 1940, but it was postponed 
indefinitely as, at the time, the government was involved in negotiations with 
the Franco regime on the future of cod exports to Spain, and it was considered 
that the radio lecture might have a detrimental effect on the negotiations.15 
Thus, it is evident that trade can both foster transnational memory and stifle 
or repress such discourse if it threatens that trade.
The third point that needs emphasizing is the stranglehold that the partisan 
outlook mentioned earlier had on politics, discourse and culture in Iceland 
in the postwar years. Claire Gorrara has pointed to the fact that, in post-war 
 Europe generally, ‘the politics of the Cold War conditioned, distorted or, in 
some cases, silenced processes of remembrance and commemoration of the 
past,’16 and Iceland was certainly no exception: almost every single discussion 
was framed in partisan terms, and every ‘national’ memory seen in those terms 
until 1989. And to this day, partisan historiography has the power to re-kindle 
the debate, as did, for instance, the publication by right-wing historian Þór 
Whitehead on ‘Soviet-Iceland’, in which he claims that those Icelanders who 
fought with the International Brigades had in fact been sent there by the Soviet 
Union in order to train them for an armed revolution in Iceland. Jón Ólafsson, 
a philosopher and specialist in all matters Soviet, has argued that no docu-
ments (now accessible in Russian archives) support any of these claims – and 
thus the contest for a definitive version of national history continues.17
 Fictions of Hallgrímsson
 Guardian Angels
Two years after the publication of Hallgrímsson’s memories in book form, and 
a year after his death, the novel Verndarenglarnir [The Guardian Angels] was 
published, the first work of fiction to have the Allied occupation of Iceland as 
its main topic. The author was Jóhannes úr Kötlum (1899–1972), a poet who 
originally had achieved recognition for his patriotic and nature poetry but 
whose work had become more socially engaged and revolutionary during the 
Depression. Like Hallgrímsson, Jóhannes úr Kötlum was a union activist and 
15 Yraola, “Íslensk viðbrögð,” 373.
16 Claire Gorrara, French Crime Fiction and the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012), 7.
17 Þór Whitehead, Sovét-Ísland and Jón Ólafsson, “Landráðakenning Þórs Whitehead: 




a member of the Communist Party, but he was also a committed nationalist 
and pacifist. In his highly polemical novel, which presents a fierce critique of 
war-mongering in general and the occupation in particular, Jóhannes úr Köt-
lum reworks Hallgrímsson memories and experiences through the medium of 
fiction, and makes them part of the anti-war, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist mes-
sage underlying the work.
The story centres around an Icelandic family from a traditional Icelandic 
farm which acts as a synecdoche for Icelandic society as a whole, with the vari-
ous family members representing different ideologies and attitudes towards 
the war and the occupation. The novel opens with Haraldur, one of the farm-
er’s sons. He was a volunteer in the Spanish Civil War, fighting with the Inter-
national Brigades and has recently returned, physically and mentally maimed: 
he is blind in one eye and suffers from amnesia and delusions. He no longer 
remembers his time in Spain as a soldier, but clearly suffers from survivor’s 
guilt: he believes himself to be the one-eyed god Odin, looking for a way to 
bring his fallen warriors back to life. This opening scene featuring Haraldur 
is remarkable for several reasons. With no history of war or war literature on 
which to base his story, the author looks, firstly, to the old Icelandic texts relat-
ing the mythological tale of Ragnarök, where the gods fight their final battle 
against the forces of evil, and, secondly, to Hallgrímsson’s recent experiences 
as a soldier in the Spanish War, which he weaves together to create the first 
work of fiction about the Icelandic experience of twentieth-century war. Fur-
thermore, it represents the first attempt in Icelandic literature to mediate war 
trauma, an attempt that was not again pursued by an Icelandic novelist until 
several decades later.
As we discover in the course of the novel, Haraldur is the only survivor from 
a battle in which all his fellow soldiers were killed. The memory of this is so 
painful to him that it makes him physically ill and sets off his delusions. Clear-
ly, he suffers from war trauma: he cannot remember the actual experience, yet 
he relives it over and over again through his delusions. According to trauma 
theory, the traumatic experience itself is beyond understanding and beyond 
language, it cannot be known or described, it is a memory that cannot be ac-
cessed yet continues to haunt its victim.18 The fragmented, obsessive nature of 
the final part of Hallgrímsson’s original text quoted earlier can be seen as indic-
ative of the traumatic nature of his memories. Lyndsey Stonebridge has point-
ed out that the idea that an impression can be both experienced and forgotten 
18 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore and 
 London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Roger Luckhurst, The Trauma Question 
(London: Routledge, 2008).
��7Literary Mediation and Reception of Memories of War
<UN>
is central to trauma theory: ‘trauma divides the mind not only from itself, but 
also splits it in time.’19 Although he lives with his parents and grandmother at 
the farm, participating in regular farm life routine to an extent, Haraldur does 
not really inhabit chronological time: his every thought and individual action 
revolves around the obsessive search for ‘his’ (Odin’s) ravens. It was Freud who 
found evidence of how the psyche ‘tried to master trauma retroactively by re-
living unconsciously a catastrophe which could not be experienced fully first 
time around.’20 Haraldur needs to believe that he is Odin, so that he can return 
to the battlefield every night to bring his fellow soldiers back to life: this is the 
only way in which he can reconcile himself with what has happened.
The Icelandic experience of World War ii, however, was not one of battle 
but of military occupation by friendly forces, which raises the question why 
Jóhannes úr Kötlum would include traumatic experiences of the Spanish Civil 
War in his novel, and in such a prominent way. The most obvious answer seems 
to lie in the anti-war message of the novel. Hallgrímsson’s experiences in Spain 
provided a recent, poignant example of the horrors of modern warfare from 
an Icelandic perspective. They demonstrated that even Icelanders, with their 
centuries-old history of peace, were no longer immune from wars elsewhere: 
the bellicose actions of the larger powers in the world now also affected them. 
As was mentioned earlier, Icelanders, with only a very few exceptions, had no 
direct experience of war. The horrors related to them in the media had always 
remained abstract. The initial reactions of many Icelandic people to the oc-
cupation of their country, in some cases naive, in others opportunistic, clearly 
were a source of grave concern for those who felt that the British military pres-
ence represented a breach of Iceland’s declared everlasting neutrality and, 
rather than protecting Iceland, had dragged it into the war by making it a tar-
get. While the novel’s allusions to Norse mythology turn the occupation into 
an event of apocalyptic dimensions, its fictionalized memories of Hallgrímur 
Hallgrímsson become a terrifying warning of the effects of war based on Ice-
landic experience, a war that was brought to Iceland against its will. Haral-
dur is an example of what will happen to Icelanders if they become involved 
in war. An important aspect of war trauma is to encounter an alien part of 
the self, not least the part that kills others, thereby destroying the fantasy of the 
self as peace-time subject.21 By becoming a soldier, Haraldur becomes, by ex-
tension, a killer. Thus, Jóhannes úr Kötlum transforms Hallgrímsson’s narrative 
19 Lyndsey Stonebridge, “Theories of Trauma,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Literature 
of World War ii, ed. Marina MacKay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 196.
20 Stonebridge, “Theories of Trauma,” 197.
21 Stonebridge, “Theories of Trauma,” 197.
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of his personal experiences into a moralizing story, offering a powerful image 
of recent events ‘for ethical consumption’ in the present.22
Considering the strong pacifist stance of the novel’s author it is notewor-
thy that both Hallgrímsson and the novel’s character based on him, Haraldur, 
chose to join the Spanish Civil War as volunteers, fighting against fascism and 
for revolutionary change. In this respect, Hallgrímsson’s model presented 
Jóhannes úr Kötlum with an ideological dilemma: he abhorred any form of war, 
but he was also a communist who strongly supported the cause of the worker 
and the fight for a better world. The reasons for Haraldur’s participation in the 
war are played down in the novel. Significantly, the emphasis is, instead, not 
on the fight against fascism, but on the deception of the great powers, Great 
Britain in particular, for obvious reasons: the British were the original occupy-
ing force in Iceland. Much is made of the fact that, during the Spanish Civil 
War, they betrayed the International Brigades, as a result of which many were 
killed, among them Haraldur’s fellow soldiers, and the war was lost. Great Brit-
ain and the other great powers are thus the enemy in the novel, at least on the 
surface: they are the symbols of belligerence, colonialism and capitalism. The 
Icelandic people on the other hand are their peaceful, innocent victims. This 
black-and-white picture is based in Icelandic partisan politics at the time. It re-
flects communist discourse, where the capitalist powers constituted the main 
enemy, but also nationalist discourse, which regarded Iceland as a powerless 
victim of foreign aggression throughout its history. From both perspectives, 
the Allied occupation of Iceland was seen as a profound betrayal of Iceland 
and everything it stood for.
This simplistic picture belies the complexity of the novel, however. Jóhannes 
úr Kötlum does not try to avoid the uncomfortable complications posed by 
his comrade’s experience. Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson and the cause he stands 
for are betrayed by politics: the Spanish Civil War was lost not least because 
of power struggles and in-fighting among the leftist forces themselves. This is 
what happens in the novel as well. While the great powers and the foreign mili-
tary are symbolic of an abstract enemy, the real enemy is to be found closer to 
home, personified in the novel by Haraldur’s twin brother. Hákon is the novel’s 
main villain: he is unrepentantly and unredeemably evil. He is not a soldier but 
a greedy opportunist who will support whichever cause he thinks will benefit 
22 Rigney, “Portable Monuments,” 380, 382. Rigney here relies in part on Hayden White’s ar-
gument that there is a structural affinity between ‘narrativizing’ events and moralizing 
them, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” in The Content of the 
Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1987).
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him. Before the occupation he supported Hitler, now he is an ardent support-
er of the British. He works for the occupying forces, which makes him one of 
the wealthiest men in Iceland. He exploits his Icelandic workers, paying them 
wages with which they can barely feed their families. Significantly, he does so 
in happy co-operation with the leader of the workers’ union. To complete his 
villainy, he pleads with his father to sell all his farmland to the British. Thus, 
Hákon is the enemy inside who betrays his country and his people, including 
his own family, to gain power and money.
The third brother, Máni, is the character in the novel who is betrayed by 
his own cause and his own leaders. At the start, he is an idealistic revolution-
ary poet trying to compose an ode in honor of Iceland’s independence. When 
Iceland is occupied by the British army he is overcome by anger, frustration 
and guilt: not only has Iceland lost its independence again before even having 
gained it fully, it has been drawn into a world war by the great powers, and 
without any Icelander standing up to defend it except a few drunks by the har-
bour who are quickly arrested by the Icelandic police. On the contrary, most of 
his countrymen seem to welcome the occupiers and are in a rush to work for 
them, even the workers who are opposed to the occupation, as they can hardly 
live off the wages paid by Icelandic companies. Máni is dismayed and tries to 
convince them to fight for their rights rather than pave the way for the occupy-
ing forces. He is desperate to help them in their fight and comes up with the 
idea of appealing to the common soldiers in the army, who are also only pawns 
in the power games of the capitalists. He writes a flyer urging the soldiers not 
to do the work of striking Icelandic workers who are fighting for a fairer deal.
Thus, Jóhannes úr Kötlum fictionalizes Hallgrímsson’s fight for workers’ 
rights at home in Iceland in the form of a separate character in the novel. Like 
Hallgrímsson, Máni and his friends are arrested and sent to prison – although 
Máni’s sentence is more dramatic and symbolic: he is transported to England. 
On board the army ship, as he sees Iceland disappear from view, Máni ponders 
the betrayal of the Icelandic government, willing to sell out its citizens to a 
foreign prison in order to protect the interests of the rich and powerful. And it 
is this betrayal that eventually convinces Máni to join the Red Army as a vol-
unteer to fight for a better world. Considering that Máni clearly is the author’s 
representative in the novel, his decision to take up arms despite his brother 
Haraldur’s painful experience is remarkable. The ‘flyer case’ plays a crucial role 
in this respect: the betrayal of the capitalist establishment is considered to be 
of such a magnitude that it convinces even a profound pacifist like Jóhannes 
úr Kötlum to turn his fictional alter ego into a soldier, following Hallgrímsson’s 
example in real life. This seems to suggest that, in the end, Jóhannes úr Kötlum 
may have seen it as inevitable that Icelanders would eventually be driven to 
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become active participants in war, now that the world and its wars had im-
posed itself on them. They have lost their innocence and become killers in 
a world characterized by deception and betrayal. This message is underlined 
in the rather melodramatic central tragedy of the novel, where the otherwise 
quiet and gentle Haraldur, in a fit of delusion, mistakes his sister’s baby for a 
British officer and, considering it a representative of the British Empire, kills it.
Jóhannes úr Kötlum’s novel thus constitutes a fictional mediation of Hall-
grímur Hallgrímsson’s memories and actions in the larger context of World 
War ii and the British occupation of Iceland, all of which posed dramatic 
challenges to Icelandic identity and national self-image. Like Hallgrímsson’s 
writings, the novel received few reviews, all of them political, and have since 
largely been forgotten. Its three original reviewers and, later, literary histori-
ans, focus primarily on the political message of the work, its anti-war critique, 
the communist views of the author and the nationalist polemic against the 
 detrimental influences of a foreign military presence in Iceland, as well as its 
obvious flaws as a work of literature. The fact that it also constitutes the first 
Icelandic novel grappling with the fictional mediation of events and experi-
ences which had not been dealt with in Icelandic literature before has gone 
largely unnoticed.23 Cold-war partisan politics and its aftermath have meant 
that the challenging questions raised by Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson’s experi-
ences have not yet become part of the general discourse, as no serious study of 
his work, or of the influences he has had on for instance Jóhannes úr Kötlum’s 
work exists. Instead it disappeared from view, from cultural memory, only to 
reappear at the start of the next century.
 Across the River Ebro
The main protagonist in Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir’s novel Yfir Ebrofljótið [Across 
the River Ebro] says at the beginning of the book:
It is strange how quickly wars are forgotten, people think first and fore-
most about rebuilding and erasing traces and in the end it is as if nothing 
has happened. Horrors are at best turned into ceremonies with speeches, 
marching bands, and flowers. They are buried everywhere, the boys from 
the Republican army, and not all of them in a graveyard. It is highly un-
likely that one chances upon their graves with flowers.’24
23 See Daisy Neijmann, “‘Óboðinn gestur.’ Fyrstu birtingarmyndir hernámsins í íslenskum 
skáldskap.” Skírnir 185 (2011). Verndarenglarnir was reviewed at the time by Kristinn 
E.  Andrésson, Sigurður Helgason, and Sverrir Kristjánsson. It has been discussed since by 
Kristinn Kristjánsson, Sigþrúður Gunnarsdóttir, and Dagný Kristjánsdóttir.
24 Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir, Yfir Ebrofljótið (Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 2001), 35.
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Gunnlaugsdóttir’s text is published in 2001, a crucial moment for ‘historical 
memory’ in Spain. It is the same year that Javier Cercas’ novel Soldados de 
Salamina (2001; Soldiers of Salamis, 2004) is published, the first among many 
bestsellers in Spain on the Civil War and the Franco regime. It is also the time 
when, as Francisco Ferrándiz explains, Spain has ‘seen the emergence of a 
surprisingly strong social movement, loosely founded on the idea of “recover-
ing historical memory”.’ He explains that the ‘recovery movement,’ which has 
never failed to spark controversy, mostly focuses on: ‘(1) locating graves and 
exhuming corpses of the victims of Franco’s repressive policies, both during 
the Civil War (1936–1939) and after Franco’s victory, and (2) recording oral tes-
timony from victims and relatives, mostly in digital video format.’25 The exhu-
mations have sparked controversy and debate, but the reappearance of these 
victims in the media through photographs has also meant that ‘[t]he buried 
bodies the graves contain have turned into mute protagonists, but extraor-
dinarily significant, in the process known as the “recuperation of historical 
memory” in Spain in the twenty-first century.’26 The bodies have come back to 
haunt Spanish society, and thus opened up the past, forcing a new negotiation 
of remembering/forgetting.
Gunnlaugsdóttir’s protagonist, directly based on Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson, 
is, interestingly, also called Haraldur. What is more, he addresses his story to 
‘Máni,’ in this instance not a personal name but the Icelandic word for the 
moon. These names alone thus establish a direct textual link between the two 
earlier mediations of Hallgrímsson’s experiences. This novel, however, does 
not view these experiences in a contemporary setting but is retrospective for 
the most part. Haraldur is an old man who, alone in his Reykjavík flat, revis-
its his memories of his time in Spain, fighting with the International Brigades 
during the Civil War. Like Haraldur in Verndarenglarnir, he returned from the 
war with physical and mental injuries. He can no longer use his left hand (is it 
purely a coincidence that it should be his left hand?), and he has tried to forget 
everything concerning the war as the memories are too painful, even though 
this means that he betrays his promise to his friend Andrés before he died, that 
he would testify to what really happened.
Having reached old age and starting to lose his memory, however, Haraldur 
is beginning to realize that he needs to tell his story. Thus the novel goes back 
25 Francisco Ferrándiz and Alejandro Baer, “Digital Memory: The Visual Recording of Mass 
Grave Exhumations in Contemporary Spain,” Forum: Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research (Online Journal) 9.3 (2008): Art. 35, par. 10.
26 Francisco Ferrándiz, El pasado bajo tierra Exhumaciones contemporáneas de la Guerra 




and forth between past and present as Haraldur remembers. The descriptions 
of his experiences are extremely detailed, demonstrating the complexity of 
this war and challenging any black-and-white view. At the same time they are 
deeply personal, giving the reader an intimate insight into the personal experi-
ence of a large historical event which has overshadowed Haraldur’s life ever 
since.27 The emphasis in the novel is therefore not least on the consequences 
of these experiences: how does one continue to live with the trauma of war, 
the memory of fallen friends and the betrayal of ideals? Although the fascists 
and Nazis are the enemy that Haraldur and his fellow soldiers are fighting on 
the ground, the real enemy in the novel is politics, which will betray anyone 
and everyone.
The Icelanders who saw the horrors of war first-hand were very few in num-
ber. Those who made it back to Iceland had to try and readjust to everyday 
life in a society for which the war had meant unprecedented prosperity and 
progress rather than atrocities, suffering and starvation. This made the read-
justment all the more difficult, as their experiences did not fit into Icelandic 
reality. In Iceland, there was no public story or memory of war veterans, war 
heroes or survival against the odds. While it is true that Haraldur himself tries 
to forget, it is just as true that there is noone who understands, believes, or 
even wants to listen to his story anyway. This becomes painfully clear when his 
brother-in-law, who does not know the first thing about war, accuses Haraldur 
of having betrayed his ideals. Instead, Haraldur concludes, people ‘prefer to 
live with deception,’ for ‘the truth disturbs the peace.’28
One Icelander who experienced the horrors of the concentration camps 
was Leifur Muller. On his return he published his memories (Í fangabúðum 
nazista [In the Nazi concentration camps], 1945), which were re-written, ex-
panded and re-published in 1988 (Býr Íslendingur hér? [Does an Icelander live 
here?], with Garðar Sverrisson). In the later edition, Muller looks back not only 
on his time in the camps but also remembers what it was like to live with this 
experience, before and after camp syndrome and ptsd became recognized.29 
While Gunnlaugsdóttir relies on Hallgrímsson’s memories for the descriptions 
of the war in Spain, she integrates Muller’s experiences into Haraldur’s account 
27 Gunnþórunn Guðmundsdóttir, “Tregðan í frásögninni: Yfir Ebrofljótið,” and Úlfhildur 
Dagsdóttir, “Flakkað um frásagnir: Minni, tími og stríð í skáldverkum Álfrúnar Gunn-
laugsdóttur,” Rúnir: greinasafn um skáldskap og fræðastörf Álfrúnar Gunnlaugsdóttur, ed. 
Guðni Elísson (Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, 2010).
28 Gunnlaugsdóttir, Yfir Ebrofljótið, 436.
29 Leifur Muller, Í fangabúðum nazista (Reykjavík: Víkingsútgáfan, 1945); Garðar Sverrisson, 
Býr Íslendingur hér? Minningar Leifs Muller (Reykjavík: Iðunn, 1988).
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of his life after his return from the war, for instance the fact that Haraldur al-
ways has clothes ready at the end of his bed in case he needs to get up in the 
middle of the night and leave.30 Thus, the novel becomes, in Rigney’s words, ‘a 
fictional framework where different stories can be linked’, as Gunnlaugsdóttir 
weaves together and re-mediates Icelandic memories of war, actual and fic-
tionalized.31 Twenty years earlier, Gunnlaugsdóttir was the first Icelandic au-
thor after Jóhannes út Kötlum to write about traumatic war experience in an 
Icelandic context, in the short story ‘I’. In this story, the figure of the soldier, 
and in particular his gun, becomes the trigger of both fascination and terror.32
With her novel and earlier short story, Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir contests 
Icelandic collective memory of both the Spanish Civil War and World War ii. 
The Icelandic historian Guðmundur Hálfdanarson has pointed to the fact that 
World War ii has been remarkably absent from Icelandic public consciousness 
and debate, and its discussion has remained quite low-key in Icelandic histori-
ography. In Icelandic collective memory, too, World War ii and the Allied occu-
pation play only a very modest and muted role, as can be seen for instance from 
its virtual absence in Icelandic museum and public memorial culture. Hálf-
danarson suggests this may be attributed to the fact that the Icelandic experi-
ence of World War ii does not fit into the grand narrative of Icelandic history, 
which centres around the heroic battle for independence from foreign oppres-
sion, which in turn is considered essential for social and economic progress 
and welfare. During the war, however, it was in fact foreign occupation which 
brought wealth and modernity to the country and laid the foundation for the 
postwar development of Iceland as a modern nation. It is not least as a result of 
this that, in Hálfdanarson’s words, ‘interest in, or moral incentive of, rewriting 
the history of Iceland’s participation in the Second World War, or to present an 
alternative narrative … has been limited at best.’33 Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir on 
the other hand focuses on personal memory of the war, particularly memories 
which challenge the grand national narrative of, on the one hand, a military 
invasion by a foreign aggressor, and, on the other hand, the ‘blessed war’ that 
30 Gunnlaugsdóttir, Yfir Ebrófljótið, 69, 360.
31 Rigney, “Portable Monuments”, 378. Gunnlaugsdóttir published an extensive article based 
on her research into experiences of the Nazi concentration camps as related in three 
published memoirs (by Leifur Muller, Primo Levi and Jorge Semprún): “Í návist dauðans: 
frásagnir þriggja manna af dvöl sinni í fangabúðum nazista,” Ritið 3.3 (2003).
32 Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir, “I”, Af manna völdum (Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 1981), 7–14.
33 Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, “‘The Beloved War.’ The Second World War and the Icelandic 
National Narrative,” Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies 
Revisited, eds. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academ-
ic Press, 2011), 89.
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brought Iceland wealth, by placing it in a transnational context. In one inter-
view after the publication of the novel, Gunnlaugsdóttir mentions the boom 
in memory texts in Europe and the interest in World War ii at the millennium 
and confirms she is writing history from the inside, from the individual’s per-
spective, through the lens of memory. As she explains:
The War had more impact on people than one thinks. People speak of 
the wartime lightly in Iceland, too lightly I think, because people were 
scared. The fear lives on with the children and has influenced the writers 
who want to review this period, even if simply for themselves. It is often 
said that people write to get rid of certain things […] But my opinion is 
that if you forget the past something dies inside you. There are things 
that should not be forgotten, as that would be a sign of a certain type of 
death.34
Here, the author clearly touches upon many issues with which we are famil-
iar in the discourse on the millennial memory boom, but that had, until then 
and to a large extent since, remained outside the general discourse in Iceland. 
Interestingly, the interview was published in the newspaper Morgunblaðið, 
the same right-wing paper which supported Franco during the war and which 
 usually has had very harsh words to write about those who fought with the 
International Brigades.
Seen in this light, one could say that the memorial process represented in 
Yfir Ebrofljótið through Haraldur represents an attempt to fragment a mono-
lithic national narrative by rendering subjective experiences of war in the larg-
er context of transnational memory. Textual ghosts from a past the nation has 
chosen to forget because they did not fit into the grand narrative of Icelandic 
history are brought back to life. Haraldur never wanted to ‘bring the past back 
on himself,’35 only to realize in old age that it has continued to haunt him and 
has alienated him from those closest to him. His decision finally to tell his story 
is the long overdue testimony he had promised his dying friend. By bearing 
witness at last, he challenges deception and demands recognition on behalf of 
those whose suffering has been ignored and whose experiences and sacrifices 
have been forgotten. Similarly, the novel, in its fictional mediation of Icelandic 
memories of war, bears witness to ‘forgotten’ stories and experiences in na-
tional history and literary history, this time in the more receptive transnational 
34 Fríða Björk Ingvarsdóttir, “Það veitir mér meira öryggi að leggja út í óvissuna,” interview 
with Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir, Lesbók Morgunblaðsins, 22 December 2001.
35 Gunnlaugsdóttir, Yfir Ebrofljótið, 436.
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context of the memory boom and the recognition of symptoms and long-term 
effects of war trauma.
It is significant that the novel ends with Haraldur, on his way home, think-
ing that he ‘didn’t know, and didn’t want to know. That within a few months a 
world war would break out and the realm of death would take over. As it had 
in Spain under Franco.’36 These final sentences directly link the Spanish Civil 
War and the Second World War, one directly following the other. These two 
international events catapulted Iceland into the modern age and into modern 
war. From this moment on, Icelanders had a share in international war, and 
had to face the fact that, as a nation, whether they liked it or not, they were no 
longer peace-time subjects ‘north of war,’ but participants in world events.37
The publication of Yfir Ebrofljótið in 2001, twelve years after the fall of the 
Berlin wall, meant that an overwhelming sense of relief of finally leaving Cold 
War politics behind was still palpable in the country. It is, for instance, strik-
ing that the left – right, communist – fascist discourse is barely mentioned in 
the work, despite its centrality to the work itself, and neither are the trade in-
terests. Instead, the novel clearly aims to rekindle forgotten memories among 
new generations of readers living in a global world and exposed daily to trans-
national memory through media such as literature, film, popular culture, social 
media and the Internet. This new readership has grown up with Iceland being 
a participant on the international stage, and is therefore much more likely to 
be receptive to viewing Icelandic memory in a transnational context and to 
explore the reverberations of world events at home in a new light.
It comes therefore as no surprise that the reception of Gunnlaugsdóttir’s 
novel was very different from the works of Hallgrímsson and Jóhannes úr 
 Kötlum. Other factors of course play their part in this, notably changes in the 
media: the advance of new media, the fading of partisan journalism and the 
advances in cultural journalism. The novel was widely reviewed in newspapers, 
magazines, literary websites and on tv and radio. It was nominated for several 
literary prizes, the most prestigious of which was undoubtedly the  Nordic Prize 
for Literature. It seems to garner continued interest, for instance as the subject 
of a literary program on Icelandic National Radio in 2015. Its legacy, whether it 
will be constitutive of war memory in Iceland, is harder to gauge at this point 
in time.
36 Gunnlaugsdóttir, Yfir Ebrofljótið, 456.
37 ‘North of war’ (Norðan við stríð, 1971) is the title of an Icelandic occupation novel by In-
driði G. Þorsteinsson which is structured on the trope of Icelanders always having be-
lieved their country to be too far removed ever to become a part of international wars.
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 Memorialization of Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson
The lack of any discourse on the memory boom in Iceland might perhaps lead 
one to believe that the country had not witnessed such a boom. This, however, 
would not be quite accurate. Ketill Kristinsson has studied, mapped and inves-
tigated the history of trauma memorials in Iceland in the twentieth  century. 
He has travelled around the country, listed the memorials, their location, the 
year in which they were built, and their ‘character’, that is, the movement as 
seen elsewhere from the monumental to the memorial.38 His chart of the 
building of memorials around the country demonstrates abundantly that Ice-
land followed many other countries in Europe and elsewhere in this matter. 
The huge increase in the building of memorials from the 1980s and onwards 
is unmistakable, as is the change in their form and location. The memorials 
mainly memorialize fishermen and others lost at sea, as well as those killed in 
natural disasters, in particular in avalanches which have contributed to a great 
loss of life in small villages in Iceland. One such memorial is the Memorial to 
Drowned Seamen in the Fossvogur Cemetery in Reykjavík. The history of the 
memorial is interesting, as it is in part based on one of the earliest trauma 
memorials erected in Iceland. The original was built in 1938 on the Tomb of 
the Unknown Fisherman in a clear echo of tombs of the unknown soldiers 
erected across Europe in the wake of the Second World War. There are no Ice-
landic war memorials (although there are foreign war memorials in Iceland); 
instead Icelanders have tended to regard those lost at sea as their fallen heroes. 
In 1996 additional structures were added to the memorial: low walls called the 
Waves of Memory. Here, relatives of those lost at sea could pay for their names 
to be edged on the ‘wave’ stones under a heading with the boat’s name and 
the year in which it perished. In 2005 the Minster of Fisheries, Árni Matthie-
sen, supported the initiative to add the names of those who had been lost at 
sea during World War ii, the first time a particular group had been specifically 
memorialized, paid for by the public. On one of these ‘waves’ the ship Sæborg 
and its crew can be found, with the name of Hallgrímur Hallgrímsson edged 
in the stone. Hallgrímsson story has thus come back to haunt us, his story has 
become one of the stories that call on us to remember. Maybe it to a certain 
extent exemplifies Iceland’s political, geographical and cultural situation in 
Europe: being very much on the margins, but nevertheless intricately involved 
in  central events.
38 Some of the results are discussed in Ketill Kristinsson, “Eyrnamörk gleymskunnar: Nok-
kur orð um minnismerki,” Ritið 13.1 (2013).
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It is interesting to note that, while Hallgrímur’s name on the memori-
al awards him certain recognition, it is only for his death at sea, not for his 
 participation in the International Brigades or his fight for workers’ rights. Out-
side of his literary contribution he is, in other words, only recognized as a 
victim, not an agent, and only within the context of public memorial culture 
in Iceland, which is, of course, tied to the grand narrative of Icelandic history. 
It is the literary works, which memorialize him and his ‘afterlife as textual 
monuments’ in Rigney’s terms,39 that provide the social framework for the 
memory of him as an active agent, a soldier, an Icelandic participant in an 
international conflict.
 Conclusion
‘Under the Republic’s Flag: Memories from the Spanish Civil War’ by Hall-
grímur Hallgrímsson constitutes an intriguing example of a ‘forgotten’ text 
that refuses to go away. Its afterlife as a textual monument of personal memo-
ries and experiences that did not fit into the monolithic founding myth of the 
modern Republic of Iceland clearly demonstrates how, in Astrid Erll’s words, 
‘the nation-centredness … approach … “forgets” the history of exchange within 
Europe.’40 It makes it very obvious that memory of war and occupation, as well 
as trauma memorials are very much under-discussed and under-researched in 
Iceland, and need to be brought into the discourse of the past. Icelandic histo-
riography, collective memory and national self-image have not yet undergone 
the kind of revision that has happened elsewhere, and a clear tendency to view 
Icelandic events and experiences almost exclusively from an Icelandic point 
of view remains. At the same time, Hallgrímsson’s text has been the source of 
repeated attempts at ‘reactualizing’ his memories at important points in Ice-
landic history, always contesting the dominant national version of history and 
claiming recognition, a place in cultural memory. The afterlife of Hallgríms-
son, in the form of various re-workings and re-interpretations of his memories, 
constitutes a poignant example of the formative role of international events 
in Icelandic history, personal and national, as well as of what can be gained by 
integrating national and European memory.
39 Rigney, “Portable Monuments,” 372.
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The Italian Hall Tragedy, 1913: A Hundred Years of 
Remediated Memories
Anne Heimo
On Christmas Eve 1913 seventy-three people were crushed to death during the 
1913–1914 Copper Strike in the small township of Calumet on the Keweenaw 
Peninsula, Upper Michigan. On Christmas Eve the local Women’s Auxiliary of 
the Western Federation of Miners (wfm) had arranged a party for the strikers’ 
families at the local Italian hall. At some point in the evening someone was heard 
to shout ‘fire’ and as people rushed to get out of the building they were hauled 
down the stairs and crushed to death. Sixty-three of the victims were children. 
There was no fire. Later on this tragic event became to be known as ‘The Italian 
Hall tragedy’, ‘The Italian Hall disaster’ or the ‘1913 Massacre,’ and it continues to 
be the one most haunting event in the history of the Copper Country.
As a folklorist and oral historian, I am foremost interested in the history 
and memory practices of so called ordinary people in everyday situations 
and how they narrate about the past and events and experiences they find 
memorable and worth retelling. When first hearing about the tragedy a few 
years ago, I could not help noticing that it had all the elements for keeping 
a story alive. The tragedy was a worker’s conflict between mining companies 
and miners, which resulted in the death of many innocent people, mainly 
children. Although the tragedy was investigated on several occasions, no one 
was found responsible for the deaths, and the case remains unsolved to this 
day. Was it a pure accident, an ill-fated prank or the deliberate work of anti-
trade-unionists, in other words murder? The inquiries were carried out in-
adequately and the documents of the coroner’s inquest went missing for a 
half century. Even the doors of the hall have an important part in the story. 
While some believe that the doors were bolted from the outside to stop people 
from fleeing, some are sure that the doors opened inward and could not be 
opened, because the bodies were piling up in the front of them. In many ways 
the story also reminds me of historical tales concerning so called Christmas 
panics in churches around Finland in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
These tales often include a false fire, people suffocating in stairways trying 
to flee and that many of the victims are children. These tales are based on 
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historical events, and  because of these panics, officials ordered, already in the 
nineteenth century, that church doors and doors of other public buildings are 
to open outward.1
Now after going through dozens and dozens of versions of the story I am 
perhaps even more amazed by its persistence. The story has been told so many 
times and on so many forums, that it is nearly impossible to write about it 
without quoting someone else’s words. But why, a century later, do people con-
tinue to retell this particular story?
Previously I have examined narrated memories and historical interpreta-
tions mainly from the perspective of the never-ending social process of history 
making, in which we all take part regardless of our education, profession or mo-
tivation.2 This continuous process consists of the interplay of public, popular, 
and scholarly histories and takes into notice the active role of non-historians 
and vernacular history in history making. Although people have always partici-
pated in history and memory making, new information and communication 
technology enable people to engage in these practices in ways that were not 
possible before. This shift also offers new opportunities for scholars to exam-
ine these activities, which before the digital era happened mostly within small 
communities and groups and could not be easily observed without long-term 
participant observation and interviewing.
An alternative way to look at this same process is to examine it as the reme-
diation of transnational and transcultural memory. First, a historical event is 
created by the media, ‘… by newspaper articles, newsreels, photographs, dia-
ries, historiographic works, poems, novels, plays, paintings, memorials, films, 
tv series, comics and blogs as well as Twitter and Facebook status updates’ as 
Dagmar Brunow points out.3 After this the memory of the event will continue 
to travel across and beyond different borders, scales and territories and have 
1 Janne Toivonen, “‘Kirkko pallaa, alttari puttoo ja kivimuuri kaatuu’ – joulukirkkojen 
tuhoisien pakokauhujen vuoksi ovet aukeavat Suomessa ulospäin,” Yle uutiset, 27 December 
2015, accessed 16 June 2016, http://yle.fi/uutiset/kirkko_pallaa_alttari_puttoo_ja_kivimuuri_
kaatuu__joulukirkkojen_tuhoisien_pakokauhujen_vuoksi_ovet_aukeavat_suomessa_ 
ulospain/8533432.
2 See e.g. Anne Heimo, Kapina Sammatissa: Vuoden 1918 paikalliset tulkinnat osana historian 
yhteiskunnallisen rakentamisen prosessia (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2010), 
17–18; Anne Heimo, “The 1918 Finnish Civil War Revisited: The Digital Aftermath,” Folklore 57 
(2014), 142, accessed 7 June 2016, doi:10.7592/FEJF2014.57.heimo.
3 Dagmar Brunow, Remediating Transcultural Memory: Documentary Filmmaking as Archival 
Intervention (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), 4.
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new meanings attached to it at every stage.4 When the memory ceases to be 
 remediated it has lost its meaningfulness. The same applies to all narratives. 
When we can no longer find meaning in a narrative, there is no point in retell-
ing it.
Our everyday life has changed fundamentally during the last few decades. 
Internet technology has had a huge impact on many aspects of our lives, among 
them the possibility to take part in global activities, which transcend national 
borders. In memory studies this shift has led to the re-examining and contest-
ing of former notions of memory, for instance the terms collective memory and 
national memory, which perceive groups, communities or the nation-state as 
certain types of containers of memory with more or less clear-cut borders. 
Even private and personal memories are increasingly shared in public with 
people whom we do not necessarily know. To overcome the problems associ-
ated with these former terms, terms like transnational memory5 and transcul-
tural memory6 have been introduced. Both of these terms stress the movement 
of memory across and between times, places, generations and media, from 
the private sphere to the public sphere, from individuals to communities and 
vice versa and beyond national (and other) borders. Additionally the acknowl-
edging of the role of (new) media in the construction of memory has led to a 
shift from studying ‘sites of memory’ to the ‘dynamics’, ‘flows’ and ‘travels’ of 
memory.7 While an image may travel and be given new meanings without be-
ing altered, memories in narrative form will always be subject to change, and 
be shaped and reworked to new needs. This shaping is done according to the 
requirements of popular storytelling and draws on knowledge and informa-
tion from the surrounding culture.
4 Chiara De Cesari and Anne Rigney, “Introduction: Beyond methodological nationalism,” 
in Transnational Memory: Circulation, Articulation, Scales, ed. Chiara De Cesari and Anne 
 Rigney, (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 9.
5 De Cesari and Rigney, “Introduction,” 3–8.
6 Astrid Erll, “Travelling Memory,” Parallax 17 (2011), 9, accessed 7 June 2016, doi:10.1080/135346
45.2011.605570.
7 José Van Dijck, Mediated Memories in the Digital Age, (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), 18–19, 53–55; Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney,” Introduction: Cultural Memory and its 
Dynamics,” in Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, ed. Astrid Erll 
and Ann Rigney, (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2009); Julia Creet, “Introduction,” in Memory 
and migration: multidisciplinary approaches to memory studies, ed. Julia Creet and Andreas 
Kitzmann, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 9; Erll, “Travelling Memory,” 9; De Ce-
sari and Rigney, “Introduction,” 8–11.
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‘New’ media is often considered more democratic than ‘old’ media, although 
this is not always the case.8 It is also true that most users will rather passively 
follow the activities of other users or share contents created by others on the 
Internet than create new contents themselves.9 Nonetheless, I think that the 
examining of history and memory making practices online will give insight to 
these practices and demonstrate what people themselves find worth remem-
bering of their past and why.
 Everyday Practices of Online History and Memory Making
The Internet is full of both large institutional and small-scale private sites of 
memory and commemoration, which are used increasingly to showcase lost 
heritage sites, to commemorate historic events retrospectively or to share fam-
ily memories with both local and transnational audiences. Although collabora-
tion and participation with wider audiences is common practice among public 
historians working in archives, museums or oral history projects as well as a 
wide range of other actors, including writers, journalists, artists, film makers 
and activists, people will often choose to act individually on the personal level 
and share their memories spontaneously with their peers rather than take part 
in institutionally organized acts of memorialization, however impressive or 
well-planned they may be.10 They can become their own publishers, authors 
and archivists, who do not necessarily need or want expert supervision to cre-
ate, manage and curate their collections. At the same time these practices re-
sult in a new kind of heritage, which is produced without outside supervision 
or expertise and which is more liable to change than preservation.11
8 See e.g. Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading, “Introduction”, in 
Save as…Digital Memories, ed. Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Read-
ing, (London & New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), 8–11; Jose Van Dijck, The Culture of 
Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
9 Jakob Nielsen, “The 90-9-1 Rule for Participation Inequality in Social Media and Online 
Communities,” Nielsen Norman Group, 2006, accessed 7 June 2016, https://www.nngroup 
.com/articles/participation-inequality/.
10 Peter Jan Margry and Cristina Sánchez-Carretero, “Introduction: Rethinking Memorial-
ization: The Concept of Grassroots Memorials,” in Grassroots Memorials. The Politics of 
Memorializing Traumatic Death, ed. Peter Jan Margry and Cristina Sánchez-Carretero, 
(New York & Oxford: Berghahn, 2011), 3–4; Heimo, The 1918 Finnish Civil War Revisited.
11 Elisa, Giarccardi, “Introduction: Reframing Heritage in Participatory Culture,” in Heritage 
and Social Media: Understanding Heritage in a Participatory Culture, ed. Elisa Giarccardi, 
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Participatory culture and grassroots activities are characteristics of many of 
these practices. Web 2.0 is often regarded a particular technology which makes 
interaction on the Internet (social media) possible, when it actually refers 
more to the way people are using the Internet than to the actual technology.12 
This new mindset includes, for instance, a motivation to participate and share, 
to trust other users and the right to create new contents by remixing former 
ones, which are all features of convergence and participatory culture. Conver-
gence refers to the circulation of media due to technological, industrial, cul-
tural and social changes in culture and to the flow of contents across multiple 
media platforms. Participatory culture highlights community involvement and 
is ready to offer all interested an opportunity to contribute. Participatory cul-
ture is not only about production and consumption; it is also about affiliation, 
expression, collaboration, distribution and the disclaiming of former divisions 
between professionals and amateurs.13 Although participatory culture is nei-
ther only a feature of today, nor exists only on the Internet, the term is now 
commonly used when referring to cultural practices on the Internet. These 
practices may also occur offline, but are still dependent on new technology, 
and the creations can be distributed globally through digital networks even 
when they are produced personally and locally.14
The Italian Hall tragedy offers a fruitful example to examine the remedia-
tion of transcultural memory across and between different kinds of borders 
and times. The tragedy was immediately covered by local and national me-
dia from dissenting vantage points and photos of the site of the tragedy, the 
victims and their funerals, were circulated widely. However, a year later there 
was little or no mention of the event in public, and this is how the situation 
remained for decades. Even the release of Woody Guthrie’s song ‘1913 Massa-
cre’ in 1941 did not break the silence. Nonetheless the memory of the tragedy 
continued to be conveyed, especially amongst those families and local ethnic 
(London & New York, Routledge, 2012), 1–10; See also Laurajane, Smith, Uses of Heritage, 
(Oxon, Routledge, 2006).
12 Timothy O’Reilly, “What is Web 2.0? Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next 
Generation of Software,” Oreilly (2005), accessed 7 June 2016, http://www.oreilly.com/
pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html.
13 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, (New York & Lon-
don: New York University Press, 2006), 2–3, 322–331; Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford and Joshua 
Green, Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture, (New York 
& London: New York University Press, 2013).
14 Joanne Garde-Hansen, Media and Memory, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2011), 46.
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 communities which had been affected by the tragedy. When the time came, 
these memories surfaced again and have since been remediated in numerous 
ways and for various reasons. Whereas these private and personal memories 
used to be mostly presented and published by outsiders, such as journalists, 
historians and writers, today the situation is quite different. People can now 
share their memories on web and social media sites by themselves, without 
supervision. This case study also shows that over a century later the memory 
of the tragedy is still open for new interpretations and uses.
In the following I will first introduce Calumet, its history and multi-ethnic 
community and the actual tragedy. Then I will examine the memory of the 
tragedy from different perspectives, including the remediated memory and 
the transnationality and diasporic nature of the heritage site. After this I will 
present some examples of online commemoration and explore some of the 
reasons why the memory of the tragedy continues to fascinate and intrigue 
people.
 Calumet – A Multi-Ethnic Mining Community
Copper Country was the home of the first mining boom in the United States. 
Copper was found on the Upper Michigan Peninsula in the 1840s and from 
then on, for over a century, the area was in need of a constant flow of immi-
grant workers. Most of the mining companies were relatively small in size and 
employed only a few thousand workers at the most. One of the largest mining 
companies was Calumet & Hecla (C&H), which had over 21,000 employees in 
1907. Like so many other companies, also C&H applied a paternalistic system 
and built houses, shops, schools, libraries and other services for its employees. 
In addition to serving the needs of the company’s workers, paternalism also 
meant that the company had control over nearly all aspects of the lives of its 
employees.15
From the 1860s to 1920s over 350,000 Finns immigrated to North America. 
In the United States large numbers of Finns ended up working in the mines in 
15 Gary Kaunonen and Aaron Goings, Community in Conflict: A Working-Class History of the 
1913–14 Michigan Copper Strike and the Italian Hall Tragedy, (Lansing: Michigan State Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 21–24, 85; Linsday E. Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place: 
One Hundred Years of Remembering the Italian Hall Tragedy and the 1913–1914 Michigan 
Copper Strike, (Macomb: Faculty of the Department of History of Western Illinois Univer-
sity, 2014), 25, accessed 7 June 2016, http://gradworks.umi.com/15/57/1557255.html.
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Copper Country in Michigan and the Iron Range in Minnesota. One of the first 
permanent Finnish settlements in the United States was founded in Calumet 
already in the 1860s and in the following decades Finns continued to move 
there.16 The Finnish community was only one of the many immigrant commu-
nities in the region at the time, but it was and still is the most populous ethnic 
community there.
Around the turn of the century socialism began to gain ground among Finn-
ish immigrants and many ‘Red Finns’ took an active role in leftist politics and 
trade unions.17 This made the Finns the largest socialist group in the country 
and one of the most discriminated. All around the United States workers were 
forced to compete against each other, which lead to ethnic hostilities. While 
immigrants from English-speaking countries, Germans and Scandinavians 
were offered high-rank jobs, Finns, Slavs and Italians were given the most me-
nial jobs. The differentiation between the different ethnic groups was about 
‘old’ and ‘new’ immigrant groups, but it was also about racial ideology. Con-
trary to Scandinavians the whiteness of Finns was questioned.18
Despite the fact that Copper Country workers had been joining trade 
unions since the 1880s, the WFM-organized Copper Country Strike in 
 1913–1914 was the first major strike in the area. The strike was a multiethnic 
enterprise to improve working conditions, achieve union recognition and to 
unite  immigrant   communities. Many Finns were involved in the strike, both 
as members of the local wfm or because they held positions within the wfm. 
The strike began on 23 July 1913 and ended nine months later in April, 1914. 
The strike was not a success for the strikers, and thousands of miners moved 
elsewhere afterwards.19 Nonetheless, mining continued until the 1960s when 
most of the mines were shut down in the area. The very last copper mine was 
shut down in 1995.
16 Peter Kivisto, Immigrant Socialists in the United States: The Case of the Finns and the Left, 
(London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1984), 72, 74–75.
17 Kivisto, Immigrant Socialists in the United States, 92–98; Ralf Kauranen and Mikko Pollari, 
“Transnational socialist imagination: The connections between Finnish socialists in the 
usa and Finland at the turn of the 20th century,” in Labouring Finns: Transnational Poli-
tics in Finland, Canada, and the United States ed. Michel S. Beaulieu, Ronald N. Harpelle 
and Jaimi Penney, (Turku: Institute of Migration, 2011); Kaunonen and Goings, Commu-
nity in Conflict, 49–51.
18 Kivisto, Immigrant Socialists in the United States, 126–129; Kauranen and Pollari, “Transna-
tional socialist imagination,” 40–41; Kaunonen and Goings, Community in Conflict, 47–48.
19 Kivisto, Immigrant Socialists in the United States, 139; Kaunonen and Goings, Community 
in Conflict, 88–91, 113–114.
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 The Italian Hall Tragedy
The Copper Country Strike had been going on for five months and to cheer the 
families and especially the children of the strikers, the Women’s Auxiliary Or-
ganization of the wmf decided to arrange a party at the Italian Hall on Christ-
mas Eve. Five to seven hundred people, a major part of them local children, 
were at the party enjoying themselves, when a shout of ‘fire’ was heard. Only a 
moment later people began to rush towards the stairs to get out. Tens of peo-
ple found their way out, but then someone fell down the steep stairway. This 
caused more people to tumble down the stairs and people began to pile up on 
top of each other. Help arrived in a few minutes, but it took hours until people 
could be entangled from each other and moved from the staircase. Some of 
them survived with no or minor injuries, but seventy-three people were found 
dead. Most of the dead were children of Finnish immigrants. The victims were 
buried a few days later at the local Lakewood cemetery, side by side in two 
unmarked mass graves, one for twenty-two catholic victims and one for the 
forty-four protestant ones. The rest of the victims were buried in family graves. 
Burial and memorial services were held in six churches in several languages, 
with the Finnish Church among them.20
20 Steve Lehto, Death’s Door: The Truth behind Michigan’s Largest Mass Murder, (Troy, mi: 
Momentum Books, 121–123; Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place, 119–120.
Figure ��.� [s]howbet’s YouTube video also includes 
clippings from local  newspapers. Family and 
friends of Finnish victims held their funeral 
service at the  local Finnish church.  





Several eyewitnesses testified that a strange man wearing an anti-union 
Citizen Alliance button pinned to his coat had run up the stairs and shouted 
‘fire’ and then left, but this was never officially stated. The mining companies 
denied having anything to do with the incident. Neither the coroner’s inquest 
held soon after the tragedy nor the subcommittee sent by the United States 
Congress to investigate the tragedy a few months later found anyone guilty for 
the deaths.21 This led to several alternative explanations concerning the cause 
of the disaster. Some blamed the tragedy on a drunkard who had thought he 
had seen flames and some on a linguistic misunderstanding since most of the 
people in the hall did not share a common language.22 According to the cur-
rent predominant version, which is largely based on Steve Lehto’s investiga-
tions, the mining companies had wanted to disturb the party, but there is no 
evidence that they had actually bolted the doors or that they had planned the 
deed with its horrific outcome.23
For decades the doors were not considered to have anything to do with the 
tragedy, but at some point they became one of the main motives of the story. 
Some are sure that the outward opening doors had been deliberately bolted by 
members of the Citizen’s Alliance to keep people inside, while others main-
tainthat the bodies piling up in front of the doors made it impossible to open 
the inward opening doors although documents prove that the doors did not 
open inward.24 In October 2015 Steve Lehto posted a newspaper clipping on 
the Facebook page ‘The Italian Hall Disaster – Resource Center’ to prove once 
more his point about the doors having nothing to do with the causalities. One 
person commented on his post: ‘That’s all I ever here [sic] too is about the 
doors. I tell them that you said the doors opened the right way and even tell 
them the way the staircase was they couldn’t have opened in. They still don’t 
believe me. Ugh. It’s no use. lol.’
21 Lehto, Death’s Door, 124–152, 163–174.
22 Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place, 81; Raymond Alvar Wargelin, “Re-
sponse” to Puotinen, Arthur, “Copper country Finns and the strike of 1913,” in The Finnish 
Experience in the Western Great Lakes Region: New Perspectives, ed. Michael G. Karni, Matti 
E. Kaups and Douglas J. Ollila, (Turku: Migration Institute, 1975), 154.
23 Lehto, Death’s Door, 207–208; Steve Lehto, Italian Hall: The Official Transcript of the Coro-
ner’s Inquest, (Troy, mi: Momentum Books, 2007).
24 Lehto, Death’s Door, 175–178. Facebook, “The Italian Hall Disaster –  Resource Center”, 
accessed 10 June 2016, https://www.facebook.com/pg/The-Italian-Hall-Disaster-Resource- 
Center-291845417514549/notes/?ref=page_internal. 
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 Remediated Memories of the Italian Hall Tragedy
The news about the tragedy at the Italian Hall was first released by the 
 Finnish-American socialist newspaper Työmies (Worker), which published an 
extra edition on Christmas Day in both Finnish and English. The paper an-
nounced the death toll to be 80 and already at this stage it referred to eyewit-
ness accounts concerning a strange man with his cap pulled down over his 
eyes and a Citizen’s Alliance button pinned to the lapel of his coat yelling ‘fire’ 
before leaving the building. On 26 December the Työmies declared on its front 
page ‘83 murhattu!’ (83 murdered!) and accused capitalists for the murder of 
children. The next day the first members of the staff of Työmies were arrested 
for their accusations.25 The news soon circulated throughout the country and 
abroad. Some newspapers took a neutral stance, but many sided either with or 
against the strikers and wfm.
A year later many had put the event behind them. On the first anniver-
sary of the tragedy there was no mention of it in the local newspapers. The 
 situation  stayed the same for years to come. For example, in 1920 Juuso 
Hirvonen wrote a 120-page history of the Finns in Copper Country, but did 
not mention the  tragedy and only briefly referred to the strike.26 The first to 
break the silence was Ella Reeves Bloor, one of the members of the Women’s 
Auxiliary  Organization, who had arranged the Christmas party at the Italian 
Hall.27 It was her autobiography which inspired Woody Guthrie to compose 
his song  ‘1913 Massacre’ on his album Struggle, a year later, in 1941.28 Others 
have also recorded the song, among them Bob Dylan who wrote his own ver-
sion of  the song “‘Song for Woody’, as a tribute to Guthrie in 1961, and Arlo 
Guthrie, who recorded his father’s version in 1972. But in the local commu-
nity  the  memory remained hushed and discussed only among friends and 
family.29
The silence was finally broken in the 1970s when the plans to tear down the 
Italian Hall made people alert to the possibility of losing an important local 
25 Lehto, Death’s Door, 110.
26 Juuso Hirvonen, Michiganin kuparialue ja suomalaiset siirtolaiset, (Duluth: Privately pub-
lished, 1920).
27 Ella Reeve Bloor, We Are Many: An Autobiography of Ella Reeve Bloor, (New York: Interna-
tional Publishers, 1940).
28 Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place, 19.
29 See e.g. Lehto, Death’s Door, 2; Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place, 15.
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site of memory.30 Several local stories and memoirs of the tragedy were pub-
lished in the 1980s.31 A new wave of books came in the 2000s.32 Among them 
Deborah K. Frontiera’s young adult novel Living on Sisu, which tells the story 
through the diary entries of a 12-year old girl.33 In 2006 attorney and author 
Steve Lehto published his book Death’s Door: The Truth behind the Italian Hall 
Disaster and the Strike of 1913.34 Lehto’s aim was to set the record straight so he 
also published the transcript of the trial.35 These have since earned him the 
role of expert in the history of the tragedy.
Academics have also shown an interest in the event. The tragedy has been 
covered in various studies on labour, social and immigrant history. One of the 
first of these was by Arthur Puotinen in the collection of essays The Finnish 
Experience in the Western Great Lakes Region: New Perspectives in 1975.36 The 
most recent studies were published in the 2010s. Labor and social historians 
Gary Kaunonen and Aaron Goings have both examined the tragedy as part of 
their larger studies about the Copper Country Strike and the political activities 
of immigrants in the area, especially Finns.37 Linsday Hiltunen’s thesis Cultural 
Memory and the Power of Place (2014) deals with the cultural memory of the 
30 Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place, 104–106.
31 Wilbert B. Maki, Remembrance of a Tragedy, 1913, (si: W.B. Maki, 1983); Arthur W. Thurner, 
Rebels on the Range: The Michigan Copper Miners’ Strike of 19131–914, (Lake Linden, mi: 
John H. Forster Press, 1984); Peggy Germain, Tinsel & Tears 2 (The Italian Hall Disaster, 
Calumet, Michigan), (Privately published, 1987).
32 Lawrence J. Molloy, Italian Hall: The Witnesses Speak, Great Lakes (Hubbell, mi: Great 
Lakes, GeoScience, 2014); Peggy Germain, False Alarm: 1913 Italian Hall Disaster and Death 
Certificates (Author House, 2005).
33 Deborah K. Frontiera, Living on Sisu: The 1913 Union Copper Strike Tragedy, (Bluebonnets, 
Boots & Books Press, 2010).
34 Lehto, Death’s Door; the second edition was published in 2013.
35 Lehto, Italian Hall.
36 Arthur Puotinen, “Copper country Finns and the strike of 1913,” in The Finnish Experi-
ence in the Western Great Lakes Region: New Perspectives, ed. Michael G. Karni, Matti E. 
Kaups and Douglas J. Ollila, (Turku: Migration Institute, 1975); The collection also marks 
the beginning of ongoing collaboration between Finnish and American scholars study-
ing Finns in the United States. See e.g. Labouring Finns: Transnational Politics in Finland, 
Canada, and the United States, ed. Michel S. Beaulieu, Ronald N. Harpelle and Jaimi Pen-
ney, (Turku: Institute of Migration, 2011); Finns in the United States: A History of Settlement, 
Dissent, and Integration, ed. Auvo Kostiainen, (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2014).
37 See also Gary Kaunonen, Challenge Accepted: A Finnish Immigrant Response to Industrial 
America in Michigan’s Copper Country, (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010).
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strike and the tragedy it inflicted on the local community. A notable number 
of the authors mentioned above are of Finnish descent.
In 2004 the shooting of material for the documentary 1913 Massacre: A Film 
inspired by a Woody Guthrie Song, began. The film produced and directed by Ken 
Ross and Louis V. Galdieri (Dreamland Pictures llc) came out in 2011 and has 
since been screened around the United States as well as in Finland.38 The docu-
mentary Red Metal: The Copper Country Strike of 1913 directed by Jonathan Sil-
vers (Saybrook Productions ltd) premiered in December 2013 and was shown 
on Finnish national television a year later.39 In both of the films Woody Guthrie’s 
song is performed, in the former by Arlo Guthrie and in the latter by Steve Earl.
 A Transnational Heritage Site?
The tragedy has been commemorated in various ways including books, mem-
oirs, films, songs, conferences, lectures, tours, concerts and even an opera.40 
Yet, in spite of all the interest, there exists no permanent exhibition about the 
event.41 However, the Italian Hall was listed on the National Register of Historic 
Sites in 1980. In spite of pleas to salvage and renovate the building, The Italian 
Hall was pulled down in 1984. Afterwards the sandstone arch of the doorway 
was erected as a memorial of the tragedy at the now empty lot of the Italian Hall.
At the site there is also a marker which tells the story of the incident. The 
original text, which mentions the inward opening doors, was replaced in 2013 
with a new text:
Michigan Historic Site, Italian Hall Tragedy
By December 1913, thousands of area copper miners had been on strike 
for five months. They were fighting for union recognition, safer working 
conditions, shorter workdays and better pay. On Christmas Eve hundreds 
gathered on the second floor of the Italian Hall to attend a holiday party 
for strikers’ families. As the children filed to the stage to receive presents, 
38 1913 Massacre: A Film inspired by a Woody Guthrie Song, accessed 7 June 2016, 
http://1913massacre.com/.
39 Yle, tv 1, Historia: Veristä kuparia, accessed 7 June 2016, http://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2014/ 
12/11/historia-verista-kuparia.
40 Hoagland, Unresolved; Hiltunen, Cultural Memory and the Power of Place.
41 Michigan Technological University Archives created a travelling exhibit “Turmoil & 
Tragedy” with its own website for the centennial of the 1913–1914 strike: “Tumult and 




someone yelled, ‘Fire!’ People panicked and rushed toward the exit. There 
was no fire. Many were trampled on the stairs. Officially seventy-three 
people died: more than half were children under ten. Despite a Congres-
sional hearing and a coroner’s inquest, the person who yelled fire was never 
identified.
Several immigrant communities were involved in the tragedy, Finnish, Italian, 
Slovenian, Croatian and Polish. The marker tells the story of the tragedy, but 
does not list either the names of the seventy-three victims or their ethnicities. 
The only recognition of ethnicity is a plaque donated by the Italian Ameri-
can Ethnic Organization with the text ‘In honor of the Italian-Americans who 
contributed greatly to this community’. Although the plaque is attached to the 
memorial arch it makes no reference to those members of the community who 
lost their lives in the tragedy.42 According to Lehto the reason for this is that it 
would raise questions and disputes about the number of victims, their names 
and their nationalities. Fifty-five of the victims were born in the United States, 
though they were identified according to the nationality of their parents.43
42 Lehto, Death’s Doors, 95–97.
43 Lehto, Death’s Doors, 148, 206; The Italian Hall Disaster, Calumet, Michigan, accessed 7 
June 2016, http://www.genealogia.fi/emi/emi3d31e.htm.
Figure ��.� “Chokes me up every time we stop” commented one person on TripAdvisor after 
visiting the Italian Hall memorial. (Accessed 10 June, 2016, https://www.tripadvi-
sor.com/Attraction_ Review-g42038-d4557640-Reviews-Italian_Hall_Site-Calumet 
_Upper_Peninsula_Michigan.html. Screenshot 4 May 2017)
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Memory continues to travel and have new meanings attached to it. The 
Italian Hall memorial can be regarded as a site of ‘pain and shame’ as Keir 
Reeves and William Logan describe heritage sites that are a result of episodes 
which most would rather forget than remember.44 On TripAdvisor, review-
ers recommend visiting the memorial to commemorate the disaster, to get 
acquainted with labour history and, as one reviewer notes, with ‘the need 
for safety in all building construction safety’.45 Today it is regarded also as a 
more or less macabre dark heritage site and can be found in books and web-
pages listing examples of unsolved crimes, places of untimely death or other 
‘strange’ or ‘unusual’ places.46
 Digital Diasporas and Diasporic Genealogy
For dispersed migrants around the world the Internet offers various ways to 
connect with each other. Members of these diasporic-based online groups not 
only have a whole range of different sites to choose from, but their reasons 
to participate in these activities also vary. Michel S. Laguerre defines digital 
diaspora as
[a]n immigrant group or descendant of an immigrant population that 
uses it connectivity to participate in virtual networks of contacts for a 
variety of political, economic, social, religious, and communicational 
purposes, that for the most part, may concern either the homeland, the 
host land or both, including its own trajectory abroad.47
44 William Logan and Keir Reeves, “Introduction: Remembering places of pain and shame,” 
in Places of Pain and Shame. Dealing with Difficult Heritage, ed. William Logan and Keir 
Reeves, (London & New York, Routledge, 2009), 1.
45 TripAdvisor, Italian Hall Site, Calumet, accessed 7 June 2016, https://www.tripadvisor.
com/Attraction_Review-g42038-d4557640-Reviews-Italian_Hall_Site-Calumet_Upper_
Peninsula_Michigan.html.
46 Michigan’s Otherside: Exploring the Strange & Unusual in the Great Lakes State, Wicked, 
accessed 7 June 2016, http://michigansotherside.com/the-tragedy-at-italian-hall/; Vi-
ral Nova omg, 25 Days of Creepy Christmas, Day 5, accessed 7 June 2016, http://www 
.viralnova.com/italian-hall-disaster/; Crime Magazine, America’s Worst Unsolved Crime: 
The 1913 Italian Hall Disaster accessed 7 June 2016, http://www.crimemagazine.com/
america%E2%80%99s-worst-unsolved-crime-1913-italian-hall-disaster.
47 Michel S. Laguerre, “Digital Diaspora: Definition and Models,” in Diasporas in the New 
Media Age: Identity, Politics and Community, ed. Adoni Alonso & Pedro J. Oiarzabal, (Las 
Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2010), 50.
Heimo�54
300845
Family history is one the most popular reasons to engage in history-making.48 
The digital and participatory turn has meant a further increase on fam-
ily history practices and what Catherine Nash (2008) refers to as diasporic 
 genealogy, the searching for one’s ancestral roots in ‘the old home country’ or 
among family members who have migrated to other parts of the world.49 In 
addition to searching for lost relatives and sharing family memories, people 
can help and assist each other in these practices on the Internet independent 
on where they are.
It is estimated that there are over 600,000 people in the United States who 
recognize their Finnish ancestry.50 Over 4,400 of them belong to a closed Face-
book group ‘American Finnish people’. In addition there are Facebook pages 
for local Finnish American groups around the country with several hundred 
members in each, for example ‘Finnish American Heritage Society of Can-
tebury, ct’ (496 likers, accessed 7 June 2016), ‘Cokato Finnish American His-
torical Society’ (426 likers, accessed 7 June 2016) and ‘mn Finnish American 
Historical Society Duluth, mn (133 likers, accessed 7 June 2016). Most of the 
members of these groups are second or third generation Finns. The two most 
popular groups ‘Finnish Genealogy’ and ‘Old Recipes from Our Finnish Ances-
tors’ are closed Facebook groups dedicated to the sharing of family history and 
memories. ‘Finnish Genealogy’ was established in 2014 and the membership 
continues to grow (7,085 members, accessed 7 June 2016). The group members 
share personal documents, such as family photos, letters and documents, and 
help each other in translating texts, searching for information in parish regis-
ters or answering various enquires. The group ‘Old Recipes from Our Finnish 
Ancestors’ (5,484 members, accessed 7 June 2016) is a spin-off of the former 
group created in 2014 for the sole purpose of sharing old and new family reci-
pes in order to ‘connect and learn more about our Scandinavian and Finnish 
heritage, and to share recipes, memories and stories related to our roots, draw-
ing us all closer through similar interest in our Scandinavian and Nordic heri-
tage’. As a result of these activities all of these sites form archives consisting 
48 For the United States see Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, Presence of the Past. Popu-
lar Uses of History in American Life, (New York & Chichester, Columbia University Press, 
1998), 21–22, 89–114; For Australia see Paul Ashton and Paul Hamilton, History at the Cross-
roads: Australians and the Past, (Sydney: Halstead Press, 2007), 27–28; For Finland see  Pilvi 
Torsti, Suomalaiset ja historia, (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2012), 29–37, 40–51.
49 Catharine Nash, Of Irish Descent: Origin Stories, Genealogy, & the Politics of Belonging, 
(Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2008), 15–16.
50 Kero, “Migration from Finland to North America,” 53.
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of thousands of posts and hundreds and hundreds of photos, as well as some 
videos and text files.
I examine these types of online sites as certain types of archives, spontane-
ous archives, because they are also about selection, displaying and curation. 
But then again, compared to archives proper, spontaneous archives are dy-
namic, continuously evolving and often ephemeral. Spontaneous refers to the 
fact that these sites are often created at the spur of the moment. Therefore 
they may disappear or be removed without former notice or they may turn into 
long-lasting online archives, which may or may not be actively updated. Spon-
taneous also emphasizes the unofficial nature of these non-institutional me-
morial sites, in the same manner as vernacular and grassroots memorials are 
on occasion referred to as spontaneous shrines.51 Spontaneous archives may 
also be compared to independent community archives, but they do not require 
a sense of community to the same degree.52 People are drawn to spontane-
ous archives for various reasons. Spontaneous archives, similar to their counter 
parts spontaneous shrines, are the result of an emotional need to share private 
and public memories within a group to which one feels connected, even if the 
members of the group do not know each other.
Spontaneous archives come in numerous forms – blogs, YouTube videos, 
Flickr, Facebook etc. Spontaneous archives can be part of a larger audiovisual 
archive, which Brunow defines as ‘the sum of images, sounds and narratives 
circulating in a specific society at a specific historical moment’53 or a part of a 
digital archive such as YouTube, which also allows for the uploading of user-
generated material and therefore resembles archives in general. Spontaneous 
archives have also common features with creative archives or invented archives, 
where people publish user-generated contents for fun, as a fandom activity, 
school assignment, or private or public history and memory making, for ex-
ample.54 Similar to creative and invented archives, spontaneous archives are 
created primarily for the user’s own needs.
51 Jack Santino, “Performative Commemoratives: Spontaneous Shrines and the Public Me-
morialization of Death,” in Spontaneous Shrines and the Public Memorialization of Death, 
ed. Jack Santino, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
52 Andrew Flinn, “Archival Activism: Independent and Community-led Archives, Radical 
Public History and the Heritage Professions,” InterActions: ucla Journal of Education 
and Information Studies, 7 (2011): xx, accessed 7 June, 2016. http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/9pt2490x.
53 Brunow, Remediating Transcultural Memory, 197.
54 Garde-Hansen, Media and Memory, 83–86.
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 Spontaneous Archives and Remixed Memories
The Italian Hall tragedy continues to be commemorated and discussed on 
various websites and blogs. Some of these have been created by different in-
stitutions for the centennial of the Copper Country Strike  1913–1914,55 by local 
history enthusiasts56 or political and labour organizations.57 However, most of 
the online discussions, sharing of post memories and commemorating takes 
place on public and semi-public social media sites dedicated to family, local, 
ethnic, migrant, or worker’s history.
On blogs the event is typically commemorated through the use of both text 
and images. Most of the images are newspaper clippings about the tragedy and 
old photos which have been circulated elsewhere. But private blogs may also 
include family photos of family members who survived the tradegy, as well as 
new family photos of the descendants of the survivors. The use of images has 
increased immensely in recent years. Images can be used as memory tools, but 
also to comment on and discuss. Documentary images and family photos both 
function as records of the past and testify to the authenticity of the events.58
The Facebook page ‘The Italian Hall Disaster – Resource Center’ was created 
in December 2011 and had 659 members in June 2016. The page announces: 
‘This site is a clearinghouse for information, photos and discussion of the Ital-
ian Hall disaster of 1913. Feel free to contribute.’59 The page was created and is 
administrated by the author of the book Death’s Door, Steve Lehto. Hundreds 
of photos, documents and newspaper clippings have been posted on the page, 
some by Lehto and some by the other users of the page. Other sites have also 
55 Copper Country History: History, Heritage, Memory, accessed 7 June 2016, https:// 
coppercountry.wordpress.com/; Finnish American Historical Archive/Finlandia University 
February: 2008 Oral History Digitization Project: 1913–1914 Copper Strike and Italian Hall Di-
saster, accessed 7 June 2016, http://www.kentsgenealogy.com/finnamericanoralhistories/ 
CopperStrike.html; 1913–2013 Michigan Copper Miners’ Strike 1913–14 Centennial, Cer-
emony at Italian Hall During FinnFest, accessed 7 June 2016, https://1913strike.wordpress 
.com/2013/06/26/ceremony-at-italian-hall-during-finnfest/.
56 Copper Country Reflections, Italian Hall Tragedy, accessed 10 June 2016, http://www 
.pasty.com/reflections/id228.htm; Lost in Michigan, The Italian Hall in Calumet: Michi-
gan Historical Markers, accessed 10 June 2016, http://lostinmichigan.net/.
57 Labor and Working-Class History Association, accessed 10 June 2016, http://lawcha.org/
wordpress/2013/07/25/100-years-later-michigans-1913-14-copper-country-strike/
58 Annette Kuhn, An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory, (London & New York: 
Tauris, 2002), 49; Van Dijck, Mediated Memories, 112–113; Brunow, Remediating Transcul-
tural Memory, 5.
59 Facebook, “The Italian Hall Disaster – Resource Center”, accessed 10 June 2016. https://www 
.facebook.com/The-Italian-Hall-Disaster-Resource-Center-291845417514549/?ref=br_rs
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been created on Facebook to promote other projects linked to the event, for 
example the documentary 1913 Massacre that has its own Facebook page with 
332 likers60 and Kaunonen’s and Goings study with 95 likers.61
YouTube videos are a new medium for people to commemorate family and 
local history and provide thought-provoking examples of how the vernacular, 
institutional and commercial are mixed today. These user-generated videos are 
typically remixed,62 consisting of a montage of photos, archival documents, 
postcards, newspaper clippings etc., with a well-known song by a well-known 
artist playing in the background. Bruce Springsteen’s song ‘Youngstown’ from 
the album ‘The Ghost of Tom Joad’ (1995), which tells the story of the rise and 
decline of this once prosperous steel town, has, for example, inspired people 
coming from Youngstown or similar towns to create remix videos.63 Among 
the twenty most-popular versions of Guthrie’s song ‘1913 Massacre’, played 
by Guthrie himself, his son Arlo Guthrie, Bob Dylan or by someone else on 
YouTube,64 there are four remix videos of the Italian Hall tragedy, which con-
sist of Guthrie’s song and a montage of photos and newspaper clippings. The 
most popular one of these ‘1913 massacre at the Italian Hall’ published in 2009 
by showbet had 7,658 views in June 2016, which is over a thousand more than 
in May 2015 when I first viewed it (6,340 views).65
For some the story of the Italian Hall tragedy is about the hardships of migrant 
communities and workers in general while some use it to criticize capitalism 
and express their political views. Some use it to stress the need for safety regula-
tions in building constructions. Others will express their astonishment about 
not having any knowledge of this important event, which is related to their fam-
ily or local history. Many mention in their comments that although they have no 
personal connection to the event or had not even known about it before, they 
can still relate to the experiences of those who were part of the tragedy. Over a 
60 Facebook, “1913 Massacre: film”, accessed 10 June 2016.
61 Facebook, “About 1913–14 Michigan Copper Strike and Italian Hall Tragedy Book Project”.
62 Remix is the reworking or adaptation of an existing work. The remix may be subtle, or 
it may completely redefine how the work comes across. It may add elements from other 
works, but generally efforts are focused on creating an alternate version of the original. A 
mashup, on the other hand, involves the combination of two or more works that may be 
very different from one another.
63 Anne Heimo and Kirsi Hänninen, “Participatory, Community and Spontaneous Archives 
and Digitally Born Cultural Heritage,” Folklore Fellows’ Network 47 (2015): 8–9.
64 Search words, “woody guthrie 1913 massacre” gives 3,820 hits, “1913 massacre calumet” 127 
hits, “Italian hall tragedy” 2,680, and “italian hall disaster” 5, 480 (16 June 2016).




Figure ��.3 On YouTube search words “italian hall 1913” offer a variety of differ-
ent types of videos  concerning the  tragedy. 
(Accessed 10 June , 2016, https://www.youtube.com/results?search_
query=italian+hall+1913. Screenshot 4 May 2017)
hundred years later the remediated memories of the tragedy still evoke emotive 
reactions and serve as an example of prosthetic memory66at work.
66 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in 
the Age of Mass Culture, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 2–3.
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However the most popular reason to participate in the commemoration of 
the tragedy is when it is part of one’s family or local history.67 This has to do 
with the fact that family history practices have become immensely popular 
in recent years and that people trust family memories and narratives highly 
as historical sources – even when they contradict facts presented in other 
sources. Family narratives encompass strong emotional power and vernacular 
authority. These features make them reliable accounts of the past and worth 
sharing with each other. According to folklorist Robert Howard, vernacular 
authority ‘emerges when an individual makes appeals that rely on trust spe-
cifically because they are not institutional’.68 These appeals are backed up, for 
instance, by tradition – or as in this case by family memories – and not by a 
formally instituted social formation such as a church, a media company or an 
academic publication.
 The Power of Family Memories
On all of the sites mentioned above people will frequently mention how the 
tragedy relates to their family history and where and when they learned about 
the event. The following family story titled ‘The Hundred Year Anniversary of 
The Italian Hall Disaster’ was published by Brita Caroline, a photographer liv-
ing on the Michigan Upper Peninsula on Christmas Day, 2013:
We all grew up hearing stories. It was so horrifying. Children died. DIED. 
ON Christmas Eve. At a Christmas party. It was too much to take in. All of 
those precious little children, just trying to celebrate the season amidst 
a time of turmoil. We saw pictures that never left our brain. We heard all 
about the door that opened inwards, and we all felt anger at the man who 
hollered, “Fire!”
For us Eskolas, it took on a whole new meaning when we grew up with 
our own personal story attached to it. My Grandma Ethel is my dad’s 
mom. She is still with us today, and we cherish her dearly. She is a special, 
special woman. Her father, who we call Papa Hill, was there at the Ital-
ian Hall on that fateful night. When the panic set in from the call of fire, 
Papa Hill was about to head to the stairs too, but his older sister stopped 
him and gathered him and his siblings with her to wait it out by one 
67 Heimo, “The 1918 Finnish Civil War Revisited”.
68 Robert Glenn Howard, “Vernacular Authority: Critically Engaging ‘Tradition’, in Tradition 
in the Twenty-First Century. Locating the Role of the Past in the Present, ed. Trevor J. Blank & 
Robert Glenn Howard, (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2013), 83.
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of the windows. They stood there together, the siblings, in a tight little 
group, listening to the horror of it all, until finally they were led to safety 
through the window and down a ladder. Can you imagine?? What those 
kids heard?? But still, they were the lucky ones. It’s impossible to imagine.
Not everyone was so lucky. A lot of young children’s lives ended that 
night. It changed the Copper Country forever. When the Hollywood pro-
ducers came a few years ago, they said that they could still feel the trag-
edy as they walked around the desolate streets of Calumet. Something 
this big doesn’t just go away. It changes people forever, and it becomes 
who you are. This is who we are up here in the Copper Country. We fully 
embrace it because it makes the grief a little bit easier to bear if we all 
bear just a little bit of it.69
Similar to this example most family stories about the event will either include 
the story of how and why their grandparent or other close relative survived or 
that they perished. The creator of the popular YouTube video mentioned above, 
[s]howbet, writes: ‘My great grandmother said she didn’t smell any smoke, and 
told the children to stay put, and hold her skirt. They were some of the few to 
survive the trampling. My Mother [name] and her three brothers didn’t believe 
my grandma when she told this story’. Of the thirteen comments concerning 
the video one mentions the death of her great-grandmother and two tell why 
their grandparents survived: ‘My grandmother was the last living survivor. She 
was a daughter of a copper miner. She only survived because she went back 
to her seat to get her new gloves her mother had just knitted. Her best friend, 
[name], sitting next to her, died. She was always adamant that it was a union 
man that yelled, ‘fire’ and ‘… What a terrible tragedy, my dad had talked about 
it (his parents weren’t at the hall because his older sister was sick), didn’t know 
there was a Woody Guthrie song about it. Thanks for posting!’70 One example 
of this type of survival story was even presented on a product review site by a 
person who had purchased a copy of the film Red Metal: ‘My interest in viewing 
and then purchasing Red Metal centres around my family’s history as my Dad 
was one of the children at the Christmas party. The story goes that an adult 
69 Brita Caroline Photograph Blog, accessed 10 June 2016 http://britacarolineblog.com; I 
have been granted permission to publish the story with names.
70 YouTube, “1913 massacre at the Italian Hall”, accessed 16 June 2016, https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=UgrPK2CNuJg.
�6�The Italian Hall Tragedy, �9�3
300845
Figure ��.4 The tragedy continues to be discussed on various 
Facebook sites like on the regional site “Pasty Central” 
(https://www.facebook.com/PastyCentral/.  
Screenshot 4 May 2017)
passed him out a window to someone, thus saving his life …’71 Sometimes these 
survival stories leads people to ponder on the alternatives: What would it have 
meant for me and my family if the family members had not survived? One of 




the blogs features a photo of the author’s children with a caption: ‘… Imagine 
how [my son] might not even exist if [grandpa] would’ve taken those stairs.’
The names of Brita Caroline’s relatives mentioned in her blog reveal that 
she is of Finnish descent, but she does not bring this up in her story. This is 
typical for most commentators. Outside the Facebook groups dedicated to 
Finnish-American heritage and history, people will rarely connect the event 
to their Finnish background. This suggests that the relevance of the story lies 
elsewhere.
The above examples are by no means unique or special, but illustrate how 
historical knowledge and memories are produced and shared (mediated) to-
day. At first glance these family memories may seem very brief and fragment-
ed, but actually the difference between how we share our memories online 
and offline does not differ much. Outside the interview situation, we rarely 
tell whole, coherent stories. Like Alessandro Portelli states: ‘Most personal and 
family tales are told in pieces and episodes, when the occasion arises; we learn 
even the lives of our closest relatives by fragments, repetitions, hearsay.’72 This 
is also the manner we do it online, as Henry Jenkins reminds us: ‘Each of us 
constructs our own personal mythology from bits and fragments of informa-
tion extracted from the media flow and transformed into resources through 
which we make sense of our everyday lives.’73
 Conclusions
The memory of the Italian Hall Tragedy in 1913 has been remediated for 
over a century in numerous forms, newspapers, journals, books, songs, 
 autobiographies, films and, in the 2000s, online. Although the memory of the 
disaster was forced into oblivion in the public sphere for decades, its  memory 
has continued to be cherished in the private sphere of family. The tearing 
down of the Italian Hall in the 1980s followed by the centennial brought about 
plenty of retellings of the story. Today the memory of the tragedy also attracts 
tourists, especially those interested in dark tourism and dark heritage sites. A 
major part of the commemoration of the tragedy is institutional or academic, 
but the tragedy is also remembered by so-called ordinary people interested in 
72 Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia. Oral History and the Art of Dialogue, (Madi-
son: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 4.
73 Jenkins, Convergence Culture, 3–4.
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family and local history. Much of this remembering happens online and evokes 
people to share their own memories of the incident.
History and memory making and archiving are never neutral or disinter-
ested activities. Archives can include as well as exclude, and it is often the mi-
norities who are left out.74 Due to their small number and invisibility, Finnish 
immigrants are usually not accounted for in national histories of their new 
home countries. This applies also to those cases where they have played a sig-
nificant part in the country’s political history, for example in the United States 
and Canada. Often the experiences of immigrants go unnoticed also in their 
former home countries. Although more Finnish migrants died in the Italian 
Hall tragedy than on the Titanic, the tragedy is largely unknown in Finland.
The memory of the tragedy was never only local. The tragedy happened 
in a multicultural community and affected the lives of families coming from 
different parts of Europe. Nonetheless, much of what has been written and 
published about the Italian Hall tragedy has been done by people of Finnish 
descent, but this does not mean that they are in all cases viewing it only as a 
part of their family history or Finnish-American history. In the beginning of my 
study I assumed that spontaneous archives would offer a way for people with 
Finnish ancestry to bring forth their history in the United States, but my analy-
sis shows that although much of the personal commemoration of the tragedy is 
intended for family and friends and the local and regional community, it offers 
information to anyone who has an interest in the event, for whatever reason.
The remediated memory of the Italian Hall tragedy shows that heritage no 
longer consists of only museum artefacts, memorials or historic sites, or that 
it is entirely in the hands of professionals. Due to digital technology and con-
vergence culture people today have new kinds of possibilities to make their 
experiences known outside their immediate spheres to new audiences around 
the world, challenging in this way former notions of cultural heritage as be-
ing a product that does not change and is in need of protection, and which is 
controlled by experts. Instead it should be seen as a process which is dynamic, 
ever-evolving and ephemeral, and often curated and managed by the same 
people who created it or participated in the process.
74 Julia Creet, “Transnational Archives: The Canadian Case,” in Journal of Aesthetics & Cul-
ture 3, 2011; accessed 10 June 2016, doi 10.3402/jac.v3i0.7216; Flinn, “Archival Activism”, 3; 
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chapter 12
How Does This Monument Make You Feel? 
Measuring Emotional Responses to War  
Memorials in Croatia
Vjeran Pavlaković and Benedikt Perak
Since the collapse of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
 collective remembrance in all of the successor states has undergone dramatic 
transformations as part of nation-building projects and strategies to bolster 
the legitimacy of new political elites. This has included nationalist revision-
ism of the narratives of the Second World War and the creation of founding 
myths based on the bloody wars accompanying Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Al-
though there is a general agreement across the political spectrum regarding 
the dominant nation-building narrative in Croatia, which emphasizes its vic-
tory in the War of Independence (known as the Domovinski rat, or Homeland 
War, 1991–1995), there is considerably less consensus over the Second World 
War.1 This so-called ‘red-black ideological division’ in society is manifested 
in seemingly perpetual politicized debates over communist Partisans, fascist 
Ustaša, and Serb extremist Četniks, which is then additionally distorted by 
the more recent traumas of the 1990s conflict. The need for unity during the 
Homeland War led to the policy of ‘national reconciliation’ under the first Cro-
atian president, Franjo Tuđman, which emphasized the struggle for statehood 
as one of the goals of the Croatian Partisans and concurrently whitewashed 
the Ustaša movement of its fascist ideology. The long-term consequences were 
the demonization of the antifascist struggle and the rehabilitation of Nazi-
fascist collaborators, which was played out across the country’s memoryscape: 
thousands of Partisan memorials have been damaged or completely destroyed 
1 The results of the research project “Symbolic Strategies of Nation-building in the Western 
Balkans,” which included a detailed opinion poll that posed questions about both the Sec-
ond World War and the Homeland War, showed that the majority of respondents in Croatia 
held the official narrative of the latter to reflect the truth, while interpretations of the former 
were considerably polarized. The complete results of the opinion poll are available at http://
cultstud.ffri.hr/istrazivanje/projekti/118-symbolic-strategies. See also Vjeran Pavlaković, 
 “Fulfilling the Thousand-Year-Old Dream: Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in Croatia”, 
in Pål Kolstø, ed., Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2014).
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since 1991, while new monuments and public spaces have been dedicated to 
some of Hitler’s most fervent allies. The victorious and emancipatory narrative 
of antifascism has slowly been replaced with an anti-communist victimization 
discourse perpetuated through commemorative practices at various sites of 
memory.
Croatia’s efforts to join the European Union has meant that since 2000, its 
administrations have had to adopt the transnational narratives of antifascist 
founding myths, resulting in the partial revalorization of the Partisan struggle. 
Right-wing political parties have also adopted the eu discourse on the Second 
World War, although by condemning communist crimes, and they have sought 
to equate all totalitarian systems through eu memorial days such as the Day 
of Remembrance for Victims of all Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes (23 
August). After Croatia was admitted to the eu on 1 July 2013, many political ob-
servers and scholars predicted that the bitter polemics over the Second World 
War would play a minor role compared to the burning socio-economic issues 
plaguing the country. However, since the eu accession, symbolic politics cen-
tred on interpretations of the Second World War, as well as renewed debates 
on the Homeland War, have continued to dominate headlines and divide the 
political elites at a time when a unified strategy for resolving the economic 
crisis has been most needed. The election of a short-lived right-wing coalition 
in 2016 exacerbated the red-black division, particularly over cultural policies, 
memory politics and commemorative practices.
Previous research presented at conferences related to cost action IS1203 
(In search of transnational memory in Europe) has traced the top-down 
strategies of rehabilitating the Ustaša in post-1990 Croatia, transnational eu 
discourse in Croatian memory politics and collective remembrance of com-
munism.2 The challenge, however, is how to measure the reception of these 
various stages of reframing the past. As a part of the project ‘Framing the 
Nation and  Collective Identity in Croatia: Cultural Memory of 20th Century 
Traumas,’3 this chapter seeks to analyze to what degree perceptions of past 
2 “Remembering War the European Way: Croatia’s Commemorative Culture and the eu”, eu 
Politics of Memory Conference, European University Institute, Florence, Italy (20 June 2015); 
“eu Narratives and the Specter of Communism in Croatia,” cost Conference – Memory of 
Communism in Europe, Paris, France (15–16 May 2014); and “Creating Victims out of Per-
petrators: Symbolic Strategies of Rehabilitating World War Two Collaborators in Croatia 
since the 1990s,” cost meeting Social Construction of Guilt and Victimhood, Krakow, Poland 
(16 September 2013).




wars are shaped by commemorative practices, monuments, political  speeches 
and media  representations of political rituals. Drawing upon the material 
gathered at  several commemorations (including video footage of speeches, 
photographs of monuments and media coverage), our goal was to develop a 
survey to measure emotional responses to a controversial Second World War 
memorial in Croatia. We wanted to measure firstly the reaction to a decon-
textualized visual representationof the monument and secondly measure the 
response to the same representation but this time contextualized with various 
commemorative speeches imbuing the static monument with conceptualiza-
tions of meaning. The selected monument – along with a memorial complex, 
archive and museum – commemorates the notorious concentration camp of 
Jasenovac established by the Ustaša regime in the Independent State of Croatia 
(ndh – Nezavisna Država Hrvatska). An increasingly vocal group of right-wing 
historians, journalists and politicians has sought to erase, or at least radically 
redefine, the narratives associated with this site of memory by questioning the 
number of victims and rehabilitating the perpetrators. The memorial already 
underwent a transformation in meaning during the shift from socialist Yugo-
slavia to independent Croatia, and the latest efforts to undermine the accepted 
historical narrative are representedby an attempt to inscribe alternative mean-
ings in line with right-wing interpretations of the Second World War. In the 
midst of this cacophony of state-promoted narratives and revisionist counter-
narratives bordering on conspiracy theories, is it possible to determine how 
Croatian society perceives this dark episode from the 20th century?
One of the important questions in the research of the collective memory is 
the influence of the emotional and cognitive dimensions in the mechanism 
of social memory transmission. How successfully are the subjective qualities 
of the individual memories transmitted and elicited in the inter-subjective 
communication? What are the salient emotional and cognitive features of the 
narration that successfully construct a socially shared memory? Can we mea-
sure the level of affective and cognitive engagement of the receivers of the 
representations of the cultural memories prominent in social communication 
and media? Can we predict the behavioural and pragmatic tendencies based 
on the level of emotional and cognitive appraisal? Can we correlate the level 
of emotional and cognitive appraisal with the representation of a particular 
event in a collective memory? This chapter tackles some of the abovemen-
tioned questions by investigating the effects of a monument’s representations, 
associated commemorative speeches, and media coverage on the individual’s 
affective and cognitive stance about the traumatic events in Croatian collective 
memory. In order to formulate the reception of this multimodal representation 
we situate the present study on the collective memory within the  theoretical 
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framework of embodied cognition,4  cognitive linguistics approaches to the 
conceptualization of social identity,5  cultural linguistics notion of socially dis-
tributed cognition6 and componential appraisal theory of emotion.7
This theoretical framework implies that the construction of a commemo-
rative event establishes socially distributed conceptualization networks that 
can involve several (conflicting) conceptualizing models.8 In other words, 
the same event can be construed differently by profiling different frames, re-
sulting in specific emotional, cognitive and behavioural responses. The study 
presented in this article measures and compares the emotional and cognitive 
engagement of subjects when exposed to differently construed types of com-
memorative events. Its aim is to quantitatively compare the affective appraisal 
and cognitive responses of ‘shallow conceptual’ elicitation via a decontextual-
ized static image of the monument (Figure 12.3), with the ‘deep conceptual’ 
elicitation of monument representation contextualized with the speeches 
delivered by the selected memory producing actors. The theoretical assump-
tion is that the level of emotional and cognitive engagement produced by the 
visual conceptual elicitation via an image represents the established individ-
ual’s stance to the constructed (mediated) collective memory. This ‘shallow’ 
categorical knowledge is seen as the activation of the salient conceptual pat-
terns in the dynamic system of individual mental representation ( knowledge) 
of the event. On the other hand, the conceptualized elicitation of the event, 
contextualized via  political speeches, is seen as the ‘deeper’ framing of the 
 individual’s  conceptual model. The contextualized representation engages 
4 L. Barsalou, “Grounded Cognition,” Annual Review of Psycholgy, (2008) 59. See also Benedikt 
Perak and Sanja Puljar D’Alessio, “Kultura kao emergentno svojstvo otjelovljene spoznaje,” in 
Nenad Fanuko and Sanja Puljar D’Alessio (eds.), Avanture kulture: kulturalni studiji u lokal-
nom kontekstu (Zagreb: Jesenski and Turk, 2013), 77–108.
5 George Lakoff, Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don’t (Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press, 1996); George Lakoff, The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s 
Guide to Your Brain and Its Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
6 Farzad Sharifian, “Cultural linguistics”, in Farzad Sharifian, ed., The Routledge Handbook of 
Language and Culture (London: Routledge, 2015), 473–492; Roslyn M. Frank, “A future agenda 
for research on language and culture” in Sharifian, The Routledge Handbook of Language and 
Culture, 493–512.
7 Klaus Scherer, 2009. “Emotions are emergent processes: they require a dynamic computa-
tional architecture,” in Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society, 364 (2009), 3459–34747; 
Johnny R.J. Fontaine, Klaus Scherer and Cristiana Soriano, eds., Components of emotional 
meaning: A sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
8 Gabriel A. Radvansky and Jeffrey M. Zacks, Event Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014); George Lakoff, The political mind: A cognitive scientist’s guide to your brain and its poli-
tics. (New York: Penguin, 2008). 
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more  processing of the affective and cognitive resources, and consequently 
is expected to produce a more elaborated affective appraisal and complex 
 activation of entrenched conceptual networks for a given commemorative 
event. The difference in the affect response between these two types of elici-
tation is thus seen as an effect of the conceptualization strategies, involving 
change in affective stance and dynamic negotiation between individually en-
trenched cognitive models and socially conventionalized cultural models in 
the process of distributing cognition, (intergenerational) transmission, appro-
priation and remediation of the meaning in culture. By comparing the features 
of decontextualized and contextualized types of elicitation we formulated an 
instrument for the qualitative and quantitative description of the intersubjec-
tive dynamics of affect elicitation, cultural conceptualizations and incentives 
for norms of behaviour, as well as communication strategies that constitute an 
individual’s relation to the collective identity.
In the first part of the chapter we present a historical background of the 
Second World War in Croatia, followed by an overview of memory politics in 
Croatia necessary for understanding post-socialist shifts in commemorative 
culture. Bleiburg,9 Srb10 and Jasenovac represent some of the most contro-
versial collective remembrance sites in post-1990 Croatia. The history of the 
Jasenovac Memorial site is thus presented along with the systematic revision-
ist strategies bordering on Holocaust denial pursued by various extreme Croa-
tian nationalists in the media during 2015 and early 2016. In the second part 
9 The commemorations in Bleiburg, located in Austria near the Slovenian border, symbol-
ize the repression and mass killings of the defeated ndh forces, along with civilians, by 
the Partisans in the last phases of the Second World War and immediate post-war period. 
As in Jasenovac, the number of victims remains subject to manipulation and debate, and 
the commemoration itself has been controversial due to the rehabilitation of the ndh by 
many of the participants over the years. See Vjeran Pavlaković, “Deifying the Defeated: 
Commemorating Bleiburg since 1990,” in L’Europe en Formation, No. 357 (December 2010).
10 Formerly celebrated on 27 July as the Croatian Uprising Day during socialist Yugoslavia 
to honour the mass uprising in response to the Ustaša terror in 1941, the commemoration 
has been more of a local event organized by Croatian Serb organizations and Croatian 
antifascist associations since 2000. However, right-wing politicians and organizations 
claim the uprising was not antifascist but rather led by Četniks with the goal to ethnically 
cleanse the area of Croats. See Vjeran Pavlaković, “Contested Pasts, Contested Red-Letter 
Days: Antifascist Commemorations and Ethnic Identities in Post-Communist Croatia,” in 
Ljiljana Šarić, Karen Gammelgaard and Kjetil Ra Hauge, eds., Transforming National Holi-
days: Identity Discourse in the West and South Slavic Countries, 1985–2010 (London: John 
Benjamins Publishing, 2012).
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of the article we present the methods, results and analyses of the affect and 
 conceptualization response study related to Jasenovac.11
 The Second World War in Croatia and Memory Politics
Although the Second World War radically transformed and affected all of the 
republics of former Yugoslavia, the traumas and deep divisions of that conflict 
can be felt particularly in contemporary Croatia due to the complex relation-
ship between state-building narratives, legacies of both right- and left-wing ex-
tremist ideologies and interethnic violence perpetrated on a massive scale. The 
Homeland War in the 1990s reawakened many of the unresolved issues ofthe 
past, which had been suppressed for decades as part of the socialist regime’s 
efforts to maintain its monopoly over the historical narrative. The ideology of 
‘brotherhood and unity’ was coined to emphasize the unified struggle of all of 
Yugoslavia’s peoples against the foreign occupiers and domestic collaborators, 
rather than to focus on the internecine slaughter of civilians and revenge kill-
ings. The cultural memory politics of socialist Yugoslavia (with some regional 
differences) have reflected this interpretation of the past in commemorative 
practices, monument construction, official historiographies and educational 
systems, as well as a broad range of cultural production until the system began 
unraveling in the 1980s, following Tito’s death.
The Second World War on the territory of former Yugoslavia was not a clear-
cut struggle between foreign occupiers and a revolutionary guerrilla move-
ment, but a multisided civil war characterized by the systematic persecution 
of rival ethnic and religious groups for over four violent years.12 The spiral of 
violence was particularly brutal in the ndh, which included not only most of 
today’s Croatia (notably lacking the Istrian Peninsula and most of the territory 
on the Adriatic coast), but also present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Members of 
the Ustaša terrorist movement established the ndh on 10 April 1941, just a few 
days following the Axis invasion and destruction of the Interwar-era  Yugoslav 
11 The Srb case study will be completed as part of the ongoing framnat research project.
12 See Marko Attila Hoare, Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: The Partisans and the 
Chetniks, 1941–1943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Vjeran Pavlaković, “Yugosla-
via,” in Phillip Cooke and Ben Shepherd, eds., European Resistance in the Second World 
War (Barnesly: Pen & Sword Military, 2013); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder: 
The Second World War in Yugoslavia (London: Hurst & Company, 2008); and Jozo Tomase-
vich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001).
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state (1918–1941). The Ustaša leader, Ante Pavelić, who had returned from 
his exile in Italy, quickly established a harsh dictatorship that passed racial 
laws against Serbs, Jews and Roma. The regime built a system of concentra-
tion camps (the most notorious being the Jasenovac complex) and violently 
repressed any opposition to his regime. While many Croats initially welcomed 
the ndh as salvation from the Serb-dominated Interwar Yugoslav state, the 
totalitarian methods of the Ustaša regime quickly revolted the majority of the 
population. Serbs, who comprised nearly 30% of the ndh’s inhabitants, were 
the main targets of the regime’s genocidal politics. They swelled the ranks of 
the growing Partisan resistance movement, organized by the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito’s command. Other Serbs joined the Četniks, 
who fought for the restoration of royal Yugoslavia, but engaged in numerous 
atrocities against Croat and Muslim civilians and eventually fully collaborated 
with the pro-Axis forces.
The Ustaše stayed loyal to Hitler until the end, and while much of the lead-
ership, including Pavelić, were able to escape to the West after May 1945, tens 
of thousands of others associated (or allegedly associated) with the regime 
suffered in postwar communist massacres, death marches or other types of 
persecution, symbolically commemorated as the Bleiburg massacre and the 
Way of the Cross in May every year.13 Croats in particular were saddled with 
the guilt of the Ustaša crimes, even though by the end of the war hundreds of 
thousands of ethnic Croats had fought in the Partisan ranks. The legitimacy 
of the post-war socialist regime was based upon the official narratives of the 
Partisan struggle, referred to in the historiography as the People’s Liberation 
Struggle (nob – Narodnooslobodilčka borba). Although by the 1960s Yugoslavia 
in many aspects was far more liberal than its neighbours in the Soviet bloc, the 
challenging of the state’s interpretation of the past, especially the numbers of 
victims, was a taboo topic that could result in prison sentences. In addition 
to new rituals, commemorations, history books, films and cultural products 
which reinforced the Partisan narrative of the war, the communist regime 
erected thousands of monuments and memorials at important memory sites 
dedicated to the ideals of brotherhood and unity, socialist revolution, and 
 sacrifice for the new  Yugoslav state.14
13 Martina Grahek Ravančić, Bleiburg i križni put 1945.(Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 
2009).
14 Renata Jambrešić-Kirin, “Politička sjećanja na Drugi svjetski rat u doba medijske re-
produkcije socijalističke culture,” in Lada Čale Feldman and Ines Prica, eds., Devijacije i 
promašaji: Etnografija domaćeg socijalizma (Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 
2006).
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After multiparty elections in 1990 and the rapid disintegration of com-
munist ideology in Yugoslavia as well as Eastern Europe, the monopoly over 
the past crumbled along with the former political system. A proliferation of 
debates about the Second World War in Croatia contributed to the deteriora-
tion of Serb-Croat relations and the slide towards a new cycle of war. Slobodan 
Milošević, Serbia’s president and architect of Yugoslavia’s bloody dissolution, 
used his propaganda apparatus to spread fear among Croatia’s Serbs of a re-
newed Ustaša threat. At the same time, Tuđman (himself a former Partisan 
officer) and his Croatian Democratic Union (hdz – Hrvatski demokratski 
savez) tolerated the rehabilitation of the Ustaše in an attempt to bridge the 
red-black ideological divide among Croats. Despite the shameful policies dur-
ing its brief existence and its inglorious end, the ndh remains romanticized 
in certain circles because of the predominance of the state-forming ideology 
(državotvornost) and ideas of ‘state right’ among nationalists. In their interpre-
tation, the Ustaše had supposedly established the first independent state since 
the loss of national sovereignty in 1102, ignoring the fact that the ndh was 
divided and controlled by both Italy and Germany. Fetishization of the state 
led to the minimizing, and sometimes complete denial, of Ustaša crimes by 
émigrés who fled Tito’s Yugoslavia, a trend that entered mainstream Croatian 
political culture after 1990. Nevertheless, the Croatian Constitution (adopted 
in December 1990 and amended most recently in 2010) cites the Partisan move-
ment and zavnoh (State Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of 
Croatia, the governing body of the Croatian Partisans) as part of the continuity 
of Croatian statehood.15 The establishment of statehood (whether the ndh, 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia within a federal Yugoslavia, or independent 
Croatia in 1991) remains at the heart of war remembrance in Croatia. This in-
cludes speeches at sites such as Jasenovac – as described below – even though 
other commemorations are more relevant to the nation-building narrative.
Commemorations, along with other political rituals such as rallies, parades, 
anniversaries and other mass gatherings, are symbolic public activities that 
elites use to construct grand narratives of the national past and their own po-
litical legitimacy. ‘Politics is expressed through symbolism,’ asserts anthropolo-
gist David I. Kertzer, suggesting that even people in modern societies are more 
influenced by symbolic forms than rational calculations.16 While the majority 
of socialist-era monuments remained the same (those that werenot among 
the 3,000 damaged or destroyed ones), the content of the commemorative 
15 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, online version at http://www.zakon.hr/z/94/
Ustav-Republike-Hrvatske.
16 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 2.
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 practices, especially the speeches, has inscribed new meanings into old sites. 
It is precisely the reception of what is inscribed into contested memory sites 
such as Jasenovac that our research is trying to analyze, two decades after the 
transition into multiparty democracy and the establishment of an indepen-
dent nation-state.
 Jasenovac as a Controversial Site of Memory
Along with the Bleiburg and Srb commemorations, the collective remem-
brance of Jasenovac is among the most controversial memory sites related 
to the Second World War in post-socialist Croatia. Unlike Bleiburg, where 
the small memorial is overshadowed by the chapel and outdoor altar hosting 
the commemorative speeches, Jasenovac is dominated by a massive monu-
ment that serves as a backdrop to the commemoration as well as an easily 
 recognizable symbol frequently reproduced in the media (see Illustrations 2 
and 3). The Jasenovac ‘Flower’, designed by architect Bogdan Bogdanović, rep-
resents the later trend of abstract memorial design known as Yugoslav social-
ist modernism. While many Partisan memorials, such as the Srb monument 
by sculptor Vanja Radauš, clearly depict scenes of the war in a socialist realist 
manner (heroic soldiers, grieving mothers, suffering civilians and murderous 
fascist enemies), Bogdanović’s transcendent, almost alien monument does not 
in any way indicate that it marks the location of a brutal extermination camp. 
According to Bogdanović himself, ‘the “Flower” is an enigmatic construction. 
Just like the death of man is mysterious, especially in a shadowy time. The 
monument must be enigmatic.’17 This monument thus provides an interesting 
case study in trying to measure emotional reactions to a site of memory where 
the Yugoslav regime invested considerable resources in constructing a specific 
narrative of the past yet chose to do so through a memorial with ambiguous 
symbolism.
Unlike Auschwitz, Dachau or other former concentration camps, the Jaseno-
vac Memorial Site lacks original buildings and is dominated by the massive 
concrete ‘Flower’ monument next to a memorial museum renovated in 2006. 
In contrast to the gas chambers of the Nazi death camps, victims in Jaseno-
vac, the nearby Stara Gradiška and other Ustaša camps were often murdered 
17 Interview with Bogdan Bogdanović quoted in Nataša Jovičić, “The Alchemy of the ‘Flow-
er’”, in Tea Benčić Rimay, ed., Jasenovac Memorial Site, (Jasenovac: Spomen-područje 
Jasenovac, 2006), 229.
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 through less systematic but more brutal methods.18 The estimated number of 
victims at Jasenovac has fluctuated wildly over the years and was subject to 
considerable political manipulation almost immediately after the end of the 
Second World War. The figure of 700,000 victims was considered sacrosanct in 
socialist-era Yugoslavia, and by the 1980s some scholars inflated that number 
to allege that over 1 million individuals, predominantly Serbs, were killed in the 
camps alone.19 The reaction of Croatian nationalists, such as Franjo Tuđman, 
was to minimize the numbers. Even before he became president, Tuđman ar-
gued that the total death toll for all camps in Croatia was not more than 40,000, 
a figure he continued to cite in the 1990s.20 The museum’s website currently 
lists just over 80,000 Serbs, Jews, Roma, Croats and individuals of other nation-
alities as victims,21 although scholars estimate that the final tally of victims is 
probably as high as 100,000.22 In her work on socialist Yugoslav monuments, 
historian Heike Karge has shown that the debates over the number of victims 
affected the decisions related to the building of a memorial at Jasenovac, in-
cluding decisions at the highest political levels of the communist regime.23
As mentioned above, no original structures remain at the Jasenovac site. 
The Ustaše destroyed the camp and nearly all administrative records in 1945 
when it became clear the war was lost, and in subsequent years the inhab-
itants of the town of Jasenovac scoured the ruins for building material to 
repair their devastated homes. In the 1950s local officials floated the idea of 
creating some kind of memorial at the site, but it was not until 1963 that 1,500 
18 Nataša Mataušić, Jasenovac 1941–1945 (Zagreb: Kameni cvijet, 2003); Mišo Deverić and Ivan 
Fumić, Hrvatska u logorima, 1941.-1945. (Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista 
Republike Hrvatske, 2008); and Slavko and Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac i Bleiburg nisu isto 
(Zagreb: Novi liber, 2011).
19 Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga (Zagreb: Globus, 
1992), 11–12, 44; and Nataša Mataušić, “The Jasenovac Concentration Camp,” in Rimay, ed., 
Jasenovac Memorial Site, 47–48.
20 Interview with Tuđman, reprinted in Novi list, 23 April 1996, 21. The discussion about the 
manipulation of the number of Jasenovac victims was featured in Franjo Tuđman’s most 
well-known and controversial book, Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti (1990). The notion of col-
lective guilt was one of the central tenets of Tuđman’s challenging the number of Serbian 
victims in the Second World War.
21 Tables identifying the victims at the Jasenovac camp by nationality can be found at www.
jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6711 (accessed 5 May 2016).
22 Archive of Javna ustanova Spomen područje ( jusp) Jasenovac, Fond spj – Komemoraci-
je, A-745, Slakvo Goldstein, “Procjene o priližnom broju žrtava ustaškog logorskog sustava 
Jasenovac 1941–1945,” 21 April 2005.




people participated in a ‘work action’ to clear the terrain and that a decision 
was made to construct a monument.24 The Croatian People’s Liberation War 
veterans’ organization chose Belgrade architect Bogdan Bogdanović’s ‘Flower’ 
design (sometimes referred to as the ‘Stone Flower,’ Kameni cvijet, even though 
it is made from reinforced concrete), symbolizing ‘indestructible life,’ as the 
 central monument.25 Work on the monument lasted from 1964 until the open-
ing ceremony on 4 July 1966.26 Gal Kirn, a leading scholar on Yugoslav modern-
ist monuments, explains that the abstract forms represent universalist values, 
timelessness and an antifascism that is not tied to a single nationalism.27 These 
memorials, even when located at the site of death camps such as Jasenovac, 
share the vision of modernization and education which Yugoslavia strove for 
but was ultimately unable to achieve due to its internal lack of cohesion. The 
construction ofa museum began in September 1967 and was completed in July 
1968, the same year the Jasenovac Memorial Site Institution was established to 
administer the museum. In 1983 the Jasenovac Memorial Site was expanded to 
include all of the outlying camps that constituted the Jasenovac system, such 
as Krapje, Uštice, Stara Gradiška (the location of a women’s camp) and Don-
ja Gradina. The latter location is a massive killing field across the Sava River, 
an area which today belongs to Bosnia-Herzegovina (in the Republika Srpska 
 entity). The once-united memorial site is therefore physically divided between 
two countries. The fragmentation of the memorial site has resulted in two radi-
cally different constructions of the past: the Croatian one, which offers a con-
temporary museum space and commemorative site, and a Bosnian Serb one 
which perpetuates the Jasenovac myths from the communist period.
In 1991 the memorial site was occupied by rebel Serb forces that devastated 
the museum and looted its collection. The objects ended up in a storage facil-
ity in Banja Luka (Bosnia-Herzegovina), were transferred to Washington, d.c., 
24 Duško Lončar, Deset godina spomen-područja Jasenovac (Jasenovac: Spomen-područje 
Jasenovac, 1977), 13–14.
25 Bogdanović stated in an interview that ‘in the Jasenovac Flower I denoted life – the crimes 
which took place in Jasenovac were terrible, but it is important to show what comes after-
wards.’ Quoted in Jovičić, “The Alchemy of the ‘Flower’”, 229.
26 Lončar, Deset godina spomen-područja Jasenovac, 13–14.
27 Gal Kirn, “A Few Critical Notes on the Destiny of the Yugoslav Partisan Memorial Sites 
in the Contemporary, Post-Yugoslav (Croatian) Context,” in Nataša Ivančević, ed., Vojin 
Bakić: Lightbearing Forms – A Retrospective (Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2013), 
288. See also Gal Kirn and Robert Burghardt, “Jugoslovenski partizanski spomenici: 
Između revolucionarne politike i apstraktnog modernizma,” in Jugolink, vol. 2, no. 1 (2012), 
7–20.
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with the help of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 2000, and 
were finally returned to Croatia in 2001 (Mataušić 2006: 54).28
28 Mataušić, “The Jasenovac Concentration Camp,” 54. Croatian authorities estimate that 
about 30% of the collection, which in 1991 consisted of some 14,000 objects and 2,500 
publications, is still missing. It is believed to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia.
Figure 12.1 The Jasenovac monument by Bogdan Bogdanović during a commemoration 
in 2014
Photo by vjeran pavlaković
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As part of his general political platform of restoring Croatia’s antifascist leg-
acy, former president Stjepan Mesić (2000–2010) annually attended the Jaseno-
vac commemoration (in honor of the final breakout attempt by the  remaining 
camp prisoners on 22 April 1945), where he often gave fiery commemorative 
speeches praising the Partisan resistance movement and condemning at-
tempts at rehabilitating the ndh. As Croatia drew closer to eu membership, 
even the hdz, under former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, understood that the 
country needed to adopt European paradigms of remembrance, particularly 
in relation to the Holocaust.29 In 2006 a new exhibition space was opened at 
the memorial site, and Sanader, Prime Minister at the time, described what 
Jasenovac meant to Croatia from a clear European perspective:
We must speak about a Europe without divisions precisely at Jasenovac. 
Because Jasenovac is a tragic measure of the depth of divisions which, in 
the context of the old conflicted Europe, were carved deeply into the tis-
sue of Croatian society. Few countries in Europe felt and suffered so much 
from the consequences of European divisions and conflicts  between 
ideologies and peoples. In the Homeland War we overcame those divi-
sions, we strengthened our antifascist foundations while simultaneously 
condemning communist totalitarianism, and we raised the paradigm of 
a newly united and reconciled Croatia that is our pledge in the new Eu-
rope. That new Europe brings values that are also part of our inheritance, 
such as dialogue, tolerance, peace and democracy. Modern Croatia will 
be built on exactely those values.30
Mesić’s successor, Ivo Josipović (2010–2015), and the coalition government led 
by the Social Democratic Party (sdp) continued the commemorative practices 
at Jasenovac which included explicit condemnation of the ndh and Ustaše, 
references to eu values, and recognition of the Croatian antifascist contribu-
tion to the Allied victory in the Second World War (see Figure 12.1).
The election of the hdz’s candidate for president in 2015, Kolinda 
 Grabar-Kitarović, precipitated a shift in the discourse used at Second World 
War commemorations that paralleled a more general trend in attempts by 
right-wing politicians and intellectuals to undermine Croatia’s antifascist 
legacy. In April 2015, President Grabar-Kitarović chose to break the practice 
29 Ljiljana Radonić, “Univerzalizacija holokausta na primjeru hrvatske politike prošlosti i 
spomen-područja Jasenovac,” in Suvremene teme, vol. 3, no. 1 (2010).
30 Ivo Sanader at Jasenovac, 27 November 2006, https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/jasenovac- 
otvoren-memorijalni-muzej-i-obrazovni-centar/5524.
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of her predecessors and did not attend the commemoration of the Jasenovac 
victims (she had laid a wreath at the site several days earlier). She took sev-
eral other symbolic actions soon after becoming president, such as removing 
a bust of Tito from the presidential office (which even Tuđman had kept) and 
then sponsoring the Bleiburg commemoration in May, which the sdp coali-
tion had previously stopped funding because of the perception among the Left 
that it contributed to the rehabilitation of the Ustaša movement. The electoral 
campaign prior to parliamentary elections in the fall of 2015 were notable for 
the hdz’s virulent anti-communist discourse, threats of imminent lustration 
and the decision to include parties openly sympathetic to the Ustaše in their 
coalition. Once the hdz was able to form a government in early 2016, many 
of its initial moves seemed to confirm fears that the radical right wing of the 
party was pushing an ideological agenda mirroring the developments in some 
other Central European countries such as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Some 
of the first decisions of the new government were to appoint a controversial 
(some would say revisionist) historian, Zlatan Hasanbegović, as the minister of 
culture, restore parliamentary sponsorship over the Bleiburg commemoration, 
and propose to change the name of the parliament to the name it had during 
the ndh (Hrvatski državni Sabor).
Furthermore, the government did not react when demonstrators marched 
and threatened the electronic media council while shouting fascist slogans (Za 
dom spremni, the Ustaša motto meaning ‘Ready for the Homeland’), because 
it had punished a broadcaster for hate speech against minorities, and turned 
a blind eye on threats and even physical attacks on representatives of the Serb 
minority and independent journalists. The general atmosphere was addition-
ally poisoned by a sustained media campaign in the right-wing press discred-
iting the numbers of victims at Jasenovac, which included references to the 
annual Jasenovac commemoration as a ‘Demonic Dance of Red Bandits’ (see 
Figure 12.2).31 Right-wing weeklies, such as Hrvatski tjednik, Hrvatsko slovo and 
Vijenac, along with publications such as Jasenovački logori (2015), have argued 
that even the current numbers of victims are greatly exaggerated, andhave fur-
ther claimed that the ‘truth’ about the concentration camp is that it allegedly 
continued to exist as a communist-run camp until 1952 where all of the victims 
were actually Croats.32
31 Hrvatski tjednik, 30 April 2015, front page. The subheading reads “Jasenovac: Magnum cri-
men against truth and Croatia.”
32 The questionable historical methodology and clear ideological agenda of the revisionist 
camp prompted Slavko Goldstein to respond with his own book countering the claims of 
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Figure 12.2 Cover of right-wing weekly Hrvatski tjednik referring to the Jasenovac commem-
oration as a ‘Demonic Dance of Red Bandits’.
In April 2016, the premier of Jakov Sedlar’s revisionist film, Jasenovac – Truth, 
which included several falsifications identified by investigative journalists, was 
the Society for Jasenovac Camps (Društvo Jasenovačkih logora), titled Jasenovac: tragika, 
mitomanija, istina (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2016).
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the straw that broke the camel’s back and spurred an outcry from human rights 
ngos, the Serb minority, Roma and Jewish organizations, the antifascist asso-
ciation of Croatia and even the Israeli ambassador.33 Consequently, all of these 
groups boycotted the official commemoration, resulting in an international 
scandal. While the official commemoration was held on 22 April, attended 
primarily by government ministers and parliamentary deputies, alternative 
commemorations were held on 15 April (organized by Croatia’s Jewish com-
munity) and on 24 April (organized by the Association of Antifascist Veterans 
of Croatia and the Serbian National Council), along with a protest in Zagreb 
organized by civil society ngos on the same day as the official event. The rival 
interpretations of the nature of the Jasenovac camp were thus present not only 
in academic publications and the media, but in a number of commemorative 
rituals and official government statements. It is after this context of contested 
narratives in the public sphere during March and April 2016 that the respon-
dents of the study were asked to comment on the affective and cognitive fea-
tures of the Jasenovac memorial.
 Jasenovac Conceptualizations and Affective Engagement 
Case Study
In the following sections we will present the findings of the research on emo-
tional and cognitive responses after the exposure to the Jasenovac monument 
representation (Illustration 2), as well as the speeches from commemorations 
and media appearances given by three memory-producing actors:
a) Zoran Milanović, the former president of the Social Democratic Party of 
Croatia (sdp), who was, at the time of the speech at the Jasenovac com-
memoration (26 April 2015), Prime Minister of Croatia.34
b) Igor Vukić, a revisionist historian and contributor to the controversial 
book Jasenovački logori, who appeared in the talk show ‘Bujica’ in April 
2015.35
33 Jutarnji list, 8 April 2016, p. 5. The Israeli ambassador to Croatia, Kalay Kleitman, stated 
that after seeing the film she felt that it “selectively depicted history, attempted to revise 
many known historical facts, and offended the feelings of people who lost their loved 
ones in Jasenovac.”
34 Link to the speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSMyMs1rFUA.




c) Aleksandar Vučić, who was, at the time of the speech at the memorial 
centre Donja Gradina (19 April 2015), Prime Minister of Serbia.36
In order to measure the effects of the speeches on the affective and cogni-
tive engagement, we conducted an experimental study using a questionnaire37 
with 126 participants, mostly students from the University of Rijeka, Faculty 
of Humanities and Social Sciences, during April 2016. They were distributed in 
three groups according to the approximately five minute-long speeches deliv-
ered by either Milanović, Vukić or Vučić (see Table 12.1).
This paper will focus on the results of the questionnaires from the groups 
who observed the speech by Milanović38 (M), the interview with Vukić39 (V) 
and the speech by Vučić (Vč).40 The questionnaire was conducted in the fol-
lowing phases: (1) general questions, (2) presentation of the monument, (3) 
questionnaire with 21 dimensions measuring affective appraisal and stance, (4) 
presentation of the speech, (5) reiteration of the questionnaire from phase 3.
 Phase 1: General Questions
The first phase of the questionnaire recorded seven categories: age, sex, edu-
cation, profession, nationality, political affiliation, faith, stance on abortion 
and stance on gay marriage as well as stance on the theory of evolution. The 
 average age of the participants was 21.8 years, of whom 83% were women and 
36 Link to the speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lIvK8qzg-G4.





38 The summary of the answers: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1aZ0dqwYRElXPQQFxjV
JPk1ixnjOyjCRUKNVSnsonKf4/viewanalytics ).
39 The summary of the answers: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1Un5i3gKEYo_M7x7jDPQy 
Am3hVqoTI0n0g3YyL0KfukY/viewanalytics.
40 As the results have shown, the Vučić group needs more subjects to be statistically rel-
evant. However, we have included the results in the presentation of the study.
Table 12.1 The structure of the participants in the Jasenovac study.
Sum Milanović Vukić Vučić
126 57 41 18
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17% men. The subjects were mostly students of the University of Rijeka study-
ing Pedagogy 25%, Cultural Studies 30%, Psychology 27%, English language 
and literature 5%, Polytechnics 6%: with 56% undergraduate, 36% graduate, 
and 5% doctoral studies, while 1% were high school students.
Regarding national identity, 93% of the subjects declared themselves 
 Croats, 2% Serbs and 5% remained nationally undeclared. As to the politi-
cal affiliation, 73% declared themselves undecided, 16% opted for the Social 
Democratic Party, 5.3% for Živi zid, 2% for MOST, and under 1% for other par-
ties (including, interestingly, the hdz, which, at the time of writing, has the 
highest number of seats in the Croatian parliament). Regarding the faith, 54% 
declared themselves Roman Catholics, 25% Agnostics, 16% Atheists, 2% Mus-
lims, and under 1% Buddhists and Hindus.
The last few questions were included to reveal some deeper socio-cultural 
aspects of the subject’s belief values. On the question of abortion, 82% opted 
for the legalization of abortion and the freedom of a mother’s choice, while 
12% expressed a firm stance in favour of banning abortion with pro-life argu-
ments. The distribution for the question on marriage issues was similar, with 
90% supporting the legalization of homosexual marriages, and 9% exclusively 
in favour of heterosexual marriages only. On the question of evolution, 26% 
thought evolutionary theory to be a scientific paradigm that proves religious 
beliefs incorrect and is therefore unfit to be taught in schools, 50% considered 
the theory a paradigm that should be taught in schools on a different and sepa-
rate level from religious theories, while 21% believed evolutionary theory to be 
equally valid to the religious creationist theory.
 Phase 2: Presentation of the Monument
In the second phase of the research design we exposed the participants to a 
photograph of the Jasenovac monument (Figure 12.3) for a period of one min-
ute without any additional information about the memorial site.
 Phase 3: Questionnaire with Sixteen Dimensions Measuring Affective 
Appraisal and Stance
In order to measure the affective response to the illustration, we formulated a 
questionnaire with sixteen dimensions as dependent variables that indicate 
the level of emotional engagement and cognitive appraisal. The dimensions 
were selected in accordance with the theoretical assumptions of componential 
process model (cpm) of emotion mechanisms.41 The cpm claims emotions to 
41 Klaus Scherer, “Emotions are emergent processes: they require a dynamic computational 
architecture,” Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society, 364, (2009), 3459–34747.
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be dynamic and emergent processes arising from interaction of the organism 
with its environment and direct interaction with higher cognitive processes. 
The questions in the questionnaire are classified in features of arousal, hedon-
ic valence with pleasantness and unpleasantness dimensions, six emotion cat-
egories of fear, shame, anger, disgust, pride, happiness, love, three normative 
appraisals expressing congruence of the representation with one’s self values, 
and two behavioural tendencies to promote or to dismantle the monument 
(see features in Table 12.2). The question was formulated in the following man-
ner: ‘By looking at the monument I feel: X [Feature]’. The subjects evaluated 
the occurrence of a particular feature elicited by the representation of the 
monument ona five-point Likert scale with the following labels: 1 – strongly 
disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 4 – agree, and 5 – strongly 
agree. Table 12.2 presents the results of the evaluation after the initial exposure 
to the image of the Jasenovac monument (Figure 12.3).
The aggregate data for all three groups of subjects (n = 126) (Table 12.3) show 
that initial elicitation with the image of the Jasenovac monument resulted in 
the neutral activation of the behavioural tendency to keep and promote the 
monument (mean = 3.27, sd = 1.14). Slightly negative results were recorded for 
Figure 12.3 Image of the Jasenovac monument used to elicit reactions in subjects.
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Table 12.2 The results of emotional engagement and cognitive appraisal elicited by the Jase-
novac monument representation, measured by the five-point Likert scale for three 
sets (‘Milanović’, ‘Vukić’, ‘Vučić’) across sixteen features. The column ‘Sum’ shows ag-
gregate of all three sets. The measure of mean (or average) shows the most common 
value on a Likert scale, while standard deviation is a measure that quantifies the 
amount of variation of a set of data values.
Sum Milanović Vukić Vučić
Feature Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Disgust 2.12 1.21 2.21 1.22 1.73 1.07 2.41 1.33
Love 1.81 1.01 1.79 1.00 1.83 1.02 1.82 1.01
Anger 2.49 1.37 2.60 1.28 2.22 1.37 2.65 1.46
Unpleasantness 2.66 1.23 2.84 1.19 2.20 1.25 2.94 1.25
Pride 2.18 1.14 2.28 1.13 2.07 1.17 2.18 1.13
Happiness 1.72 0.94 1.68 0.95 1.71 0.84 1.76 1.03
Shame 2.19 1.14 2.49 1.14 1.78 1.13 2.29 1.16
Fear 2.10 1.22 2.30 1.24 1.76 1.18 2.24 1.25
Sadness 2.84 1.39 2.79 1.28 2.68 1.46 3.06 1.43
Pleasantness 2.08 1.03 2.09 0.95 2.02 0.96 2.12 1.17
Arousal 2.44 1.15 2.33 1.11 2.46 1.21 2.53 1.12
Monument promotes values in 
 accordance with my values
2.41 1.09 2.67 1.01 2.39 1.24 2.18 1.01
Monument inspires me to promote 
my identity and values
2.35 1.20 2.58 1.13 2.07 1.10 2.41 1.37
Monument inspires me to question 
my identity and values
2.28 1.29 2.63 1.28 1.85 0.99 2.35 1.62
Behavioural tendency: deinstall 
the monument
1.75 0.97 1.93 1.05 1.68 0.93 1.65 0.93
Behavioural tendency: keep and 
promote the monument
3.27 1.14 3.23 1.13 3.29 1.08 3.29 1.21
affective arousal, emotional categories of sadness, unpleasantness and anger, as 
well as cognitive appraisals expressing the congruence of monument symbolic 
value with self-identity and social values. On the other hand, the participants 
 disagreed that the representation elicited affective categories of disgust, love, 
happiness and a behavioural tendency to dismantle the  monument. Overall, 
the initial static visual stimulus activated a somewhat expected neutral and 
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Table 12.3 The aggregate mean results for all three groups (Milanović, Vukić, Vučić) (n=126) on 
the five-point Likert scale questionnaire after exposing the subjects to the illustration 
of the Jasenovac monument. The results are ordered in descending values. The thin 

























Monument inspires me to question my identity and values
Monument inspires me to promote my identity and values





Behavioural tendency: keep and promote the monument
Behavioural tendency: de-install the monument
low-level affective engagement and cognitive appraisal in the respondents 
given the fact that the assessment was conducted in simulated experimental 
settings. However, the structure of the results shows the salient features of 
 affective and cognitive dimensions elicited by the ‘shallow’ image representa-
tion of the Jasenovac commemoration memorial.
After this evaluation we asked the subjects whether they recognized the 
monument in the illustration. Around two-thirds of the participants (66%) 
recognized the monument, mostly from the media (40%), but also from el-
ementary school (16%), high school education (16%), and college (4%). Less 
than 1% answered that they had some personal connection to the historical 
events this monument represents. The rate of recognition is somewhat low 
considering the great historical importance of the commemoration site in 
Croatian history and the level of media exposure.
 Phase 4: Presentation of Political Speeches
In the fourth phase of the experiment, we exposed our participants to a speech 
related to the Jasenovac monument by one of the following memory actors: 
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Although the respondents had some previous knowledge of the Jasenovac 
memorial from either the media or school, and had an opportunity to indi-
cate their emotions based on the visual image of the memorial, the content 
of the video clips of Milanović, Vukić and Vučić provided specific  information 
of diametrically opposed interpretations of the nature of the concentration 
camp and its current role as a memorial space. Milanović’s talk was anti-
fascist and pro-Croatian, while Vukić’s arguments could be summarized as 
 anti-communist and pro-Croatian. Vučić’s speech had strong anti-Ustaša and 
pro-Serbian tones.
The speech by former Prime Minister Milanović can be seen as a con-
tinuation of the narrative Croatian political elites have been transmitting at 
Jasenovac since 2000. He emphasized, even more than in previous years, the 
important role of Croatian Partisans (including Croats, Serbs and other nation-
alities) in defeating fascism, and cited the importance of antifascism in the 
Croatian Constitution. This focus on defending the legacy of antifascists from 
Croatia, more so than reflecting on the victims of the concentration camp, 
is clearly a response to the pressure from the hdz’s anti-communist rheto-
ric and the decision of President Grabar-Kitarović to avoid the commemo-
ration. Milanović also used the opportunity to criticize the rehabilitation of 
the Ustaše at the Bleiburg commemoration and the frequent chanting of the 
Ustaša motto ‘Za dom spremni’ (Ready for the Homeland) at football matches. 
He then ended the speech in a very fiery and patriotic manner, shouting ‘Long 
live Croatian antifascism, long live a modern and humane Croatia!’ Viewers 
were thus presented with a Jasenovac memorial which represented Croatian 
resistance to fascist ideology and a patriotism that included all regions of Cro-
atia (Milanović repeatedly referred to various parts of the country and their 
contribution to the Partisan movement).
Igor Vukić’s interview attempts to paint a much different picture of the 
Jasenovac camp than he promotes in his publications and many media ap-
pearances. Vukić and several like-minded historians claim that in addition 
to exaggerating the number of victims killed at Jasenovac by the Ustaše, the 
Figure 12.4 Igor Vukić Figure 12.6 Aleksandar VučićFigure 12.5 Zoran Milanović
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communist regime constructed lies to cover up that the true mass murders 
took place after 1945 when the camp was used to hold defeated Ustaše forces, 
and later Cominform supporters considered to be on the wrong side of the 
Tito- Stalin split.45 His approach is not to build upon the internationally ac-
cepted historiography, but to automatically dismiss all previous research as 
lies and deliberate manipulations, all with the goal of demonizing Croats and 
the Croatian people. He attempts to illustrate the benign nature of Jasenovac, 
which he claims was a work camp and not a death camp, with a story of Ustaše 
guards playing with his father (a Serb) when the latter was a child. This is in 
line with his publications46 in which he argues that witnesses do not mention 
seeing any Roma prisoners other than some circus performers (the approxi-
mately 8,000–15,000 Roma victims were most often immediately killed upon 
arriving at the camp complex),47  that many Jews were in fact protected by the 
Ustaša regime (a rather perverse argument considering that it was the Ustaša 
regime that enacted anti-Semitic laws immediately upon coming to power, 
resulting in an estimated 10,000–13,000 Jewish victims in the Jasenovac camp 
alone)48 and that Serbs were sent to the camp only if they resisted the Ustaša 
regime as Četniks or Partisans (not only were the majority of Serb victims civil-
ians, the Ustaše labelled practically all Serbs Četniks, a practice continued in 
Croatian nationalist circles to this day).49
Vukić’s overall argument is that Jasenovac is one of the main symbols of 
the falsifications constructed by the communists to paint the Ustaše as mass 
murderers and justify their own authoritarian regime. Vukić presents the 
Jasenovac memorial as a place that leftist politicians use for manipulating the 
public in order to promote a communist, pro-Yugoslav, and anti-Croat political 
45 Slavko Goldstein has convincingly debunked the conspiracy theories presented in the 
publications by Vukić and others who support the ‘three camp theory’ in his book Jaseno-
vac: tragika, mitomanija, istina (2016).
46 Igor Vukić, “Sabirni i radni logor Jasenovac, 1941–1945,” in Stjepan Razum and Igor Vukić, 
eds., Jasenovački logori: istraživanja (Zagreb: Društvo za istraživanje trostrukog logora 
Jasenovac, 2015), 132–134.
47 Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, “The Genocide Carried out on the Roma – Jasenovac 1942,” in 
Rimay, Jasenovac, 168–169.
48 Ivo Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Novi liber, 2001), 302–343.
49 Drago Roksandić, “Of Tragedy, Trauma, and Catharsis: Serbs in the Jasenovac Camp, 
 1941–1945,” in Rimay, Jasenovac, 86–89. Roksandić notes that ‘in many cases the Ustashas 
[sic] preferred to classify the Serbian inmates, particularly the elderly, as Chetniks, even 
when it was obvious they had no connections with Chetniks.’ Ibid., 87.
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agenda. The reception of the messages sent by these two opposed video clips 
are  reflected in the second set of responses to the image of the memorial by the 
different emotional reactions.
Aleksandar Vučić’s talk paints the opposite picture to that presented in 
Vukić’s interview. With a rhetorically confident and emotionally conducive 
tone he portrays the savageness and ruthlessness of the Ustaša crimes that 
were committed in the Jasenovac camp against Serbs. The allegorical picture 
of the Serbian suffering is demonstrated by the vivid depiction in his speech at 
Donja Gradina of a child’s head being crushed by an Ustaša guard and the use 
of knives to slaughter prisoners. The rhetorical twist is produced when Vučić 
declares that the Ustaša’s extermination plan was not successful, praising the 
resiliency of the Serb people and their bright future, without any need for ex-
pansionism but with a need to firmly control their territory. With the skillful 
activation of the main conceptualizations of the Serb-Croat conflict from the 
perspective of Serbian politics, the main goal of this talk was to praise the Ser-
bian people while simultaneously profiling Croatia, a geopolitical rival and eu 
member, in terms of Ustaša crimes.
 Phase 5: Stance towards the Speaker and the Message
In the research design we included questions measuring the stance towards 
the speaker and his message, measuring qualitative and quantitative values. 
The quantitative dimensions were again measured with the same five-point 
Likert scale (Table 12.4).
Table 12.4 shows the mean values and standard deviation of evaluations re-
garding two questions: (a) do you have positive attitude towards the speaker? 
and (b) do you agree with the content of their message? The results indicate 
Table 12.4 Attitudes towards the speaker and the message expressed in measures of mean and 
standard deviation (sd).
Milanović Vukić Vučić
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Positive attitude towards 
speaker
3.08 1.23 2.61 1.04 2.29 1.16
I agree with the content 3.56 1.02 2.46 1.00 2.94 1.34
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that the Milanović group expressed the highest value of agreement with 
Milanović as a person (mean = 3.08, sd  =  1.23), as well as with the content 
of Milanović’s antifascist message (mean = 3.56, sd = 1.02). Personal attitudes 
towards Vukić were slightly lower. Subjects in the Vučić group had the most 
negative attitudes regarding Serbian Prime Minister Vučić, but his message 
was valued as neutral. Interestingly, Vučić’s anti-Ustaša message scored a rela-
tively higher level of agreement than Vukić’s pro-Ustaša revisionist message 
about the Jasenovac site.
In order to gain some qualitative insight about the reception of conceptual-
izations in the speeches we asked subjects to write down the prominent ideas 
they observed in the speech and the most emotive phrases they remembered. 
The following examples (1–3) illustrate the prominent idea detected by the 
subjects in Milanović’s talk.
1) Moderna Hrvatska država nije osnovana na idejama tadašnje formirane 
ndh, već je upravo utemeljena na otporu takvoj politici i propagandi. Hr-
vatska prema tome ne podržava veličanje nacionalizma, već za cilj ima jed-
nakost, bez obzira na nacionalnost.
‘The contemporary Croatian state is not based on the ideas of the ndh, 
but on the resistance towards such politics and propaganda. Croatia, 
therefore, does not support nationalism but has equality as its goal, re-
gardless of nationality.’
2) Najviše me emotivno probudilo kad je spominjao Bleiburg i Jasenovac, 
te kada je pričao o partizanima u svojoj obitelji, jer su i moji preci bili u 
partzanima.
‘I was emotionally moved when he mentioned Bleiburg and Jasenovac, 
and when he spoke about the Partisans in his family, because my ances-
tors were also Partisans.’
3) živjela antifašistička Hrvatska
‘Long live antifascist Croatia’
Some of the highlights from Milanović’s talk include the prototypical national 
messages with the aim to bolster national pride connected with the antifas-
cist resistance (3), denunciation of the Ustaša regime (1) and recent attempts 
to reintegrate the Ustaša salutation ‘Za dom spremni’ into popular nationalist 
repertoire. Some of the participants have related the message with their family 
Partisan history (2), which made the talk more emotional and meaningful for 
them. However, some of the participants clearly state the need to leave this 
futile rhetoric and divisions in the past, perceiving it as primitive division of 
the Croatian people.
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Example (4) illustrates the predominant understanding of the main idea in 
Vukić’s talk.
4) logor u Jasenovcu je bio radni logor, a ne logor smrti
‘The Jasenovac camp was a work camp, not a death camp.’
In Vukić’s talk the most interesting conceptualization is construed by the nar-
rative depicting his father playing with Ustaša soldiers in Jasenovac (5). This 
particular scene frames the whole event with an emotional flavor of cheerful-
ness intended to support a cognitive conceptuali of Jasenovac as a work camp, 
and not a death camp (4). This positive manipulation of the children’s frame 
and its immediate affective – cognitive value is seen as especially important for 
the construal of the affective load necessary to superimpose the more frequent 
negative suffering frame connected with the Jasenovac narrative.
5) Moj se otac sjeća kako su ga ustaše nosile na ramenima i igrali se s njim!
‘My father remembers how the Ustaše used to carry him on their shoul-
ders and play with him!’
The same conceptualization but with opposite affective valence is skillfully 
construed in Vučić’s talk (6)
6) kada se spominju djeca i način na koji su krvnici govorili kako će ih ubiti 
polako.
‘When he mentions children and the manner in whichbutchers talk 
about how they are going to kill them slowly’.
Vučić channels this affective arousal into the main theme as seen by one of the 
subjects:
7) Nitko neće istrijebiti Srbe koji su duhovno i intelektualno nadmoćniji jer 
vide veličinu svojih žrtava i strahotu zločina nad svojim ljudima, a uzdižu se 
iznad nje – ne osvećuju se, ali pamte i prkosno stoje iznad svih!
‘No one will exterminate Serbs that are spiritually and intellectually su-
perior because they see the greatness of their own victimhood and the 
horror of the endured crimes and still rise above it all – they do not take 
revenge, but remember and dare to stand above them all!’
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the intricacies of the figura-
tive speech usage that activate the affective states and profile the pragmatic 
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inferences in the listener. However, the qualitative paradigm can be noted 
from the previous examples. The speakers rely on the activation of the affec-
tive content and traumatic experiences by use of the embodied metonymic 
and metaphoric representations of horror, killing, imagery of innocence and 
children, vivid expressions of brutality, or the opposite heroic images of the 
sacrifice, pride and playfulness that are conducive to the construal of the more 
abstract cultural models of nationality50 with implicit rearrangement of the 
social norms and implications for self-identification and emergence of social 
identity processes. The reception of the linguistically modulated affective pro-
cesses is qualitatively measured in the next phase of the questionnaire.
 Phase 6: Repetition of the Question from Phase 3
After exposing our participants to the political talks we wanted to see whether 
the conceptualizations of the commemoration had some immediate effect on 
the affective and cognitive engagement regarding the Jasenovac monument. 
In order to determine if there was any change in the respondents’ perception 
of the monument, the questionnaire from Phase 3 with sixteen dimensions 
was introduced again. This allowed us to measure the difference between 
pairs of affective dimensions and cognitive appraisal features after the initial 
decontextualized visual stimulus and then after the speech’s contextualized 
conceptualizations. A paired-sample two-tailed t-test51 using software R52 
was conducted to compare and measure significant differences in the evalua-
tion results for the sixteen features before and after the exposure to political 
speeches. The mean difference was then calculated for each feature. The mean 
difference obtained by the t-test is taken to represent the effect of emotive 
engagement and appraisal caused by the profiled conceptualizations in the 
speech. The effects of the speeches by Milanović, Vukić and Vučić, along with 
the aggregate data, are represented in Table 12.5 and Table 12.6 with mean dif-
ference and p-values.53
50 Patrick Colm Hogan, Understanding Nationalism: On narrative, Cognitive Science, and 
Identity (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2009).
51 A paired t-test is used to compare two population means for two samples in which obser-
vations in one sample can be paired with observations in the other sample. In this case 
our subjects had the same set of questions evaluating the engagement with the monu-
ment before and after the speech with the five-point Likert scale.
52 https://www.r-project.org/.
53 P-value is defined as the probability of obtaining a result equal to or “more extreme” than 
what was actually observed, when the null hypothesis is true. If the null hypothesis is true 
(p value = 1) means that there is no effect or difference between two measured phenom-
ena. P values evaluate how well the sample data support the argument that the null hy-
pothesis is true. Following the conventions of the asterisk rating system, we have marked 
the significant results with the p value ≤ 0.05 with *, p value ≤ 0.01 with ** and p ≤ 0.001 ***.
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Table 12.5 Effects of affective engagement and cognitive appraisal after the speeches by 
Milanović, Vukić and Vučić, as well as their aggregate effects. Values represent  
the mean of differences derived from two sided paired t-test and p-values (* p ≤ .05, 
** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001.) with a 95% confidence interval.
Aggregate M,V,Vc Milanović Vukić Vučić
Feature Mean Diff P-Value Mean Diff P-Value Mean Diff P-Value Mean Diff P-Value
Disgust 0.4*** 0.0002 0.2632 0.0874 0.6098*** 0.0003 0.3529 0.3028
Love −0.0434 0.5807 0.0877 0.4028 −0.0976 0.5117 −0.3529 0.0546
Anger 0.4174*** 0.0002 0.3158* 0.0431 0.6585** 0.0033 0.1765 0.422
Unpleasantness 0.4173*** 0.0004 0.3684* 0.0299 0.6585*** 0.0004 0.0000 1
Pride −0.0956 0.4026 0.0526 0.7636 −0.1707 0.3602 −0.4118 0.0895
Happiness −0.1217 0.1086 −0.0351 0.7606 −0.1707 0.1642 −0.2941 0.0961
Shame 0.2260* 0.0392 −0.0877 0.5199 0.5854** 0.0017 0.41176 0.262
Fear 0.2434* 0.0252 0.0351 0.802 0.5854** 0.0029 0.1176 0.7073
Sadness 0.5304*** 5.23E-05 0.5965** 0.0025 0.5854** 0.0071 0.1764 0.5479
Pleasantness −0.2086* 0.0319 −0.1228 0.3825 −0.1463 0.3366 −0.6470* 0.0226
Arousal 0.6173*** 8.45E-09 0.7544*** 2.39E-07 0.6829*** 0.0002 0.0000 1
Monument 
promotes values  
in accordance 
with my values
0.1391 0.1381 0.2807* 0.0410 0.0488 0.6431 −0.1176 0.7498
Monument 




0.1826* 0.04775 0.211 0.1591 0.1951 0.1031 0.0588 0.8167
Monument 








−0.0956 0.2506 −0.2281* 0.0313 0.0732 0.5838 −0.0588 0.8484
Behavioural 
tendency: keep 
and promote the 
monument
0.2347* 0.01947 0.3158* 0.01297 0.2439 0.1242 −0.0588 0.8784
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Table 12.6 An illustration of the effects after the speeches by Milanović, Vukić, and Vučić as 
measured by t-test. The effects are the difference in the mean values of the psycho-
metric five-point Likert scale for each feature, before and after the speech. The green 
bars represent effects in the Milanović group, red bars in Vukić’s and gray ones in the 
Vučić group.













Monument promotes values in accordance with my values
Monument inspires me to promote my identity and values
Monument inspires me to question my identity and values
Behavioural tendency: deinstall the monument
Behavioural tendency: keep and promote the monument
The results show the greatest and statistically significant increase in the emo-
tional dimension of arousal and negative hedonic valence54 in three groups: 
unpleasantness (Tables  12.7 and 12.8), sadness (Tables  12.7 and 12.8), anger 
(Tables 12.7 and 12.8), fear (Table 12.8) and disgust (Table 12.8). This difference 
is on a scale of 0.4–0.7 of a five-point Likert scale. This could be interpreted 
that, on the average, the effect of the talk was to raise arousal and negative 
valence by almost 15%. The highest increase in these negative emotions is gen-
erated in the Vukić group implying that the revisionist message stimulated a 
feeling of unease, fear and repulsion, as exemplified by the statement from one 
of the subjects in this group (8):
8) sve izjave govornika su pobudile ljutnju
‘All statements aroused anger.’
54 The ability to experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings, or to represent objects as ‘posi-
tive’ or ‘negative’, is known as representing hedonic ‘valence.’
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The low arousal, negative emotion of sadness also prominently increased in 
all groups (Tables 12.7 and 12.8), although slightly less in the Vučić group. This 
difference could be due to the Vučić inability to induce emphatic discourse 
with his predominantly Serbian nationalistic message, as stated from the ques-
tionnaire (9):
9) hrvati su ubijali srbe u jasenovcu. oni su i dalje tu i napreduju.
‘Croats killed the Serbs in Jasenovac. They are still here and continue 
to advance.’
In all groups the positive hedonic valence, pleasantness (Illustration 8) and 
happiness, decreased. The greatest negative tendency of these emotions is re-
corded in the Vučić group. This is probably related to the vivid depictions of 
the atrocities committed in Jasenovac. This is corroborated by speech observa-
tion by one of the participants in the Vučić group (10):
10) smrt, teror, ubijanje djece
‘death, terror, killing of children’
It is interesting that socially complex emotions, such as pride, shame 
 (Table 12.9) and love, have a different type of directionality in the three groups, 
showing more correlation with the cognitive models of self-appraisal and so-
cial standards.
The negative emotional category of shame tended to decrease after 
Milanović’s speech. This can be seen as one of the intended effects of the 
 commemorative ritual, related to Milanović’s conceptualization of Jasenovac 
as a site of traumatic but transformational memory, connected with the lib-
eration of the camp by the victorious antifascist army and the overthrow of 
the Ustaša regime (see example 3). The increase of the pride and love dimen-
sions in the Milanović group can be attributed to the same kind of successful 
conceptualization of the traumatic history and reinforcement of these positive 
humanistic values in the present that are seen as congruent with self-identity 
and social values, and the reestablishment of one’s identity.
On the other hand, shame tends to increase while love and pride decrease 
in the Vukić and Vučić groups. The effect of shame dimension in the Vukić 
group is especially prominent with a statistically significant increase over 0.58 
in terms of the five-point Likert scale, or 12%. This can be interpreted as the 
psychological effect of how Vukić construes the Jasenovac narrative from a re-
visionist position that tends to highlight the two conflicting cultural models of 
Croatian identity: a nationalist model and an antifascist model. Both of those 
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models have been imbued with atrocities committed during the Second World 
War or during the communist regime. This type of framing and conceptual fo-
cus on the rivaling models of the national history correlates with the decrease 
of pride.
The tendency to positively correlate symbolic representation of the Jaseno-
vac monument and one’s own moral values increases slightly for the Milanović 
group (0.28 or 5.6%) (Table 12.7). This is probably related to Milanović’s profiling 
of the victorious antifascist history and progressive values that resonated with 
the subjects. On the other hand, questioning one’s identity and values tends to 
be related more with the Vukić group. Vučić’s depiction of theUstaša atrocities 
in Jasenovac seems to have effects on inhibiting identification of the monu-
ment with one’s values and identity, as well as decreasing rational inquiry of 
the self-values and social norms.
The behavioural tendencies follow from the affective appraisal process. The 
Milanović group has a statistically significant increase in tendencies to keep 
and promote the monument (0.3158 or 6%). This is also observed in the Vukić 
group. The Vučić group, however, demonstrated a significant decrease of pleas-
antness and pride, as well as anincrease of shame and fear, resulting in a slight 
decrease of the tendency to keep and promote the monument. However, it is 
interesting that, although statistically not significant, the behavioural tenden-
cy to dismantle the monument was also heightened in the Vukić group. This 
small effect can be attributed to the accepted revisionism of the Vukić concep-
tualizations, but also a statistically significant increase of shame, fear, disgust 
and unpleasantness (Table 12.8).
In summary, the aggregate data set (Table  12.10) demonstrates that po-
litical speeches generated the largest effect size in the affective dimension 














Monument promotes values in
accordance with my values
Behavioural tendency: deinstall the monument
Behavioural tendency:
keep and promote the monument
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Table 12.9 Statistically significant effects sizes after Vučić’s speech.
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of arousal. Although qualitatively not discriminative, the value of affective 
arousal is correlated toactivating attention, regulating consciousness and in-
formation processing.55 The activation of attention is a key factor for the 
successful transmission of cultural memory, especially its transgenerational 
dynamics. In other words, if an event does not arouse any affective load, it 
is likely to be forgotten in the next generation. It can be argued that com-
memorative rituals have a function to capture the attention of audiences by 
heightening the affective dimension of arousal. The most common means of 
creating arousal in traumatic commemoration sites such as Jasenovac is by re-
constructing vivid depictions of atrocities. Particularly Vučić, and to a certain 
extent Milanović, exploited these constructive strategies in their speeches, 
while Vukić tried to reconceptualize the prototypical Jasenovac representa-
tion by introducing the images of a safe childhood within the scenery of an 
alleged work camp.
The arousal is also correlated with the increase of different emotions. Not 
surprisingly, the effects of the commemorative speeches were to increase 
sadness, unpleasantness and intrinsically negative emotions such as disgust, 
anger, fear and shame. The effects of increased sadness can be interpreted as 
the measure of the intensified participant’s empathy with the victims of the 
camp. The activation of anger and fear is especially important because of their 
capacity to motivate reasoning about implications and coping strategies. In 
our experiment we have deliberately chosen speakers that construed different 
causal configurations in relation to the traumatic events and implicated dif-
ferent type of rationalizations to channel coping with these negative feelings. 
Motivation and coping are an important link to framing and establishing dif-
ferent cultural models and social norms. The significant increase of sadness is 
related to successful conceptualization of the traumatic events, usually elabo-
rated in vivid metonymic and metaphoric expressions that enable receivers to 
mentally recreate the distress in an embodied manner. Lastly, the contextual 
conceptualizations promoted the tendencies to keep the monument, implying 
that their symbolic significance regained new meaning.
55 The relation between arousal and attention has been the subject of extensive research 
in psychology. See Eysenck Michael, Attention and Arousal: Cognition and Performance 
(Springer Science & Business Media, 2012); A. Hunter and J.D. Eastwood, J.D., “Does state 
boredom cause failures of attention? Examining the relations between trait boredom, 
state boredom, and sustained attention,” Exp Brain Res (2016), 1–10. The cpm theory by 
Scherer also indicates the correlation of appraisal of relevance and attention.
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 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a study intended to experimentally measure 
the psychological impact of political talks on the affective engagement and 
conceptualization of the collective remembrance site Jasenovac, symbolically 
represented by its monument. The Jasenovac site was chosen as a contested 
commemoration site that political agents use to construct narratives of the 
Croatian national past, inscribing new meanings into cultural memory through 
their commemorative rituals. We conducted an experiment with 126 partici-
pants and devised qualitative and quantitative methodology to empirically 
examine their reception of the political ritual uses of Jasenovac memory sites. 
The three groups of participants were exposed to the image of the Jasenovac 
monument and then political speeches by three memory agents (Milanović, 
Vukić and Vučić), all of whom are pushing different narratives about the con-
centration camp.
The structure of the emotional features reveals somewhat expected distri-
bution for a commemoration event with sadness and unpleasantness in the 
upper ordinal range and happiness in the lower end. The results of the effect 
size show the greatest increase in the emotional dimension of arousal, un-
pleasantness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust. The range 0.4–0.7 of a five-point 
Likert scale or almost 15% effect size for these important features indicates 
that the commemorative speeches have increased attention, motivation and 
reasoning about the implications of the commemoration for the national cul-
tural model, which is one of the most important functions of commemorative 
rituals.
The qualitative textual analysis of political speeches and participant’s ob-
servations identified narrative strategies of different speakers to construe the 
cultural memories of this contested memory site. The semantic analysis of re-
sponses revealed that effective inter-subjective communication of emotional 
qualities involved the use of embodied metonymic and metaphoric conceptu-
alization that influence the behavioural tendencies and appraisal of the par-
ticipant’s self and social values. In accord with embodied cognition theory, we 
argue that affective and cognitive engagement elicited by the memory actors 
and their narrative practices are important in consolidating, reevaluating and 
renegotiating cognitive models, values, social identities and cultural memory. 
With the frequent reinforcement of the message in the media we can hypothe-
size that effects of this process create culturally distributed collective memory.
Due to the experimental research conditions, the effect sizes are to 
be taken as tendencies and not as absolute values. We can presume that di-
rect involvement in the commemoration rituals would result in deeper 
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 psycho-sociological impact due to the more elaborated context. Nevertheless, 
this study indicates that the dynamics of a cultural memory transmission is 
correlated with the level of affective and cognitive engagement of the recipi-
ents. It also shows the functions of the conceptualizations activated by the 
memory agents in their speeches for the construal and appropriation of a cul-
tural model and permeating the monument with new symbolic meanings.
The data we gathered enables us to seek even more correlations of depen-
dent variables with other independent variables of age, sex, nationality and 
education, as well as to perform a qualitative study of the significant linguistic 
strategies of recreating affective engagement from the perspective of memory 
transmission and reception. In the future we plan to broaden the pool of re-
spondents, including regional diversity, political orientation and age groups.
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Transnational Holocaust Memory, Digital Culture 
and the End of Reception Studies
Wulf Kansteiner
Holocaust memory and memory studies have always been intertwined. In 
the 20th century, Holocaust memory advocates and memory studies scholars 
shared enthusiasm for politics of regret. In the 21st century, they have to share 
the blame for allegedly fostering Euro-centrism.1 All along the way, the con-
ceptual infrastructure of memory studies developed in large measure through 
scholarly analyses of emerging memories of the Final Solution. That applies 
first and foremost to concepts of transnational memory which are almost syn-
onymous with Holocaust memory scholarship.2 The marriage made both em-
pirical and ethical sense. Holocaust memory was one of the first fully-fledged 
transnational collective memories traveling around the Northern hemisphere 
in the form of attractive imagetexts and uniting publics from different coun-
tries in appreciation of similar media events. Moreover, Holocaust memory 
seemed to be an unequivocal mark of political progress, helping a formerly 
divided continent traverse the great distance from the depths of the world 
wars to peaceful and prosperous cooperation in the European Union. The 
transformation was particularly pronounced and tangible in (West) Germany 
where significant segments of society recalled the crimes of the Nazi period 
with sincere remorse and acknowledged the suffering of their former victims 
under the sign of Holocaust memory.3 Given such promising realignments, 
memory scholars quickly connected the dots. Negative heritage in the form of 
Holocaust memory appeared to be the perfect moral conduit for advancing a 
human rights agenda in the age of globalization. After a phase of catastrophic 
1 Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century:’ Geno-
cides of Indigenous Peoples and the Genocide,” in Colonialism and Genocide, edited by Dirk 
Moses and Dan Stone (Routledge: New York, 2007), 148–180.
2 Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney, “Introduction,” in Transnational Memory: Circulation, Ar-
ticulation, Scales, edited by Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney (Berlin: DeGryuter, 2014), 1–25, 
10.
3 Jeffrey Olick, The Sins of the Fathers: Germany, Memory, Method (Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 2016).
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self-destruction in the age of nationalism, the Western world seemed to have 
hit upon a formula for effective moral education based on natural affinities 
between the economic-political dynamics of late modernity and the similarly 
growth-oriented forces of mediatized self-reflexive memory culture.4 Conse-
quently, many scholars in the burgeoning field of memory studies assumed 
that the blessings of Holocaust memory could work wonders in a wide range of 
settings, including in societies with little geographical or historical proximity 
to the events of the Final Solution.5
In the meantime, we have left behind the optimism of cosmopolitan mem-
ory. It has become clear that a given society can cherish Holocaust memory 
and yet intentionally engage in serious human rights violation. Or, depending 
on one’s interpretation of us, Israeli and eu foreign policy, one could come 
to the even more depressing conclusion that the presence of a mature Holo-
caust memory regime enhances the risk for the illegitimate and unethical use 
of military force. So on second look it seems that the moral effects of official 
Holocaust memory are a rather complicated issue. First of all, official, state-
sponsored Holocaust culture might increasingly look the same all across the 
West but has nevertheless had different memory effects in different national 
and institutional settings. In matters of Holocaust remembrance cultural ho-
mogeneity hides a considerable degree of political diversity. Second, official 
Holocaust memory only seems to have become an important moral force in so-
cieties in which transcultural Holocaust narratives and iconography became a 
key reference point of national self-identification. In some national settings of-
ficial Holocaust memory thus temporarily assumed a truly self-critical profile; 
in others settings it has always been a force of national self-promotion. Third, 
as official Holocaust memory has become a more clearly transnationally and 
transculturally constituted collective memory, upheld by transnational institu-
tions and transnational carrier groups such as academics and memory profes-
sionals, it seems to have lost some of its ability to serve as truly self-critical 
moral compass. Finally, while these emplotments of the history of Holocaust 
culture appear perfectly plausible they are difficult to prove because we have 
only limited insights in the reception of Holocaust culture over the course of 
the last four decades.
There are good reasons to assume, for instance, that the invention of popu-
lar Holocaust memory in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, accomplished with 
4 Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2006); see also Amos Goldberg and Haim Hazan (eds.), Marking 
Evil: Holocaust Memory in the Global Age (New York: Berghahn, 2015).
5 Jeffrey Alexander, “The Social Construction of Moral Universals,” in Alexander et al., Remem-
bering the Holocaust: A Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3–101.
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considerable trans-Atlantic input from Hollywood, has temporarily had truly 
self-critical effects in (West) German society. In fact, one might speak here of 
an example of cultural trauma, i.e., a mediated collective agreement among 
significant cross sections of society perceiving a lack of collective identity and 
purpose caused by the realization of the extraordinary crimes committed by 
Germans during World War ii.6 In the meantime, that productive sense of em-
pathic unsettlement has subsided.7 After a pivot point during the 1990s, uni-
fied Germany has regained a robust sense of pride anchored, for instance, in a 
widely shared belief in Germany’s extraordinary accomplishments in the arena 
of memory politics.8 One should not be surprised by this turn of events, crafted 
once again with generous help from abroad. Societies seem to strive (naturally, 
one is tempted to say) to devise and re-tool strategies of collective remem-
brance for the purpose of collective self-praise. The resulting memory comfort 
zones might invoke stories of heroism, eternal victimization or memory cham-
pionship but, social, political and psychological contexts permitting, they tend 
to alleviate rather than exacerbate feelings of unsettlement and trauma.
Despite a general yearning for uplifting memories, self-critical strategies of 
collective remembrance can and have travelled widely. The combination of 
indigenous self-critical inquiries into shameful wwii collaboration and the 
export of the (West) German model of Holocaust education has resulted in 
phases of more or less self-critical memory in many Western European coun-
tries, including the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Norway and Austria.9 But 
as the transnationalization of Holocaust memory has transformed the Final 
Solution from a national into a transnational historical event and the task of 
remembrance from a German into a European obligation, culminating in the 
adoption of Holocaust memory as a quasi-official foundational eu memory 
and civic religion in Stockholm in 2000, Holocaust memory has lost a great deal 
of the self-critical edge it possessed in some settings.10 The new  perception of 
the Holocaust as a European human rights catastrophe with lots of blame to 
go around ended decades of German exceptionalism. With the German model 
6 On the concept of Cultural Trauma see Jeffrey Alexander, Cultural Trauma: A Social Theo-
ry (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).
7 For the concept of empathic unsettlement see Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writ-
ing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).
8 See for example Norbert Frei’s polemic comments about the student movement’s collec-
tive memory in Germany, “Zum erneuten Dienstjubiläum der ‘Achtundsechziger’: Gen-
eration Sündenstolz,” Neue Züricher Zeitung, 3/8/2008.
9 Roni Stauber (ed.), Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust (New 
York: Routledge, 2011).




of memory management embraced across the continent and historical re-
sponsibility spread on many shoulders, unified Germany assumed a leadership 
position commensurate with its political and economic heft. And once again 
Europe followed Germany’s lead, turning self-critical into merely self-reflexive 
memory and, in the process, shifting focus from acknowledging past crimes 
and making amends to exhibiting and celebrating Europe’s extraordinary will-
ingness of acknowledging past crimes and making amends.11
Therefore, one should also not be surprised that institutionalized Holocaust 
memory never assumed much of a self-critical edge in communities spared the 
onus of perpetrator status or legacies of collaboration, as for example Israel 
and the us. When survivors of the Final Solution for the first time stepped 
into the public limelight, in the context of the Eichmann trial in Israel, the full 
extent of their suffering and lack of recognition of that suffering after wwii 
caused a temporary sense of self-doubt in Israeli society. But even in a diverse 
memory culture such as Israel’s, official Holocaust memory has been consis-
tently and skilfully deployed as a political asset justifying the use of force and 
the violation of human rights.12 There is no indication, for example, that the 
civil religion of Holocaust memory enshrined at Yad Vashem helped Israelis 
understand the historical injustice of the Nakba and embrace policies of regret 
and restitution.13 In the same vein, the many public institutions of Holocaust 
memory in the us have complemented popular culture’s happy memories of 
wwii as the good war, rendering it all the more difficult for mainstream us so-
ciety to imagine its soldiers in the role of perpetrators despite ample evidence 
to the contrary.14 Celebrating the liberators of World War ii seems to stand 
in the way of coming to terms with us war crimes past and present. In this 
context, one may also wonder about how precisely Holocaust memory and the 
memory of slavery intersect in us politics and culture. Has the rise of popular 
Holocaust memory, from the broadcast of the tv series Holocaust in 1978 to the 
inauguration of the Holocaust Memorial Museum (ushmm) in 1993, delayed 
11 Bill Niven, “German Victimhood Discourse in Comparative Perspective,” in Dynamics of 
Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe, edited by Eric Langenbacher, Bill Niven and 
Ruth Wittlinger (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 180–194, 185.
12 Idith Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005).
13 Ronit Lentin, Co-Memory and Melancholia: Israelis Memorialising the Palestinian Nakba 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 28; see also Jennifer Hansen-Glucklich, Holocaust 
Memory Reframed: Museums and the Challenges of Representation (New Brunswick: Rut-
gers University Press, 2014).
14 John Bodnar, The “Good War” in American Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2010), 221.
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the official recognition for the traumas of slavery? After all, the dark heritage 
of slavery only attained a permanent memory presence on the National Mall 
in Washington d.c. when the National African History and Culture Museum 
(nahcm) opened in September 2016.15 Or, was the presence of Holocaust 
memory, setting a precedent for negative remembrance, an indispensable pre-
condition for the delayed development of an increasingly self-critical official 
memory of slavery? Put differently, was there never an option for a direct way 
from the media event Roots to nahcm, without the detour through Holocaust 
and ushmm?
The comparison of Holocaust and slavery memories in the us illustrates 
the difference between self-reflexive and self-critical sites of memory. Collec-
tive memories are self-reflexive as a matter of course; they tend to explicitly 
address historical events from a given collective’s real or imagined past and 
imbed them in patterns of interpretation integrating past, present and future 
into meaningful story lines. The stories come in different flavours and hybrids. 
They might feature largely positively connoted events integrated into positive 
narrative trajectories, as for instance the events of the American revolution 
as part of an uplifting history of us democracy;16 negatively connoted events 
integrated into positive narrative trajectories, for example traditional recita-
tions of Polish suffering as part of gratifying invocations of Polish resilience;17 
or negatively connoted events integrated into stories expressing collective feel-
ings of doubt and regret as during the first decade of Holocaust culture in West 
Germany. The last story type is most likely to produce self-critical sites of mem-
ory, posing probing questions about past failures and their ongoing relevance 
in an atmosphere of relative collective insecurity.18 Phases of cultural trauma 
offer opportunities to inquire into the causes of past crimes and address the 
all-important questions of if and how a given collective can prevent its mem-
bers from becoming perpetrators (again). Self-critical memory deals with one’s 
own crimes, not the crimes of others and targets the centre of an ingroup’s 
symbolic sense of self. Self-critical memory pursues the question of what 
15 Tonya Bolden, How to Build a Museum: Smithsonian’s National Museum of African Ameri-
can History and Culture (New York: Viking, 2016); for the memory of slavery in the us see 
also Ron Eyerman, Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Iden-
tity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
16 Janice Hume, Popular Memory and the American Revolution (New York: Routledge, 2014).
17 Ewa Ochman, Post-Communist Poland: Contested Pasts and Future Identities (New York: 
Routledge, 2013).
18 See in this context Jörn Rüsen’s typology of historical narration and especially his concept 




 illegitimate or immoral acts of violence are implicated in a group’s cherished 
accomplishments. Consequently, self-critical memories thrive along vectors of 
passionate identification raising the intriguing question to what extent people 
around the globe feel themselves passionately involved in transnational con-
cepts and practices of collective belonging. Transnational political institutions 
often appear to elicit at best lukewarm responses from its constituencies and 
therefore do not constitute promising arenas of self-critical memory politics. 
In this sense, it is, for instance, unrealistic to expect that a memory institution 
such as the House of European History will elicit powerful feelings about Euro-
peaness, let alone be able to channel these feelings into decidedly self-critical 
memory trajectories.19 In fact, it might be altogether unrealistic to expect that 
the kind of media that ushered in Holocaust memory 35 years ago, i.e., televi-
sion, film, museums and memorials, could still provoke passionate feelings in 
audiences steeped in interactive digital culture and living at a point in time 
when the remembrance of the Final Solution transitions from the dynamic 
realm of communicative memory to the settled realm of cultural memory. All 
in all, the deck is clearly stacked against Holocaust memory serving (again) any 
time soon as a truly self-critical site of memory. Generational, media historical 
and transnational dynamics of memory culture are likely to relegate Holocaust 
culture-as-we-know-it to the dustbin of cultural hagiography.
If Holocaust memory can be resurrected as an emotionally and politically 
relevant fixture of future memory culture it would have to be in the guise of 
immersive, simulative and possibly also counterfactual digital memory. Gam-
ing culture, social media networks and digitally empowered academic ex-
change are the kind of cultural environments where Holocaust culture might 
get a second lease on life as a transnationally shared, passionately pursued and 
possibly also self-critically inflected memory practice. A selective glance at 
digital Holocaust culture suggests, however, that the new media of collective 
remembrance are often embedded in traditional power structures and that 
the more innovative environments raise intriguing questions about the the-
matic boundaries and collective subject positions of Holocaust memory. While 
Holocaust allusions abound in cyberspace and established institutions of Ho-
locaust memory make ample use of digital technologies, Holocaust memory 
has simply not yet arrived in the digital age – if we identify as one of the key 
attractions of digital culture its ability to offer users the experience of captivat-
ing historical narrative worlds combined with the compelling illusion of being 
able to inflect the narrative trajectories of these worlds according to their own 
19 Wolfram Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the European 
Parliament’s House of European History Project,” Journal of Common Market Studies 55/3 
(2017), 518–534.
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aesthetic predilections. Put differently, digitized Holocaust culture features a 
great deal more conservative remediation of analogue and electronic media 
contents, formats and communication patterns than one would expect or like 
to see given the fact that other segments of contemporary historical culture of-
fer fully fledged immersive and interactive historical worlds. Moreover, in light 
of Holocaust culture’s refusal to go fully interactive and simulative, it is difficult 
to imagine which groups might passionately embrace Holocaust memory as a 
key element of their collective sense of self let alone turn it into a site of rigor-
ous self-criticism.
 Gaming the Holocaust Paradigm?
The ritual has been played out on a number of occasions in recent years: some-
body greedily, provocatively or courageously develops a Holocaust themed 
video game and is promptly pressured to abandon the project. In 2010, a group 
of Wolfenstein 3D modders, led by a young Israeli, developed a technologically 
crude Auschwitz revenge game loosely based on the 1944 uprising of members 
of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando who succeeded in killing three ss-guards 
and setting fire to one crematorium.20 The game that the group worked on for 
over three years featured Nazi violence in the camp and then turned the tables 
on the torturers and had players in the role of Jewish inmates go on a killing 
spree of the Nazi camp personnel from a first-person-shooter perspective.21 
The response came quickly after the release of a pilot.22 Representatives of 
the Wiesenthal Center and the Anti-Defamation League rejected the project 
because ‘the Holocaust should be off-limits for video games’.23 Citing negative 
media attention and attendant emotional stress, the group cancelled the game 
20 The uprising has been subject to various retellings; see the measured words in Nicholas 
Chare/Dominic Williams, Matters of Testimony: Interpreting the Scrolls at Auschwitz (New 
York: Berghahn, 2016), 6–7; and compare, for instance, to Leni Yahil, The Holocaust (New 
York: Oxford up, 1990), 486.
21 Michael McWherto, “Concentration Camp Game Was Meant To Be Fun,” Kotaku, 
10 December, 2010, http://kotaku.com/5711317/concentration-camp-game-was-meant-to - 
be-fun. Accessed 21 October, 2016.
22 See the pilot and additional screen shots: “Sonderkommando Revolt Wolfenstein 3D 
mod,” last updated 13 December, 2010, http://www.moddb.com/mods/sonderkommando - 
revolt. Accessed 21 October, 2016.
23 Brian Crecente, “Anti-Defamation League Slams ‘Fun’ Holocaust Video Game as Horrific 
and Inappropriate,” Kotaku, 11 December, 2010, http://kotaku.com/5712163/anti-defama-




weeks before its scheduled release date.24 Apparently, violent counterfactual 
Jewish revenge fantasies are intriguing and prize-worthy on the big screen in, 
for instance, Inglourious Bastards, but unacceptable in the allegedly low-brow 
cultural environment of video game coding and modding.25
A New York City indie programmer has had a similar experience with a very 
different kind of video game project. Since 2008, Luc Bernard has worked on 
Imagination is the only Escape, which is set in Nazi-occupied Paris and depicts 
the suffering of Jews from the perspective of a young Jewish boy. The game 
blends history and fantasy in an effort to produce visually and narratively so-
phisticated historical fiction about the Shoah and has received much advance 
praise from game critics. Nevertheless, Bernard could not find distribution 
venues and most recently also failed in his efforts to raise capital through a 
crowdsourcing initiative.26 For a video game designer it is clearly a bad career 
move to invest creative efforts and many months at the screen in crafting a 
Holocaust-themed virtual game environment. The situation is vaguely remi-
niscent of Holocaust scholarship in the 1960s when the few scholars trying 
to write the history of the Final Solution struggled with similar prejudices.27 
Today, even big players in the huge and influential video game industry are 
only carefully inching closer to the taboo subject matter of Holocaust gam-
ing. In this vein, the powerful Wolfenstein franchise, now owned by Bethesda 
Softworks, stepped into a fictitious Nazi concentration camp in its successful 
2014 release of Wolfenstein: The New Order. In the counterfactual game set in 
the 1960s after the Nazis have won wwii, Wolfenstein hero Blazkowicz infil-
trates a Nazi camp to liberate a brilliant Jewish scientist. The short episode 
features provocative images including a female camp commander holding a 
24 Riva Gold, “Designers Pull Plug on Auschwitz Death Camp Revolt Video Game,” Haartz.com, 
26 December, 2010; http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/designers-pull-plug-on-auschwitz-
death-camp-revolt-video-game-1.333022. Accessed 21 October, 2016.
25 In 2009 the adl, for instance, praised Inglourious Basterds as “an allegory about good 
and evil and the no-holds barred efforts to defeat the evil personified by Hitler, his hench-
men and his Nazi regime. If only it were true,” “adl Statement on Quentin Tarrantino’s 
‘Inglourious Basterds’,” archive adl.org, 18 August, 2009, http://archive.adl.org/presrele/
holna_52/5585_52.html#.V852dBR0U6U. Accessed 21 October, 2016; for a scholarly as-
sessments of the movie’s transgressive accomplishments see Robert Dassanowsky (ed.), 
Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds: A Manipulation of Metacinema (New York: Con-
tinuum, 2012).
26 “Imagination Is The Only Escape,” Indiegogo.com, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/
imagination-is-the-only-escape#/. Accessed 21 October, 2016.
27 Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian (Ivan Dee, 1996).
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baby upside down by its leg, whip at the ready, before the ‘camera’ swiftly cuts 
to another scene.28
Critics and gamers have identified a number of reasons for the Holocaust 
gaming taboo. Mainstream games with attractive graphics are expensive and 
therefore game developers tend to copy and fine-tune previously successful 
formats rather than launching radically new aesthetics and content matter. 
Moreover, a lot of fast-paced, action-oriented video game violence thrives 
on simple plot structures that seem to preclude the kind of complex narra-
tive explanations scholars use to account for events like the Final Solution. 
Finally, the gaming industry lacks auteur figures such as Lanzmann, Spielberg 
or  Tarantino who can more easily transgress limits of historical taste. Conse-
quently, as Jeff Hayton has pointed out, ‘medium, genre, and economics all 
work as inhibiting factors steering video games away from a sustained engage-
ment with Nazism and the Holocaust.’29 Last but not least, some of the key 
players of the Holocaust memory establishment cannot imagine how they 
could successfully transfer their didactic and political mission into simulative 
and interactive ludic digital environments and have therefore concluded that 
video games and their brand of genocide/human rights education are simply 
incompatible with each other.
Reservations about the compatibility of the medium video game with seri-
ous historical subject matter are not limited to Holocaust themes; they also 
exist with regard to other topics including 9/1130 and slavery.31  At the same 
time, video games have conquered the historical imagination of many  players 
28 Plygon, “The New Order shows you the horror of concentration camps from the first per-
son,” YouTube, 19 May 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v  =  DbQ3H6lEWDE. Ac-
cessed 21 October, 2016.
29 Jeff Hayton, “Beyond Good and Evil: Nazis and the Supernatural in Video Games,” in Mon-
ica Black/Eric Kurlander (eds.), Revisiting the “Nazi Occult:” Histories, Realities, Legacies 
(Rochester: Camden House: 2015), 248–269.
30 Consider for instance the 9/11 virtual reality reenactment 08:46 based on a student project: 
DarkWolfLetsPlay, “08:46/9/11 Terrorist Attack Oculus Rift Game,” youtube, 19  October, 
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v  =  vd2_j8dsOsM. Accessed 21 October, 2016; 
and see the helpful review by Adi Robertson, “The virtual reality 9/11 experience is bad, 
but not for the reasons you’d expect,” The Verge, 30 October, 2015, http://www.theverge 
.com/2015/10/30/9642790/virtual-reality-9-11-experience-empathy. Accessed 21  October, 
2016.
31 “Slave Trade Video Game Edited After Backlash,” Huffington post, 3 September, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/slave-trade-game-edited-following-backlash 
_us_55e8489be4b0b7a9633bdc73. Accessed 21 October, 2015.
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as games with historical themes proliferate.32 Moreover, as a result of the de-
velopment of serious gaming during the last 15 years, video games now play 
a decisive role in government and corporate training, education, health care 
and public policy.33 The gaming community is very aware of this disconnect 
and some game critics have already concluded that the status quo in digi-
tal Holocaust memory is untenable. Given the cultural prominence of video 
games in general and games with historical themes in particular it amounts 
to a strange case of Holocaust denial in reverse that no sophisticated game 
about the topic yet exists.34 That way, the field is left wide open to dubious 
right-wing concoctions such as KZ Manager35 and, even more importantly, the 
medium’s extraordinary didactic potential remains untapped. As prominent 
history game designer Brenda Romero has emphasized, due to their interactive 
nature ‘games convey complicity like no other medium can.’36 Therefore, they 
32 Matthew Kappell/Andrew Elliott (eds.), Playing with the Past: Digital Games and the Simu-
lation of History (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014); see also Daniel Kline (ed.), Digital Gaming 
Re-imagines the Middle Ages (London: Routledge 2014); Chris Kempshall, The First World 
War in Computer Games (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2014); Tobias Winnerling and 
Florian Kerschbaumer (eds.), Early Modernity and Video Games (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars, 2014); and Nina Huntemann and Matthew Payne (eds.), Joystick Soldiers: The 
Politics of Play in Military Video Games (New York: Routledge, 2010).
33 For a definition and historical overview of serious gaming see Christian Loh, Yanyan 
Sheng and Dirk Ilfenthaler, “Serious Games Analytics: Theoretical Framework,” in Seri-
ous Games Analytics: Methodologies for Performance Measurement, Assessment, and Im-
provement, edited by Christian S. Loh, Yanyan Sheng and Dirk Ifenthaler (Cham: Springer, 
2015), 3–29; see also Ralf Dörner, Stefan Göbel, Wolfgang Effelsberg and Josef Wiemers 
(eds.), Serious Games: Foundations, Concepts and Practice (Cham: Springer, 2016); and Ute 
Ritterfeld, Michael Cody, Peter Vorderer (eds.), Serious Games: Mechanisms and Effects 
(New York: Routledge, 2009).
34 Eric Day, “Why We Don’t Have a Holocaust Video Game and Why We Desperately Need 
One,” overmental.com, 5 May, 2014, http://overmental.com/content/why-we-dont-have - 
a-holocaust-video-game-and-why-we-desperately-need-one-1303; Luke K, “wwii Games: 
Where is the Holocaust,” Critical Gamer, http://www.criticalgamer.co.uk/2011/01/17/wwii - 
games-where-is-the-holocaust/. Accessed 21 October, 2016.
35 “KZ Manager,” Wikipedia, last updated 21 October, 2016, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
KZ_Manager. Accessed 21 October, 2016.
36 Video game designer Brenda Romero cited in Kaveh Waddell, “A Video Game That Lets 
You Torture Iraqi Prisoners,” theatlantic.com, 1 August, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2016/08/a-video-game-that-lets-you-torture-iraqi-prisoners/493379/. 
Accessed 21 October, 2016. Romero is also the designer of the Holocaust board game Train: 
Dean Takashi, “Brenda Romero’s Train board game will make you ponder,” venturebeat.
com, 11 May, 2013, http://venturebeat.com/2013/05/11/brenda-romero-train-board-game - 
holocaust/. Accessed 21 October, 2016; on agency in war games see Pat Harrigan, Matthew 
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seem particularly well suited for having gamers intimately explore the experi-
ences and decisions of people living in foreign worlds, including historical nar-
rative worlds. And that intimate knowledge of past actors, may they be victims, 
perpetrators or bystanders, offers in principle great potential for self-critical 
memory politics.37
The disconnect between a burgeoning historical gaming culture one the 
one hand and the lack of state-of-the-art Holocaust gaming on the other hand 
turns video games into an important cultural arena illustrating par excellence 
Andrew Hoskins’ perceptive remarks about the bifurcation of memory cul-
ture in an age of digitization. Hoskins identifies a clear division of ‘two media/
memory cultures: one formalized, institutionalized, regimented (including on-
line); the other more emergent, confrontational, yet fragmented.’ Obviously, 
both spheres of social memory are closely intertwined and influence each 
other with the second, more fluid and emergent culture featuring a ‘virality 
that undermines attempts to sanitise history.’38 For Hoskins the ‘immediacy, 
mobility, flexibility and interactivity’ of the new emergent memory is the result 
of digital hyperconnectivity and particularly pronounced in social networks 
and file sharing platforms.39 Due to its scale and speed the new memory prob-
lematizes the relationship between the hitherto stable cultural constructs of 
‘past’ and ‘present,’ raises anxieties about people’s ability to actively shape so-
cial memory, and prompts a rush to judgment that disrupts time-tested rituals 
for containing and forgetting potentially unsettling pasts. The gaming industry, 
focused on a few particularly profitable markets and dominated by two dozen 
companies, clearly belongs to the regimented memory culture. In the world 
of Tencent, Sony and Microsoft, the formal regimes of oblivion and contain-
ment, translated into effective processes of self-censorship, are clearly (still) 
functioning. That raises intriguing questions about digital Holocaust memo-
ry in the more fluid and flexible cultural digital contexts of social media and 
academia.
Kirschenbaum and James Dunnigan (eds.), Zones of Control: Perspectives on Wargaming 
(Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2016).
37 Adam Chapman, Digital Games as History: How Videogames Represent the Past and Offer 
Access to Historical Practice (New York: Routledge, 2016).
38 Andrew Hoskins, “The Right to be Forgotten in Post-Scarcity,” in, The Ethics of Memory in 
a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be forgotten, edited by Alessia Ghezzi et al. (New 
York: PalgraveMacmillian, 2014), 50–64, 60; see also Andrew Hoskins, “Digital Network 
Memory,” in Mediation, Remediation and the Dynamic of Cultural Memory, edited by As-
trid Erll and Ann Rigney (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), , 91–106.
39 Hoskins, “The Right to be Forgotten,” 55; see also José van Dijck, The Culture of Connectiv-
ity: A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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In crafting an identity for itself, the emerging field of digital memory studies 
follows in the footsteps of other academic disciplines. The proponents of the 
new field highlight historical developments that cannot be successfully stud-
ied by existing scholarly strategies – namely the digital revolution with the 
instruments of traditional memory studies – and showcase a new set of intel-
lectual tools better suited for the job at hand.40 In short, they expose the limits 
of an established intellectual world and build up a new conceptual infrastruc-
ture. On the deconstructive side, all the essential binaries of memory studies 
become subject to critical review because digital memory requires nothing 
less than radically ‘changing the parameters of the who, what, when, and why 
of remembering.’41 Digital memory no longer evolves along the individual-
collective axis. In the post-broadcast era there is no collective to speak of, at 
least not in the way in which television used to aggregate consumers into audi-
ences through narratives and media events. For the same reason, there are also 
no clearly identifiable private or public spheres. Participatory digital culture 
features active individuals constantly posting, editing, liking and linking in 
pursuit of fluid ‘we’s’ and for the purpose of crafting and exhibiting an attrac-
tive self. That job requires an intimate, affective, and symbiotic relationship to 
digital technology and it is often the machine that dictates the rhythm of com-
munication.42 As a result, transhuman entities do the remembering, requiring 
digital memory studies to leave behind the comfortable human-non-human 
divide. Since transhuman selves are immersed in expansive networks always 
in the state of becoming, digital memory also obliterates the conventional dif-
ferentiation between archives and lived historical culture with serious conse-
quences for the social construction of time.43 In fluid networks, audiovisuals 
of the present rub elbows with audiovisuals from the past, rendering impossi-
ble any collectively organized, self-reflexive process of balanced remembering 
and forgetting. In fact, the very distinction between past and present becomes 
flexible with transhumans living in an ‘extended now,’ being unable to leave 
40 Karen Worcman and Joanne Garde-Hansen, Social Memory Technology: Theory, Practice, 
Action (New York: Routledge, 2016), esp. 46–49; Ellen Rutten, Julie Fedor and Vera Zvereva 
(eds.), Memory, Conflict and New Media: Web Wars in Post-Socialist States (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2013); and Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading (eds.), Save 
As … Digital Memory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
41 Andrew Hoskins, “The Restless Past: An Introduction to Digital Memory and Media,” in 
Digital Memory Studies: Media Pasts in Transition, edited by Andrew Hoskins (New York: 
Routledge, forthcoming).
42 Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
43 Wolfgang Ernst, Digital Memory and the Archive (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
2013).
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behind the ghosts of past humiliations and battling the dystopias of eternal 
memory, on the one hand, and technological obsolescence and instant memo-
ry death, on the other hand.44 These fluid, transhuman ‘we’s’ circulate on many 
planes including transnational and transcultural planes but it is questionable 
if they also attain enough cultural and political stability to support the arduous 
process of self-critical remembering. It might take forceful memorial anachro-
nisms such as cosmopolitan memory with its fictions of righteous permanence 
to launch effective challenges of existing memory regimes. However, for those 
questions to become relevant Holocaust memory would first have to leave the 
confines of formalised, institutionalized and regimented digital memory.
 Digital Holocaust Education: From the Pedestrian to the Radically 
Multi-directional
Given the prominence of the education theme in Holocaust memory it is not 
surprising that websites of applicable institutions abound with teaching guide-
lines, online courses and lessons plans adapted to all kinds of curricular con-
texts. The uk’s Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (hmdt) takes, for instance, great 
pride in ‘offering a huge range of resources to educators’ although the charity’s 
line-up of teaching tools would be best characterized as numerous rather than 
diverse.45 The overarching theme of Holocaust Memorial Day 2016 was ‘Don’t 
stand by’ and with that catchy title hmdt invited students and teachers to 
become creative and craft films, launch social media campaigns or plan a hmd 
event in support of all sorts of deserving causes, ranging from genocide edu-
cation to battling sexism and lgbt prejudice.46 But previous year’s proudly 
mentioned initiatives and especially the hmdt teaching  resources released 
in support of the ‘Don’t stand by’ theme focus quite narrowly on Holocaust 
history, encouraging students, for instance, to draw up a character map of a 
British Holocaust hero, contemplating a number of survivor testimonies or cel-
ebrating resistance activities during the Holocaust.47 In addition, the teaching 
44 Martin Pogacar, Media Archeologies, Micro-Archives and Story-Telling: Re-Presencing the 
Past (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
45 “For Educators,” Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, http://hmd.org.uk/content/for-educators. 
Accessed 22 October, 2016.
46 “Don’t Stand By: Holocaust Memorial Day 2016: What You Can Do,” http://hmd.org.uk/
sites/default/files/HMD_files/dont_stand_by_-_final.pdf. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
47 “Don’t Stand By: Holocaust Memorial Day 2016: Lesson Activity: British Heroes of 
the  Holocaust,” http://hmd.org.uk/sites/default/files/british_heroes_of_the_holocaust_
resource .pdf. Accessed 22 October, 2016; “hmd 2016: Lesson Plan: Didn’t Stand By,” 
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tools lack interactive depth and ambition, consisting of text pdfs and short 
incoherent PowerPoint presentations.48 hmdt is not an outlier in this context. 
Most of the established institutions provide teaching resources that are con-
servative, predictable and uninspiring in content and form.49
There are exceptions – some problematic, others truly innovative. Yad Vash-
em’s website features, for instance, an interactive learning environment that 
describes ‘the ghettos during the Holocaust from the children’s perspective, 
and attempts to present this complex experience in a way that is accessible to 
children.’50 One might object to the naïve drawings and small scale of the visual 
learning environment. Yet the platform does present a wealth of visual and his-
torical information in an accessible albeit only rudimentary interactive format. 
Nevertheless, as a lot of Holocaust products for young audiences, ‘Children in 
the Ghetto’ amounts to a strange type of Holocaust denial; the tool repeatedly 
identifies hunger as a serious problem in the ghettos but refrains from spelling 
out the consequences or detailing any other problems faced by the ghetto pop-
ulation.51 There are excellent reasons for such reticence. As Yad Vashem points 
out: ‘The unsupervised exposure to Holocaust history at a young age may induce 
trauma in children and could possibly trigger strategies of distanciation and 
even feelings of resentment towards the topic.’52 The word of warning  contains 
http://hmd.org.uk/education/hmd-2016-lesson-plan-didnt-stand. Accessed 22 October, 
2016; “Life Stories,” http://hmd.org.uk/resources/life-stories. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
48 hmdt is currently developing a fully interactive digital teaching tool called hmdt Eteach, 
but a presentation of the pilot at the bahs Conference in July 2016 did not reveal a par-
ticularly dynamic or innovative platform. Andy Fearn, “hmdt Eteach: A new interactive, 
multimedia resource to support educators in teaching effectively about the Holocaust 
and subsequent genocides,” bahs Conference 2016, ucl 7/20/2016.
49 “Teaching Resources”, Holocaust Educational Trust, http://www.het.org.uk/teaching - 
pack. Accessed 22 October, 2016; “The International School for Holocaust Studies: Edu-
cation Materials,” Yad Vashem http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/index.asp . 
Accessed 22 October, 2016; “Teacher Resources: Educating Hearts and Minds,” Museum 
of Tolerance, http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.5052463/k 
.AE91/Teacher_Resources.htm. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
50 “International School for Holocaust Studies: Learning Environments,” Yad Vashem, http://
www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/learning_environments/index.asp. Accessed 22 
October, 2016.
51 For children’s books with similar problems see, for instance, Phoebe Eloise Unterman, 
Through Eva’s Eyes (Kansas City: Landmark, 2009).
52 In October 2016, only the German version of the online game worked. Here the words of 
warning in the original German: “Die unbeaufsichtigte Beschäftigung mit dem Holocaust 
in einem jungen Alter kann zu einem Trauma bei Kindern führen, sowie zu Distanziert-
heit und in manchen Fällen sogar zu einem Gefühl der Feindseligkeit im Zusammenhang 
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a strange list of risks implying inadvertently that a sense of resentment towards 
the topic constitutes as serious a problem as trauma. In this specific case, it is 
not the laudable search for the new digital teaching tools which constitutes 
a problem, but the troublesome race to the bottom of the teaching pyramid 
that seeks to expand the realm of Holocaust memory by enlisting younger and 
younger captive audiences, for instance by way of digital technology deemed 
particularly attractive to children. Initiatives such as ‘Children in the Ghetto’ 
illustrate that there might indeed be some hard limits of Holocaust memory. 
Faced with the self-fabricated dilemma of either  falsifying history or traumatiz-
ing children, silence could be an excellent temporary option.
A second exception is the pathbreaking IWitness initiative of the usc 
 Shoah Foundation. The project is truly remarkable because it hands over 
editorial power over cultural memory to teachers and high school students, 
teaching them basic film editing skills and providing them with extensive ac-
cess to the Shoah Foundation’s archive of Holocaust testimonies. The students 
are furthermore encouraged to enter their films in the yearly IWitness Video 
competition. The winning entries of 2016 powerfully demonstrate that the 
students, giving the choice, are ready to leave behind the history of the Ho-
locaust. Time and again, the films take a short clip from survivor testimony 
out of its historical context and use it as a jumping off point to engage with 
pressing present-day concerns such as poverty, homelessness, mental illness, 
animal rights, self-help and human solidarity.53 In this way, Holocaust memory 
becomes a tangential concern subject to powerful multi-directional forces of 
reframing and forgetting.54 The results of the IWitness digital film initiative 
are not Holocaust memory as we know it and they also do not (yet) amount 
to fully emergent connective memories. They represent an interesting hybrid: 
broadcast memories produced by members of a post-broadcast generation. 
The results indicate that, in an appropriate communicative-didactive setting, 
handing over interpretive power to transhuman memory amateurs should give 
less cause for ethical concern than, for example, encouraging designated mem-
ory experts to craft Holocaust curricula for young children.
mit dem Thema,” see “Die Internetseite ‘Kinder im Ghetto:’ Kommentare für Lehrer,” Yad 
Vashem, http://ghetto.galim.org.il/ger/about/lessons.html. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
53 “IWitness Video Challenge: Top Videos by Groups – 2016,” University of Southern Califor-
nia, http://iwitness.usc.edu/SFI/IWitnessChallenge/Winners.aspx?y = 2016. Accessed 22 
October, 2016.
54 On the concept of multi-directional memory see Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional 




At the same time, the Shoah Foundation has pursued ambitious  transhuman 
experiments designed to retain power of interpretation for the institution. For 
a number of years, the most digitally advanced institution of Holocaust mem-
ory has been tinkering with Holocaust holograms. The developers combine vi-
sual testimony of survivors of the Shoah, taped over the last few decades, with 
highly sophisticated computer software. They hope to be able to stage capti-
vating encounters between tomorrow’s school children and the holograms of 
yesterday’s survivors in which the ghosts from the past answer the children’s 
questions in an interactive setting and an atmosphere of pious, intergenera-
tional respect.55 The holograms of survivors are very good at mastering the past; 
in simulated conversation they seemingly spontaneously provide the details of 
their family histories, camp ordeals, survival strategies and postwar lives. But 
they cannot handle the present; don’t ask them what they had for breakfast 
today. At some point during the communicative process, the ingenious hybrid 
of dialogical questions and monological answers breaks down. The holograms 
are a fantastic attempt to stem the tide of history and decelerate the historici-
zation of Holocaust memory. Their creators certainly understand the stakes of 
Holocaust memory in today’s rapidly changing demographic and media envi-
ronment. The culturally constructed aura of the Holocaust survivors has been 
a crucial component of Holocaust education in the past decades.56 For the fu-
ture of Holocaust memory it is important that that aura gets a second lease 
on life or is replaced by a similarly attractive memorial focus. The holograms 
embody the insight that Holocaust survivors as we encountered them on tv 
or in video testimonies represent a media figure which should, in principle, be 
able to survive the biological deaths of the actual survivors.
It will be interesting to follow the careers of the holograms. If their develop-
ers and the protagonists of digital memory studies read contemporary culture 
correctly the holograms could become exoskeletal media stars. But it is also 
possible that the figure of the survivor, in its new digital disguise, does not at-
tain the same media success that its analogue predecessor enjoyed on the tv 
55 For a video demonstration see itc Graphics Lab’s “New Dimension in Testimony  – 
usc ict and sfi Classroom Concept,” 8 February, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v = AnF630tCiEk. Accessed 24 October, 2016; see also Sophia Stuart, “How Natu-
ral Language Tech, Holograms Are Preserving Holocaust Testimony,” pcmag.com, 8 April, 
2016, http://www.pcmag.com/article/343452/how-natural-language-tech-holograms-are - 
preserving-holocaus. Accessed 24 October, 2016.
56 Jeffrey Shandler, While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1999); Oren Meyers, Eyal Zandberg and Motti Neiger (eds.), Communicat-
ing Awe: Media Memory and Holocaust Commemoration (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 
2014); and, more critically, Ann Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others 
(New Brunswick, 2011).
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screens over several decades. In the past, the aura of the survivors depended on 
a specific media effect. The viewers had to be able to entertain the illusion that 
they could meet the survivors in their everyday lives and talk to them about 
the extraordinary past. Through small, seemingly insignificant markers such as 
clothing, speech, body language, lighting and background, the  coverage con-
veyed a powerful sense of historical simultaneity. The words and images on 
the screen created an atmosphere of co-presence, placing survivor and viewer 
in the same time frame and social universe.57 But the holograms are no longer 
aesthetically and narratively embedded in the present-day social context of 
the observer. Despite their technological sophistication, the holograms cannot 
be effectively and continuously brought up to date; they might always carry 
small, yet pervasive markers of historical non-simultaneity. Therefore, they are 
perhaps unable to fulfil the shuttling-service between past and present that the 
mediated survivors of the tv coverage of the 1980s and 1990s accomplished on 
a regular basis. In the era of analogue and electronic media, nobody managed 
to invent media aesthetics that could prevent their own historicization, but 
perhaps that rule no longer applies in an age of hyperconnectivity. Either way, 
the holograms only amount to a clever simulation of true digital interactivity. 
Unless the holograms are released into the wild online, its ‘dialogue’ partners 
cannot challenge the holograms’ memory, the conceptual or narrative frame 
of Holocaust remembrance or the emotional frame of intergenerational piety. 
In an institutional communicative triangle comprising tomorrow’s school chil-
dren, the digital ghosts of Holocaust survivors, as well as heritage professionals 
and software developers, power is concentrated in the hands of the represen-
tatives of the Shoah Foundation although it is difficult to determine if today’s 
and tomorrow’s school children also perceive of the distribution of power in 
this way.
 Facebook Broadcasting: ‘Never again without Memory’
The tension between regimented and emergent digital memories, i.e., be-
tween institutional authorial control and the consumers’ desire to engage with 
 history on their own terms and according to their own narrative/ aesthetic pref-
erences is even more pronounced on the social media front. In August 2016, the 
ushmm took the Olympic Games in Brazil as an opportunity to  enlighten its 
57 Wulf Kansteiner, “Macht, Authentizität und die Verlockungen der Normalität: Aufstieg 
und Abschied der NS-Zeitzeugen in den Geschichtsdokumentationen des ZDF,” in Die 




150,000 followers via Facebook about the 1936 Berlin Olympics, reporting in 
a series of 15 entries about the partial exclusion of Jews and the denigration 
of black athletes by Nazi authorities. The posts generally elicited hundreds of 
likes, several dozen shares and a handful of comments each. They represent a 
routine flow of Facebook entries primarily based on information readily avail-
able in the ushmm’s Holocaust Encyclopedia and photo archives. Occasion-
ally, the coverage was interrupted by more current concerns. The museum 
marked for instance ‘the second anniversary of the beginning of the Islamic 
State’s genocide of the Yezidi’ (8/2) with the help of a poster of the Free Ye-
zidi Foundation emphasizing that the ushmm staff had already assembled a 
report on the matter.58 The pr tactic of trying to fit an ongoing genocide into 
an anniversary obsessed memory culture in order to have somebody pay at-
tention to the Yezidi’s plight did not trigger the desired reaction. Within three 
weeks the post elicited an underwhelming response of a total of 117 likes/sads/
angries, 62 shares, and only one comment, whose author referred to the Nazi 
precedent and pointed out ‘that reports are great for documentation and lat-
er trial but … overwhelming force and unconditional surrender are the only 
things that stop genocide.’59
The ushmm pr officers had more luck with an entry on 11 August, deploring 
the suffering of civilians in the besieged city of Aleppo, Syria. Carefully chosen 
phrasing (‘these crimes could amount to genocide’) were combined with a well 
edited, heart-wrenching video clip showing pictures of a hospitalized five-year 
old boy, a victim of a Syrian government attack, who later died of his inju-
ries.60 The clip was viewed 158,525 times and with 1,105 shares proved to be the 
most successful entry of the month. The 145 lively comments are particularly 
intriguing, documenting multi-directional memory in action as  commentators 
addressed the important questions of who is to be blamed for and what is to 
be done about the war crimes in Syria. Many users voiced massive frustra-
tion with government variously highlighting the failure of local and regional 
58 In June 2016 the un officially determined that Isis is committing genocide against the 
Yazidis: “un Commission of Inquiry on Syria: isis is committing genocide against the 
Yazidis,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 16 June, 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID  =  20113&Lan-
gID  =  E. Accessed 22 October, 2016; see also “un: Yezidi ‘genocide has occurred and is 
ongoing,’” Rudaw, 16 June, 2016, http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/16062016. Accessed 
22 October, 2016.
59 ushmm’s Facebook page, 2 August, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/holocaustmuse-
um/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
60 ushmm’s Facebook page, 11 August, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/holocaustmuse-
um/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
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leadership in the Middle East, the flawed foreign policy of the us, and, more 
specifically, the particular responsibility of the Obama administration. The 
comments, overwhelmingly coming from the us, run the gamut from rigorous 
self-criticism (‘The us is very much responsible for this’61) to determined iso-
lationism (‘No sympathy!! America has our own problems’62). In this context, 
commentators also discussed immigration, offered prayers and time and again 
deplored the suffering of innocent children. Some comments are politically in-
correct (‘Ya lets replace another raghead countries leader it worked so good in 
iraq and libya … idiots who gives a fuc they have been slaughtering each other 
for thousands of years’63); others are difficult to interpret even when looking 
at the specific context of the post (‘It’s time for a Muslim genocide, emoij’64). It 
was a lively, at times contentious discussion containing hardly any comments 
dealing with Holocaust history.
The successful entry about Syria raises interesting questions about the 
relevance of historical precedent in political communication and the role 
of Holocaust institutions in shaping communicative memory. The subscrib-
ers of the ushmm feed and their Facebook friends probably share a relatively 
strong interest in history, but the explicit historical references included in 
the comments deal with the very recent past; only two commentators create 
analogies to wwii history. The Nazi past does not appear to resonate strongly 
with ushmm followers trying to make sense of the war in Syria. Moreover and 
more important for our purposes, having successfully triggered a debate, the 
ushmm stays completely silent during subsequent discussions. Throughout 
the month of August 2016, ushmm only once responded to a commentator 
providing specific historical information. Otherwise it stayed above the Face-
book flow and fray even when specifically prompted by its Facebook friends to 
respond or take a position.65 That passivity seems to reflect the general policy 
of the ushmm and other Holocaust institutions whose staff members prefer 
61 Dennis Howard on ushmm’s Facebook page, 20 August, 2016, https://www.facebook 
.com/holocaustmuseum/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
62 Overwatch Blizzard on ushmm’s Facebook page, 22 August, 2016, https://www.facebook 
.com/holocaustmuseum/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
63 Dan Gunner on ushmm’s Facebook page, 20 August, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/
holocaustmuseum/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
64 Dylan H. Brown on ushmm’s Facebook page, 21 August, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/
holocaustmuseum/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
65 Ron Van Cleef: “Yes, this is terrible, but I am curious if the ushmm has condemned the 
us bombings of civilians in Syria, Afghanistan and other places?” on ushmm’s Face-




one-directional communication, ‘broadcasting’ a carefully shaped, widely ac-
ceptable message via social media, but refusing to engage further and bring 
their considerable  expertise to bear on the difficult moral questions of how 
to develop an  appropriate communicative memory of war crimes and what 
political consequences to draw from that memory. The users, for that mat-
ter, appear to expect and accept this miscommunication, perhaps because 
they are not   looking at  institutions like the ushmm for historical and politi-
cal guidance.   Apparently,  they simply like to be part of the group and share 
its values. As  one user puts it: ‘amazing 1099 shares wonderful’.66 For many 
‘subscribers,’ the ushmm Facebook page seems to be a cyberspace address 
where they can hang out with peers, pursue their genocide memory interests 
by adding  a  thoughtful facet to their virtual selves, and then return to their 
 comfortable lives.
Put into more abstract terms, the Facebook feed of the ushmm is the place 
where the carefully balanced, politically correct cosmopolitan Holocaust 
memory comes in direct, dysfunctional contact with the kinds of antagonistic 
and agonistic memories that pervade everyday life.67 In response to the Aleppo 
post, some subscribers yelled at each other in an antagonistic mode, a few en-
gaged with each other’s diverging opinions in a relatively respectful agonis-
tic fashion, and often the entries simply coexisted in cyberspace without any 
discernable explicit communicative link. But none of the contributions man-
aged to penetrate the communication barrier between the institution’s settled, 
objectifying cultural memory of genocide and the users more fluid, emergent 
and opinionated exchange reflecting more or less firmly held positions and 
prejudices. The communication strategy of the ushmm makes perfect sense. 
Like their professional colleagues across the globe in the business of Holocaust 
memory, the managers at the ushmm are heavily dependent on government 
subsidies and private philanthropy. They have a lot to lose and nothing to gain 
by politicizing their activities, because negative press coverage would alien-
ate sponsors, endanger their business model and jeopardize the value of their 
brands.
But the purposeful depolitization of genocide memory has important nega-
tive consequences. In light of the ushmm’s actual communication patterns the 
mission of official Holocaust memory ‘never again genocide’ is misleading. The 
multifold activities of the harbingers of official memory reflect  communicative 
aims and practices that are best summarized as ‘never again Holocaust/
66 Butch Allen Seals on ushmm’s Facebook page, 26 August, 2016, https://www.facebook 
.com/holocaustmuseum/. Accessed 23 August, 2016.
67 Anna Bull and Hans Hansen, “On Agonistic Memory,” Memory Studies 9/4 (2016), 390–404.
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genocide without memory.’ The overwhelming share of their investigative and 
communicative efforts are not geared towards identifying countries/groups at 
risk, assembling preventive expertise and actions and lobbying aggressively for 
early intervention – that would fit the motto ‘never again’ which represents a 
vital argument in justifying their sizeable budgets. Rather, the activities are 
fabulously well suited for preventing the kind of black hole of Holocaust mem-
ory that existed roughly between 1945 and 1975.68 Institutions such as ushmm 
will never again waste the memory opportunities and memory obligations that 
present themselves during and after genocide but they are not sure how to 
address the arduous task of shaping political will to action. This understand-
able reticence occurs at a most unfortunate moment when transhumans and 
their parents, representing a wide spectrum of different media biographies, 
need to learn how to congregate into viable we’s and launch politically relevant 
memory cultures.
 YouTube, Twitter and Genocide Prevention Efforts  
in an Academic Bubble
The ushmm’s leadership appears to be very aware of the disconnect between 
genocide memory and genocide prevention and dedicates some of its resourc-
es to engage politicians and academics in genocide prevention outreach. Un-
fortunately, these efforts do not seem to accomplish the desired results. The 
ushmm has, for example, recently enlarged and re-calibrated its Center for the 
Prevention of Genocide in order ‘to make the prevention of genocide a core 
priority for leaders and academics around the world through its multi-pronged 
program of research, education, and public outreach’.69 On 19 May, 2016 the new 
centre staged a high-profile one-day event in pursuit of these lofty goals which 
was ambitiously entitled Partners in Prevention: A Global Forum on Ending 
Genocide and featured an impressive line-up of politicians, policy experts, ngo 
68 On the evolution of Holocaust culture see for instance Rebecca Jinks, Representing Geno-
cide: The Holocaust as Paradigm? (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); and Wulf Kansteiner and 
Todd Presner, “Introduction: The Field of Holocaust Studies and the Emergence of Global 
Holocaust Culture,” in Probing the Ethics of Holocaust Culture, edited by Claudio Fogu, 
Wulf Kansteiner and Todd Presner (Cambridge ma: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1–42.
69 “Museum Announces $20 Million Gift to Name the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Preven-
tion of Genocide,” ushmm, 19 February, 2015, https://www.ushmm.org/information/
press/press-releases/museum-announces-20-million-gift-to-name-the-simon-skjodt-
center-for-the-pr. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
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leaders and academics.70 The guests spoke eloquently about the challenges of 
genocide prevention, for instance with regard to the warning-to-response-gap. 
In that context, they identified a number of strategies to be pursued further 
and studied more closely, including the need to work together with local elites 
in identifying and containing potentially particularly violent militias (‘militia 
mapping’). Coverage of the event was widely shared through social media but 
appears to have triggered no substantive responses. As of 28 August, 2016, the 
YouTube-clip of the panel about ‘Bridging the Warning-to-Response Gap’ up-
loaded on 24 May counted 13 views.71 The enthusiastic tweets sent out during 
the event by ushmm social media coordinator Kai Frazier (‘Packed house for 
#ushmm’s #PreventGenocide forum’ and ‘I so enjoy working with these two. 
#ushmm’s @NaomiKikoler & @Qattouby of #Syria discussing how to #Prevent 
Genocide’72) also elicited no response.
The tweets inadvertently highlight a perfectly normal yet troublesome di-
vide. For academics and assorted experts, discussions about genocides past 
and present provide a memory comfort zone (‘I so enjoy working with these 
two’). Through meetings and connected outreach coverage they validate 
each other’s work in an atmosphere of competitive respect and sombre per-
formances attesting to their caring disposition and intellectual control of the 
subject matter. At the same time that they are crafting self-affirmative memory 
aesthetics they are often quite critical of other, popular strategies of genocide 
aesthetization. The lack of self-reflexivity is nicely illustrated by Holocaust re-
search initiatives in the thriving and rapidly expanding transcultural terrain of 
the digital humanities. In 2014, after several years of path-breaking research, 
a team of scholars published a volume entitled Geographies of the Holocaust, 
marking the arrival of the spatial turn in Holocaust studies.73 With the help 
of relatively large quantitative data sets, they raised and answered intriguing 
questions about the ghettoization process, the mass murder of civilians in 
occupied Eastern Europe, the arrest of Jews in wartime Italy and the expan-
sion of the ss camp system in general and Auschwitz in particular. But in their 
70 “Partners in Prevention: A Global Forum on Ending Genocide,” ushmm, https://www 
.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/partners - 
in-prevention-a-global-forum-on-ending-genocide. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
71 That number had increased to 14 by October 2016, ushmm, “Bridging the Warning-to - 
Response Gap,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDNshd6yOns&feature=youtu.be. 
Accessed 22 October, 2016.
72 Kai M. Frazier, Twitter post, 24 May, 2016, https://twitter.com/hashtag/preventgenocide. 
Accessed 22 October, 2016.
73 Anne Kelly Knowles, Tim Cole & Alberto Giordano (eds.), Geographies of the Holocaust 
(Bloomington: Indiana up, 2014).
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 enthusiasm for the innovative methods of spatial analysis and geovisualiza-
tion the authors and the publishers included in the volume a number of beau-
tifully rendered artistic illustrations and condensations of their quantitative 
analyses that inadvertently channel Nazi visions of living space and geographi-
cal control.74 Put differently, the book, like so many publications in the field 
of Holocaust history and Holocaust studies, fails to address and acknowledge 
the profound sense of unease that, pace Saul Friedlander,75 should help us ad-
dress the troubling parallels between the perpetrators’ worldview and geno-
cidal projects and our attempts to render them explicable and meaningful in 
history and memory. Considered from this perspective, the bit maps of digital 
humanities Holocaust scholarship are the selfies of the academic world and, 
as visual products in an ironic twist of analogue-digital remediation, perfectly 
compatible with a Nazi point of view of the camp system and deportation net-
work. All this is not surprising. As to be expected, the digital humanities in gen-
eral and scholarly Holocaust digital culture in particular primarily serve the 
purpose of providing new venues for the pursuit and display of transnational 
expert culture. There is no reason to assume that the use of digital technology 
in historical research would automatically inspire scholars to develop a more 
self-critical and politically ambitious relationship to the past.
 From Electronic to Digital Media Reception Studies?
The study of Holocaust culture, including the present essay, has always chan-
nelled wide-ranging assumptions about the use of memory culture, assump-
tions shared by many qualitative analyses in the field of memory studies. 
Countless research projects advance on the reasonably sounding premise 
that the content and structure of the memory products under discussion 
correlate with the communication experiences surrounding those products. 
That assumption is problematic because we simply do not possess or have 
not  extensively analysed reception data that would exhaustingly document 
74 Claudio Fogu, “A ‘Spatial Turn’ in Holocaust Studies?” in Probing the Ethics of Holocaust 
Culture, edited by Claudio Fogu, Wulf Kansteiner and Todd Presner (Cambridge ma: Har-
vard University Press, 2016), 218–239; see also “Interview with Anne Knowles, Tim Cole, 
Alberto Giordano, and Paul Jaskot,” in in Probing the Ethics of Holocaust Culture, edited 
by Claudio Fogu, Wulf Kansteiner and Todd Presner (Cambridge ma: Harvard University 
Press, 2016), 240–256.




correlations between media content, media aesthetics and media use. Media 
archives contain a wealth of quantitative usage data but they reflect powerful 
commercial and political interests and often only provide rather imprecise 
insights into actual audience behaviour.76 Moreover, we have generally only 
been able to retain fragmentary qualitative reception data about electronic or 
digital media usage which causes serious problems for the historical studies 
of tv audiences. As a result of these gaps, there is a great deal of research on 
media effects77 but we still lack information about key audience segments, for 
instance of the audiences of such pervasive genres as televised sports, crime 
dramas78 and historical programming. Consequently, there are good reasons 
to assume that indifference, ironic use, and simply unpredictable vectors of 
reception are systematically underreported in available audience research. 
With hindsight and a little remediative conceptual imagination it appears 
likely that the predominant reception models used to make sense of audi-
ences in the era of film and television reveal a great deal of information about 
scholarly assumptions informing these models without having been able to 
bridge the gap between implicit and real audiences. In addition, the field of 
media reception studies has for a long time operated with outdated concep-
tual frameworks focusing first on national audiences and then on individual 
agency, but lacking, for instance, sophisticated concepts for the study of global 
media audiences.79
The limits of audience studies are all the more frustrating since Holocaust 
culture began with an undisputed feat of media reception studies. When the 
nbc tv series Holocaust was broadcast on us prime time in April 1978 to pub-
lic acclaim, more than 30 countries followed suit and laid the foundation to 
the type of transnational Holocaust memory with which we are familiar to-
day. In Germany, the decision to purchase and broadcast the series was widely 
discussed for months before the series hit the screen in January 1979. The un-
usual public deliberations about public tv scheduling decisions gave German 
media and media scholars plenty of advance warning. As a result, viewers 
 experienced an unprecedented wave of contextualizing media coverage of the 
76 Jerome Bourdon and Cecile Meadel (eds.), Television Audiences Across the World: Decon-
structing the Ratings Machine (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2014).
77 See for example Patrick Rössler (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Media Effects 
(Walden: Wiley, 2017).
78 Matt Briggs, Television, Audiences and Everyday Life (New York: Open University Press, 
2010), 2.
79 Adrian Athique, Transnational Audiences: Media Reception on a Global Scale (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2016).
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tv event and media scholars had a chance to prepare a similarly unprecedent-
ed state-of-the-art reception analysis of the docu-drama whose possible effects 
on German audiences was a point of great curiosity at home and abroad.80 
The research subsequently proved that the carefully scripted event had indeed 
a remarkable short-term and possibly also decisive long-term impact on Ger-
man collective memories of the Nazi period. 50% of the West German adult 
population had seen at least one instalment of the series and more than 10,000 
viewers wrote letters or called the station giving voice to intense feelings of 
shock and shame at the extent and systematicity of Nazi judeocide.81 At a time 
when successful prime time history fare generated on average a few hundred 
viewer responses, Holocaust set a stunning record that has no parallel in the 
history of German television.
Unfortunately, the path-breaking research strategies of 1979 remained an 
isolated effort. Media scholars interested in gauging the relevance of mass me-
dia programming for the development of collective memories have to content 
themselves with the type of reception data that public television networks 
generate as a matter of course and have generally no access to the archives 
of private networks. As a result, tv’s important contributions to the task of 
public remembrance have to be guesstimated on the basis of quantitative rat-
ings, a historically dwindling number of professional reviews, a handful of in-
consistently selected and archived viewer responses and the occasional case 
study conducted by researchers in the networks or their academic peers. Un-
der those circumstances memory scholars have a tough time reconstructing 
communication processes initiated and reflected by tv. More specifically, they 
are largely prevented from documenting multidirectional use of historical tv 
coverage and forced to resort to the kind of unsophisticated interpretation of 
mass media data often encountered in the field of memory studies. Time and 
again, the narrative worlds of extraordinary media events are taken to reflect 
dominant trends of collective remembrance without proper attention paid to 
television seriality and routines, complex transnational and multi-media inter-
actions, as well as actual reception processes.82
80 Claus Wilke, “Die Fernsehserie ‘Holocaust’ als Medienereignis,” Zeitgeschichte-online, 
March 2004, <http://www.zeitgeschichteonline.de/md=FSHolocaust-Wilke>.
81 Yitzhak Ahrens et al., Das Lehrstück “Holocaust:” Zur Wirkungsgeschichte eines Mediener-
eignisses (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982).
82 Just as guilty as everybody else in this regard: Wulf Kansteiner, In Pursuit of German Tele-




The fields of memory and media studies face familiar problems and might 
repeat old mistakes as they try to gauge the role of digital media in the develop-
ment of 21st century historical imaginations without good empirical data.83 On 
the one hand, fragmented digital memories are probably more dynamic and 
diverse than collective memories in the broadcasting era. On the other hand, 
digital culture offers many more opportunities for externalizing memories, 
for instance in social media settings, and, in principle, memory politics could 
therefore be studied more systematically than previously possible. But the age 
of television and the era of digital memory differ in another important respect. 
Good qualitative tv reception data did not exist in the 20th century and had to 
be created at considerable expenses by researchers inside and outside the net-
works. In contrast, memory researchers now face a truly perverse situation of 
abundance and radical inaccessibility. Digital communication network provid-
ers collect and aggregate unbelievably extensive and sophisticated data about 
their costumers’ media habits for the purpose of improving network efficiency 
and selling network access to advertisers and content providers. In principle, 
these data allows unprecedented insights in the generation of historical con-
sciousness because multi-platform consumption of historical content and ex-
plicit generation of historical interpretation can be recorded in unprecedented 
depth and breadth. For the network providers, individual media biographies 
and crowd tastes and reflexes are open books and, if the providers were so 
inclined, easily captured by existing algorithms. But that treasure trough is off 
limits for academic researchers who are carefully shielded from the business 
secrets of the industry and tied to the rules of privacy laws which place strict 
limits on the way available data can be used for research purposes, for instant, 
as a result of the sound principle of informed consent. From a scholarly per-
spective, the transition from nationally framed public tv networks, which be-
latedly provided access to its extensive production and reception records, to 
powerful commercial corporations, which sell web access and content on a 
transnational scale, represents a tragic turn of events. For better or the worse, 
the scholarly utopia of being able to watch and reconstruct the process of his-
torical consciousness formation in great detail and perhaps even in real time 
will never come to pass. In that sense, comprehensive reception analysis of 
narrative historical worlds, a term that might have been a misnomer from the 
get-go because it structurally underestimated consumers’ interpretive agency, 
appears now less realistic than ever before. Nevertheless, exciting research op-
portunities abound with regard to the impact of interactive and immersive 
digital memory and artificial intelligence on our historical imaginations. Some 
83 Michael Gray, Contemporary Debates in Holocaust Education (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
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social media, for instance Twitter, are relatively accessible for researcher trying 
to capture interactive historical culture in action.84 Moreover, with the help of 
fairly straightforward digital research techniques, for example web analytics, 
researchers can generate interesting insights into the use of online historical 
information even without access to proprietary information of network pro-
viders.85 Last but not least, there is always the option of informed consent, 
i.e., of cooperating with consumers, for instance by tracking their engagement 
with historical data on mobile devices or by observing their adventures in 
 immersive simulative gaming environments. The collective memories of the 
future, including the memories of war and genocide, will be generated in thor-
oughly interactive, immersive, and counterfactual narrative worlds – even if it 
will still be difficult for researcher to observe that process, reconstruct it after 
the fact and really understand reception processes.
 Conclusion
Holocaust culture was invented in the era of analogue media. It is a creature 
of photography, film, radio, television, architecture and conventional museum 
aesthetics and was fully developed before the rise of digital culture. When 
Schindler’s List was released in 1993 and the Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
Washington d.c. opened its doors in the same year, personal mobile phones 
and PlayStation did not exist. Despite its long analogue history, the cosmo-
politan Holocaust memory of the new millennium is synonymous with digital 
technology. On a few occasions, Holocaust culture has even produced path-
breaking digital advances as in the case of the Shoah Foundation’s database 
of 53,000 survivor testimonies which are turned into superior research and 
teaching tools through highly innovative search engines.86 But the rigid in-
terpretive frame and carefully moderated distribution systems of cosmopoli-
tan Holocaust memory render it incompatible with central elements of our 
digitized everyday life. Official Holocaust memory is professionally managed 
for the purpose of safeguarding the mission and long-term interests of the re-
spective memory institution. In its current format, official Holocaust culture 
84 Katrin Weller et al., Twitter and Society (New York: Peter Lang, 2013).
85 Richard Rogers, Digital Methods (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2013).
86 Todd Presner, “The Ethics of the Algorism: Close and Distant Listening to the Shoah Foun-
dation Visual History Archive,” in Probing the Ethics of Holocaust Culture, edited by Clau-




therefore represents an antithesis to the nimble, decentralized exchanges 
of opinions driving social media communication. Moreover, with its fear of 
counterfactual historical representations linked to concerns about Holocaust 
denial intrinsic to the field, official Holocaust culture is a particular hostile 
environment for cutting-edge simulative and immersive virtual reality tech-
nologies. As a result, connective, emergent digital Holocaust memories exist 
in some social media contexts, but not in the institutional settings designed 
to teach Holocaust and genocide memory. Official Holocaust memory is thus 
poorly prepared to participate in meaningful ways in the exciting recalibration 
of virtual, real and embodied experiences set into motion by digital culture 
and especially ai technology.87 In the important memory arena of Holocaust 
culture, formalized, regimented standards for the deployment of digital tech-
nology have hitherto prevailed.
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (ihra), founded in 
Stockholm in 2000, has nicely summarized reservations about social media 
shared by many Holocaust educators and Holocaust memory managers. As the 
ihra explicated in its 2014 guidelines for the use of social media in Holocaust 
education: ‘Trends such as Holocaust denial, diminishment and trivializa-
tion are rampant on the Internet and using social media has the potential to 
introduce these topics to students and give them unwarranted prominence.’ 
Moreover, ‘social media is typically seen as platform for entertainment – the 
 purview of pop culture, not learning and intellectual debate.’88 It is not clear 
from the document to what extent the ihra shares these reservations. In my 
view, the authors of the guidelines fail to point out that the online presence 
of Holocaust denial should not be equated with its popularity. There is a sig-
nificant degree of Holocaust-denial-phobia in Holocaust culture, some of it 
instrumentalized for fund-raising purposes. The distanciation from Holocaust 
entertainment contains a similarly disingenuous element. All Holocaust and 
ns-history learning sites, including Yad Vashem, Auschwitz, Buchenwald or 
the ushmm have great, more or less intentionally crafted thanatouristic en-
tertainment potential – otherwise they would not be as popular as they are.
The problems lie elsewhere and should be more clearly and honestly 
 addressed. Cosmopolitan Holocaust memory and emergent digital Holocaust 
culture (to the degree that the latter exists) represent different, competing types 
87 See the interesting historicization of virtual reality cultures in Melanie Chan, Virtual Real-
ity: Representations in Contemporary Media (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
88 “Using Social Media in Holocaust Education,” International Holocaust Remembrance Al-
liance, April 2014, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/media-room/stories/new - 
social-media-guidelines. Accessed 22 October, 2016.
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of history edutainment with the emergent culture featuring a wider spectrum 
of narrative scripts and much more dynamic, at times unpredictable vectors of 
interpretive power than its well-established predecessor. Fast-paced and un-
scripted discussions about the politics of memory in social media, often driven 
by a rush to judgment, can result in powerful temporary consensus in support 
of official Holocaust culture. But social media also facilitate multi-directional, 
volatile confrontations about important problems of interpretation that defy 
cosmopolitan Holocaust culture. A case in point is the multi-voiced discussion 
about genocide, Islamophobia, and us war crimes spontaneously and collec-
tively crafted in response to the ushmm Facebook feed about Syria discussed 
above. These kinds of discussions have significant politicizing potential but are 
generally systematically sidestepped by risk-averse Holocaust memory institu-
tions eager to avoid political exposure. These discussions highlight a central 
dilemma of cosmopolitan Holocaust culture: One cannot successfully pursue 
the political objective of genocide prevention while strenuously trying to avoid 
political risk-taking. Genocide prevention requires political courage and that is 
in short supply in cosmopolitan Holocaust memory.
For related reasons, official Holocaust memory keeps a careful distance from 
the captivating virtual environment of video game culture, observing somewhat 
helplessly from the sidelines the rise of a paradigm of popular entertainment 
that threatens its business model and allegedly also its ethical raison d’etre. 
Video games facilitate a new quality of absorbing, shared immersion in narra-
tive cultural worlds, including realistically shaped historical worlds, based on 
rapid multi-sensory input, ludic pleasure and a significant degree of narrative 
and especially spatial control. It is now technologically completely realistic to 
recreate virtually Nazi society according to our (scholarly) ideas of how that 
society functioned. Or, to put a finer point to it, we can bring to virtual, interac-
tive life our interpretations of the extreme social universe of Auschwitz and/
or any of the 42,500 other Nazi camps that covered the continent of Europe.89 
The virtual camp scenario constitutes a central representational taboo of con-
temporary Holocaust culture. That taboo has a lot to do with taste, power and 
the history of Holocaust memory – and it represents perfectly legitimate con-
cerns about the political and ethical purposes that could possibly be served by 
breathing a second, virtual life into the hell that was Auschwitz. Most likely, 
these concerns do not represent any absolute limits of representation but re-
flect the limits of our present-day didactic-ludic imagination. We  simply do 
89 Eric Lichtblau, “The Holocaust Just Got More Shocking”, New York Times, 1 March, 2013, 




not yet know what lines of historical interpretation and corresponding game 
rules a virtual Auschwitz should embody so that the gamers immersed in that 
truthfully recreated and therefore extremely violent world would emerge from 
the game with a self-reflexive democratic historical consciousness. How can 
the act of releasing into the world algorithms for a virtual Auschwitz support 
a human rights agenda of inter-cultural respect and non-violence? However, 
putting those legitimate concerns into writing immediately holds up a critical 
mirror to our familiar, comfortable cosmopolitan Holocaust experiences. How 
did we ever assume that a historical culture that incessantly and compulsively 
circles around the dark holes of torture, mass death and extreme moral de-
pravity serves those very same objectives? Does spelling out the dark holes in 
virtual detail really makes all that much of an ethical difference?
While we might not yet be able to design a good Auschwitz game, that prob-
lem does not apply to other didactically valuable, ludically viable, and his-
torically realistic Nazi game ideas. What would be wrong with designing the 
virtual world of Nazi-occupied Poland, France, the Netherlands or Denmark, 
having players assume the perspectives of Jews caught in the maelstrom, seek-
ing out the few existing loopholes to safety and learning in the process that the 
vast majority of Jews were increasingly faced with choiceless choices and no 
hope for rescue? Such a game should be at least as capable of inducing empa-
thy with the victims as the Holocaust movies of past decades which are prob-
ably becoming increasingly ineffective as a didactic tool for younger audiences 
steeped in digital culture. And why stop there? Why not work on a spin-off 
Aleppo 2016 game which follows the trial and tribulations of Syrian refugees 
on their way to Europe as the try to escape from Assad, rebel troops, Isis and 
Russian air strikes and try to overcome global disinterest and prejudice in very 
much the same way as German Jewry in the summer of 1939. If scripted intel-
ligently such an Aleppo-game would go a long way to expose the depravity of 
Europe’s political elite of 2016 as they tried to shed their Geneva Convention, 
un Human Rights Charter and eu Convention on Human Rights obligations.90 
In fact, it is difficult to imagine any video game about the topic that would be 
in such poor taste as the ‘game’ that said politicians have been playing with the 
90 In fact, a successful and ethically valuable game that follows the suggested trajectory 
already exists. That war of mine released by a Polish developer in 2014 lets players ex-
perience the struggle for survival of a group of civilians in a fictional besieged Eastern 
European city. Loosely based on the 1992–96 siege of Sarajewo the game goes a long way 
in creating empathy with war victims, see Clark, Justin. 2014. “Counting Body like Sheep 
to the Rhythm of the War Drum,” Gamespot, November 17, 2014. Accessed 25 January, 2017, 
https://www.gamespot.com/reviews/this-war-of-mine-review/1900-6415963/.
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lives of millions of refugees whom they have denigrated and sought to contain 
in overcrowded camps outside the eu.
Simulative interactive narrative worlds exploring past and present crimes 
against humanity could also offer new, decidedly self-critical perspectives on 
perpetrator and bystander biographies. Digital game formats seem to be very 
well suited to have players experience in their own virtual life the slippery 
slope of the conformism, prejudice and fanaticism that precede genocide. In 
this fashion, genocide gaming could assume a self-critical quality and teach 
players, reflecting on their own virtual ethical failures and virtual crimes, how 
to recognize and counteract the early warning signs of radicalization and in-
difference. Since gaming with its extraordinary immersive potential offers the 
ambivalent (and for ‘analoguers’ very troublesome) experience of being simul-
taneously inside and outside a given simulative world, a Holocaust game could 
help overcome a didactic impasse that cosmopolitan Holocaust culture has 
thus far never been able to solve: it could complicate and possibly undermine 
the troublesome structural parallels between the passive bystanders of the 
Holocaust of the 1940s and the relative passive consumers of official Holocaust 
culture of the last four decades, a culture that has taught consumers the virtues 
of remembering the victims (never again genocide w/h memory) but provided 
little meaningful guidance in self-critically engaging with legacies of perpetra-
tion and preventing large scale victimization (never again genocide). Given 
the high stakes involved, the first realistic, fully immersive, interactive and 
simulative Holocaust game should be developed at the centre of our Holocaust 
culture, for instance, through a collaboration between the Shoah Foundation, 
ushmm, Yad Vashem, the Gedenkstättennetzwerk, the Museum of Tolerance 
and other interested parties. The task is too important and too expensive and 
has too great a didactic potential to be left exclusively to commercial enter-
prises or freelance outfits.
In my view, the examples of digital Holocaust culture cited above do not 
yet demonstrate conclusively that today’s gamers, social media users and their 
technological devices represent a fundamentally different memory species 
than their electronic forbearers. At the same time, the examples indicate that 
the users of digital culture put a premium on becoming the narrators of their 
own memories and escaping the relatively narrow thematic confines of estab-
lished Holocaust memory, a multi-directional desire they might share with 
generations of film and television consumers who simply did not have similar 
cultural agency.
While we are still busy trying to figure out the dynamics of mediatized hu-
man collective memories, post-human collective memory is already thriving, 
for example in the form of self-reflexive ai robotics. Robots are intelligent to 
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the extent that they engage in self-reflexive learning, i.e., a kind of social mem-
ory leading to a degree of unpredictability and autonomy. ai learning process-
es and collective memories are modelled after human learning and collective 
memory but feature new patterns of retention and forgetting that turn ai ro-
bots into different memory agents than humans. Ironically, that makes them 
particularly suitable objects for media reception analysis while their interac-
tions with humans also break the mould of anything that can be reasonably 
grasped with the methods of reception studies. Hence, a crucial task in the 
field of robotics consists of developing effective guidelines for roboethics and 
robot ethics preventing humans from irresponsibly using ai robotics and im-
buing robots with robust circuits of self-critical memory in the hope that they 
will get better at this task than humans ever were.91 The response to that chal-
lenge will decisively influence the quality of post-human social relations, the 
future of self-critical memory, and, way down on the list of possible concerns, 
the need to develop new concepts of memory studies.
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